Best Air Force 1943-1945

[drgondog]

Parsifal - you are eloquent in the demacation/discriminant issues but both you and Buffnut slide away from US Airpower versus Brit (non Commonwealth) Airpower, including explicitly USAAF, USN, USMC vs RAF and FAA.

For clarity, focusing on only upon skills and ability to project power independent upon which nation provides the aircraft and fuel, stick strictly with organized squadrons if you choose and make your first cut on just the RAF and USAAF. I was actually surprised that USAAF group level (similar to US Army Division sanctity of organization) strength in July 1943 was only several groups below mid 1945 - a distinct highlight to how fast the US mobilized to planned strength after being in direct conflict for only 18 months.

US Bomber squadrons TOE were four squadrons (12 plus per operational mission) per bomb (VH, H. M/L) group, three squadrons(16 plus per operational mission) per Recce and Fighter Group and four squadrons per ATC group. The USAAF statistics only discusses 'Groups' not operation aircraft per Group. In July 1943 the B-17 and B-24 Groups were 36 Core Strength and 48 TO&E. In July 1944 the Core strength was 48 heavy/medium bombers and 72 TOE - the Fighter groups were 48 Core/66 TOE growing to 72 TOE in July 1944. That will help in comparing squadron discriminant RAF with USAAF Group displacement.

In mid 1943 I believe the USN and USMC had a combined 200+ Squadrons by mid 1943 ---- equating to ~ 200/3 = 66 'Groups' to add to USAAF 235+ groups ------------> 235x3 + 66x3 = 903 - 980 squadrons based on mixed TO&E of 3-4 sqdn/group

 

[buffnut453]

No, Drgondog, you're the one who expanded the discussion to include USN and USMC to suit your agenda. This thread was about "Best AF" not "Best overall capability across all air arms".

As for the rest of your post, once again, you're just summing up a numbers game - surprise, surprise, the larger nation with the stronger economy that hasn't been at war for so long (and hence had more time to prepare) and whose homeland isn't under regular attack is able to produce a larger air force. That's not rocket science but neither is it a valid assessment of ability. As already noted, we're not arguing about the Soviet air force even though that was very large. To take a modern example, how would you compare the air forces of Russia, China, India, Israel and the UK? They vary greatly in size and in capability, part of which is technical, and part is training and doctrine. Pick the "best" out of those?

 

[parsifal]

DG

I accept your superior knowledge in this area of debate, but I do have some knowledge concerning mobilization rates and deployments, and really am trying to avoid "argument" for arguments sake. Really what I am trying to do is pool knowledge to arrive at a better understanding.

Just for clarity, incidentally, I was relying on Ellis statistical summaries in my posts. he doesnt give summaries of US squadrons, which is frustrating, but he does give summaries of frontline strengths for both the RAF and the USAAC. I had to do a squadron based calculation for the CW units, because their frontline strengths were not listed, just the numbers of squadrons.

With regard to the US naval air forces, I will explain in a minute why I did not consider them, but for clarity I have not included them in the RAF totals. If they were you need to add another 1194 to that land based total. The FAA at that time had 84 front line squadrons on establishment

That all said, I would simply draw your attention to an issue that will draw this rapid expansion of the USAAC into focus. It was a similar expansion to that which was occurring for the US army field formations at the time. The US army upon mobilization was expanded from about 12 divs to about 70 divs in less than a year, but this did not mean that at the end of 1942 the Americans had 70 Divs combat ready. Far from it. In fact by the end of 1942, they were able to field about 1 corps of troops for front line combat, so in reality, depite all the expansion that was going on, the abilities of the US forces was still quite limited. The US was hard pressed to put into the field the forces they did at Torch, and this was essentially a Corps level operation. By the time they got to Sicily, they were able to field an army level operation. by the time they got to Normandy, the Americans were fielding the equivalent of an army group, and by the time of the Ardennes this had expanded to two army groups, plus of course a single army in Italy.

