Best Air Force 1939-1941 (1 Viewer)

Best Air Force 1939 to 1941?


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At the same time they had to push the german fighter groups back from the Channel, which they achieved, at great cost, but they were successful eventually.

Pushed back..? Huh? Most fighter unitstransferred to the Ostfront in early 1941. A couple of Wing remained. Those remained in the exact same spot for years, essentially fighting like guerllas in the air. I do not understand what you are talking.

Ratio of loss was 1-5 favour of Jagdgruppen, despite outnumbered. RAF was not outnumber in 1940.. it outnumbered attacking fighters in contrast and had poorer results. Of course advantage of Germans was they had nothing to defend in France. Bombing of France by English..? It is a favour for German. France is enemy country.. they can sunbath in airfield, sip beer, watch show. British couldnt do, when London was attacked, they had to fly.

The Germans retained a qualitative advantage especially in the expereience of their pilots, but in terms of organizational skills, I dont see anything that compares with Fighter Command, until the reorganization of the Reich Defences and the establishment of the Kammhuber line in 1942-3. Until then, the Luftwaffe, whilst enjoying a significant qualitiative advantage in its personnel, did not have the organizational skills to match.

I do not think this so simple. The UK had centralized fighter defense system with radars, Germany had a de-centralized fighter defense system with radars. At start of war. The latter worked well enough, Bomber Command forced to cease daylight bombing. Centralised system was better for defense against massed raids, but British system was hardly perfection, it could scramble fighters from a Group, even scramble-able, guided Squadrons number was limited.. but otherwise was rigid area defense.. 11 Group and 12 Group not even working together at all. British had not one home defense system but four! Complete human stupidity and rivalry between leaders, otherwise easily possible. Technically it was limited, radar operator can not tell true altitude, nor could tell true numbers of enemy aircraft - vital elements - too poor training, too poor equipment (big wavelenght CH radar, more primitive, early radar). Completely blind over land - radar only sees to sea. Organistation, "Big Wing" controversy is well known. Some UK leaders realized need for centralised fighter, bomber etc. force. Like Germans already did. British organisation and planning, scramble relied on small Squadron, German already on Big Wing (Gruppe). Different words - German already had system which routinly concentrated force into large units. USA, USSR similiar structure. Only UK relied on ad hoc grouping of Squadrons in 1940-41.. No doubt it was backward practice of WW1. Speaking WW1 - Red Baron already realised that, used Big Wing tactics as English call. In reality, idea present from immerial times: concentration of force. Napoleon was one master of it.
 
I'm pointing out that the side which had the home advantage won.RAF in BOB , Luftwaffe in mainland Europe.Only massive numerical difference could change that.Not ''organization''.
By the way what happened to the organization of Fighter Command vs the Channel geschwader?

What is a "Home Advantage". Certainly numbers were decisive, but the numerical advantage enjoyed by the RAF didnt come about because of superior production bases, it came about because of superior organization, and admittedly poor strategic decisions by the Germans. Key point of course was the decision to invade Russia, but even before that, there were signs the Germans were losing the air war. Despite enjoying a considerable numerical advantage overall, even in mid 1941, they were losing in certain key area. Their blitz offensive had become prohibitively expensive. Along the channel frontiers, the two geschwaders battling the 6 or so squadrons tasked with attritioning them down, were suffering some humilating defeats, or at least not shooting the RAF down as one sidedly as usual. this led to a decision in July to the Luftwaffe pulling back from the frontier near the channel ports. This was followed by other withdrawals from other sectors of the coast. By forfeiting control of the airspace over the channel, except in certain sectors, the LW were being denied the ability to challenge the control of the Channel, and were denied the possibility of restarting their offensive over England. It rendered safe the bases of bomber command, and paved the way for the commencement of the great offensive that destroyed the Luftwaffe really. This was all done at great cost, admittedly, but it was also done from a position of overall numerical inferiority, not superiority.

As 1942 wore on the RAF and the LW traded places insofar as numerical position was concerned. I do not believe this was a product of fate, or was inevitable, and it certainly wasnt because the RAF had a bigger industrial base to call on, or because the Germans were preocupied in Russia and the British had no other theatres to worry about. Quite the contrary, the british had numerous distractions from this great purpose as well. They were losing shipping hand over fist, they were puring huge resources into dealing with the Italians, and were being forced to rush reinforcements to the Far East. No, it was their superior organization that was paying dividends for them. They wedre mass producing aircrew, and foregoing the "sexy" end of technology in favour of getting the numbers out there. They were organizing their forces in a far more focussed and effiicient way than the Germans ever did (well, maybe in 1944, when it was all too late). Here is where you will find the benefits of organization.

