Battle of Midway, a better plan

[pinsog]

I have been a student of the Battle of Midway since 5th or 6th grade. i have always wondered what could have been done for the Marine air group that was slaughtered, my thinking has always centered around providing them with better planes. But after a few threads here, I realize that was impossible. I also think that the US battle plan was rather poor and they had considerable luck in winning the battle, even though, including Midway island, they actually had more airplanes available.

The US had almost the exact date of the attack and the size/make up of the attacking force. Unless the US carriers are spotted, it is nearly 100% assured that the Japanese will attack the island base first. Knowing this, I believe the US should have concentrated on ambushing the 1st air attack on the island and overwhelmed it with numbers. How could that have been done you ask?

The US had 3 carriers with a combined group of 81 Wildcats, 101 Dauntless dive bombers and 43 or so Devastator torpedo planes. Midway had 21 Buffalos and 7 Wildcats.

What else could have been brought? When the 3 carriers were at Pearl, the entire Yorktown fighter squadron was replaced by F4F-4's, while the Enterprise and Hornet had some damaged fighters replaced. Yorktown left 15 airworthy F4F-3's at Pearl, and 10 replacement F4F-4 Wildcats were also left at Pearl as they were not needed by the Enterprise and Hornet. Also, 21 Marine F4F-3's had just been left at the island of Noumea. I would have picked those fighters up and brought them back to Pearl. When Yorktown docked for repairs, I would have instructed every mechanic on all 3 carriers to go over the 15 Yorktown fighters she just traded in and get them as close to 100% as possible. So, 21 Marine F4F-3's and the 15 Yorktown F4F-3's is 36 extra fighters, along with the 10 unused replacement F4F-4's equals 46 extra Wildcats. Still not overwhelming enough I would have looked around, knowing they won't release any P39 or P40's to me, I would have also loaded up the 22 P36's that were still airworthy, instructing the AAF mechanics to get ready ASAP. That is 58 extra fighters. I would have deck parked them on 2 of the 3 carrier and sent all 3 out together at the time the Yorktown historically left port. I would have told the carriers to park themselves 75 miles or so south of Midway. Only B17's would have been retained at Midway, with all other bombers, Dauntless and Vindicator, sent back to Midway, the 58 fighters replacing them on the island. That now gives me, 53 Wildcat's, 22 P36's and 21 Buffalos on Midway itself, along with 81 Wildcats about the 3 carriers.

Morning of the initial attack: I know from intelligence sources that the attack is expected this morning, so say half of the Midway fighters and half of the carrier fighters are launched at 6 am for CAP mission, the carriers have moved to 50 miles south of Midway. At the sighting of the first Japanese air strike, all remaining Midway fighters are scrambled, and the carrier CAP of 42 Wildcats is sent to Midway while the carriers launch remaining Wildcats as close in CAP to replace CAP now headed to Midway.

Japanese strike of 36 Zeros, 36 level bombers and 36 dive bombers is about to meet 95 Wildcats, 22 P36's and 21 Buffalos. All 22 P36's and half the Wildcats, say 50, are to go after the Zeros, while the 21 Buffalos and 45 remaining Wildcats go after the bombers. Out numbered 2 to 1, no Zeros should intercept the bomber destroyers, and with 66 fighters going after 72 carrier bombers, no bombers should survive. In fact, I'm not sure many or any Zeros would, or should survive. US casualties shout be very light.

All of this could/should have been done with what was historically available and in the historical time line. Japanese first strike obliterated, possibly, very possibly, completely wiped out. US casualties should be very light do to us jumping the Zeros first with a 2 to 1 advantage, an added plus is the ability of the P36 to actually dogfight, turn and climb with a Zero at around 15,000 feet.

 

[mikewint]

The Japanese were outplayed. Their forces were split and spread, and their main battleship and cruiser force which was supposed to engage the US fleet were far too far away and played no role. The Japanese carriers were pretty much alone.

Part of the outmaneuvering of the Japanese was due to the cracking of naval codes. They intercepted word of the Japanese ambush plan, and ambushed them instead.

