Best bombs against Oil and Industrial Targets

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Lots of the following drawn from the Richard Davis spreadsheets of allied strategic bomber raids in Europe.

Based on the average bomb tonnage per attacking aircraft, consider this the quick initial list of Mosquito only raids on oil targets, from mid 1944 on, date, attacking, target. You need the raid reports to be definitive. (DD/MM/YYYY)

14/06/1944, 33, Gelsenkirchen/Buer
15/06/1944, 26, Gelsenkirchen/Buer
17/06/1944, 4, Gelsenkirchen/Buer
25/06/1944, 39, Homberg/Meerbeck
28/06/1944, 7, Gelsenkirchen/Buer
30/06/1944, 36, Homberg/Meerbeck
1/07/1944, 3, Homberg/Meerbeck
1/07/1944, 4, Gelsenkirchen/Buer
3/07/1944, 1, Homberg/Meerbeck
3/07/1944, 4, Gelsenkirchen/Buer
4/07/1944, 3, Gelsenkirchen/Buer
5/07/1944, 33, Gelsenkirchen/Buer
6/07/1944, 30, Gelsenkirchen/Buer
7/07/1944, 9, Gelsenkirchen/Buer
8/07/1944, 7, Gelsenkirchen/Buer
9/07/1944, 7, Gelsenkirchen/Buer
11/07/1944, 6, Homberg/Meerbeck
12/07/1944, 6, Homberg/Meerbeck
13/07/1944, 3, Homberg/Meerbeck
13/07/1944, 4, Gelsenkirchen/Buer
16/07/1944, 35, Homberg/Meerbeck
5/08/1944, 34, Wanne-Eikel/Krupp Treibstoff
6/08/1944, 38, Castrop Rauxel/Klocknerwerke
14/08/1944, 1, Sterkrade/Holten
15/08/1944, 2, Dortmund/Hoesch
15/08/1944, 3, Kamen/Chemischewerke
15/08/1944, 3, Sterkrade/Holten
16/08/1944, 2, Dortmund/Hoesch
16/08/1944, 2, Kamen/Chemischewerke
16/08/1944, 2, Sterkrade/Holten
17/08/1944, 1, Dortmund/Hoesch
17/08/1944, 2, Kamen/Chemischewerke
17/08/1944, 2, Sterkrade/Holten
18/08/1944, 1, Wanne-Eikel/Krupp Treibstoff
23/08/1944, 2, Castrop Rauxel/Klocknerwerke
23/08/1944, 3, Homberg/Meerbeck
25/08/1944, 2, Castrop Rauxel/Klocknerwerke
25/08/1944, 3, Homberg/Meerbeck
26/08/1944, 1, Dortmund/Hoesch
16/09/1944, 3, Dortmund/Hoesch
26/09/1944, 6, Homberg/Meerbeck
30/09/1944, 2, Sterkrade/Holten
30/09/1944, 4, Bottrop/Welheim
1/10/1944, 6, Dortmund/Hoesch
2/10/1944, 2, Dortmund/Hoesch
3/10/1944, 3, Kamen/Chemischewerke
5/10/1944, 3, Dortmund/Hoesch
9/11/1944, 6, Wanne-Eikel/Krupp Treibstoff
11/11/1944, 17, Kamen/Chemischewerke
15/11/1944, 4, Gelsenkirchen/Buer
15/11/1944, 6, Wanne-Eikel/Krupp Treibstoff
20/11/1944, 11, Homberg/Meerbeck
20/11/1944, 14, Castrop Rauxel/Klocknerwerke
29/11/1944, 29, Duisburg/Meiderich
30/11/1944, 36, Duisburg/Meiderich
8/12/1944, 28, Duisburg/Meiderich
9/12/1944, 4, Meiderich
11/12/1944, 4, Duisburg/Bruckhausen
11/12/1944, 31, Duisburg/Meiderich
11/12/1944, 45, Duisburg/Bruckhausen
15/12/1944, 3, Duisburg/Bruckhausen
17/12/1944, 3, Hallendorf/Hermann Goering
2/01/1945, 8, Castrop Rauxel/Tar
5/01/1945, 6, Castrop Rauxel/Tar
6/01/1945, 4, Castrop Rauxel/Tar
12/01/1945, 8, Rechlinghausen/Forsetzung
12/01/1945, 10, Bochum/Carolinengluck
18/01/1945, 51, Sterkrade/Holten
26/01/1945, 8, Castrop Rauxel/Tar
31/01/1945, 6, Duisburg/Bruckhausen
31/01/1945, 8, Dortmund/Hansa
1/02/1945, 8, Duisburg/Bruckhausen
12/02/1945, 11, Misburg
13/02/1945, 7, Misburg
13/04/1945, 12, Riesa

There where a lot of oil targets so sending massive waves to a single target would be a problem. Amateurs study aircraft design. Professionals study oil production.

Interesting list, the crude oil refineries in occupied Europe, but not the Benzol plants, also I am unsure the Auschwitz plant ever became operational. 109 listed targets, Richard Davis comes up with 225 targets hit, including storage facilities, by the strategic bombers but some of the entries are the result of different reports using different names for the same target.

