Best Air Force 1939-1941

[ctrian]

There is one flaw with the "home advantage" theory.....the defeat of the French, Polish, etc airforces and the inevitable defeat of the Luftwaffe.....lot's of reasons can be sighted, "home advantage" seemed to be more "home disadvantage"? I'm sorry, but I think you are really over-simplifying it.

You can't have an airforce when the enemy's army is occupying your country.Poland and France were defeated in detail not just by airpower.As for the Luftwaffe it kept fighting till the end.

 

[parsifal]

The period we are looking at really is January '41 through to the end of June. In that period the germans outnumbered the RAF, not the other way around. Moreover it is a myth that the two german Fighter Groups were taking on the whole of Fighter command. In fact only small portions of the FC were ever committed to the battle, usually about 3 squadrons, escorting groups of bombers. In that six month the RAF committed 17 squadrons to the offensive, with a maximum of 8 committed in the biggest battles. Conversely, in that time the LW committed 38 staffeln to the battle. I do not know the maximum committed at any given time.

It is actually a misnomer to try and compare the battle over France without also considering the wider battles occurring in the whole of western Europe. If that is considered, German losses actually outnumber British.

If we just look at a few days in April, we can see the loss rates were much closer than is so often claimed...these rates are from Forsyth, who names the serial numbers of aircraft lost, and where they were lost as well as the cause. They are collated from post war reconciliations drawn from both sides, and not from unsubstantiated claims so often used misleadingly in so many otherwise reputable sources:

7/8 April
RAF: 17
LW: 14

8 April (Day)
RAF: 12
LW: 9

8/9 April

RAF: 11
LW: 13


9 April (Day)
RAF: 14
LW: 11


9/10 April
RAF: 21
LW: 21

10 April (Day)

RAF: 17
LW: 10

10/11 April
RAF: 19
LW: 22

11April (Day)
RAF: 7
LW: 5

And so it went on, more or less the same, for 6 months. That is not a 5:1 ratio, its not even a 2:1 ratio. If one compares oranges to oranges, and looks at all losses for the whole TO, a much better, and far closer margin, picture of what was happening begins to emerge. Sure, by concentrating most of their available fighter assets near the Channel, the Germans were able to eak out a modest advantage, but by so doing lost elswhere on the front. Over Britain, German losses were becoming crippling, both by day and night. British losses were heavy as well, this was no picnic, but the British knew they could absorb such losses and come back for more.....the germans either did not, or did not want to, think about the long issues

 

[ctrian]

Is that fighters only or all aircraft? What areas? What was the strength of Luft and RAF ? If those stats apply to the German effort against Britain they show the RAF in poor light .

 

[Readie]

Over Britain, German losses were becoming crippling, both by day and night. British losses were heavy as well, this was no picnic, but the British knew they could absorb such losses and come back for more.....the germans either did not, or did not want to, think about the long issues

Thank you parsifal.
Goering under estimated the RAF and did not anticipate the losses the LW would have to take to make good his promises to Hitler.
When things did not go as planned like every out of touch commander in history he gave in and looked around for another soft target where his lauded LW could dominate.
If Adolf "Dolfo" Joseph Ferdinand Galland or Werner Mölders were in charge then it may have been a different story...
Cheers
John

 

[parsifal]

Is that fighters only or all aircraft? What areas? What was the strength of Luft and RAF ? If those stats apply to the German effort against Britain they show the RAF in poor light .

They represent total losses to both sides from all causes over the whole western European Theatre. Does not include operations over Iceland, the western approaches or over Scandinavia.

I fail to see how they show RAF operations in a poor light. Outnumbered, with a generally lower standard of pilots at that time, they were nevertheless inflicting comparable losses on their opponents. The daylight operations over Northern France were particularly difficult, as you rightly claim, but the British can nevetheless claim the strategic victory here as well (which is coroborated by LW personnel of the time, principally Galland). Always outnumbered, targetting the the premier fighter groups of the LW, this was always a tough assignment. Nevertheless by the end of the campaign the RAF had achieved its stated mission.....it controlled the skies over the channel and were denying control of the airspace even over the coastal regions of Northern France. Your friend who disputed that point earlier, demonstrates a classic continental misunderstanding of the purpose of the campaign and its outcomes. The German fighter groups were still there alright, but they no longer seriously challenged RAF dominance in the channel. Throughout the latter half of 1941, LW operations over the British isles tapered off to almost nothing, and this wasnt just because they lacked the numbers from Russia. Its because they lacked the numbers because of poor management of their available resopurces.