American ground fire and fighter coverage over Midway was just enough of a hindrance to the Japanese air attack that the Japanese commanders ordered their aircraft to refit for a second attack on the island instead of hunting for the American carriers. That enabled the American carrier-borne torpedo bombers and dive bombers to find and attack the Japanese carriers while their decks were loaded with aircraft, fuel and munitions. Basically the damage to their carriers after that first attack was catastrophic. Far worse than what Yorktown sustained. In most cases, I don't think repair without being able to dock someplace would've really been feasible for the kind of damage they took with their decks covered in combustibles when the American dive bombers struck.

If they hadn't ordered the second wave of attacks on Midway and had instead gone after the American carriers, the American planes would've either been interdicted by Japanese fighters or would've found the Japanese carriers with their decks empty and wouldn't have been able to deal such devastating blows.

Short answer? Luck. Bombing a carrier while it's covered in explosives is better than bombing one when its deck is empty

 

[mikewint]

The Japanese were outplayed. Their forces were split and spread, and their main battleship and cruiser force which was supposed to engage the US fleet were far too far away and played no role. The Japanese carriers were pretty much alone.

Had Yamamoto kept his huge fleet together, all the scouting planes from his battleships and cruisers and especially from the light carriers would have helped to detect the Americans earlier and then the light carrier planes would have helped to attack the American carriers and to defend the Japanese fleet better. The large number of ships with AA would have made it more difficult for the planes to attack the carriers and would have drawn some bombs away from the invaluable carriers into the less valuable ships.

As it occurred, the incredibly expensive 70,000 ton Yamato and Musashi just wasted fuel, men, etc, sailing around the Pacific throughout the war without doing any damage. The smaller Bismarck at least sank the Hood.
It is ironic that the only American torpedo that exploded and sank a ship was launched by a slow Catalina from Midway and it sank a tanker.

Part of the outmaneuvering of the Japanese was due to the cracking of naval codes. They intercepted word of the Japanese ambush plan, and ambushed them instead.
American ground fire and fighter coverage over Midway was just enough of a hindrance to the Japanese air attack that the Japanese commanders ordered their aircraft to refit for a second attack on the island instead of hunting for the American carriers. That enabled the American carrier-borne torpedo bombers and dive bombers to find and attack the Japanese carriers while their decks were loaded with aircraft, fuel and munitions. Basically the damage to their carriers after that first attack was catastrophic. Far worse than what Yorktown sustained. In most cases, I don't think repair without being able to dock someplace would've really been feasible for the kind of damage they took with their decks covered in combustibles when the American dive bombers struck.

If they hadn't ordered the second wave of attacks on Midway and had instead gone after the American carriers, the American planes would've either been interdicted by Japanese fighters or would've found the Japanese carriers with their decks empty and wouldn't have been able to deal such devastating blows.

Short answer? Luck. Bombing a carrier while it's covered in explosives is better than bombing one when its deck is empty

 

[pinsog]

The tanker torpedoed by the Catalina didn't sink. I know how it played out originally and I also believe there was a lot of luck involved. My plan eliminates much of the need for luck through sheer numbers. You know when and where the first wave of bombers will be and they don't know your waiting, perfect time to completely, or almost completely wipe out 50% of the enemy strike capability.

After crushing the first wave with overwhelming numbers of Wildcats, Buffalos and P36's, our fighters land, re-arm and re-fuel in waves as the Japanese fleet continues to approach, unmolested, at 20 or so knots, the second wave waiting below deck armed for a ship strike. The real question here is, if only a few Zeros return from the first mission, would they cancel the 2nd strike and flee? Or would they re-arm for another strike against Midway? Or would they suspect that our carriers were around Midway and launch the anti-ship strike they are already armed for?

They need to close to 175 miles from Midway to allow fighter escort from Midway all the way to the target so for the US it does become a waiting game. If they do, then the US carriers could launch all 101 dive bombers and 43 torpedo bombers and pick up their fighter escort as they passed Midway, saving fuel for both bombers and fighters. Also, with so many excess fighters, all 53 Wildcats and 22 P36's (minus those lost or damaged during the morning engagement) that were based on Midway could escort the strike leaving all 81 carrier based Wildcats and all 21 Buffalo's to remain for carrier/island defense (Minus of course the few that were lost or damaged in the morning engagement).

