claidemore
Senior Airman
Colin1,
Frantisek is actually tied for 4th and 5th place for successes during BoB, with an Australian, Hughes. Urbanowicz would be in 11 to 15th spot. The two leading scorers for the RAF during the Battle were Eric Lock and Ginger Lacey.
Of course Urbanowicz and Frantisek had training in their countries of origin, but there is no way to determine if that was an asset or a hindrance. Given the limited success Poland had against the Luftwaffe (both Urbanowicz and the Czech born Frantisek flew with the Poles), I'd tend to think it didn't help much.
The .303 was not the wrong weapon, it was simply not the best weapon. 2000 downed German planes indicate that it was adequate to the task. Note that the Luftwaffe also changed weapons after the battle, going from 2 wing mounted MG-FF cannon to a single nose mounted one and eventually from 7.92 mgs to 13mm. Did they also have the wrong weapons? No, they just adapted as they learned lessons from combat experience. Ditto for the RAF.
You do realize that not every one of those 500 replacement pilots had only 10 hours on the type they were to fly? (Nobody ever got into the fight with only 10 hours solo) There were trained pilots in reserve, pilots in training, OTU instructors, and pilots transferred from FAA and Bomber Command as well. There were about 1100 trained fighter pilots on hand at the start of the battle, there were 550 to 650 Spitfires/Hurricanes ready for operations on any given day and they were turning out about 200 pilots a week. Here's a quote:
It's a good idea to read the stories of some of the pilots who actually took part in the Battle and read their accounts of the training they recieved. Relying on the interpretations of other researchers tends to compound their errors.
Frantisek is actually tied for 4th and 5th place for successes during BoB, with an Australian, Hughes. Urbanowicz would be in 11 to 15th spot. The two leading scorers for the RAF during the Battle were Eric Lock and Ginger Lacey.
Of course Urbanowicz and Frantisek had training in their countries of origin, but there is no way to determine if that was an asset or a hindrance. Given the limited success Poland had against the Luftwaffe (both Urbanowicz and the Czech born Frantisek flew with the Poles), I'd tend to think it didn't help much.
The .303 was not the wrong weapon, it was simply not the best weapon. 2000 downed German planes indicate that it was adequate to the task. Note that the Luftwaffe also changed weapons after the battle, going from 2 wing mounted MG-FF cannon to a single nose mounted one and eventually from 7.92 mgs to 13mm. Did they also have the wrong weapons? No, they just adapted as they learned lessons from combat experience. Ditto for the RAF.
You do realize that not every one of those 500 replacement pilots had only 10 hours on the type they were to fly? (Nobody ever got into the fight with only 10 hours solo) There were trained pilots in reserve, pilots in training, OTU instructors, and pilots transferred from FAA and Bomber Command as well. There were about 1100 trained fighter pilots on hand at the start of the battle, there were 550 to 650 Spitfires/Hurricanes ready for operations on any given day and they were turning out about 200 pilots a week. Here's a quote:
Although flying training was cut as the Battle progressed, it still took around nine months for a pilot to be trained and no-one would have been sent into battle without a minimum of over a hundred hours, and most much more than that. Joe Leigh, a young sergeant pilot who was posted to 64 Squadron in September 1940 is a case in point. Having joined the RAFVR in June 1939, he was called up at the outbreak of war and began his training in January, and was not posted to an Operational Training Unit until 31 August 1940. After two weeks' conversion onto Spitfires he joined 64 Squadron. It was only in this latter part of training – at the OTU – that training was cut significantly, and it is true that some pilots were entering the battle with as little as ten hours on Spitfires or Hurricanes. These were few, however. In practice, however, few squadron leaders sent new pilots into battle without raising those hours a bit more. Jimmy Corbin, for example, joined 66 Squadron on 28 August 1940, (having had 27 hours on Spitfires), but was not allowed to become an operational fighter pilot and after a week or so, was temporarily posted to 610 Squadron in north-east England. There, where the battle was quieter, he was given the chance to gather some all-important experience before rejoining 66 Squadron once more.
It's a good idea to read the stories of some of the pilots who actually took part in the Battle and read their accounts of the training they recieved. Relying on the interpretations of other researchers tends to compound their errors.