Battle of Midway, a better plan

As far as I can figure the P-36s at Pearl were P-36A's with one .50 cal and one .30 cal in the cowl. The .50 cal had 200 rounds.
I have no idea what shape the engines were in. R-1830s were good for 300-350hrs in initial airline service or over 400 with experienced operators. Large airlines could get 550-650 hours between overhauls on later overhauls.

I have no idea what the USAAC was getting but with the timeline proposed it pretty much grab whatever P-36s are in good shape, do a quick fix on a few more, fit some seat armor and perhaps try to fit a 2nd .50 in place of the .30 cal.

Next you need pilots and here again there are road blocks. Using green pilots isn't going to give very good results and the Army is unlikely to send predominately experienced pilots with 2nd rate aircraft to Midway while keeping the green pilots with the 1st rate aircraft to protect Pearl IF this plan goes pear shaped. b

I also have serious reservations about the lack of Japanese submarines and flying boats operating to the south east of Midway. It may have historically accurate but it was a less that stellar move by the Japanese. Perhaps they thought that the discovery of recon forces would tip their hand (not knowing the codes were broken) but going into a battle/invasion with NO recon assets along your enemies main line of supply/communications seems a bit lacking in military brilliance.
It seems this is hindsight generalship as depending on the Japanese to do this before the battle is a serious risk.

The Japanese had intended to use flying boats to scout Midway and environs, but USN caught wind of plan and parked their own seaplane tender in French Frigate Shoals, the intended refueling point, thus blocking the Japanese plan.

Shortround6 said:

As far as I can figure the P-36s at Pearl were P-36A's with one .50 cal and one .30 cal in the cowl. The .50 cal had 200 rounds.
I have no idea what shape the engines were in. R-1830s were good for 300-350hrs in initial airline service or over 400 with experienced operators. Large airlines could get 550-650 hours between overhauls on later overhauls.

I have no idea what the USAAC was getting but with the timeline proposed it pretty much grab whatever P-36s are in good shape, do a quick fix on a few more, fit some seat armor and perhaps try to fit a 2nd .50 in place of the .30 cal.

Next you need pilots and here again there are road blocks. Using green pilots isn't going to give very good results and the Army is unlikely to send predominately experienced pilots with 2nd rate aircraft to Midway while keeping the green pilots with the 1st rate aircraft to protect Pearl IF this plan goes pear shaped. b

I also have serious reservations about the lack of Japanese submarines and flying boats operating to the south east of Midway. It may have historically accurate but it was a less that stellar move by the Japanese. Perhaps they thought that the discovery of recon forces would tip their hand (not knowing the codes were broken) but going into a battle/invasion with NO recon assets along your enemies main line of supply/communications seems a bit lacking in military brilliance.
It seems this is hindsight generalship as depending on the Japanese to do this before the battle is a serious risk.

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On the P36's: exactly. I agree. 22 were said to be airworthy, I don't know what shape that means they were in. We agree completely that if 2 50's can be fit, fine, if not then they go with 1 30 and 1 50, fit seat armor and send them. None of us know what pilots are at Pearl Harbor to fly them. Again I would like to remind everyone that the US had many high time pilots that hadn't seen combat, Jimmy Thach being one of them. These same Army, Navy and Marine pilots I would commit to battle here are the same ones that saw combat here or at Guadalcanal and fought the Zero to a 1 to 1 kill ratio.

Please don't forget, there would be 46 extra Wildcats also, flown by the same men who fought the Zero at Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal.

Why bring the P36's at all? Because they can help. A Zero can't lock down on a Wildcat if a P36 is behind him shooting or he risks getting shot down himself. Is it perfect? No. Is it superior? No. But we didn't really have anything that was before the Hellcat, Corsair and Lighting finally began to arrive. I mean, they used 21 Buffalos at Midway. That should tell us that they were already scrapping the bottom of the barrel. Who here would choose a Buffalo over a P36? I bet every pilot at Midway in a Buffalo would have traded in an instant if offered.