A plus of this scenario, no one should get lost. Hornet lost all her escort fighters and a few of her bombers because they got lost. None of the Midway bombers got lost trying to find Midway. Fly north, attack fleet, fly south, Midway hasn't moved. With an escort of 50-75 Wildcats and P36's, the bombers would have NO trouble getting through, so we would not have the needless slaughter of Navy torpedo crew, marine dive bomber pilots and AAF bomber pilots, and there would still be around 100 fighters covering Midway and the carriers. Plus, Midway is an unsinkable radar equipped picked destroyer, 20-50 miles north off the US carriers allowing the Japanese strike, if launched to be hit early by US fighters in the best position.

If an inbound strike is detected, the US strike, I think, should be aborted, all US fighters, and Dauntless bombers (drop bombs and prepare to attack Japanese bombers) should fall back and attack the Japanese somewhere north of Midway when they meet up with the Midway fighters.

If not, the fighters sweep the Zeros out of the way and let 101 dive bombers and 43 torpedo bombers attack unmolested except for flack. Should be a slaughter, 25 dive bombers per carrier attacking without opposition. The US might have to make multiple attacks if the carriers have just launched there strike, but that wouldn't be an issue if even a couple of bombs land on each carrier and destroy the flight decks. It would then become plane-less Japanese carriers running from undamaged US carriers.

Think of how many planes and crew the US would have saved from launching all attacks from, or near Midway. Attack, turn south and fly back to Midway island which is unsinkable and hasn't sailed off in the wrong direction while you were gone. If your short of fuel, land at Midway, if not, we will point you to your carrier.

Also, in the unlikely event that a US carrier was damaged by Japanese attack (unlikely in the face of that amount of US fighters) You would have continuous fighter coverage from Midway through the whole attack, and continuous anti-sub air patrol from Catalinas and B17's after the air attack or battle was over. My plan should have less attrition of pilots through combat, none through getting lost and no carrier losses

 

[Tkdog]

Long time reader, first time poster.

I think you are missing a few beats there.

• They didn't want to risk the Japanese guessing they broke the codes
• Shooting down aircraft doesn't win a naval war. Sinking carriers does. The USN was aiming for the carriers. Shooting down planes and even defending Midway from air attack is secondary. Cold, but true.
• There was a non-zero chance that the IJN *knew* the codes were broken and/or was otherwise deceiving them. Unwise to strip all defense from Oahu.

 

[pinsog]

Tkdog: so carriers 25-75 miles south of Midway who just happen to be delivering planes to an island stronghold is a direct tipoff of broken codes? Yet 3 carriers 250 miles north of Midway in the middle of nowhere that just happen to be 175 miles due east of the Japanese fleet for no reason seems legit? I would go with delivering planes to Midway as less likely to tip them off.

You also realize that if you shoot down all the enemy carrier planes that the carrier's are now defenseless and can be sunk at will without fear of defending fighters or retaliation against your own ships? It's like, running the enemy out of bullets doesn't win ground battles, but shooting him immediately afterwards when he is defenseless does win ground battles.

My plan removed 22 'obsolete' P36's and 25 Wildcats, leaving 101 P40's and a couple dozen P39's. If the Japanese fleet had attacked Pearl again, they would have faced 140 ish AAF fighters right around where the P39 and P40's worked best. After getting severely worked over by fighters and flak (if you recall, Midway's comparatively pathetic defense had caused 25% attrition to the first wave) the Japanese fleet, now retiring with a MUCH reduced air group, would have been ambushed by the same massive fighter equipped US fleet that was going to ambush them at Midway. I picture Hawaii B17's constantly shadowing them, giving out exact positions while the US carrier group launched 101 dive bombers and 43 torpedo bombers covered by 53 Wildcats while retaining 81 Wildcats for fleet protection. That would work out just great for the US

 

[pinsog]