This is to give an idea of the axis oil situation mainly in the 1943 and 1944 period. It should be noted pre war the Germans were already blending alcohol into motor fuel, creating a mix of 95% oil, 5% alcohol.

Using the Richard Davis figures the roughly 1 year of major attacks on oil targets resulted in the 8th Air Force dropping 77,150 short tons of bombs and Bomber Command 101,530 short tons, this compared with their total 1943 bomb tonnages of 44,909 and 155,721 respectively, and both were more accurate on average in 1944 than in 1943. The 15th Air Force started de facto oil targets earlier by officially attacking Ploesti marshalling yards, with bad accuracy, often hitting the refineries that surrounded the yards, again using Richard Davis the USAAF heavy bombers in the Mediterranean Theatre dropped 42,250 short tons on bombs in 1943, the 15th Air Force oil tonnage as 57,225.

The allies lacked the bombing power to really hurt German oil production in 1943, before considering the German defences would have been more effective the more predictable the targets were.

According to Richard Davis of 238,400 short tons on oil targets, 114,850 was on the synthetic oil plants, 64,150 tons on natural oil refineries, 31,940 tons on Benzol plants, and 26,000 tons on oil storage facilities.

Using the captured German documents Oil Production in Greater Germany is put at 4,652,000 metric tons in 1940, 5,542,000 in 1941, 6,368,000 in 1943 and 7,508,000 in 1943. In addition in 1943 the German army took over 700,000 tons of oil products from Romania direct, in addition to any crude oil or refined products sent to Germany. The 1939 forecast was Germany needed around 8,300,000 tons of oil products per year

Romanian Oil Production, Thousand Tons and Exports in tons columns are year / Crude Oil production / Drilling (km) / Refinery Runs / Domestic Consumption / Exports to Czechoslovakia and Germany / Exports direct to the German Army

1938 / 6610 / 288 / 6228 / 1674 / 999,240 / nil
1939 / 6240 / 256 / 5837 / 1785 / 1,285,153 / nil
1940 / 5810 / 235 / 5472 / 1862 / 1,429,807 / nil
1941 / 5577 / 253 / 5255 / 1811 / 2,885,229 / 34,351
1942 / 5655 / 339 / 5237 / 2098 / 1,822,207 / 369,452
1943 / 5266 / 344 / 4903 / 2007 / 1,795,555 / 715,749

Exports to Italy and Albania were, in tons
1938 560,475
1939 629,350
1940 342,943
1941 761,667
1942 862,179
1943 391,354

Main Source Oil and War by Goralski and Freeburg. Note they give most of their figures in barrels per day, with 7.33 barrels of crude equalling a tonne, that is metric ton. The USSBS uses metric tons for its oil figures, since they are straight from German documents.

Axis natural oil production, average barrels per day for the year 1943,
Albania 2,742
Austria 20,488
Czechoslovakia 547
France 975
Germany 13,625
Hungary 17,390
Italy 236
Holland 3
Poland 9,589
Romania 107,348

So 172,943 barrels per day or around 8.6 million tonnes per year of crude oil. However not all of the Romanian production was available to the Germans, the Romanian economy used around 40% and, unlike Hungary, the Germans were unable to change this very much. So Romania drops from around 107,000 barrels to around 64,000 barrels, and the crude oil production available to most of the axis war machine in Europe drops to 6.5 million tonnes. Also during the year the Romanians exported an average of 2,000 barrels a day to Switzerland and 266 barrels per day to Turkey, around 110,000 tonnes.

You can see what the Red Army's 1944 advance did in terms of crude oil supplies, eliminating Poland and Romania, which were 67.6% of 1943 total crude oil supplies and 56.8% of crude oil available to the non Romanian axis powers in Europe.

As of the end of 1940 Germany controlled the following crude oil refineries, output in barrels per day,
Austria 10,000
Denmark 12,200
France 151,600
Germany 68,800
Italy 57,300
Norway 1,200.

Romania could refine its own production, I am unsure of Hungary's Capacity. You can see how Germany had a substantial over supply of crude oil refineries even after the allies recaptured France. This is one reason the allied strikes did not cut production as quickly for motor fuel etc. compared with avgas, which was made in the synthetic plants.

Now to switch to the figures in the British Bombing Survey Unit, which largely reproduce the USSBS figures.

German output of finished fuels and lubricants in 1943 by process, in tonnes
Hydrogenation, 3,431,000
Fischer-Tropsch 484,000
Crude oil refineries 1,933,000
From Benzol 657,000
From Coal Tar 985,000
From Alcohol 18,000
Total 7,508,000 tonnes.

At the end of 1943 the hydrogenation plants, which made all or almost all of the avgas, production was 299,000 tons per month, up from 250,000 tons in the previous December, by April 1944 monthly production was 307,000 tonnes.

All up Germany is estimated to have imported or produced some 11,300,000 tonnes of oil products in 1943.