Galland amply demonstrates in his book the significance of this campain, and why it was a costly, but strategic victory for the RAF. Germany's efforts over England cannot make that claim, cannot claim to have won the defensive battle even but must admit similar losses at least in the first half of the year. In the second half things got harder, but by then the battle was irretrievably lost for the LW. Yjere was much hard fighting ahead, many battles with one sided losses, but the air battle over for France was well nigh won by the end of the Summer 1941. British skies and coastal waters were secure....it was time to move on to Germany...... a three year nightmare if ever there was one

 

[Tante Ju]

I do not understand why concentrate on first half of 1941. RAF operations were very small scale.

1st half of 1941, RAF offensive operations balance,

Fighter, 6873 sorties, 112 losses (1,6%) Day
Fighter, 275 sorties, 5 losses (1,8%) night
Bomber, 1033 sorties, 34 losses (3,2%) day
Bomber, 2330 sorties, 34 losses (1,0%) night

Unfortunately, no Luftwaffe sorite/loss figures.

Its easy pick a few days, and forgot all months.. 3/4 of all fighter sorties were flown in June not until then... Taking advantage of LW being elsewhere. Pushing back, no. Turtle put out his head when eagle left the scene you can say.

After in 2nd half of 1941, things got ugly for RAF. July-December 1941:.

Fighter, 20495 sorties, 416 losses (2,2%) Day
Fighter, 311 sorties, 7 losses (2,2%) night
Bomber, 1406 sorties, 108 losses (7,6%) day
Bomber, 2688 sorties, 39 losses (1,45%) night

Luftflotte 3 in 2nd half of 1941, July-December.

Fighter,19535 sorties, 93 losses (0,4 %)
Bomber, 6409 sorties, 129 losses (2,0 %)
Recce 1108 sorties, 13 losses (1,1 %)

Fighter exchange 4,47:1. RAF was loosing fighter 5,5 times rate and bombers 4 times rate per sortie than Luftwaffe.

"Over Britain, German losses were becoming crippling, both by day and night. (in first half of 1941)"

Not true. German bomber night losses losses in Blitz, 1941.

Day losses are insignificant (3 to 9 per month, November - May), i do not list. Waste of time.

Night losses.
October 1940, 5900 sorties, 0,3% loss per sortie
November 1940, 6125 sorties, 48 loss. 0,7% loss per sortie
December 1940, 3450 sorties, 44 loss, 1,2% loss per sortie
Jan 1941 2050 sorties, 22 lost, 1 % loss per sortie
Feb 1941, 1450 sorties, 18 losts, 1,2 % loss per sortie
March 1941, 4275 sorties, 46 lost, 1 % loss per sortie
April 1941, 5250 sorties, 58 lost, 1,1 % loss per sortie
May 1941, 3800 sorties, 55 lost, 1,4 % loss per sortie
June 1941, much higher, because bombers now in Russia. There is opposition. Mid May is last attack on London.

How the loss of one or two bombers a day will cripple Luftwaffe bombers is mystery. In 1941 they loose as many in a month as in a bad day in summer 1940. Perhaps airframes need write off because of ageing after a while, and crews get old and unfit for duty!

Loss were insignificant both in absolute numbers (during BoB German bomber losses amount to 200/month. And they could keep it up). Also note most is due to accidents of night taxying, navigation, not enemy action. Crews mostly safe.

My source Hooton, Eagle in Flames.