It must also be remembered that Japanese pilot training and aircraft production was so slow at the beginning of the war, that they couldn't even keep up with plane and pilot attrition from the beginning of the war. NONE of the 4 Japanese carriers at Midway were at full strength. If all the US had done at Midway was shoot down tge entire first attack wave, the Japanese then launch a second strike and it is also wiped out, if that is all the US had done, I believe it would have been as effective as actually sinking the carriers. The Japanese couldn't have replaced the aircrew for probably a year, maybe more. Shooting Japanese aircraft down over or near Midway would guarantee they would not return to action. Most pilots and crew on the carriers that were sunk were saved and lived to fight another day. Those downed over Midway and Yorktown did not return to action

 

[Peter Gunn]

While it's a well thought out scenario you've presented, I think you're using way to much hindsight. You're tasking the USN with tactics that break with their doctrine and training and with what amounts to a massive leap of faith (in untried/untrained initiatives). I see what you're driving at but I can't see how that would get a better result than what was achieved historically.

For starters, what happens if the American air groups take debilitating casualties? Outnumbered is fine but the Zeros and their pilots were a pretty capable bunch, and as much as I'd like to give the Navy its due, fighter v. fighter 6/6/42, they were still playing catch up to the Japanese.

Don't know if you've read "Shattered Sword" but there's pretty good info in there, also some myths being challenged by it. In the end, I think the USN played to it's strengths to the best of it's abilities at the time. In Shattered Sword they address questions about IJN operations and the reasons they did what they did, and in a word... Doctrine. Same for the USN, and the USN doctrine worked better than the IJN doctrine.

Not to knock your case, as I said, it's well thought out and presented, I give you bacon for that.

 

[pinsog]

Bacons awesome, I'll take it.

I don't see any huge change in tactics, it's basically just bringing a huge deck load of extra fighters to tip the odds. I have Shattered Sword and The First Team, Wildcats essentially fought Zeros to a 1 to 1 ratio, but with the Wildcats bouncing the Zeros from above on the first pass, followed by P36's which could actually dogfight with a Zero on equal footing below 12,000 feet. (Allies using P36/Hawk 75 reported it could outclimb a KI43 and out turn it above 180-200 mph). All the US fighters really have to do is keep the Zeros busy while 66 other US fighters take on 72 bombers, that shouldn't take long. Then it becomes 4 to 1 odds. In reality, 50 Wildcats making a diving firing pass from above on 36 Zeros should/would knock down at least some with the Wildcats zooming back up for altitude advantage. P36's follow behind dropping into the disorganized Zeros and tail chase dogfighting keeping the Zeros busy as Wildcats make diving passes and pick them off. While Zeros are busy not dying, 60 odd Buffaloes and Wildcats line up behind 72 bombers, the Kate level/torpedo bombers being especially helpless, and gun every last one into the sea. None of this plan is using hindsight, if I used hindsight I would leave all US torpedo bombers at home and have 36 dive bombers and 40 or so Wildcats on every carrier.

 

[buffnut453]

I think it's a big ask to expect USAAF, USN and USMC fighter aircraft to operate cooperatively at scale in a conflict such as this. Simply planning the mission when some units are island-based and others are on the carriers would be a big challenge. Then there's the issue of communicating in the air to ensure attacks are properly coordinated. Given the technology of the day, it was often hard for units within the same service to communicate if the wrong radio crystals were used. Trying to do that across 3 services could be really challenging (one could treat USN and USMC as one service...but don't tell that to the Marines!).

 

[pinsog]

Oh, also, don't worry about Pearl being left vulnerable, another 36 Wildcats and their pilots (VF10 maybe?) arrived at Pearl on the 28th, 2 days before Yorktown left. It was from this ship that the 6 Avengers and crew were flown to Midway in time for the battle. If we really wanted to tip the numbers, we could let Enterprise and Hornet wait and sail with Yorktown and deckload these 36 fighters onto one of the carriers also. Now we have 2 carriers with full deck loads, 1 carrier flying CAP and anti sub patrol (we know from history there were no subs in position and no need for fighter CAP, but again that is looking back, so 1 carrier would need a clear deck for patrols)

 

[pinsog]