Year end stocks of the 3 main fuels, in tonnes
avgas, 1939 511,000, 1940 613,000, 1941 254,000, 1942 324,000 1943 440,000, 1944 146,000
motor gasoline 1939 280,000, 1940 626,000, 1941 379,000, 1942 313,000, 1943 436,000, 1944 118,000
diesel 1939 138,000, 1940 296,000, 1941 164,000, 1942 138,000, 1943 244,000, 1944 121,000. Note the 1943 reserve figure appears to be wrong, it does not reflect a reported 486,000 tons surplus of production over consumption.

Average monthly use of the fuels in 1944, avgas 116,000, motor gasoline 149,000, diesel 118,000 tonnes.

There was some 140,000 tonnes of fuel captured in Italy in 1943.

German supply (domestic production, loot and imports) in 1944 as percentage of 1943 of avgas 58%, of motor gasoline 69%, of diesel 70%.

By October 1944 the allied bombing campaign had reduced the German petroleum products output, all types, from a peak of around 700,000 tonnes in February to around 275,000 tonnes, avgas from 175,000 to around 10,000 tonnes (reading from a graph, so there is some error in the numbers). Motor gasoline to 40%, diesel about halved. All up these three fuels had dropped from around 500,000 tons in March to 125,000 tonnes in September, back up to 150,000 tonnes in November, mainly due to an extra 30,000 tonnes of avgas. From then on it was all downhill.

Leuna was credited with 51,000 tons a month in April 1944, using twice as much gas as New York did during the mid winter heating peak. Poelitz 62,000 tons was the largest plant.

It should be pointed out the Hydrogenation plants were more than just oil plants, they made other products like methanol and nitrogen. Putting the plants out of production had similar effects on the explosives supply as it did on the fuel supply, the Germans even used rock salt in the (partial) place of explosive filling.

In case you were wondering the 1943 US crude oil output was 4,125,000 barrels per day, or every 15 days the US produced as much crude oil as German controlled Europe did in a year.

Two final points,

Verrier in the book Bomber Offensive notes the US Survey of Ploesti just after it was captured concluded that at the most generous estimate the plants were capable of operating at about 10% of capacity. Overall missing rate of the bombers in the attacks was put at 7%. Verrier agrees with Speer that repeated attacks were needed, given damage from isolated raids was usually quickly repaired. The book also states Ploesti was eliminated as a strategic target on 24 July, but the strike list clearly shows raids were still launched. In addition the RAF laid around 1400 mines in the Danube between April and August 1944, dropping traffic to 1/3 normal level, over the course of a year 60% of the oil was shipped by river, note that for 3 months of the year ice prevented river transport. As a result more had to be shipped by railways already over loaded, further reducing the amount of oil received from Romania.

According to Oil and War the 1945 Romanian oil production was 95,266 barrels per day on average. Showing how it could recover.

In 1940 Egypt had an oil output of 17,773 barrels per day, that is more than Germany. Its capture, assuming the same 1943 production, would have added another 14% to axis crude oil supplies.

 

[JDCAVE]

...On Oboe: a review of the 8-Group ORB's show that about 56% (*edited from 75% earlier) of Mosquito stories on Main Force operations were abortive. The ORBs do not provide details as to why. However the records suggest that increase use of, or expansion of Oboe capability was not achievable during the latter stages of the war...

Jim

This, a table I put together for my dad's operations, October-December, 1944:

 

[Snautzer01]

It wasn't. The historical records do not support your statement. You didn't need massive waves. 200-300 bombers per target was sufficient and the USAAF and the RAF had more than sufficient heavy bomber forces for the task and still attack other targets. The problem in November-December 1944 was the weather. In the case of heavy overcast only Oboe and GH directed forces were able to conduct raids with accuracy suffice for oil targets. The German production records show that the strategic bomber forces made a serious impact on these targets.

Jim

No that is my point. What i said is that massive waves are not the answer . Read a few post above.

 

[Snowygrouch]

I've read this through carefully and it is an excellent treatise on the subject and raises new points and questions. Very well done! In my opinion, this should be submitted in a peer reviewed journal for broader distribution.

I'm not sure would I agree that an "all Mosquito" force would have the capability to put the necessary plants unless it was targeted at one or two specific plants as you allude. More significantly, perhaps the aircraft and ordinance of choice would be Tall-boy equipped Lancasters. Production of Tall-boys was particularly limited throughout the war, but perhaps specific knowledge would have elevated its use on specific oil targets. I'm only aware of a couple of raids where it was used on oil targets.

I want to make clear that I do not have "hate-on" for the Mosquito. It was a highly capable aircraft for the roles in which it was used. It was highly versatile and marvellously useful. However it had its limitations and a very large mosquito force to replace the capability of Lancasters was not realistic. It would have required more airfields, and more pilots and navigators—the most highly trained aircrew members.

On Oboe: a review of the 8-Group ORB's show that about 56% (*edited from 75% earlier) of Mosquito stories on Main Force operations were abortive. The ORBs do not provide details as to why. However the records suggest that increase use of, or expansion of Oboe capability was not achievable during the latter stages of the war.

Jim

Hi Jim,
Thats an interesting proposal, I`m not sure who would publish such a thing ?

Kind Regards

Calum

 

[JDCAVE]

Hi Jim,
Thats an interesting proposal, I`m not sure who would publish such a thing ?