My opinion is that the expansion of the AAC mirrored this expansion. In 1942, despite all the mnassive expansions in personnel and equipment, the US forces in the ETO were extremely limited in their ability to put frontline forces into the field. The first bombiong operations were at Squadron strength, and IIRC were in July 1942. Fighter operations over the continent were not implemented until the end of the year, in miniscule proportions. Fast forward to six months later and the situation had changed considerably, but compared to RAF/CW ops was still extremely modest. The massive expansions that you are referring to are correct....but in June 1943 they were still not having any effect on the battle per se, because most of these formations were simply not ready. Within 6 months that situation had changed dramatically, I will grant you that.

The problem for the US was in the relatively small size of its starting force, and the need to continually break up formations to act as cadres for the next crop of new formations. This was as true for the AAC as it was for the ground formations.

So even though the AAC was as big as the RAF, if not bigger, in June 1943 it was still a force that needed to time to build up its experience and consolidate its expansion. I was aware that the AAC reached its peak strength oin July 1943, but this raw figure is somewhat misleading IMO, because it fails to take stock of the massive expansion the AAC had undergone so recently. You cannot do that and expect your forces to be immedialtey ready for heavy duty combat.

With regard to the Naval aviation issue, I am not ignoring it, but the the initial brief given for this thread was that we were to exclude Naval Air Arms in our discussions. For this reason we cannot consider the IJN air force, neither can we consider the FAA or the USN air coprs or, I guess, the USMC air formations. If that were the case, I thik the equation would change as you say. We are simply restricted to assessing the land based air forces

 

[parsifal]

Without Commonwealth Forces the RAF would be a very hard pressed service, maybe on par with the Italians .

I'd have to disagree with that. We can look at the frontline strengths and capabilities of the italians at any period, and they will always be inferior to the RAF excluding the effects of the dominions and the exiles at any period. The only proviso I would put on that is that the the RAF sent the majority of its training establishments overseas, to Austrlia, Canada, the US and South Africa mainly, though the personnel remained predominantly British until after 1943.

I admit , as I did to DG, that I wouild not know how to separate colonial manpower from British manpower for the RAF, so in these respects, if you have information to claify, I would be most grateful.

However, on those formations badged as "RAF", your position simply does not stack up to closer scrutiny. If we look at December (I do have figures for September 1943 for the italians, but I think this would be unrepresentative to do that) we find the RAF with a front line strength of 5257 aircraft, whilst the Italian air force had a front line strength of 1416, of which just 597 were serviceable. Many of the fighters were biplanes, many of the bombers unarmoured trimotor aircraft fast approaching obsolesence. Ther is no possibility of the Italian air force being even remotely comparable to the RAF, even with the Commonwealth component being excluded

The Italians were training less than 2000 repolacement aircrew per year, at a time that the RAF and the Commonwealth were training over 40000. If we assume (unreasonably IMO) that the Commonwealth were training about half of that 40000, that still leaves 20000 that can be attributed to the RAF personnel. You cannot seriously raise the italian air force as a cdreible challenge to the RAF with those numbers infront of us.

 

[pbfoot]

I admit , as I did to DG, that I wouild not know how to separate colonial manpower from British manpower for the RAF, so in these respects, if you have information to claify, I would be most grateful.
QUOTE]

The number tossed around here is 25% of RAF squadrons were Canadian I would not feel bad about knocking this down to 20+% , I would assume the numbers for other Commonwealth countries would not be far off proportionally giving the Commonwealth between 40-45% of RAF aircrew.
I would also disagree with the year that you state of 1944 , I would concede up to 42

 

[drgondog]

DG

I accept your superior knowledge in this area of debate, but I do have some knowledge concerning mobilization rates and deployments, and really am trying to avoid "argument" for arguments sake. Really what I am trying to do is pool knowledge to arrive at a better understanding.