Buffnut: I can understand your reasoning, but it isn't a hugely complicated plan. Your on a tiny little island barely bigger than the runway. Navy, marine and AAF guys all sitting in their planes, engines running, half of them are orbiting over airfield, point your finger north and say "Jap come, Jap bad, shoot Jap, him at 17,000 feet, go kill". They wouldn't even need to speak the same language, you could mix French, Belgians, Finns, Poles, wouldn't matter, just 17,000 feet, that way(pointing) or "Follow me" very slowly and loudly in English (slow and loud always helps foreigners understand English better). A huge wad of 3 different makes of fighters rise into the air, climbs to 20,000, and then falls like hail on them en masse

 

[buffnut453]

Sorry but you're being overly simplistic and making a couple of sweeping assumptions that (a) the plan you take off with is the plan that you actually implement (seldom the case), and (b) that the Japanese will carry on attacking as per the historical record. "Take off and attack the enemy" is blindingly obvious...it's much more challenging to make real time decisions of how you attack and with what forces. Air combat is messy and aircraft are hard to see. It's not likely that any single defending pilot will have total visibility of the entire enemy force. It IS likely, however, that several pilots will see the same part of the enemy attack force, resulting in a large proportion of the defending fighters getting sucked into an initial engagement leaving large portions of the Japanese attacking force to approach unhindered.

It's highly likely that the defenders would need to rely on Midway-based radar and ground control to deliver the kind of results you're advocating. That hadn't been practiced and the communication/coordination issues I highlighted would remain.

 

[mikewint]

The odds at the June 1942 battle favored the Japanese. The imperial fleet had four carriers to the Americans' three, backed up by scores of battleships, cruisers and light carriers as part of the largest armada that had ever steamed from Japan.
No military had ever won more territory in six months than had Japan. Its Pacific Empire ranged from the Indian Ocean to the coast of the Aleutian Islands, and from the Russian-Manchurian border to Wake Island in the Pacific.

However the US did have several things working for it:
American intelligence officers -- often eccentric and free to follow their intuitions -- had cracked the Japanese naval codes, giving the Americans some idea of the Japanese plan of attack at Midway.

American commanders were far more open to improvising and risk-taking than their Japanese counterparts. In contrast, Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto created an elaborate but rigid plan of attack that included an invasion of the Aleutian Islands as well as Midway.
As I posted earlier, such impractical agendas dispersed the much larger Japanese fleet all over the central and northern Pacific, ensuring that the Japanese could never focus their overwhelming numerical advantages on the modest three-carrier American fleet.

The U.S. Navy was also far more resilient than its Japanese counterparts:
A month earlier at the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese suffered damage to one of their carriers and serious aircraft losses on another. As for the US, the American carrier Lexington was sunk, and the Yorktown was severely damaged.

But whereas the Japanese took months repairing the bombed carrier Shokaku and replenishing the lost planes of the Zuikaku, the crippled Yorktown was made seaworthy again at Pearl Harbor just 72 hours after limping into port.
The result of such incredible adaptability was that at Midway the Americans had three carriers (rather than two), against four for the Japanese (instead of a possible six).

Midway was probably the best chance for Japan to destroy U.S. naval power in the Pacific before America's enormous war industry created another new fleet entirely.
Just months after Midway, new American Essex-class carriers -- the most lethal afloat -- would be launched. Before the war ended, 17 of the planned 24 carriers would see action.

In contrast, Japan launched only four more fleet carriers to replace its growing losses. Japanese naval aircraft -- the best in the world in 1941 -- were becoming obsolete by mid-1942.
In contrast, in the months after Midway, tens of thousands of new and superior Hellcat fighters, Avenger torpedo bombers and Helldiver dive bombers rolled off American assembly lines in numbers unmatched by the Japanese.

During the Battle of Midway itself, Japanese Admiral Chuichi Nagumo fatally hesitated in launching his air fleet. He was wedded to rigid doctrine about prepping his planes with the proper munitions.
In contrast, American Admirals Raymond Spruance and Frank Jack Fletcher gambled and sent most of the planes they had at the first inkling of the approaching Japanese fleet.

Japan could not equal American industrial strength, but American aviators and seamen could certainly match the Samurai courage of their Japanese counterparts.