Kind Regards

Calum

Canadian Journal of Military History. Or some similar publication from the UK. Ask Sebastian Cox. Air Historical Branch. We can talk about this off-line, but I think you bring up new information that merits a revisit on this and with your professional background, you have much to offer. Obviously you would have to rework it a bit to comply with their style guidelines.

Edit: British Journal of Military History:

https://bjmh.gold.ac.uk/

(turning off "pumping tires" mode)

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The Strategic Oil Bombing Campaign – Calum Douglas

The start of the allied 1944 attempts to stop German oil supply is 5 April 1944, when 206 15th Air Force bombers officially attacked the Ploesti marshalling yards, with another 24 attacking the Astra Romano refinery. The bombers returned to the marshalling yards on the 15th and 24th, the 5th of May where 99 of the attackers attacked the Telaejen pumping station, another 99 attacked 3 of the refineries and 246 attacked the marshalling yards, the 18 May raids were all against refineries. The 8th Air Force had done its first major oil raids on 12 May, Bomber Command first raid of the new campaign was on 12 June.

Note on 5 November 1943 the 8th Air Force hit the Gelsenkirchen marshalling yards with 232 bombers attacking plus 49 of the bombers attacked the Buer and 47 the Nordstern synthetic oil plants. These raids do not seem to have raised much alarm. On 30 December 653 bombers attacked the Ludwigshafen/I. G. Farben plant, again not much alarm, another 417 bombers attacked the same target in 7 January 1944. then came attacking the Dollberg refinery with 37 bombers on 3 March. Then came the major raids on 5 May, with 649 bombers hitting 5 synthetic oil plants.

The April raids by 15th Air Force could look like oil strikes or they could look like the transport plans being carried out in Italy and France. The 5 May raids were done in very good weather and looked systematic, the question being would there be any follow up. For the allies, who received very little accurate intelligence on the effects of the bombings, the fact the Luftwaffe soon started telling it units about fuel supply issues was a good pointer to the bombing was doing real damage to an important resource. Air forces are fuel intensive, a long range 1,000 Lancaster raid uses say 2,000,000 gallons or 2,000 British armoured division miles, or about the fuel needed in October 1944 for both 12th and 21st Army Groups advancing about 25 miles against resistance, given most army vehicles travel about twice the distance the army advances during the advance. In 1943/44 the port of London was reopened for fuel supplies and pipelines laid to airfields in England to cope with supply issues.

The German synthetic oil plants were near major coal fields, the crude oil refineries tended to cluster near ports. No one knows whether a systematic attack against the electricity industry would have been effective, like most systems there were the major plants, against that factories often had boilers for local heating and so had the ability to generate their own electricity.

In early 1944 the 8h Air Force made two changes to escort tactics, some fighters were allowed to range out from the bomber formations, plus there were patrolled sections as the bombers passed through and the fighters were then released to undertake other operations, like ranging out. The 8th Air Force certainly moved to an all but 1 group P-51 force, the 9th Air Force kept escorting its bombers with P-47 and P-38, the 15th P-38 and P-51.

P-51/NA-73 starts production in August 1941.
The first P-51 arrived in the UK in October 1941, 32 imported by the end of the year, squadron service started in January 1942.
Merlin 60 production begins in November 1941.
Rolls Royce makes Merlin Mustang performance estimates, April 1942.
Air Vice Marshall Linnell informs the US that Merlin Mustangs are a good idea, 9 June 1942.
3 Merlin Mustang conversions were ordered on 15 June 1942.
US/UK agreement for 1,200 Merlin Mustangs built January to October 1943, split half each, with the RAF releasing Packard Merlins from its order to the USAAF, 20 July 1942.

British order request for 120 engineless Mustang airframes a month for Britain and up to 200 a month for overseas theatres 27 August 1942. RAF talks about an order for 3,000 Merlin Mustangs, half for the RAF.

2 P-51 airframes officially accepted as XP-51B prototypes, August 1942, to await engines.
British request for bulk Merlin Mustangs 8 October 1942.
Mustang X first flight 13 October 1942.
Churchill request to Hopkins for Merlin Mustangs 16 October 1942, after 6 Mustang X test flights.
British request for 400 engineless Mustang airframes to be sent and converted to use Merlins. 5 November 1942.
XP-51B first flight 30 November 1942.

Packard production of 2 stage Merlins begin in November 1942 but over the 6 months production is 4, 1, 0, 0, 3, 1, production picks up from May 1943 on. The result is P-51 Airframes at North American awaiting engines for a time. P-51B production begins in April 1943, 1 accepted, 1 more in May then 20 in June, by end July enough have been produced to equip a fighter group and begin training, but only 52 had been delivered to the USAAF, plus in July the first 22 P-51B delivered for the RAF.

Add a couple of months to ship the aircraft to Britain.

For more Merlin Mustangs earlier bringing forward Packard's two stage Merlin production by 3 to 6 months is needed. On top of that is the time line of efforts to give the US fighters more range.