 

[parsifal]

I'll post the figures for any month, was not selective in choice of days/nights. However, I would suggest that your analysis is highly selective, fails to understand the reasons for these losses, contains some downright errors or untruths, and hides critical losses for the LW to present them in the best possible light. The offensive over Northern France was part of the overall offensive, and happened to be the most expensive for the RAF. but it was only a part, of the overall program. Same can be said about the germans, their operations over Northern France were just a part of their overall pattern of ops, and contrary to what you are attempting to claim, bombig operations over the UK (London is not the only part of the UK incidentally) continued for some time after June, at an alarming and catastrophic cost.

If overall operations are viewed in the west, rather than concentrating on this one part of the front, then German losses actually very similar to those suffered by the RAF. And the important thing to note in all of this, which I stress is corroborated by people like Galland, is that as time progressed in 1941, the LW was increasingly losing its ability to act offensively, and increasingly denied access to various bits of airspace. These are undeniable and vital outcomes in the air battles that raged through 1941, and th early part of 1942. it essentially ploughed the ground on the road to Germany.

You say that the germans could sustain losses of 200 bombers a month, I'd like to see your sources for that kind of sweeping statement. i put it to you that they suspended operations over Britain for a reason, and it wasnt simply because they were growing tired of the job. I suggest you read the OKL war diaries to understand exactly how badly the LW was hurting in all of this

Moreover your dismissal of bomber losses in 1941 underestimates grossly just how many bombers they were actually losing. again from Freman, whoi has used Luftwaffe loss returns to collate his list, i will post random excepts that will show that bomber losses were way bigger than you are suggesting I would like to know your sources in this, but they simply dont correlate to the recorded loss rates given in LW records.

I can see your version of history is fundamentally different to mine. I would dearly like to know your rasons why the germans abandoned their daylight offensive in 1940, why they all but suspended bomber operations in the latter half of 1941 (something I dont fully accept, but I will check first) and why or how the british were able to resume convoy operations in the channel in 1941 with less than 0.25m tons of losses. Why werent the the LW continuing to target RAF bases as the bomber offensive? i think I know what your answer will be on that one, because the bombing was inneffective....but that is not how OKL viewed it, they were increasingly alarmed at the growing British proficiency, and would have dearly loved to have disrupted its development, but no longer had the means to do so (in 1942).

 

[Readie]

They represent total losses to both sides from all causes over the whole western European Theatre. Does not include operations over Iceland, the western approaches or over Scandinavia.

I fail to see how they show RAF operations in a poor light. Outnumbered, with a generally lower standard of pilots at that time, they were nevertheless inflicting comparable losses on their opponents. The daylight operations over Northern France were particularly difficult, as you rightly claim, but the British can nevetheless claim the strategic victory here as well (which is coroborated by LW personnel of the time, principally Galland). Always outnumbered, targetting the the premier fighter groups of the LW, this was always a tough assignment. Nevertheless by the end of the campaign the RAF had achieved its stated mission.....it controlled the skies over the channel and were denying control of the airspace even over the coastal regions of Northern France. Your friend who disputed that point earlier, demonstrates a classic continental misunderstanding of the purpose of the campaign and its outcomes. The German fighter groups were still there alright, but they no longer seriously challenged RAF dominance in the channel. Throughout the latter half of 1941, LW operations over the British isles tapered off to almost nothing, and this wasnt just because they lacked the numbers from Russia. Its because they lacked the numbers because of poor management of their available resopurces.

Galland amply demonstrates in his book the significance of this campain, and why it was a costly, but strategic victory for the RAF. Germany's efforts over England cannot make that claim, cannot claim to have won the defensive battle even but must admit similar losses at least in the first half of the year. In the second half things got harder, but by then the battle was irretrievably lost for the LW. Yjere was much hard fighting ahead, many battles with one sided losses, but the air battle over for France was well nigh won by the end of the Summer 1941. British skies and coastal waters were secure....it was time to move on to Germany...... a three year nightmare if ever there was one

Well said.

I have been reading 'Battle Stations' by Taylor Downing and 'They flew Hurricanes' by Adrian Stewart. Both books cover the period we are discussing.