At Midway, 37 of the 41 slow-flying and obsolete American Devastator torpedo bombers lumbered to their deaths, as they were easily picked off by Japanese air cover.
But such heroic sacrificial pawns drew off critical Japanese fighter protection from the fleet. In its absence, scores of high-flying Dauntless dive bombers descended unnoticed to blast the Japanese carriers with near impunity.


Americans took chances to win an their victory. The Japanese command chose to play it safe, trying not to lose advantages accrued over the prior six months.

Midway was not the beginning of the end for Japan. Just five months later off the island of Guadalcanal, only one American fleet carrier was left undamaged in the Pacific after a series of brutal sea battles. But the writing was on the wall, it was just a matter of time.

 

[pinsog]

Buffnut: I understand, but Midway was 2 tiny islands right together, not moving like a ship, 1 island was barely bigger than the runway. The Zeros were all together above and behind the bombers, the bombers were all together also. Let's make it even less complicated, 140ish US fighters, the briefing "unknown number of planes at 17,000, climb to 20,000 feet, pick an enemy plane and kill it. "
Not sure what else needs to be said with a numerical and altitude advantage. Certainly defending a moving carrier from a combined dive bomber and pincer torpedo attack is complicated and requires training and communication. But this isn't the same, you can make an elaborate over complicated plan but sometimes it's a nail and you just pick up a hammer and beat the snot out of it. I see this as a hammer/nail setup

 

[buffnut453]

But you have to get those 140 defending fighters to the enemy en masse. That's a big challenge. You have different aircraft types which, inevitably, means different climb rates and flying speeds. Then you have the impact of different tactical formations. VMF-221 was still using Divisional tactics with groupings of 3-5 fighters in a Division whereas the USN was starting to go over to what we now know as the battle pair. The differing tactical formations further complicate the challenge of getting all your fighters into the same place of sky at the same time...and if you can't achieve the mass of force that you're advocating, it's likely the defenders will be picked off in detail, which is exactly what happened to VMF-221.

Tactical formations have to be controlled and that takes communication and practice at handling large formations in a combat environment. The bigger the formation, the less maneuverable it is. If you reduce formation size, you won't achieve the mass of force. The size of Midway is irrelevant. The sky is a very big place and getting large numbers of aircraft to meet is surprisingly hard unless you have good C3 and have practiced it...a lot.

To this day, 12 Group's "Big Wing" tactic during the Battle of Britain is controversial simple because of the delay involved in getting 36-60 aircraft together and committed to the battle. It took time for each squadron to form up, and then for the Wing Leader to get them all heading to the right height and location based on GCI direction...and dealing with Spitfires and Hurricanes in the same formation was challenging. Gathering 140 aircraft is more than twice the size of the biggest 12 Group "Big Wing" with zero practice...and it involves multiple services.

You can dismiss my points as unimportant but I'd like some more tangible evidence other than "it should be easy" before I go any further.

 

[Tkdog]

Couple that with the plan has to allow for the enemy to *not* all come from one direction. We know what happened, but the defenders didn't. They also didn't know the time of the attack. Keeping planes at standby for a couple of days is a challenge.

You also have to hope the Navy folks can tell which plane is which when they zoom into the dogfight.

My (decidedly amateur) read is that the planners sent the forces they did as they thought they had a reasonable chance of success. One can always send as much as possible. But frequently it's better to send as much as is likely necessary. They knew for sure it was going to be a long war.

 

[pinsog]