As for the Kanalkampf, I see this as a British victory as well, despite the heavier losses. The British simply refused to give battle at that time except where vital interests were concerned and the battle over the channel was not a vital battle for them, at least not for a short period. they could forego the channel convoys and still survive.....but they had to defend the defence network of south east England....so they waited, essentially
 
Pushed back..? Huh? Most fighter unitstransferred to the Ostfront in early 1941. A couple of Wing remained. Those remained in the exact same spot for years, essentially fighting like guerllas in the air. I do not understand what you are talking.

Ratio of loss was 1-5 favour of Jagdgruppen, despite outnumbered. RAF was not outnumber in 1940.. it outnumbered attacking fighters in contrast and had poorer results. Of course advantage of Germans was they had nothing to defend in France. Bombing of France by English..? It is a favour for German. France is enemy country.. they can sunbath in airfield, sip beer, watch show. British couldnt do, when London was attacked, they had to fly.



I do not think this so simple. The UK had centralized fighter defense system with radars, Germany had a de-centralized fighter defense system with radars. At start of war. The latter worked well enough, Bomber Command forced to cease daylight bombing. Centralised system was better for defense against massed raids, but British system was hardly perfection, it could scramble fighters from a Group, even scramble-able, guided Squadrons number was limited.. but otherwise was rigid area defense.. 11 Group and 12 Group not even working together at all. British had not one home defense system but four! Complete human stupidity and rivalry between leaders, otherwise easily possible. Technically it was limited, radar operator can not tell true altitude, nor could tell true numbers of enemy aircraft - vital elements - too poor training, too poor equipment (big wavelenght CH radar, more primitive, early radar). Completely blind over land - radar only sees to sea. Organistation, "Big Wing" controversy is well known. Some UK leaders realized need for centralised fighter, bomber etc. force. Like Germans already did. British organisation and planning, scramble relied on small Squadron, German already on Big Wing (Gruppe). Different words - German already had system which routinly concentrated force into large units. USA, USSR similiar structure. Only UK relied on ad hoc grouping of Squadrons in 1940-41.. No doubt it was backward practice of WW1. Speaking WW1 - Red Baron already realised that, used Big Wing tactics as English call. In reality, idea present from immerial times: concentration of force. Napoleon was one master of it.

Which explains perfectly why the Luwftwaffe lost the Battle Of Britain? The big wing was wrong, Park was exactly right......I believe the outcome of the battle speaks for itself, the Royal Air Force acheived what no other European nation achieved, the successful defense of it's homeland and demonstrated that superior tactics (and may I add that several comments keep drawing on poor squadron tactics which are now largely dispelled as myth, early in the battle yes but for main, the pilots learned quickly, you don't have a 2-1 shoot down ratio with poor tactics and poorly trained pilots) and superior organisation overcame superior numbers, the Luftwaffe lost the BOB as much as the RAF won it.
 
RAF was not outnumbered in Battle of Britain, it had more fighters than Germans due to concentration of fighter aircraft. Also flew more. Typically RAF was flying at local numerical advantage. It did not have a 2-1 shoot down ratio. It lost as much planes as Germans. These are myths, but very stubbron ones.

Failure of Luftwaffe had many factors. Main I believe is very short time period - two-three weeks of intense air warfare is enough to bring the RAF to breaking point, not enough to break them completely. Strategic air campaign needs many months, if not years. Worsening weather then limited operations to blind bombing.
Second most important - German Army could not cross channel to take advantage of LW success. It could take advantage in every previous campaign. Thats why it won.

Superior tactics? This is joke for certain..
 
What is a "Home Advantage".

Ability to decide when and where to attack, and when not to attack. Ability to know enemy concentration. Ability to achieve local superioty on key points. Abilty to save pilots who are shot down but parachute. Ability for damaged planes to land quickly and repaired later. These are key advantages of any combat - unlike on ground, in air defender can concentrate forces quickly, too.

Their blitz offensive had become prohibitively expensive.

What was number of losses in blitz offensive?

