Best Air Force 1943-1945

[Readie]

John - nothing to disagree with but here is a question:

If the best airforce in 1943 boiled down to one aircraft each instead of the necessay tens of thousands (plus crews and logistics)
wouldn't the luftwaffe with
Me 262, Ta 152, Ar 234, He 277, FW 190F-8, Ju 88 (plus all the necessary variants) and Ju 52 (plus throw in whatever you wish)
be the 'best'?

Hi,
The German technical advances were incredible, even more so given the raw material shortages.
My Dad was a POW in Germany and he used to say how amazing the ME262 was, quiet and fast compared to the piston engined fighters when they flew over his camp.

The Dornier Do 335 Pfeil was another German idea that was advanced , maybe too much for the work it would have to do?

Then again we have the Soviet Yak 9 which was the most mass-produced Soviet fighter of all time. It remained in production from 1942 to 1948, with 16,769 built (14,579 during the war). It was the first Soviet aircraft to shoot down a Messerschmitt Me 262 jet.
Does this make the Yak9 the best fighter?

We have overlooked the Italian Macchi C205V Veltro too. Another beautifull aeroplane.

So hard to say one way or the other !

Cheers
John

 

[parsifal]

clearly, technology is not the only determinant of "best". Your questiuon DG puts the issue more succinctly than any amount of debate ever could.

Technological achievement is not a measure of "best". But then, neither is quantity. In the same line of reasoning that it cannot be argued the Luftwafe was the best by reason of its technology, neither can it be argued that the VVS was the best by reason of its quantity. Both have a role to play in determining "best".

But even if you combine technology and quantity, do you still have the full ingredients to determine the best air force? My opinion is that you dont. How an air force uses its technology and its numbers is also a factor. "How" in my opinion covers doctrine and pilot training, perhaps even serviceability issues.

Each one of these factors are what are called force multipliers. If you have numbers, then in combat you have the ability to gang up on enemy fighters in the air, sustain operations for longer, put a heavier tonnage of bombs over the target. If you have the qualitative edge you have the ability to absorb a greater proportion of enemy resources to bring your force under control....and theoretically, if your force is sufficiently advanced in technology, the enemy simply will not be able to contain you. If you have the technique, you may be able to maintain a high serviciability rate, or have pilots that can fly rings around your opponent, or hit targets on the ground with deadly accuracy.

The question is, which one of these elements are needed to achieve "best"? I think you need elements of all of them. Who had the best balance of these ingredients. I think the USAAF had the best mix, but not by as much as I believed when this thread was started....,

 

[Readie]

Good point.
Another measure would be resiliance.
How robust the aircraft were,firepower, how determined the pilots and everyone else involved were,the will to fight, effective tactics and leadership, effective planning, technology....etc. The best non thread example would be the Battle of Britain.
Back on thread May I suggest :-

- Mosquito bomber attacks by the RAF. An example of the tremendous accuracy achieved by Mosquitos can be shown by comparing figures for the attacks on the V-weapons sites. The average tonnage of bombs required to destroy one of these sites by B-17 Flying Fortresses was 165; for B26 Marauders it was 182 tons and for B25 Mitchells 219 tons. The average for the Mosquito was just under 40 tons!

My 'best'

Cheers
John

 

[syscom3]

3) The Lancaster was the most versatile heavy bomber of WW2

And the B-29 wasnt?

US industrial strength GB ingenuity.

Quantity has a quality all of its own.

 

[Readie]

1) The B17 was a close match.
The Lancaster pips it though due to the variety and size of bomb load it could carry.
Both aircraft were excellent and I may be accused of splitting hairs...

2) Maybe, but when you have less you have to be more ingenious.

 

[drgondog]

clearly, technology is not the only determinant of "best". Your questiuon DG puts the issue more succinctly than any amount of debate ever could.