Goering's Aldertag started with a command ' within a short period you will wipe the British airforce from the sky.. heil Hitler'. This signal was intercepted at Bletchley Park.
Aldertag started with inclement weather and Goering himself recalled the first wave of bombers and fighters. However, not all the LW had the new crystal sets and did not receive the order to turn back. The fighters turned back but the bombers carried on where they bombed Sheerness and Eastchurch. The bombers then were mauled by the RAF with 5 bombers being shot down. Aldertag stared in earnest later that same day when the weather had cleared up. 300 bombers took off with the objective of hitting RAF bases. Detling was badly bombed with loss of life and machine but, it wasn't a RAF base. It was a Coastal Command airfield. Faulty intelligence was too blame. At the end of Eagle Day the LW had lost 45 planes in action and the RAF had lost 13 in action. Goering withdrew to his Prussian hunting lodge with his senior commanders to review Aldertag. Goering failure to grasp the key elements of contemporary military strategy made him comiit one blunder after another during the BoB. He failed to press home his attacks on the Radar stations, he willingly listened to the extreme claims of his intelligence analysts about the LW successes, he failed to set the right targets for his bombers and he weakened the effectiveness of his fighters by tying them too closely to the bombers.
On the 15th August Goering and co are sipping fine wine while the Norway LW attacked Britain.15 LW bombers were shoot down for the loss of 1 RAF fighter.
The whole days operation shows a loss of 71 LW aircraft for the loss of 29 RAF aircraft. German intelligence continually underestimated the strenght of the RAF and with all autocratic systems the Germans only reported what their bosses wanted to hear...

After the first week of Aldertag Dowding was down to 700 fighters,German intelligence got the figures wrong again reporting that we had 300 fighters. The LW pilots would joke bitterly that once again they had found the 'last 50 fighters' when the RAF attacks did not diminish.

The 'big wing'.
Bader argued that the most effective way to attack the LW bombers was in mass formations consisiting of 3 or more squadrons. Bader believed that Park and Dowding dissipated the impact of the RAF by attacking at only squdron strength, keeping other squadrons standing by to respond to later assaults.The BW reflected the different circumstances of 11 12 group and caused friction within the RAF as 11 group bore the brunt of the BoB. Bader met with Churchill and the controversy rumbled on slurring the repuation of both Park and Leigh-Mallory. The BW has been judged to be a sucess at some costs within the Dowding's fighter command.

Reserves.
On the 15 September Churchill visted Park's HQ at Uxbridge. Eventually all the RAF squadrons were ordered into the air with no squadron standing by...Churchill asked Park 'what reserves have we?' Park answered 'There are none'. Both men realised that the game was nearly up, one further wave of German bombers and the airfields, the city of London and indeed the very survival of Britain would be at stake. But, no more bombers came. Goering had pushed the LW to its limit. The plan to invade Britain would be postponed indefinitely.

A close run battle ? I should coca.

Cheers
John

 

[parsifal]

Just to give one months figures on the bomber losses for the LW. according to German records, they lost 278 Bombers to all causes on the western front in April. The frontline strength of the LW at the end of March was slightly over 1800 bombers, so a loss rate of 278 aircraft represents 15.44% of the force pool. If that is not a force structure haemorraging itself to death I dont know what is....generally a loss rate abaove 3% per raid was considered unsustainable, and at that rate, the average monthly loss rate in the RAF was around 7.5% of the total force pool. Evidently 15% loss rates are unimportant to the Germans according to our esteemed friend.

 

[Lighthunmust]

Of the many things I have observed regarding human nature and the psychology of competition, the following two observations come to mind and I wonder if they are not somewhat being manifested in this and other threads:

A competitor or his supporters will frequently insist "he was holding his own" until suddenly being overwhelmed even when impartial observers were aware from the beginning of a steady decline in performance that defeat was inevitable.

Victors will frequently consciously and unconsciously exaggerate the prowess of the vanquished because victory over even a worthy opponent is never enough to satisfy the human desire for a glorious victory over the almost invincible.

 

[parsifal]

seems very deep. could you explain in slightly more simple terms for someone interested, but confused.....