Along the channel frontiers, the two geschwaders battling the 6 or so squadrons tasked with attritioning them down, were suffering some humilating defeats, or at least not shooting the RAF down as one sidedly as usual. this led to a decision in July to the Luftwaffe pulling back from the frontier near the channel ports. This was followed by other withdrawals from other sectors of the coast.

I believe it was done because 98% of the Luftwaffe simply moved to Russia. There were no bombers to escort to Britain for raids.
Why have bases at the Channel, close to Britain then? Tactically for defense its disadvantagous - being too close to British raids, scrambling fighter does not have time to move to altitude and intercept.

Do you have examples humilating defeats? Actually Fighter Command was not being shot down one sidedly over Britain in 1940. Some exception on both sides.. They were however shot down VERY one sidedly over France.. whereas LW fighters shoot down RAF Fighters ca. 2-1 1940, they shoot down them 5-1 1941.

By forfeiting control of the airspace over the channel, except in certain sectors, the LW were being denied the ability to challenge the control of the Channel, and were denied the possibility of restarting their offensive over England.

Why? The same way they moved from Channel to inland base, they could move from inland base to channel base, if needed. Nothing prevented that, except the LW being in Russia..

It rendered safe the bases of bomber command, and paved the way for the commencement of the great offensive that destroyed the Luftwaffe really.This was all done at great cost, admittedly, but it was also done from a position of overall numerical inferiority, not superiority.

Were bomber command bases ever under threatening..? Fighter Command had more fighters from August 1940 than the Luftwaffe. Fighter Command certainly had more fighters than but two JG over the La Manche in 1941. I do not understand what numerical inferiity you talk about. Perhaps you have numbers.
 
There are some simple facts here.
1) Had the LW continued to bomb the RAF airfields that we have been in trouble.
2) The 'Big Wing' was an effective use of resources.
3) RADAR gave the RAF the edge.
4) We had a superior interceptor fighter in the Spitfire.
5) The RAF was not all British, we had volunteers from all the world to help us.
6) The LW's city bombing just stiffened British resolve to fight on.
7) The RAF's final victory...however close, was a propaganda gift from heaven for Churchill.
8) Goering gave up , was defeated, which ever you prefer.
Cheers
John
 
Ctrian, an over simplification, sorry, as for your final point, I assume you are talking operations in 1941 on?

JG2 and JG26 wiped the floor with Fighter Command despite being outnumbered ,using aircraft with same performance and the Brits having the element of surprise.That's how important home field advantage really is.
 
JG2 and JG26 wiped the floor with Fighter Command despite being outnumbered ,using aircraft with same performance and the Brits having the element of surprise.That's how important home field advantage really is.

Wiped the floor ? That is plainly not true. Even stevens with occasional ascendency but neither side wiped the floor with the other, its nonsense to even suggest that.
 
Wiped the floor ? That is plainly not true. Even stevens with occasional ascendency but neither side wiped the floor with the other, its nonsense to even suggest that.

You need to read more.

The Spitfire - An Operational History - 4. Into France

RAF Fighter Command - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The year 1941 saw RAF Fighter Command claim some 711 Luftwaffe fighters shot down (although only 236 were lost
from all causes, 103 in combat) for losses of approximately 400 RAF fighters lost.


The most notable offensive battle took place over Dieppe, France Although the RAF succeeded in preventing the
Luftwaffe from interfering with the shipping, which was its primary aim,
its perceived success was misleading. Despite claims at the time that more German aircraft than British had
been shot down (106 kills were claimed by the RAF) postwar analysis showed 88 Spitfires were lost for just
23 Luftwaffe fighters and 24 bombers shot down.


1942 statistics yielded 560 claims (272 German fighters were
lost from all causes) for 574 RAF day fighters destroyed


Source is given as 'The JG 26 War Diary' (Volume 1), Caldwell .That is a well known author on Luftwaffe history ,i have his book (with Muller) ''The Luftwaffe over Germany''.I also have ''The right of the line'' and it says the same.
 
You need to read more.

The Spitfire - An Operational History - 4. Into France

RAF Fighter Command - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The year 1941 saw RAF Fighter Command claim some 711 Luftwaffe fighters shot down (although only 236 were lost
from all causes, 103 in combat) for losses of approximately 400 RAF fighters lost.