Technological achievement is not a measure of "best". But then, neither is quantity. In the same line of reasoning that it cannot be argued the Luftwafe was the best by reason of its technology, neither can it be argued that the VVS was the best by reason of its quantity. Both have a role to play in determining "best".

But even if you combine technology and quantity, do you still have the full ingredients to determine the best air force? My opinion is that you dont. How an air force uses its technology and its numbers is also a factor. "How" in my opinion covers doctrine and pilot training, perhaps even serviceability issues.

Each one of these factors are what are called force multipliers. If you have numbers, then in combat you have the ability to gang up on enemy fighters in the air, sustain operations for longer, put a heavier tonnage of bombs over the target. If you have the qualitative edge you have the ability to absorb a greater proportion of enemy resources to bring your force under control....and theoretically, if your force is sufficiently advanced in technology, the enemy simply will not be able to contain you. If you have the technique, you may be able to maintain a high serviciability rate, or have pilots that can fly rings around your opponent, or hit targets on the ground with deadly accuracy.

The question is, which one of these elements are needed to achieve "best"? I think you need elements of all of them. Who had the best balance of these ingredients. I think the USAAF had the best mix, but not by as much as I believed when this thread was started....,

I think your pargraphs above have been the best to date to parse the question.. and I agree including the qualifier at the very end.

 

[syscom3]

..... I think the USAAF had the best mix, but not by as much .....

If we look at April 1944 and onwards, the AAF had the right mix of everything and as the months went by, it just got stronger and stronger relative to the RAF.

If we jump to the spring of 1945, the gulf between the RAF and AAF in every category, (except night fighters and aircrew training) was staggering.

 

[buffnut453]

If we look at April 1944 and onwards, the AAF had the right mix of everything and as the months went by, it just got stronger and stronger relative to the RAF.

If we jump to the spring of 1945, the gulf between the RAF and AAF in every category, (except night fighters and aircrew training) was staggering.

Which is precisely the point I've been making since the beginning - that 1944 was the transition period where the USAAF was in the ascendent relative to the RAF. In 1943, I believe the RAF had the edge over the USAAF - not by a huge margin but it was there. The next year marked the transition, although the RAF was still able to project force on a global scale as exemplified by the build-up in Burma (a 50% increase between mid-43 and mid-44 despite preparations in Europe for D-Day). By the end of 1944, the USAAF certainly was bigger and better, and the gap continued to grow from that point forward. The years 1943-1945 were a period of transition and hence greater fidelity is probably required. The key question is why did I get so much flak for stating this exact position several pages ago 'cos it sounds to me like we're all in agreement!

 

[drgondog]

'We' aren't in agreement.

I made my argument based on early 1943 as the transition period during which USAAF/USN and USMC were delployed every where except Russia - and by mid 1943 deployed in strength total greater than RAF across ETO, MTO, PTO, US, Central and South America, Iceland, etc. Remember the assets in the continental US approached the combined assets of all of the Brits

What clearly separated RAF from US in 1943 was combat experience - not strength or quality of personnel, equipment, assets, logistics, aircraft, bases, aviation gasoline and 1943 was the year of ascendancy - not either the start of, and certainly not at the end of 1944.

Your example of assets in Burma for example, was a small fraction of assets the US had deployed in the Pacific, and the RAF had virtually nothing major to contribute to reversing the Japanese from previously conquered territory throughout the PTO. Having said this, the RAF was very important in helping prevent further Japanese incursions through Burma and into China or India.

The US (as a nation) was the primary arsenal/manufacturing base by early 1943 (including Russia - but Russia mafg quickly multiplied for themselves) and the key supplier to most of the RAF (and Commonwealth) in context of light and medium bomber, armed recce, long range patrol bombers (yes the Brits made and flew the Sunderland alongside the PBY and B-24s in the N.Atlantic) and ground support aircraft in every theatre -

What the US did not supply in any measure were the RAF heavy bomber, interceptor, or night fighter assets or 'intruder'(catch word for virtually every other role well perfromed by the Mosquito and Beaufighter) a/c

I do not know what the relative deployment strength of Brit naval air was in MTO and N.Atlantic in 1943 but suspect that Britain had more - but in the pacific, very, very little.