I also understand that the P36 is not the perfect fighter, but if we try to play this out historically, it is all thats available besides more F4F's. If we can't beat them at quality of plane and experience of pilots, at least try to outnumber them. As Stalin said "quantity has a quality all its own". I would consider the P36 to be, essentially, almost the exact same as a KI43 in climb, turn, speed and firepower. Is it perfect, no, but how many Hurricanes, Spitfires, P39's, P40's etc fall to the 1 50 and 1 30 of the KI43?

Greg Boeser is correct that broken codes allowed a seaplane tender and a destroyer or 2 to be parked at French Frigate Shoals where the Japanese intended for a submarine to meet up and refuel a large flying boat so it could recon Pearl Harbor looking for the US carriers.

I agree and understand your thoughts or reservations about no submarines and no aircraft recon by the Japanese and in hind sight (or even foresight) it was stupid and the Japanese paid for it, but it is 100% accurate that they did not recon Midway, SE of Midway or Pearl Harbor with aircraft and they did not get their submarine screen in place in time either. All of the Japanese recon failures are covered in Shattered Sword and they are chalked up by that book as the Japanese having victory disease, as in "recon of this or that (Pearl Harbor and Midway) would be nice, but we can easily win anyway. As I recall from Shattered Sword, many of the lower ranking Japanese officers questioned these decisions and others, but lower ranking officers questioning the actions of high ranking officers was something not done in the WW2 Japanese Navy.

As you guys question parts of the plan and I clarify certain things, does the plan now appear more reasonable to you?

Would you agree that a submarine could be anywhere, and if spotted, the 3 US carriers would be better off with Midway between them and 4 Japanese carriers as an unsinkable radar picket and fighter base?

Understand that I don't expect 21 Wildcats and 22 P36's to shoot down 36 Zeros without loss. What I do expect is that, with an altitude advantage, a diving first pass from 21 Wildcats should bring down a few Zeros and scatter and disorient the Zeros. P36's are extremely close to the Zero in climb, turn etc, gaining ground as the altitude gets lower (below 15,000 feet would be best for the P36) while retaining the high rate of roll at high speed so diving and rolling to evade the Zero would work for the P36 to disengage (P36 said to outturn a KI43 above 180 to 200 mph), or to drag the Zeros down lower where the P36 could match or some say, exceed the Zero. THE MAIN GOAL HERE IS TO TIE UP THE ZERO ESCORT, just split it away from the 72 bombers, if that is accomplished, then you now have 36 Kates and 36 Vals facing 21 Buffalos and 32 Wildcats with no escorts.

I have been hammered quite continuously for wanting to commit 22 AAF pilots in P36's and an extra 46 Wildcat pilots to Midway island because the we have no idea of the training of the AAF pilots and most of the Wildcat pilots haven't fought Zeros yet (although I did say that I would retain all unwounded Yorktown and Lexington pilots that weren't assigned to Yorktown to man these planes)

Lets look at what was deployed historically just to see how bad my plan is to use P36's with pilots of unknown quality:

21 Buffalos with green pilots. I understand the Buffalo model used at Midway was unable to do a loop. Not sure if that is true

11 Vindicator dive bombers with pilots so green that they couldn't even dive bomb, they had to glide bomb.

16 Dauntless dive bombers with pilots so green they had to glide bomb instead of dive bomb

41 Devastator torpedo planes divided into 3 groups with a grand total between all of them of 4 Wildcat fighter escorts (John Thach escort)

Who here would pick any one of these planes over a P36?