Bomber Command reports dropping 1,719 long tons of bombs on oil targets in 1940 and 576 tons in 1941, the raids ending August 1941, not surprising given the date of the Butt report. On 26/27 October 1940 an oil raid was 3 Whitleys with 3.5 tons of bombs, in 1944 similar raids were 200 aircraft with 1,000 tons of bombs.

However going to the raid reports (which need a double check) the effort in 1940 becomes 604 tons on refineries, 171 tons on oil storage facilities and 741 tons on synthetic plants, total 1,516 tons, 3,419 sorties despatched, 1643.5 attacking (some aircraft attacked more than 1 target). Of this 130 long tons were on the Hamburg refineries, Gelsenkirchen synthetic oil 170 tons, 86 tons on Leuna.

In 1941 Bomber command dropped 26 tons on refineries, 313 tons on oil storage facilities and 286 tons on synthetic plants, total 625 tons, from 975 sorties despatched, 542.5 attacking (some aircraft attacked more than 1 target) Of this 281 tons were on the Rotterdam oil storage tanks and 170 tons on the Gelsenkirchen synthetic oil.

Not exactly a major campaign against German oil sources.

Mosquitoes did not drop 4,000 pound bombs until February 1944, Bomber Command Mosquitoes dropped 1,550 tons of bombs in 1943, versus 15,160 tons in 1944

To shorten the war in Europe by early May 1944, before Overlord, requires the Germans to decide to go home. The lessons of Operation Strangle in Italy showed a transport system set up for millions of people did not need much of its capacity to handle the needs of hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Until the allies were able to undertake operations requiring German army to use more supplies and move the effects of all the transport strikes on the front line supply was small. The oil campaign cut German tactical mobility, the transport plan German strategic mobility and, in Germany, had a major impact on the economy, even if the factory was undamaged obtaining raw materials and shipping finished product became very difficult.

The allies lacked the bomb lift to go after the German oil industry until early to mid 1944, as well the defences needed to be beaten down, it also helped the allied advances captured important oil facilities.

When you divide the number of Lancaster sorties credited with bombing by the reported bomb tonnage dropped the average load was 10,065 pounds.

 

[Snowygrouch]

The start of the allied 1944 attempts to stop German oil supply is 5 April 1944, when 206 15th Air Force bombers officially attacked the Ploesti marshalling yards, with another 24 attacking the Astra Romano refinery. The bombers returned to the marshalling yards on the 15th and 24th, the 5th of May where 99 of the attackers attacked the Telaejen pumping station, another 99 attacked 3 of the refineries and 246 attacked the marshalling yards, the 18 May raids were all against refineries. The 8th Air Force had done its first major oil raids on 12 May, Bomber Command first raid of the new campaign was on 12 June.

Note on 5 November 1943 the 8th Air Force hit the Gelsenkirchen marshalling yards with 232 bombers attacking plus 49 of the bombers attacked the Buer and 47 the Nordstern synthetic oil plants. These raids do not seem to have raised much alarm. On 30 December 653 bombers attacked the Ludwigshafen/I. G. Farben plant, again not much alarm, another 417 bombers attacked the same target in 7 January 1944. then came attacking the Dollberg refinery with 37 bombers on 3 March. Then came the major raids on 5 May, with 649 bombers hitting 5 synthetic oil plants.

The April raids by 15th Air Force could look like oil strikes or they could look like the transport plans being carried out in Italy and France. The 5 May raids were done in very good weather and looked systematic, the question being would there be any follow up. For the allies, who received very little accurate intelligence on the effects of the bombings, the fact the Luftwaffe soon started telling it units about fuel supply issues was a good pointer to the bombing was doing real damage to an important resource. Air forces are fuel intensive, a long range 1,000 Lancaster raid uses say 2,000,000 gallons or 2,000 British armoured division miles, or about the fuel needed in October 1944 for both 12th and 21st Army Groups advancing about 25 miles against resistance, given most army vehicles travel about twice the distance the army advances during the advance. In 1943/44 the port of London was reopened for fuel supplies and pipelines laid to airfields in England to cope with supply issues.

The German synthetic oil plants were near major coal fields, the crude oil refineries tended to cluster near ports. No one knows whether a systematic attack against the electricity industry would have been effective, like most systems there were the major plants, against that factories often had boilers for local heating and so had the ability to generate their own electricity.

In early 1944 the 8h Air Force made two changes to escort tactics, some fighters were allowed to range out from the bomber formations, plus there were patrolled sections as the bombers passed through and the fighters were then released to undertake other operations, like ranging out. The 8th Air Force certainly moved to an all but 1 group P-51 force, the 9th Air Force kept escorting its bombers with P-47 and P-38, the 15th P-38 and P-51.

P-51/NA-73 starts production in August 1941.
The first P-51 arrived in the UK in October 1941, 32 imported by the end of the year, squadron service started in January 1942.
Merlin 60 production begins in November 1941.
Rolls Royce makes Merlin Mustang performance estimates, April 1942.
Air Vice Marshall Linnell informs the US that Merlin Mustangs are a good idea, 9 June 1942.
3 Merlin Mustang conversions were ordered on 15 June 1942.
US/UK agreement for 1,200 Merlin Mustangs built January to October 1943, split half each, with the RAF releasing Packard Merlins from its order to the USAAF, 20 July 1942.