The most notable offensive battle took place over Dieppe, France Although the RAF succeeded in preventing the
Luftwaffe from interfering with the shipping, which was its primary aim,
its perceived success was misleading. Despite claims at the time that more German aircraft than British had
been shot down (106 kills were claimed by the RAF) postwar analysis showed 88 Spitfires were lost for just
23 Luftwaffe fighters and 24 bombers shot down.


1942 statistics yielded 560 claims (272 German fighters were
lost from all causes) for 574 RAF day fighters destroyed


Source is given as 'The JG 26 War Diary' (Volume 1), Caldwell .That is a well known author on Luftwaffe history ,i have his book (with Muller) ''The Luftwaffe over Germany''.I also have ''The right of the line'' and it says the same.

I shall quote you some different figures later on. I dispute your 'wiping the floor' claim. Maybe something is getting lost in the translation here...
Cheers
John
 
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when have you ever heard of engaging the reserves before the main force , Park and Dowding were running a war and and Bader didn't like the rules .

Bader was proved right. I'll quote you sources later on tonight.
'reserves'?...we were on our uppers.
Cheers
John
 
I shall quote you some different figures later on. I dispute your 'wiping the floor' claim. Maybe something is getting lost in the translation here...
Cheers
John

You're free to quote whatever you want just keep in mind that German casualties are all causes.
 
Wiping the floor is incorrect, in part I don't agree with Lee Mallory's tactics, he didn't in part learn from the mistakes the Luftwaffe had made in 1940, that said, the RAF had little choice but to take the fight to the Luftwaffe over France, so I would call it a rock and a hard place situation, but wipe the floor? No.

I agree, the Big Wing as a reserve had merits, partiularly once the Luftwaffe switched to bombing London, but I think most people agree now that Park was right, Bader was wrong with regard the overall strategy.
 
JG2 and JG26 wiped the floor with Fighter Command despite being outnumbered ,using aircraft with same performance and the Brits having the element of surprise.That's how important home field advantage really is.

There is one flaw with the "home advantage" theory.....the defeat of the French, Polish, etc airforces and the inevitable defeat of the Luftwaffe.....lot's of reasons can be sighted, "home advantage" seemed to be more "home disadvantage"? I'm sorry, but I think you are really over-simplifying it.
 
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when have you ever heard of engaging the reserves before the main force , Park and Dowding were running a war and and Bader didn't like the rules .

Bader was proved right. I'll quote you sources later on tonight.
'reserves'?...we were on our uppers.
Cheers
John

The RAF as my Dad would say" couldn't hit a cow in the ass with a scoop shovel" in 1939 -40 with their bombing, the fighter tactics with area tactics was dated and outmoded , had coastal command even sunk a U boat during this period . I give the RAF a reluctant 3rd barely ahead of the US and Italy


Guys it had little to do with Bader. Leigh-Mallory was the Big Daddy of "The Big Wing" baby of which Bader was one of the Nannies supporting it. Park and Leigh-Mallory were both correct but at different at times during the BoB. Leigh-Mallory was completely daft and wrong in his opinion of what D-day air operations would be. I think it is fair to say that the American counterparts of Leigh-Mallory believed him wrongheaded and obstinate on most things until his death in I think 1944.

pbfoot, et al,

I definitely think the opinion that the RAF was greatly inferior to the Luftwaffe is overstatement. I believe that much of the Luftwaffe's superiority in the 1939-41 period was its ability to achieve the ultimate in air superiority by having the Heer place a tank on the enemy's airfield. Certainly the Luftwaffe helped the Heer in doing this but the Heer would have done the same with much less help. Nothing the Allies were doing in Belgium and France in Spring 1940 was going to stop the Heer. The Channel was certainly the greatest air defense weapon for the British because Panzers don't float. The Luftwaffe was as an organization like George Foreman to the RAFs Muhammed Ali in "The Rumble in the Jungle". Just like Ali the RAF's depth and width of defensive/offensive skill was superior to Foreman's and Luftwaffe's shallow and narrowly focused superior offensive power. The existence of the Channel certainly influenced the design of the RAF. It should not be considered an "unfair advantage" so to speak. If it didn't exist the RAF would have certainly been designed differently, and perhaps been just as effective in defeating the Luftwaffe in the Summer of 1940. This is another explanation of why I originally posted that the Luftwaffe had " a slight edge" during 1939-41. The assertion that the RAF was closer to the Italians or even a distant second to the Luftwaffe is not credible in my opinion.
 
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