 

[buffnut453]

Drgondog,

And here we are back at the "we could build more therefore we're the best" argument. It's truly amazing how rapidly the reset button gets hit. Almost as quickly as people forget that one of the significant factors in the expansion of US military production prior to 1941 was armaments bought and paid for by Britain. One of the main reasons for the UK securing US manufacturing was because of the latter's geographic isolation - the US was free from attack and hence could maintain production at levels that were unsustainable by powers that were within shooting range of the Axis powers. Like production capacity, geographic location of the mother country is no measure of an Air Force's superiority!

As for some of your other comments, Burma may have been a backwater compared to US operations in the Pacific or the ongoing European theatre but it was vital to Japan. If Burma fell, China would surely follow and so Burma became the meat grinder that ate up large numbers of Japanese Army formations. My comments about Burma were to counter the assertion that the US had "unlimited" resources whereas the UK was somehow incapable of expanding, neither of which statements are correct.

Were there really more US-built light/medium bombers in the RAF than there were Mosquitos? I don't think so. Nor was the US the key supplier of most ground support aircraft in every UK theatre - the Hurricanes that were so disparaged in my previous posts were primarily used for ground support in Burma during 1944 as the air defence role was given to the growing number of Spitfires in that theatre and were extensively used (indeed were the primary asset) for close air support in North Africa, although that's outside the time frame of this thread).

I think Parsifal's thread neatly defined some of the parameters of "best air force". All I've done since my first post in this thread is point out some solid examples. As Parsifal notes, the biggest isn't necessarily the best and so perhaps we need to add to his list the concept of efficiency. Tons of bombs on target per sortie is one potential measure for bombers, or we could also compare the cumulative effect (perhaps number of front-line units) delivered per head of population. However we quantify it, it may be a useful measure to consider.

 

[drgondog]

Then make your case why the British assets and force structure and footprint globally exceeds the US in 1943? And do not ignore the assets in the US for the four separate USAAF Air Forces plus Training Command plus NAVAIR just in the Continental US.

 

[buffnut453]

I'm not making that case. Once again, for the thousandth time, size does not equal "best". Am I talking to myself here? I think I'm writing in English so why is this simple concept so hard to understand?

 

[parsifal]

The huge size of the air assets kept in the US gave the US a massive base on which to draw replacement aircrew and to train the various ground echelons of their ront line forces. However, in point of fact, there was very litle difference between the support capabilities of the two air forces. The RAF organised its EATS schemes which providedd well over 200000 trained aircrew from 1940-45. By comparison, the US effort was slightly smaller, with approximately 160000 passing through their training schools.

The RAF, and its dominion subsidiaries, were a mobile force, with no difficulties in force projection. Buffnut is justified in claiming that. It had elments that were relatively static, like Bomber Command, but it also had elements that were highly mobile as well, like the RAAF Tactical air wings that provided the lions share of tactical support to Macs island hopping campaigns that ended in Borneo and on Moratai. The RAF was providing similar levels of mobility in the ETO.

If we are now talking 1943, I would have to say that in terms of both quality and quantity (front line strengths) the British air forces at that time still held the the advatage over the AAF, in just about any theatre of operations that active operations were occurring. The lions share of frontline ops by the allies were being shouldered by British and British Commonwealth forces in the ETO, in the MTO, in the CBI, and the SPac TO. US probably held dominance in in the PTO, and the SWPac, as well as the North Pac, but these later TOs were really sideshows compared to what was being undertaken in the British dominated TOs. In terms of quality/effectiveness, that is a much more subjective argument, and my own personal observations are probably les accurate than many others in this place. however, for the record, my opinion is that again the US air forces in 1943 cannot quite claim to be on par with the British air forces, though the gap was rapidly narrowing. There will be many who disagree with that, and really, if we want to be honest about this issue, its all but impossible to argue either case forcefully

 

[drgondog]

Parsifal - all pretty true when Commonwealth assets and forces are combined with Great Britain.