Honorable mention:

6 Avenger torpedo planes, unescorted

4 B26's, unescorted, at least they were fast but were piled on by huge numbers of Zeros (back to the numbers help)

The US won the battle, losing Yorktown and a lot of planes, pilots and crew. If the US Carriers had been spotted by submarine sometime before the morning of June 4th in time for the Japanese to launch their first morning strike with torpedo armed Kates, I believe they would have lost all 3 on the first Japanese strike. The Midway bombers accomplished no hits during the battle, they were simply tossed into a meat grinder, at least a P36 if in good shape was on close to equal footing or equal footing with a Zero, especially at low altitude. I believe if replaced by fighters and fought as I have described, the Yorktown would not have been lost.

pinsog said:

I have been hammered quite continuously for wanting to commit 22 AAF pilots in P36's and an extra 46 Wildcat pilots to Midway island because the we have no idea of the training of the AAF pilots and most of the Wildcat pilots haven't fought Zeros yet (although I did say that I would retain all unwounded Yorktown and Lexington pilots that weren't assigned to Yorktown to man these planes)

Lets look at what was deployed historically just to see how bad my plan is to use P36's with pilots of unknown quality:

21 Buffalos with green pilots. I understand the Buffalo model used at Midway was unable to do a loop. Not sure if that is true

11 Vindicator dive bombers with pilots so green that they couldn't even dive bomb, they had to glide bomb.

16 Dauntless dive bombers with pilots so green they had to glide bomb instead of dive bomb

41 Devastator torpedo planes divided into 3 groups with a grand total between all of them of 4 Wildcat fighter escorts (John Thach escort)

Who here would pick any one of these planes over a P36?

Honorable mention:

6 Avenger torpedo planes, unescorted

4 B26's, unescorted, at least they were fast but were piled on by huge numbers of Zeros (back to the numbers help)

The US won the battle, losing Yorktown and a lot of planes, pilots and crew. If the US Carriers had been spotted by submarine sometime before the morning of June 4th in time for the Japanese to launch their first morning strike with torpedo armed Kates, I believe they would have lost all 3 on the first Japanese strike. The Midway bombers accomplished no hits during the battle, they were simply tossed into a meat grinder, at least a P36 if in good shape was on close to equal footing or equal footing with a Zero, especially at low altitude. I believe if replaced by fighters and fought as I have described, the Yorktown would not have been lost.

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You are operating with hindsight.

You know the Devastators, Vindicators, etc won't score hits and so can be replaced without affecting the outcome. That was unknown at the time and since the goal was to sink Japanese ships (which P-36s and Wildcats won't do) stripping down the american strike force is going to be a hard decision.

P-36 is a more limited plane than you seem to believe. Yes it is pretty good at low altitude but it sucks at high altitude, high being relative. that 3900fpm climb fades to 3000fpm at 10,000ft and is down to 2200fpm at 15,000ft.
It also is rather short ranged for combat duties. It only carries 105 US gallons when loaded for combat. the 57 gal tank behind the seat was for ferrying. The center of gravity was out of wack when filled and combat maneuvers were dangerous. There is also no quick way to dump to the fuel (unlike drop tanks).
It might have had some use as the last aerial line of defense before the AA guns but sending it out over water as the first interceptor?

As to the pilots, which is it? the good pilots used at Guadalcanal, or the poor pilots used in the strike aircraft? The US had dozens of high time fighter pilots unused at Midway but were using green, barely trained strike pilots?


The idea of putting the carriers to the north east of Midway was to put them where the Japanese were less likely to look for them. Putting them behind Midway is putting them where the Japanese are most likely to look for them. You have the advantage of knowing the Japanese did not look which as you noted, was a mistake even junior Japanese officers commented on. For the American commanders to put the carriers there without knowing the Japanese mistakes ahead of time would be foolish.

Shortround6 said:

You are operating with hindsight.

You know the Devastators, Vindicators, etc won't score hits and so can be replaced without affecting the outcome. That was unknown at the time and since the goal was to sink Japanese ships (which P-36s and Wildcats won't do) stripping down the american strike force is going to be a hard decision.

P-36 is a more limited plane than you seem to believe. Yes it is pretty good at low altitude but it sucks at high altitude, high being relative. that 3900fpm climb fades to 3000fpm at 10,000ft and is down to 2200fpm at 15,000ft.
It also is rather short ranged for combat duties. It only carries 105 US gallons when loaded for combat. the 57 gal tank behind the seat was for ferrying. The center of gravity was out of wack when filled and combat maneuvers were dangerous. There is also no quick way to dump to the fuel (unlike drop tanks).
It might have had some use as the last aerial line of defense before the AA guns but sending it out over water as the first interceptor?