British order request for 120 engineless Mustang airframes a month for Britain and up to 200 a month for overseas theatres 27 August 1942. RAF talks about an order for 3,000 Merlin Mustangs, half for the RAF.

2 P-51 airframes officially accepted as XP-51B prototypes, August 1942, to await engines.
British request for bulk Merlin Mustangs 8 October 1942.
Mustang X first flight 13 October 1942.
Churchill request to Hopkins for Merlin Mustangs 16 October 1942, after 6 Mustang X test flights.
British request for 400 engineless Mustang airframes to be sent and converted to use Merlins. 5 November 1942.
XP-51B first flight 30 November 1942.

Packard production of 2 stage Merlins begin in November 1942 but over the 6 months production is 4, 1, 0, 0, 3, 1, production picks up from May 1943 on. The result is P-51 Airframes at North American awaiting engines for a time. P-51B production begins in April 1943, 1 accepted, 1 more in May then 20 in June, by end July enough have been produced to equip a fighter group and begin training, but only 52 had been delivered to the USAAF, plus in July the first 22 P-51B delivered for the RAF.

Add a couple of months to ship the aircraft to Britain.

For more Merlin Mustangs earlier bringing forward Packard's two stage Merlin production by 3 to 6 months is needed. On top of that is the time line of efforts to give the US fighters more range.

Bomber Command reports dropping 1,719 long tons of bombs on oil targets in 1940 and 576 tons in 1941, the raids ending August 1941, not surprising given the date of the Butt report. On 26/27 October 1940 an oil raid was 3 Whitleys with 3.5 tons of bombs, in 1944 similar raids were 200 aircraft with 1,000 tons of bombs.

However going to the raid reports (which need a double check) the effort in 1940 becomes 604 tons on refineries, 171 tons on oil storage facilities and 741 tons on synthetic plants, total 1,516 tons, 3,419 sorties despatched, 1643.5 attacking (some aircraft attacked more than 1 target). Of this 130 long tons were on the Hamburg refineries, Gelsenkirchen synthetic oil 170 tons, 86 tons on Leuna.

In 1941 Bomber command dropped 26 tons on refineries, 313 tons on oil storage facilities and 286 tons on synthetic plants, total 625 tons, from 975 sorties despatched, 542.5 attacking (some aircraft attacked more than 1 target) Of this 281 tons were on the Rotterdam oil storage tanks and 170 tons on the Gelsenkirchen synthetic oil.

Not exactly a major campaign against German oil sources.

Mosquitoes did not drop 4,000 pound bombs until February 1944, Bomber Command Mosquitoes dropped 1,550 tons of bombs in 1943, versus 15,160 tons in 1944

To shorten the war in Europe by early May 1944, before Overlord, requires the Germans to decide to go home. The lessons of Operation Strangle in Italy showed a transport system set up for millions of people did not need much of its capacity to handle the needs of hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Until the allies were able to undertake operations requiring German army to use more supplies and move the effects of all the transport strikes on the front line supply was small. The oil campaign cut German tactical mobility, the transport plan German strategic mobility and, in Germany, had a major impact on the economy, even if the factory was undamaged obtaining raw materials and shipping finished product became very difficult.

The allies lacked the bomb lift to go after the German oil industry until early to mid 1944, as well the defences needed to be beaten down, it also helped the allied advances captured important oil facilities.

When you divide the number of Lancaster sorties credited with bombing by the reported bomb tonnage dropped the average load was 10,065 pounds.

Typo, change the 3 to a 4, on 2nd last line.

I`ve changed it, thank you.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

I've read this through carefully and it is an excellent treatise on the subject and raises new points and questions. Very well done! In my opinion, this should be submitted in a peer reviewed journal for broader distribution.

I'm not sure would I agree that an "all Mosquito" force would have the capability to put the necessary plants unless it was targeted at one or two specific plants as you allude. More significantly, perhaps the aircraft and ordinance of choice would be Tall-boy equipped Lancasters. Production of Tall-boys was particularly limited throughout the war, but perhaps specific knowledge would have elevated its use on specific oil targets. I'm only aware of a couple of raids where it was used on oil targets.

I want to make clear that I do not have "hate-on" for the Mosquito. It was a highly capable aircraft for the roles in which it was used. It was highly versatile and marvellously useful. However it had its limitations and a very large mosquito force to replace the capability of Lancasters was not realistic. It would have required more airfields, and more pilots and navigators—the most highly trained aircrew members.

On Oboe: a review of the 8-Group ORB's show that about 56% (*edited from 75% earlier) of Mosquito stories on Main Force operations were abortive. The ORBs do not provide details as to why. However the records suggest that increase use of, or expansion of Oboe capability was not achievable during the latter stages of the war.