With regard to the US naval air forces, I will explain in a minute why I did not consider them, but for clarity I have not included them in the RAF totals. If they were you need to add another 1194 to that land based total. The FAA at that time had 84 front line squadrons on establishment

That all said, I would simply draw your attention to an issue that will draw this rapid expansion of the USAAC into focus. It was a similar expansion to that which was occurring for the US army field formations at the time. The US army upon mobilization was expanded from about 12 divs to about 70 divs in less than a year, but this did not mean that at the end of 1942 the Americans had 70 Divs combat ready. Far from it. In fact by the end of 1942, they were able to field about 1 corps of troops for front line combat, so in reality, depite all the expansion that was going on, the abilities of the US forces was still quite limited. The US was hard pressed to put into the field the forces they did at Torch, and this was essentially a Corps level operation. By the time they got to Sicily, they were able to field an army level operation. by the time they got to Normandy, the Americans were fielding the equivalent of an army group, and by the time of the Ardennes this had expanded to two army groups, plus of course a single army in Italy.

My opinion is that the expansion of the AAC mirrored this expansion. In 1942, despite all the mnassive expansions in personnel and equipment, the US forces in the ETO were extremely limited in their ability to put frontline forces into the field. The first bombiong operations were at Squadron strength, and IIRC were in July 1942. Fighter operations over the continent were not implemented until the end of the year, in miniscule proportions. Fast forward to six months later and the situation had changed considerably, but compared to RAF/CW ops was still extremely modest. The massive expansions that you are referring to are correct....but in June 1943 they were still not having any effect on the battle per se, because most of these formations were simply not ready. Within 6 months that situation had changed dramatically, I will grant you that.

The problem for the US was in the relatively small size of its starting force, and the need to continually break up formations to act as cadres for the next crop of new formations. This was as true for the AAC as it was for the ground formations.

So even though the AAC was as big as the RAF, if not bigger, in June 1943 it was still a force that needed to time to build up its experience and consolidate its expansion. I was aware that the AAC reached its peak strength oin July 1943, but this raw figure is somewhat misleading IMO, because it fails to take stock of the massive expansion the AAC had undergone so recently. You cannot do that and expect your forces to be immedialtey ready for heavy duty combat.

With regard to the Naval aviation issue, I am not ignoring it, but the the initial brief given for this thread was that we were to exclude Naval Air Arms in our discussions. For this reason we cannot consider the IJN air force, neither can we consider the FAA or the USN air coprs or, I guess, the USMC air formations. If that were the case, I thik the equation would change as you say. We are simply restricted to assessing the land based air forces

Parsifal - all your points are well reasoned.

First I would like to say that this poll started out comparing 'Air Force' vs airforce and I pointed out, correctly in my opinion, that the question was not 'land based airforce' but 'airpower' and the ability to project strategic and tactical footprint globally... and if I recall coreectly Chris came to the same conclusion and expanded the discussion

So, here we are.

Second, I arbitrarily pointed to July 1943 because I knew that USAAF was at its near maximum strength on paper, with each of those Combat groups organized and staffed - knowing full well that the total did NOT represent actual combat deployment. Having said that it is entirely reasonable to point to front line and reserves as a tangible 'strength' and then further reference by cnversation that the US Navy, while smaller, had a very significant front line strength as well as a soon to be overwhelming reserve force - and the carriers either at sea or in final stages of construction.

July 1943 represented a point in which US forces were in combat in North Afrika, the Sicily invasion was beginning, the 8th AF started combat ops w/A-20's and B-17s didn't hit first target until 17 August. The US forces were battling in the Aleutians, Australia and the Solomons. The Net is that US Airpower in July 1943 was very short of actual combat experienced aircrews in cntrast to the RAF. I absolutely do NOT argue that the US on July 1, 1943 had the depth of combat skills of the RAF.

A loose analogy is that combat operations were the tip of the iceberg but that no single country equaled the US from that approximate date going forward in the ability project overwhelming airpower across all theatres

- one can debate 'when' the actual delivery of that force crosses over the RAF/FAA. One can correctly state that the RAF was singularly stronger and of higher experience in ETO, one may debate MTO, and probably debate the Degree of superiority that combined USAAF/USN operations had over RAF in PTO - but remember that the Commonwealth forces constitued the greater contributions over the actual RAF in the PTO and a significant proportion in MTO and to a lesser degree in the ETO.