As to the pilots, which is it? the good pilots used at Guadalcanal, or the poor pilots used in the strike aircraft? The US had dozens of high time fighter pilots unused at Midway but were using green, barely trained strike pilots?


The idea of putting the carriers to the north east of Midway was to put them where the Japanese were less likely to look for them. Putting them behind Midway is putting them where the Japanese are most likely to look for them. You have the advantage of knowing the Japanese did not look which as you noted, was a mistake even junior Japanese officers commented on. For the American commanders to put the carriers there without knowing the Japanese mistakes ahead of time would be foolish.

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Good points, let me explain my thinking. As I have stated earlier, I am trying to do this without using hindsight, although it is difficult NOT to sometimes.

I have left the B17's at Midway and all the torpedo planes on the carriers even though none of them scored hits. B17's would be great for scouting of the Japanese battle group after initial sighting, being infinitely more survivable than a PBY.

At the time, for some reason, they expected the Japanese fleet to appear almost exactly where it came from, I believe it was because the Japanese fleet followed a storm front passing through, I'm not sure if there was any other reason. If they know where the Japanese fleet is coming from, and they did, or at least they guessed it right, then to me, the best place for our carriers is exact opposite of them on the other side of Midway Island with Midway full of fighters, and having radar. Any Japanese scout planes would have to fly over or around Midway, skirting Midways radar (which I doubt the Japanese knew about and probably didn't know its capability anyway). SO, in a straight line, you have Japanese fleet NW of Midway, then Midway full of fighters, and then SE of Midway you have the US carriers. Draw a radar circle around Midway that Japanese recon planes would have to avoid because it would be being patrolled by Wildcats, or long range Buffalos might be better. That gives a large area that should be free of Japanese recon planes, and this is without hindsight. Also, if any Japanese recon planes did skirt Midway, get around Midways radar coverage and into the carriers radar coverage, then if the carrier Wildcats intercepted them and shot them down, the Japanese would assume either, they just disappeared or that Midway fighters found them. They had no reason to suspect US carriers in that area, because they didn't know their code was broken.

During the Guadalcanal/Solomons campaign, the Japanese determined where the US carriers were just by which search planes didn't return. The search planes never radioed in, but when 1 or 2 or 3 that were close to each other on the search grid failed to return, the Japanese rightly assumed that they were downed by carrier CAP and determined correctly that US carriers were there. Any search planes that had to fly near Midway to find carriers on opposite side that disappeared, without getting off a message, would be assumed to have been lost to Midway CAP, they would not automatically assume US carriers got them. Does that make sense to you that no hindsight was needed to see this is a benefit?

Can we agree that no one knows when and where a Japanese sub could be and we were just lucky that none saw the carriers where they went and none happened to be where I would send them either?

There is no reason our carriers should ever be spotted if they are SE, but that could not have been known to them back then. Would you agree that IF the US carriers were spotted, the Japanese raid having to pass Midway with radar and 95 fighters, 100 miles (or you pick how far away US carriers are from Midway, I'm flexible on that) or so before US carriers would
1. let the 95 Midway fighters thin out the raid in a long running battle
2. allow US carriers to get every single Wildcat aloft and at proper altitude (there would be 81 Wildcats as they had not seen battle yet) and maybe even commit Dauntless dive bombers to fleet defense as they did at Coral Sea if needed
3. allow Midway fighters to attack the raid on the way back home again, picking off stragglers and cripples, any bomber flying alone would be an almost sure kill for a Wildcat, P36 or Buffalo. (in the attack that crippled Hornet, Wildcats and even Dauntless's slaughtered the Japanese attackers, most all of them flying back home in ones and two's. Could you imagine if that beaten, broken, shot up group of Japanese planes would have had to overfly Guadalcanal on the way to the US carriers, and then overfly Guadalcanal after they attacked Hornet and Enterprise? Its doubtful Hornet would have been lost and its doubtful any Japanese planes would have survived and gotten back to their carriers)