Jim

Mosquitoes dropping 4000 lb bombs would be more than adequate to do severe damage to the oil plants. The following excerpt from the USSBS concludes that the 4000 lb bombs were far far more effective that any other bom
bs

 

[JDCAVE]

Mosquitoes dropping 4000 lb bombs would be more than adequate to do severe damage to the oil plants. The following excerpt from the USSBS concludes that the 4000 lb bombs were far far more effective that any other bom
bs
View attachment 738147View attachment 738148

Yes. I am aware that the 4,000 cookie caused significantly more damage to oil targets.

But even late war, only a portion of the Light Night Striking Force Mosquitoes were able to carry 4,000 lb cookies. And remember the cookie was not easily accurately delivered onto targets.

Below, I summarize the operation to Berlin, 7/8-March-1945.

The 8-Group Operational Order (B-Form 551) outlines the attack for "Whitebait" (Berlin) for 7/8-March-1945. (AIR 14/3133-"B"-Forms March-1945), as follows:

H-Hour was identified as 2200 Hours, an identical time as the Main Force Attack on Dessau. 9 "Y" Mosquitoes were detailed from 139 Squadron, 10 from 162, 9 from 142, 9 from 163, 12 from 608, 9 from 128, 9 from 571 and 9 from 692 for a total of 76. The "Y" Markers were to mark the aiming point with Floater T.I.'s red, igniting at 20,000' and Floater T.I.'s green, igniting at 20,000', with one mixed long-burning T.I. Red Green igniting at 13,000'. If "Y" was unserviceable, markers were to be retained and bombs dropped with Main Force. Bombers were to aim their bombs in the following order of preference: 1) LBTI Mixed Red Green; 2) Floater TI Red or Green 3) Visually or Navigation Aids. I believe "Y" Mosquitoes were equiped with H2S Mk III radar, operating on the 3 cm x-band.

Briefed bombing times were: 3 Y/139 squadron at H-4, 3 Y/139 at H-3, 3 Y/139 at H-2, with one Floater, T.I. Red bursting at 20,000', with one Floater, T.I. Green bursting at 20,000', and one mixed Long Burning T.I. Red/Green (J) + 1 500 lb. I have presumed these were dropped by each aircraft at the briefed times. 10 crews from 162 Squadron 9 from 142, 9 from 163, 12 from 608 at HO; each with 3 X 500 lb, and 1 X 500 Long Delay. 9 crews from 128 Squadron, 9 from 571, 9 from 692; each with 1 X 4,000 lb bombs.

Route: Base – Southwold - 5300N 0810E - 5235N 920E - Target - Wide Right - 5215N 1240E- 5245N 1005E - 5235N 0710E - 5205N 0540E - 5300N 0100E - Base. This route followed the same route as the concomitant Main Force attack on the northern most W-E Leg to Dessau.

The 8-Group ORB (AIR 25/154) records that 75 Mosquitoes took off, 61 attacked the primary target, 13 were abortive and 1 missing. Three H2S aircraft marked the target by means of special equipment and the markers fell across the target in quick succession with two loads close together. The middle load falling somewhat to the north of these. The floater T.I.'s were clearly visible, while the lower markers were "generally" distinguished from the numerous dummy reds, greens, and yellows (W, SW, and NW of the target) and generally forming a good glow beneath the cloud. Bomber aircraft had no difficulty in attacking either the T.I.'s cascading or their glow. All the markers received a portion of the bombing and while no ground detail could be seen, bomb flashes were observed well around the markers. An explosion was reported at 2200 hrs and several fires could be discerned through the cloud. Slight heavy flak with fighter flares at Hannover. Little Searchlight activity.

Bomber Command Night Raid Report No. 858 (AIR 14/3412) records 70.9 tons of H.E. which included 8 X 4,000 lb H.C. and 15 X 4,000 lb M.II.

I think some assume that all Mosquitoes on these raids carried 4,000 lb cookies exclusively. This was not the case on this raid, with 23 of 61 a/c dropping these bombs.

Jim

 

[33k in the air]

Bomber Command Night Raid Report No. 858 (AIR 14/3412) records 70.9 tons of H.E. which included 8 X 4,000 lb H.C. and 15 X 4,000 lb M.II.

Isn't the 4000 lb M.II the 4,000 lb HC bomb using Minol-2 as the explosive filling instead of the previously used Amatol 60-40 or RDX/TNT 60-40 fillings?

I think some assume that all Mosquitoes on these raids carried 4,000 lb cookies exclusively. This was not the case on this raid, with 23 of 61 a/c dropping these bombs.

Jim

Harris' Despatch on War Operations has this to say about the 4,000 lb MC bomb being used by Mosquitos:

In January, 1943, small supplies of these bombs became available, and operational trials were made during the next six months. The bombs were originally intended for low level bombing, a type of operation not normally undertaken by Bomber Command at this period. Small numbers of these bombs were dropped on city targets from high altitude, but accurate photographic assessment of the results was never possible, and, as 4,000-lb HC bombs were in good supply, the use of MC bombs against this type of target did not appear to be justified. During the autumn of 1944, 4,000-lb MC bombs were used by Mosquito aircraft for high altitude night bombing, as the ballistics of these weapons are much superior to those of the 4,000-lb HC bomb; it was also used with success to breach the dykes on Walcheren Island. Partly because only one could be carried by Lancaster aircraft and none by Halifaxes, however, it never became a widely used store in Bomber Command.​

Is the number of 4,000 lb HC and 4,000 lb MC bombs dropped by Mosquitos known?