Strip the Commonwealth from the equation and just deal with RAF/FAA deployed assets compared to the US and point to Jan 1943, then July 1943. Discuss the Commonwealth pilot training in the US as part of the Training Command structure in 1943.

My thesis is that the cross over was mid 1943 by what ever objective and subjective criteria you want to use - including the rapid transfer of LW assets from Ost and Sud fronts to fortify first LuftMitte, then create LuftReich - which was a dominant and massive re-inforcement of single engine and twin engine day fighter forces to defend against USAAF daylight strategic operations in the ETO and MTO.

I have not claimed that the US airpower was superior to British airpower in ETO or MTO - I stated that is was superior by mid 1943 in force projection Globally - combined in assets deployed and fighting as well as strategic reserve able to rapidly project and execute operations anywhere required.

And yes Buffnut, capacity is a HUGE part of the quality of airpower during WWII. When one tries to compare capability you have to consider a.) size and relative assets to the strategic mission, b.) quality and skills of the individuals and teams, c.) the amount of time (less is better) required to identify an opportunity and deploy forces to secure the objective, and d.) the assets and wherewithal to support the multiple missions and infrastructure as required.

The US was clearly ahead of Great Britain in every aspect except heavy bomber capacity and at or close to par on quality and skills.. and heavy bomber assets rapidly closed with RAF when you consider the many different USAAF's Bomber Commands deployed world wide from China to SWP, to Aleutians to MTO, to ETO, etc

One could also consider Cost - it is important but difficult to compare unless details regarding labor and capital costs are available... but try to imagine any single production line turning out a B-24 every hour or a shipbuilding infrastructure producing a Liberty ship every four days (which BTW was an important factor in survival of Britain when U-Boats were sinking all the respective 'old inventory' merchant fleets of both Britain and US.

 

[buffnut453]

If we take Parsifal's well-reasoned case as being valid for 1943 and accept that the USAAF was superior in 1945, we are left with 1944 as the year of transition. During that year, aside from changes to their relative sizes, what were the major capability enhancements implemented by both forces? I can start the list but I'm happy for others to add items:

USAAF
1. Availability of long-range escort for its day bomber force, which was primarily centred (at least in ETO) on the Mustang.
2. Introduction of the B-29 during the second half of the year.

RAF
1. Formation of 2 TAF which provided outstanding close air support during the advance through Europe.
2. Introduction of the Meteor during the second half of the year.

Overall, the increase in USAAF combat experience, coupled with the 2 main force capability enhancements introduced in 1944 means that, certainly, by the middle of the year USAAF superiority can be argued but, as Parsifal points out, much of this is subjective.

 

[drgondog]

Buffnut - two points you strive to make are invalid. The first is ignoring USN Fleet and NAVAIR as well as USMC as well as Continental US assets - as if they are irrelevant to a Global Airpower discussion. The second point is that you continually try to bring the comparison to Europe.

In the context of JUST the USAAF.
The number of combat groups grew from 171 in Jan 1943 to 238 in July 1943 to 218 in Jan 1944 and then to 235+- for the remainder of the war.

United States Army Air Forces in World War II

You will note that July 1943 was the high water mark for combat group strength, not 1944, not 1945.

Further in July 1943 the USSAF had 3 VHBG (1st B-29s in US), 76 HBG(34 in ETO/MTO), 35 M/LBG (20 in ETO/MTO), 79 FG (37 in ETO/MTO), 23 ATC Transport Gp (11 ETO/MTO), 23 Recce Gp (6 ETO/MTO).