My thoughts exactly on P36. Re-read how I said I would use them: They would be the first 22 planes on the runway until radar spotted the raid, then they would launch, climb to 20,000 feet meeting with Wildcat CAP, then they would intercept at only 40 miles away from island. Do you feel that 100 gallons is enough for that mission? Maybe put enough fuel in overload tank for takeoff and climb to 20,000? (I'm flexible on that because I don't know)

Also re-read what I said about P36, that it does better lower and it would be best if they could drag Zero escort down below 12,000 feet.

Thank you for your thoughtful reply.

Shortround6, do you know if Midway fighters could take off 2 planes side by side at a time? How long between take offs? 10 seconds? 15? 20? 30?

One of the few successes of the Midway based F2As was the destruction of an H8K1 on 10 Mar '42. This a/c had been sent to photograph the US defenses on the island. The Japanese did not follow up, losing their chance to obtain much vital info. Victory disease.
USN base defense plans did not intend such island outposts as Guam, Wake, Midway or Palmyra to be major staging bases, but rather lightly held points to scout the enemy movements and dispositions. That Nimitz chose to meet the Japanese at Midway was based on the intel breakthrough that allowed him to get a jump on their plans.
Reading the development of the early operations one gets the feel of the Japanese impatience to bring the American fleet to battle to eradicate it so they could solidify their gains. Although there is often a sense that the Japanese were unstoppable up until the defeat at Midway, in fact, each delay inflicted on the Japanese timetable increased the odds in the Allies favor.
Wake Island tied up forces for two weeks, the Central Pacific carrier raids did distract the Japanese high command and caused the diversion of precious resources to chase after the carriers. The Lea - Salamua raid of 10 Mar '42 sank vital shipping needed to secure New Guinea and isolate Australia, pushing back the timetable for the occupation of Port Moresby a whole month. American carriers at Coral Sea succeeded in turning back the invasion fleet. These delays were the impetus for the whole Midway operation.

Well put Greg Boeser. I was unaware of the H8K1 shot down by Buffalos. Locating and destroying long range recon planes might have been a good job for the Buffalo until the P38 arrived.

You have to look long and hard to find highlights of the F2A in US service.

Greg Boeser said:

You have to look long and hard to find highlights of the F2A in US service.

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In part because the F2A actually equipped so few units in US Service after Dec 1941. I believe there was only one carrier borne squadron as of Dec 1941 and it was sent ashore in either Jan or Feb of 1942? They were then given to the Marines or sent to training schools. Marines only deployed them to Midway or used them at Pearl outside the Continental US.

There is also a bit of argument/confusion about "long range" F2As,. Only the F2A-3 had the extra tankage. Sources differ as to the reason. Only the new tanks in US service with fitted with self-sealing. The old 160 gallon tanks were not. Any "long range" F2A-3 that got a few 7.7mm holes in the old tanks was in serious trouble if on the outer reaches of a long range patrol. AHT claims one old wing tank was sealed and stenciled with a warning about only being fillers under orders of the squadron commander?

Hey Pinsog,

You have a solid plan and the naysayers think modern, use hindsight, aren't in command, ... AND ... it's a what-if.

All this conspires to make for no absolutely correct answer. I'd say your plan is better than what was used, with no guarantee it would be better, but no real way to be worse that what happened.

That means it's a decent plan with no guarantee of greater success, and almost no chance of worse results. The result would be up to the beholder. I'd say it would be better; by how much? I can't say. I'd try it.

GregP said:

Hey Pinsog,

You have a solid plan and the naysayers think modern, use hindsight, aren't in command, ... AND ... it's a what-if.

All this conspires to make for no absolutely correct answer. I'd say your plan is better than what was used, with no guarantee it would be better, but no real way to be worse that what happened.