My thesis is, arbitrarily, this is a point where you can point to US Airpower and state "that these forces, in uniform, trained, in combat or in stages of deployment, with a manufacturing base and training and logistics system' were the most powerful air Power in the world but had yet to prove it by experience, applied weight of firepower and destructive results in the ETO.

 

[parsifal]

With the US Naval air arms in the equation, I would agree with you, the qualitative edge shifts in favour of the Us somewhat earlier. I would still argue that it was after July, but then perhaps thats being a little too precious about the issue...

Mind you, with the IJN also thrown into the equation, the world leader in the 41-42 bracket also chnages IMO. My vote under those conditions would change to the Japanese, with the Brits in a close second and the US in third position

 

[drgondog]

With the US Naval air arms in the equation, I would agree with you, the qualitative edge shifts in favour of the Us somewhat earlier. I would still argue that it was after July, but then perhaps thats being a little too precious about the issue...

It is clearly debatable (re:July 1943) but to me that is the start of the debate period - not 1944 or mid 1944. So I agree with the caveats re: RAF dominant ETO position at that time

Mind you, with the IJN also thrown into the equation, the world leader in the 41-42 bracket also chnages IMO. My vote under those conditions would change to the Japanese, with the Brits in a close second and the US in third position

I definitely agree Japan 1942 (pre Midway), with Brits number 1 (in late 1942), but my choice is LW over US..

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Parsifal - all your points are well reasoned.

First I would like to say that this poll started out comparing 'Air Force' vs airforce and I pointed out, correctly in my opinion, that the question was not 'land based airforce' but 'airpower' and the ability to project strategic and tactical footprint globally... and if I recall coreectly Chris came to the same conclusion and expanded the discussion

That I did...

I will however say that I still would prefer different threads as I had thought it would be. One discussing Air Forces, one discussing Naval Air Forces and one discussing overall Air Powers. The reason I caved in was because of popular demand...

In all actuality it would be best to have a poll with multiple questions in it. Then one could vote for best land based, best naval based, and then overall air power during that specific time period. Then it would just be one thread to discuss all of this with multiple poll questions and options. Will have to see about setting this up.

 

[Saetta66]

I'd have to disagree with that. We can look at the frontline strengths and capabilities of the italians at any period, and they will always be inferior to the RAF excluding the effects of the dominions and the exiles at any period.


I wouldn't be so sure about this. We should check confronting datas. And we should agree on which datas using.

 

[drgondog]

I agree Japan - pre July 1942 when Midway carved a huge part of IJN ability to project power and secure their holdings - was close to RAF/FAA - This period of 1939 through 1942 is one of changing fortunes. LW definitely the strongest in my opinion through 1940 qnd into 1941. Japan very strong with their Navy but 'hidden' until December 7. Whether they achieved an equal level to Germany and Great Britain? I tend to think not. They couldn't subjugate China, they swept through RAF/USAAF/USN in five months then were crushed at Midway in mid 1942 - re: their ability to project power globally.

I still tend to rank RAF, LW as one and two, with US reaching parity to Japan in mid to late 1942 and start to go offensive during Guadalcanal, into the Solomons and New Guinea. The LW question is a difficult one for me for 1942. They were stretched but still remained a very powerful force but had no ability to weaken either Russia or even Britain strategically so I rank RAF/FAA the strongest in 1942 through mid to late 1943.

 

[pbfoot]

.

I still tend to rank RAF, LW as one and two, with US reaching parity to Japan in mid to late 1942 and start to go offensive during Guadalcanal, into the Solomons and New Guinea. The LW question is a difficult one for me for 1942. They were stretched but still remained a very powerful force but had no ability to weaken either Russia or even Britain strategically so I rank RAF/FAA the strongest in 1942 through mid to late 1943.

agree 95% except IMHO (not that my opinion means squat) I give the US parity with RAF beginning 44

 

[drgondog]

agree 95% except IMHO (not that my opinion means squat) I give the US parity with RAF beginning 44

A key fact to recall is that by January 1944 the 8th AF and 9th AF in the UK represented only 32% of ALL US deployed combat groups and still had not achieved parity with the MTO with respect to either the number of aircraft or personnel, or in tons of bombs dropped.