The July 1943 combined combat groups represented a growth from 171/(0 in MTO/ETO) in Jan 1943 to a near PEAK 238 (69 in MTO/ETO) in July 1943

Contrast that with Jan 1944 (218/103 in ETO/MTO) to July 1944 (235/(149 in ETO/MTO) It wasn't until January 1945 that the USAAF peaked at 242 Combat Groups - 18 months after July 1943 and only 4 combined Combat Groups.

Throughout the war from July 1943 to April 1945 the USAAF allocated from 30% (July 43) to MTO/ETO to 58% (Apr 1945) for ETO/MTO.

So comparing RAF/FAA to just ETO/MTO USAAF combat Groups is ridiculous and I contend that in July 1943 that US Airpower assets were far in access of Britain and remained so for the rest of the war

 

[drgondog]

If we take Parsifal's well-reasoned case as being valid for 1943 and accept that the USAAF was superior in 1945, we are left with 1944 as the year of transition. During that year, aside from changes to their relative sizes, what were the major capability enhancements implemented by both forces? I can start the list but I'm happy for others to add items:

USAAF
1. Availability of long-range escort(the P-38 started combat operations in 1942 and was the principal USAAF long range fighter in ETO/MTO in Dec 1943. It was complimented by F4U in PTO both of which had far more range capability than any RAF fighter for its day bomber force, which was primarily centred (at least in ETO) on the Mustang.
2. Introduction of the B-29 during the second half of the year At the time of Ops from China in June 1944 there were 21 B-29 and B-32 Bomb Groups either in combat or transitioning to Pacific and 74 more B-24 and B-17 BG in operations globally. A year earlier the USAAF 76 Heavy Bomb Groups - 34 in Europe and Afrika.

RAF
1. Formation of 2 TAF which provided outstanding close air support during the advance through Europe.To compliment 9th and 12th AF Tac Air in ops (along with RAF Desert AF and MTO ops prior to 1944) - as well as every USN/USMC and USAAF FG in PTO providing CAS as part of their day to day responsibilities. Your point?
2. Introduction of the Meteor during the second half of the year. Nice V-1 killer. and??

Overall, the increase in USAAF combat experience, coupled with the 2 main force capability enhancements introduced in 1944 means that, certainly, by the middle of the year USAAF superiority can be argued but, as Parsifal points out, much of this is subjective.

Then stick to quantitative?

 

[parsifal]

Parsifal - all pretty true when Commonwealth assets and forces are combined with Great Britain.

Strip the Commonwealth from the equation and just deal with RAF/FAA deployed assets compared to the US and point to Jan 1943, then July 1943. Discuss the Commonwealth pilot training in the US as part of the Training Command structure in 1943.

Its an almost impossible task to strip the Commonwealth forces away from the RAF. Something like 80 squadrons were embedded directly into the ETO commands, where squadrons possessed more than 50% colonial components they were judged to be foreign, but there were many other squadrons with less than 50% foreign manpower but still a significant proportion of foreigners, flying as RAF squadrons. I dont think you can strip the Commonwealth forces away from the RAF equation at all easily. They need to be considered as a single entity.

The RAAF in the Pacific raises some tricky challenges to this rather cosy assumption, however. Increasingly it was equipped with American equipment, co-operated less with the RAF and more with the USAAC which it was fighting alongside to a much greater extent than it was the RAF. In this regard I would have to concede my demarcation of Commonwalth = RAF becomes a little hard to accept. But neither does it mean RAAF = USAAF. And I would say the RAAF, which was probably the least influenced by the RAF at that time, would still have considered itself having greater commonality to RAF methods than to USAAC.


I have not claimed that the US airpower was superior to British airpower in ETO or MTO - I stated that is was superior by mid 1943 in force projection Globally - combined in assets deployed and fighting as well as strategic reserve able to rapidly project and execute operations anywhere required.