That means it's a decent plan with no guarantee of greater success, and almost no chance of worse results. The result would be up to the beholder. I'd say it would be better; by how much? I can't say. I'd try it.

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Thank you for the support GregP.

Do you know how much time they would need on Midway between fighters taking off? 10 seconds? 15? 20? 30?

Could they take off side by side or just 1 at a time?

I'd think they could take off in echelon 2 at a time about every 30 seconds or so, but that would assume perfect pilots and no traffic snarls. It would probably be something like an average of every 45 seconds or so.

I've taken off in echelon before in a Cessna and it's not difficult, but I also had a great view over the nose. Maybe it would be one at a time. At our annual airshow, we have a squadron of nine RV-4's that take off three at a time, and they have no trouble. But they also have an order of magnitude better visibility than most WWII fighters!

So, it might come down to 1 at a time. I am not acquainted with formation takeoff training early in the war. It might have been non-existent.

Shortround6 said:

In part because the F2A actually equipped so few units in US Service after Dec 1941. I believe there was only one carrier borne squadron as of Dec 1941 and it was sent ashore in either Jan or Feb of 1942? They were then given to the Marines or sent to training schools. Marines only deployed them to Midway or used them at Pearl outside the Continental US.

There is also a bit of argument/confusion about "long range" F2As,. Only the F2A-3 had the extra tankage. Sources differ as to the reason. Only the new tanks in US service with fitted with self-sealing. The old 160 gallon tanks were not. Any "long range" F2A-3 that got a few 7.7mm holes in the old tanks was in serious trouble if on the outer reaches of a long range patrol. AHT claims one old wing tank was sealed and stenciled with a warning about only being fillers under orders of the squadron commander?

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The only other action of note is a pair of Lexington F2As that assisted in attacking a Japanese sub in January. A few days later a sub put a torpedo in the Saratoga, taking it out of action until after Midway. Interestingly, the lack of a flight deck allowed the USN to shuffle its spare carrier squadrons between the serviceable carriers, keeping them in the game at full strength.

Greg Boeser said:

The only other action of note is a pair of Lexington F2As that assisted in attacking a Japanese sub in January. A few days later a sub put a torpedo in the Saratoga, taking it out of action until after Midway. Interestingly, the lack of a flight deck allowed the USN to shuffle its spare carrier squadrons between the serviceable carriers, keeping them in the game at full strength.

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From AHT,
Dec 31st 1941, the US has one F2A-1 and one XF2A-2 at Norfolk. 49 F2A-2s (three at San Diago, seven at Miami, others scattered, and 107 F2A-3s (five at San Diago, 37 at New York, 19 with VF-2 on Lexington, 14 with VMF-221 at Midway, seven at Pearl harbor, seven with jeep carrier Long Island, eight at Miami, three at Cape May New Jersey and the rest scattered.

Jan 3 42- The F2As of VF-2 land at Ewa in Hawaii.
Jan 7 42- The F2As are back on the Lexington.
Jan 27 42 VF-2 FwA-3 planes go back to MCAS Ewa Hawaii where all eighteen (one missing?) are transferred to VMF-221, VF-2 gets F4F-3A Wildcats.
Mar 42, ten US marine F2A-3s are sent to the island of Kauai and stay there until after Midway.
April 14 42. 14 F2A-s of Marine VMF-221 fly off Lexington to Palmyra Island.
May 31 42 VMF 221 at Midway has received 7 additional F2A-3s and 7 F4F-3 Wildcats.

Shortround6 said:

From AHT,

April 14 42. 14 F2A-s of Marine VMF-221 fly off Lexington to Palmyra Island.

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I believe that was VMF 211, built up from the rear echelon left at Ewa after Major Putnam took the forward echelon to Wake Island.

Greg Boeser said:

I believe that was VMF 211, built up from the rear echelon left at Ewa after Major Putnam took the forward echelon to Wake Island.

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You are correct, I mistyped.