You don't fall into this category but many folks gain a sense for the strength of the RAF in England (its center of Gravity) and compare only to 8th and 9th AF in late 1943 but the 12th AF had been in major operations from Afrika to Sicily to Italy at the expense of growth of the 8th AF in England, and the FEAF/CBI, etc had been in combat for more than 8 months before the 8th AF flew its first mission.

That said, the combined 8th, 9th, 12th and 15th AF comprised 1/3 of all USAAF combat units, the CONUS had 1/3 prepared and deploying into combat and the rest (FEAF/CBI/Aleutians/Atlantic-SA) had 1/3. The USN/MC had approximately 1/3 of the USAAF with a lighter mix of aircraft.

I have no problem stretching the discussion of 'parity' from mid through late 1943... for one definition of combat a/c deployed the US will cross over in latter 1943, in context of bomb tonnage the RAF has an edge (I suspect) through summer 1944, in context of medium bomber, anti shipping, CAS/tactical carrier operations, long range fighter escort squadrons (P-38/F4U), air transport, the US edges Britain somewhere in 1943.

I don't have the actual statistics for RAF ops but by mid 1944 the US had far more heavy and now very heavy bomb groups in operations (B-29) so the RAF statistically is competing against all the US heavy/very heavy bomb groups across all theatres - with fewer bombers/but much heavier bomb loads.

 

[renrich]

An interesting point is that quite a few Allied pilots other than Americans were trained in the US during the war. Number Five British Flying Training School opened for business in September of 1941 in Clewiston, Florida. I don't know how many Brits were trained there but it was still open in February of 1945. 5924 American and French pilots were trained during 1941-45, at Hawthorne School of Aeronautics, Orangeburg, South Carolina.

 

[pbfoot]

An interesting point is that quite a few Allied pilots other than Americans were trained in the US during the war. Number Five British Flying Training School opened for business in September of 1941 in Clewiston, Florida. I don't know how many Brits were trained there but it was still open in February of 1945. 5924 American and French pilots were trained during 1941-45, at Hawthorne School of Aeronautics, Orangeburg, South Carolina.

about 16000 Brits were flight trained in US and 45000 in Canada

 

[Glider]

Just a couple of observations

a) Six British Flight Training Schools (BFTS) were set up in the USA and between June and August 1941 they started training their first students. About 1000 US pilots were trained in these schools and the training was slightly more extensive than in the USAAF schools

b) During the war approx 18,000 RAF pilots were trained in the USA at both the RAF training schools and under the Arnold Scheme at USAAF training schools.

 

[Milosh]

The BCATP aircrew graduates numbered 131,553 from Oct. 1940 to March 1945. Does not include 5,296 RAF/FAA prior to July 1942 in Canada.

RCAF - 72,835
RAF/FAA - 42,110
RAAF - 9,606
RNZAF - 7,002

 

[parsifal]

The figures quoted appear to only include those aircrew that trained at some time in Canada. In fact the scheme included many other smaller locations and some countries undertook training programs outside the scheme, so this figure is somewhat less than the numbers trained worldwide under the BCATP and its various derivatives as well as the national programs undertaken by countries of the Commonwealth.

According to Alan Stephens ("The Royal Australian Air Force"), under the scheme, the UK was to recruit and train four-ninths of the RAF's annual aircrew requirements. The remaining five-ninths was to be apportioned across the Dominions as follows:-
Australia 36%
Canada 56%
New Zealand 8%

The Royal Australian Air Force trained 27,899 men through the Empire Air Training Scheme, and a further 11000 or so outside of that scheme. If Miloshes figure of 9606 is correct for the RAAF contribution to the Canadian program, then a substantial amount of training was completed outside of Canada (though his figures dont seem to gel completely with my understanding of the proportions) Prior to the scheme the RAAF had trained about 50 pilots per year, plus there were 450 Australian pilots serving in the RAF directly from 1939. Seven-ninths of the RAAF's intake were trained in Australia (all Elementary and some Advanced) with the remaining two-ninths trained in Canada (Advanced). The RAAF had to provide airfields, aircraft, instructors etc to allow this all to happen