Buffnut: Midway had a CAP up at I believe 6 am with the rest of the fighters in their cockpits with, I believe, engines running. 42 of the Wildcats in my plan came from the carrier CAP, also already aloft say 50 miles out. That leaves 96 on the island. Put 38 of them up at 6 am on CAP, all Buffalos and F4F-4's, keep the 36 F4F-3's and the 22 P36's on the ground(they climb much better than the others, especially the P36) pilots in cockpits engines running. Call comes in from PBY and from radar and the remaining 58 planes takeoff and join the CAP already at 20,000. Battle of Britain had an entire country to defend, they never knew the exact target. Midway was an island barely bigger than an airfield and another just like it. The F4F-3 and the P36 could reach 20,000 feet in 7.6-7.8 minutes. If it's too complicated to bring in the carrier CAP then you still have 36 F4F-3's and 22 P36's to take on the Zeros, leaving 21 buffaloes and 17 F4F-3 and F4F-4 to work over the bombers. 38 fighters vs 72 Japanese single engine carrier bombers doesn't bode well for the Japanese carrier bombers. But, I really don't see the issue, when radar sees them, in sending out a signal that causes the carrier CAP to head to Midway and the carriers to launch all remaining Wildcats to replace the close in CAP over the ships. If they are orbiting 10 miles north of the carriers, 40 miles south of the island, then they can be there in 10 minutes at 240 mph.

Tkdog: If you read Shattered Sword and The First Team, code breakers knew the day of the attack, they figured it would come in the morning. They were right, its why they were on hot standby ready to go on a signal. If they had been wrong they would have continued to fly CAP and be on a more relaxed standby. British pilots were on standby for pretty much the entire Battle of Britain so I think US pilots could handle 1 or maybe 2 days.

Historically they did not split, probably because it presents too much of a problem for the covering Zeros that didn't even have radios, but if they did the target for the Japanese is a non moving airfield, so they had to all come together at some point.

US Navy fighter pilots at the time were some of the best trained in the world (apart from maybe the Japanese they were about to face) so I would imagine that they probably knew the difference between a Zero and a P36. If nothing else, they may have to hold fire until they get close enough to see big red circles on the Zeros, anything with a fixed landing gear or a bomb or rear gunner would obviously be enemy.
As far as how many to send, I have never read or heard anyone in any kind of fight or battle say they had, too many bullets or too many friends.

 

[buffnut453]

You maintain CAPs of the size you mentioned for very long with the numbers of aircraft available. Even a relatively modest timing coordination error would result in your CAP running out of fuel and having to run back to base, potentially just as the raid is coming in. Have you any idea how long it takes for 58 planes to take off and reach 20,000ft, particularly if the intent is for them to attack en masse? The numbers you quote for the F4F and P-36 are for single aircraft not for a formation, which takes time to form up and can only climb at the rate of the worst--performing airframe.

You're not addressing my fundamental question of how all this was going to me controlled, nor have you addressed the assumption that the IJN aircraft might do something different than the historical record. I'm ducking out of this pointless conversation until you actually address the valid issues that are being raised.

 

[pinsog]

Buffnut: I'm not exactly sure what else the Japanese aircraft would have done. They were flying to Midway to bomb the airfield, aircraft and any other target of opportunity that would make a landing easier. What would you suggest they do different? Attack from different directions? That works on moving warships especially for torpedo planes, but you also have to look at this from the Japanese point of view: the bombers needed escorts, the escorting Zeros didn't even have radios and historically some of the badly outnumbered Wildcats and Buffalos got in 3 passes before the Zeros arrived to help. 3 passes in a Buffalo!!!! If you were the Japanese or an Allied attacking force would you want to split your escort up like that? Of course not. The level bombers, I believe, dropped their bombs in formation like B17's did.

Your correct that fighters can't patrol indefinitely. But the US suspected the attack would come early this morning and the Midway commander had a fighter CAP up, he also had the rest of the fighters on the runway, engines running and pilots in their seats. That tells me he expected an attack and he expected it very soon. Lets say they didn't have time to form up and attack in mass. Lets say, instead, that we have the F4F-3 and P36's on CAP, both were lighter, and longer ranged than the F4F-4. These are the airplanes I would want tangling with the Zeros anyway. The rest of the fighters scramble as soon as possible climb up to attack altitude in pairs and, with the Zeros being sidetracked, they attack the bombers in pairs as they arrive.

I'm not sure what more ground control you want. Here is the enemy raid, here is their altitude, go get them. Did they need more control than that? It wasn't a radar guided night intercept, it was 72 Japanese bombers in one formation with 36 zeros above and behind them, they were headed for a single airfield that wasn't moving, so I'm not sure what else they needed from the radar station on Midway