 

[Readie]

Just to give one months figures on the bomber losses for the LW. according to German records, they lost 278 Bombers to all causes on the western front in April. The frontline strength of the LW at the end of March was slightly over 1800 bombers, so a loss rate of 278 aircraft represents 15.44% of the force pool. If that is not a force structure haemorraging itself to death I dont know what is....generally a loss rate abaove 3% per raid was considered unsustainable, and at that rate, the average monthly loss rate in the RAF was around 7.5% of the total force pool. Evidently 15% loss rates are unimportant to the Germans according to our esteemed friend.

14.99% losses are acceptable though

Even the mighty LW can not sustain that, even if it is ordered too....

Cheers
John

 

[GrauGeist]

I hate to jump in with what may seem almost off-topic at this point in the Luftwaffe versus RAF debate, but I wanted to point out an often overlooked airforce that definately needs mentioning in this poll...

The Finnish Airforce - who gets my vote not because it had state-of-the-art world-class aircraft or a gruelling pilot training program that produced hundreds of cutting edge pilots, but because they scraped together castoff, often obsolete aircraft piloted by determined men and handed the Soviet Union it's a** against great odds...

That, in my book, is what makes them the best airforce of 1939 - 1941

 

[Readie]

Of the many things I have observed regarding human nature and the psychology of competition, the following two observations come to mind and I wonder if they are not somewhat being manifested in this and other threads:

A competitor or his supporters will frequently insist "he was holding his own" until suddenly being overwhelmed even when impartial observers were aware from the beginning of a steady decline in performance that defeat was inevitable.

Victors will frequently consciously and unconsciously exaggerate the prowess of the vanquished because victory over even a worthy opponent is never enough to satisfy the human desire for a glorious victory over the almost invincible.

Yes Steve, you are right. Very thought provoking. This concept could be applied to a lot of situations not just WW2
Cheers
John

 

[Readie]

I hate to jump in with what may seem almost off-topic at this point in the Luftwaffe versus RAF debate, but I wanted to point out an often overlooked airforce that definately needs mentioning in this poll...

The Finnish Airforce - who gets my vote not because of it had state-of-the-art world-class aircraft or a gruelling pilot training program that produced hundreds of cutting edge pilots, but because they scraped together castoff, often obsolete aircraft piloted by determined men and handed the Soviet Union it's a** against great odds...

That, in my book, is what makes them the best airforce of 1939 - 1941

Yes, I see what you mean. Rather like faith, Hope and Charity.
Your example shows what advantage the home ground holds too.
Whether is determination, fear or anger that is driver it doesn't matter when you fight over your own soil.

Cheers
John

 

[ctrian]

I fail to see how they show RAF operations in a poor light....

LW- 105 , RAF -118 .The defender despite all the advantages that come with it has higher losses than the attacking force .That's definitely disappointing.As for outnumbered ,in what sense ? I was under the impression that fighters strengths were higher on the RAF side .

 

[ctrian]

I can see your version of history is fundamentally different to mine. I would dearly like to know your rasons why the germans abandoned their daylight offensive in 1940, why they all but suspended bomber operations in the latter half of 1941....

Operation Barbarossa - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[Tante Ju]

multi post

 

[Tante Ju]

Just to give one months figures on the bomber losses for the LW. according to German records, they lost 278 Bombers to all causes on the western front in April. The frontline strength of the LW at the end of March was slightly over 1800 bombers, so a loss rate of 278 aircraft represents 15.44% of the force pool. If that is not a force structure haemorraging itself to death I dont know what is....generally a loss rate abaove 3% per raid was considered unsustainable, and at that rate, the average monthly loss rate in the RAF was around 7.5% of the total force pool. Evidently 15% loss rates are unimportant to the Germans according to our esteemed friend.

It would be very heavy loss if it would be truth. It is not. Number already given 58 bomber destroyed against England during night, about 5 in day time in April 1941. Your numbers are fantasm category.

 

[Readie]

It would be very heavy loss if it would be truth. It is not. Number already given 58 bomber destroyed against England during night, about 5 in day time in April 1941. Your numbers are fantasm category.

There is a lot of stat's bending by the LW team.
Goering gave up simply because he had driven the LW to exhaustion.
And, to be fair, the RAF got a lucky break.
Cheers
John