In Australia the scheme was simply known as the EATS scheme. By 1945, more than 37,500 Australian aircrew had completed training either within or outside of the EATS; a majority of these, over 27,300, graduated from schools in Australia directly under the EATS, with some of that number receiving advanced training in Canada. Many others were also were trained under article 15, the majority of the European deployed personnel received their training directly in Europe, presumably in England. The duration of World War II saw 15,746 RAAF pilots, navigators, wireless operators, gunners and engineers sent to British squadrons and 11,641 to Australian squadrons from the EATS, and a further 11000 or so trained outside of EATS for direct use by the RAAF

Perhaps some of the confusion arises because schemes outside Canada were not actually known as BCATP with a number of countries retaining some home based training outside of the EATS schemes as indicated in the Australian experience that I have outlined above. In South Africa, the scheme was termed the Joint Air Training Scheme (JATS). Under this scheme, 38 South African–based air schools would be employed to train Royal Air Force, SAAF and other allied air and ground crews. This scheme during its five year existence, was ultimately to turn out a total of 33,347 aircrew, including 12,221 SAAF personnel. Not all of this number were trained under the BCATP.

The Rhodesian Air Training Group (RATG), operating 1940–1945, was set up as part of the overall Commonwealth Air Training Plan. Again, some of its numbers need to be considered as a separate subtotal to the Canadian based schools principally because some personnel completed their advanced training outside of Canada, and also because some personnel were trained outside the BCATP scheme. The trainees came mainly from Great Britain but also from Australia, Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, USA, Yugoslavia, Greece, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Fiji and Malta. There were also pupils from the Royal Hellenic Air Force in training. Over 7,600 pilots and 2,300 navigators were trained by the RATG during the war.

In the case of Canada, at the conclusion of the war, over 167,000 students, including over 50,000 pilots, trained in Canada under the program from May 1940 to March 1945. While the majority of those who successfully completed the program went on to serve in the RAF, over half (72,835) of the 131,553 graduates were Canadians. I do not have figures on how many Canadians were trained outside of the BCATP.

In the US CATPs were set up after so many US citizens crossed the border prior to December 1941, to undergo training. This was a cause for considerable embarrassment for both the Canadians and the Roosevelt administration. Prior to Pearl Harbor, training centres were made available for the RAF; by war's end, 16,000 RAF aircrew were trained in the United States. After Pearl Harbor, 1,759 American members of the RCAF transferred to the armed forces of the United States, another 2,000 transferred later on, and about 5,000 completed their service with the RCAF

I don't have final figures for training undertaken directly in the UK, but it may be as high as 22000 aircrew every year.

During the war, the RNZAF contributed 6940 personnel to the BCATP, including 2,743 fully trained pilots to serve with the RAF in Europe, the Middle East, and Far East. More than 2,700 wireless operator/air-gunners, 1,800 navigators, and 500 bombardiers passed through the Initial Training Wing before proceeding to Canada. Of the 131,000 trainees who graduated in Canada under the Commonwealth Air Training Plan, New Zealanders formed 5.3%.

Another 1,521 pilots and an unknown number of other aircrew completed their training in New Zealand outside the BCATP, and were retained in country; either as instructors, staff pilots, or manning operational squadrons formed during the latter half of the war. My best estimate is that about 3800 personnel were given some form of aircrew training outside the EATS scheme in New Zealand.

In 1940, before the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan was fully developed, New Zealand also trained 183 observers and 395 air gunners for the RAF. From 1943 onwards, the training of wireless operator/air gunners, and navigators was carried on in New Zealand for Pacific operations.

Clearly therefore, the figures quoted for the BCATP, whilst representing a substantial portion of the Commonwealth air training shemes does not represent the total training program.

 

[renrich]

There are some interesting anecdotes about the language barrier when training French student pilots in the Stearman. One instructor reversed the ususal seating position, with the instructor sitting in the aft cockpit so he could beat the student over the head with a rolled up newspaper when he did something wrong.

 

[Milosh]

parsifal, those numbers were for Canada.
from 'Wings of Victory' Spencer Dunmore