Are you saying the USAAC was more mobile as a force than the Commonwealth forces? I am not sure if you are, but if you are, then I would say that for the areas outside of Europe that may be true, but for areas within Europe (which for me includes the MTO) I would say it is untrue. And given that the ETO and MTO was soaking up 70% of allied airpower at that time (excluding the US home commands) then the relative importance of that Pacific advantage gets drawn into focus

The US was clearly ahead of Great Britain in every aspect except heavy bomber capacity and at or close to par on quality and skills.. and heavy bomber assets rapidly closed with RAF when you consider the many different USAAF's Bomber Commands deployed world wide from China to SWP, to Aleutians to MTO, to ETO, etc

In the numbers game, the USAAF was at best, only about equal to the RAF (and its subsidiaries) throughout most of 1943. The following figures only include combat front line strengths I have not included the various training commands, which does tip the balance in favour of the US at this time (mid 1943).

The US was still getting into full stride in 1943. In 1942, for example, the Commonwealth managed to churn out over 40000 aircrew, compared to a still impressive 29000 in the US forces. In terms of force structures, the USAAC fielded 8586 combat aircraft in June 1943 for its overseas commands, compared to 6026 in the RAF (including those forces in the UK that can be termed "front line"), organised into 384 Sdns. However, to this total needs to be added the various minor air forces that were either partially or wholly manned by foreigners serving under RAF control (very nominally in the case of the pacific deployments). In terms of front line squadrons at least, the breakdown is something like as follows (numbers of sqns)

RAF: 384
RNZAF:16 (7 ETO)
RNorwegianAF: 5 (after 1940)
Poland (RAF): 14
RSAAF: 14 (MTO only)
RAAF: 17 (ETO) + 38 (PTO)
RCAF: 41 (ETO)
Czech: 4
Belgian: 2
India: 7 (CBI)
Netherlands 3 (ETO) + 2(PTO)
Yugoslavia: 2

I dont know if I have all the exiles that fought under RAF control, but just on the basis of these figures, and assuming an average squadron strength equivalent to the RAF, one needs to add about 2635 additional aircraft to the RAF totals. That means the Commonwealth and its exiled allies, all with clear links to the RAF had a force structure of about 8600 aircraft.

One could also consider Cost - it is important but difficult to compare unless details regarding labor and capital costs are available... but try to imagine any single production line turning out a B-24 every hour or a shipbuilding infrastructure producing a Liberty ship every four days (which BTW was an important factor in survival of Britain when U-Boats were sinking all the respective 'old inventory' merchant fleets of both Britain and US.

I would agree with all the points you are making here, but a few words of caution. The battle being fought in the Atlantic was almost as impportant to the US as it was to the British. If Hitlers U-Boats had been successful in severing the Atlantic and Carribean routes, the US economy would have been decimated almost as badly as the British. Roughly speaking it would have been halved in output. Moreover whilst the US output of merchant shipping was undeniably prodigious,. it spent much of its first two years of production simply replacing losses to the US merchant fleet that had been suffered in that first year of the US entry. Moreover, the US copuld never claim self sufficiency in ASW escort capability in the Atlantic. It was always short of an adequate number of escorts, and was always to an extent dependant on the RN and RCN to make up that deficit.

 

[buffnut453]

How does one stick to quantitative for a subjective evaluation of "best"? If the underdog beats the favourite in the Superbowl final, does that make the underdog the best all-round team? Of course not, it just means on that day, under those conditions, it was better than the adversary. It's even harder to determine which is the better of the 2 teams if they never actually faced each other in competition, which is precisely the situation here with the USAAF and the RAF. If you want quantitative measures then remove the term "best", replace it with a plethora of other alternative terms (biggest, most technically advanced in airframes, most technically advanced in aircraft systems, most mobile etc) and start a new thread for each.

 

[pbfoot]

Without Commonwealth Forces the RAF would be a very hard pressed service, maybe on par with the Italians .