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At the same time they had to push the german fighter groups back from the Channel, which they achieved, at great cost, but they were successful eventually.
The Germans retained a qualitative advantage especially in the expereience of their pilots, but in terms of organizational skills, I dont see anything that compares with Fighter Command, until the reorganization of the Reich Defences and the establishment of the Kammhuber line in 1942-3. Until then, the Luftwaffe, whilst enjoying a significant qualitiative advantage in its personnel, did not have the organizational skills to match.
I'm pointing out that the side which had the home advantage won.RAF in BOB , Luftwaffe in mainland Europe.Only massive numerical difference could change that.Not ''organization''.
By the way what happened to the organization of Fighter Command vs the Channel geschwader?
Pushed back..? Huh? Most fighter unitstransferred to the Ostfront in early 1941. A couple of Wing remained. Those remained in the exact same spot for years, essentially fighting like guerllas in the air. I do not understand what you are talking.
Ratio of loss was 1-5 favour of Jagdgruppen, despite outnumbered. RAF was not outnumber in 1940.. it outnumbered attacking fighters in contrast and had poorer results. Of course advantage of Germans was they had nothing to defend in France. Bombing of France by English..? It is a favour for German. France is enemy country.. they can sunbath in airfield, sip beer, watch show. British couldnt do, when London was attacked, they had to fly.
I do not think this so simple. The UK had centralized fighter defense system with radars, Germany had a de-centralized fighter defense system with radars. At start of war. The latter worked well enough, Bomber Command forced to cease daylight bombing. Centralised system was better for defense against massed raids, but British system was hardly perfection, it could scramble fighters from a Group, even scramble-able, guided Squadrons number was limited.. but otherwise was rigid area defense.. 11 Group and 12 Group not even working together at all. British had not one home defense system but four! Complete human stupidity and rivalry between leaders, otherwise easily possible. Technically it was limited, radar operator can not tell true altitude, nor could tell true numbers of enemy aircraft - vital elements - too poor training, too poor equipment (big wavelenght CH radar, more primitive, early radar). Completely blind over land - radar only sees to sea. Organistation, "Big Wing" controversy is well known. Some UK leaders realized need for centralised fighter, bomber etc. force. Like Germans already did. British organisation and planning, scramble relied on small Squadron, German already on Big Wing (Gruppe). Different words - German already had system which routinly concentrated force into large units. USA, USSR similiar structure. Only UK relied on ad hoc grouping of Squadrons in 1940-41.. No doubt it was backward practice of WW1. Speaking WW1 - Red Baron already realised that, used Big Wing tactics as English call. In reality, idea present from immerial times: concentration of force. Napoleon was one master of it.
What is a "Home Advantage".
Their blitz offensive had become prohibitively expensive.
Along the channel frontiers, the two geschwaders battling the 6 or so squadrons tasked with attritioning them down, were suffering some humilating defeats, or at least not shooting the RAF down as one sidedly as usual. this led to a decision in July to the Luftwaffe pulling back from the frontier near the channel ports. This was followed by other withdrawals from other sectors of the coast.
By forfeiting control of the airspace over the channel, except in certain sectors, the LW were being denied the ability to challenge the control of the Channel, and were denied the possibility of restarting their offensive over England.
It rendered safe the bases of bomber command, and paved the way for the commencement of the great offensive that destroyed the Luftwaffe really.This was all done at great cost, admittedly, but it was also done from a position of overall numerical inferiority, not superiority.
Ctrian, an over simplification, sorry, as for your final point, I assume you are talking operations in 1941 on?
This is a fallacy2) The 'Big Wing' was an effective use of resources.
This is a fallacy
JG2 and JG26 wiped the floor with Fighter Command despite being outnumbered ,using aircraft with same performance and the Brits having the element of surprise.That's how important home field advantage really is.
when have you ever heard of engaging the reserves before the main force , Park and Dowding were running a war and and Bader didn't like the rules .Says who?
Wiped the floor ? That is plainly not true. Even stevens with occasional ascendency but neither side wiped the floor with the other, its nonsense to even suggest that.
You need to read more.
The Spitfire - An Operational History - 4. Into France
RAF Fighter Command - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The year 1941 saw RAF Fighter Command claim some 711 Luftwaffe fighters shot down (although only 236 were lost
from all causes, 103 in combat) for losses of approximately 400 RAF fighters lost.
The most notable offensive battle took place over Dieppe, France Although the RAF succeeded in preventing the
Luftwaffe from interfering with the shipping, which was its primary aim,
its perceived success was misleading. Despite claims at the time that more German aircraft than British had
been shot down (106 kills were claimed by the RAF) postwar analysis showed 88 Spitfires were lost for just
23 Luftwaffe fighters and 24 bombers shot down.
1942 statistics yielded 560 claims (272 German fighters were
lost from all causes) for 574 RAF day fighters destroyed
Source is given as 'The JG 26 War Diary' (Volume 1), Caldwell .That is a well known author on Luftwaffe history ,i have his book (with Muller) ''The Luftwaffe over Germany''.I also have ''The right of the line'' and it says the same.
when have you ever heard of engaging the reserves before the main force , Park and Dowding were running a war and and Bader didn't like the rules .
I shall quote you some different figures later on. I dispute your 'wiping the floor' claim. Maybe something is getting lost in the translation here...
Cheers
John
JG2 and JG26 wiped the floor with Fighter Command despite being outnumbered ,using aircraft with same performance and the Brits having the element of surprise.That's how important home field advantage really is.
when have you ever heard of engaging the reserves before the main force , Park and Dowding were running a war and and Bader didn't like the rules .
Bader was proved right. I'll quote you sources later on tonight.
'reserves'?...we were on our uppers.
Cheers
John
The RAF as my Dad would say" couldn't hit a cow in the ass with a scoop shovel" in 1939 -40 with their bombing, the fighter tactics with area tactics was dated and outmoded , had coastal command even sunk a U boat during this period . I give the RAF a reluctant 3rd barely ahead of the US and Italy