 

[JDCAVE]

Isn't the 4000 lb M.II the 4,000 lb HC bomb using Minol-2 as the explosive filling instead of the previously used Amatol 60-40 or RDX/TNT 60-40 fillings?




Harris' Despatch on War Operations has this to say about the 4,000 lb MC bomb being used by Mosquitos:

In January, 1943, small supplies of these bombs became available, and operational trials were made during the next six months. The bombs were originally intended for low level bombing, a type of operation not normally undertaken by Bomber Command at this period. Small numbers of these bombs were dropped on city targets from high altitude, but accurate photographic assessment of the results was never possible, and, as 4,000-lb HC bombs were in good supply, the use of MC bombs against this type of target did not appear to be justified. During the autumn of 1944, 4,000-lb MC bombs were used by Mosquito aircraft for high altitude night bombing, as the ballistics of these weapons are much superior to those of the 4,000-lb HC bomb; it was also used with success to breach the dykes on Walcheren Island. Partly because only one could be carried by Lancaster aircraft and none by Halifaxes, however, it never became a widely used store in Bomber Command.​

Is the number of 4,000 lb HC and 4,000 lb MC bombs dropped by Mosquitos known?

Thanks for that. I hadn't understood the differences between these two types.

jim

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

AIR 22/203 Mosquito in Bomber Command. Official Totals, 1,631.7 long tons by day, 24,922.7 by night, total 26,554 long tons, including 100 Group fighter bombers. (Napalm 1 gallon = 6.5 pounds) Bomb raids: 3,632 day and 25,007 night sorties despatched, 2,472 and 22,489 attacking. (776+141+7469)*100/(2472+22489) = 33.6% dropped 4,000 pound bombs (first attack 23/34 February 1944). There were 2,451 attacking sorties in 1942/3 (official) and 848 such sorties 1 January to 22 February 1944 (unofficial). Take them away and the percentage of attacking sorties that dropped 4,000 pound bombs 23 February 1944 onwards is 38.7%. For 1945 it is 8,478 attacking, 3,266x4,000 pound bombs dropped, 38.5%. Unofficially 4,707 flares dropped.

H.E. Bombs
4000​	HC	776​
4000​	MC	141​
4000​	M2	7,469​
1000​	MC	12​
1000​	GP	2​
500​	MC	31,357​
500​	GP	11,763​
500​	USA	18​
250​	GP	778​
250​	MC	4​
40​	AP	104​
20​	AP	72​
20​	Frag	532​
Incendiary
1000​	TI	347​
500​	Smoke	17​
250​	TI	16,632​
250​	Spot Fire	396​
250​	TI Float	32​
4000​	Inc	8​
250​	Inc	62​
100​	Smoke	10​
30​	Inc	128​
20​	FB	14​
4​	Inc	18,866​
4​	X	280​
No. 14	106 x 4	6,678​
No. 15	158 x 4	3,160​
Napalm	Gallons	10,150​
Total Tons	For 1942	231.2​
Total Tons	For 1943	1,550.9​
Total Tons	For 1944	15,067.2​
Total Tons	For 1945	9,704.4​
Mines
1500​	Mine	27​
1000​	Mine	72​

Bombs dropped on mining sorties, probably in totals above, 250 pound TI 22, 250 pound Spot Fire 5, unofficially also 108 flares,

Reference not recorded in file: Strength by mark as of 5 April 1945. 5 and 8 group squadrons 105, 109, 128, 139, 142, 162, 163, 571, 578, 608, 627, 692 (578 non operational with 7 mark XVI). 100 group squadrons, 23, 85, 141, 157, 169, 239, 515, BDSU (Bomber Support Development Unit). 192 Signals investigation squadron would add 6 more IV and 8 more XVI to these totals.

22 IV/XX/XXV
104 IX/XVI
63 XVI
43 XX/XXV
42 XXV
1 II
61 VI
28 XIX
61 XXX
425 Total

AIR 14/931 Strength by squadron type, 5 April 1945, ignores aircraft in non operational units, different report to the above which says both Oboe squadrons had 31 IX/XVI.

Mosquito Bomber
Squadron	Est.	10​
Squadron	Oper.	9​
Aircraft	U.E.	180​
Aircraft	Str.	201​
Aircraft	Serv	144​
Crews	No.	196​
A/C & Crew	No.	141​
Squadron	Est.	2​
Mosquito Bomber Oboe
Squadron	Est.	2​
Squadron	Oper.	2​
Aircraft	U.E.	60​
Aircraft	Str.	68​
Aircraft	Serv	54​
Crews	No.	61​
A/C & Crew	No.	54​
Mosquito Fighter, 100 Group
Squadron	Est.	8​
Squadron	Oper.	8​
Aircraft	U.E.	142​
Aircraft	Str.	158​
Aircraft	Serv	97​
Crews	No.	111​
A/C & Crew	No.	89​
Total
Squadron	Est.	20​
Squadron	Oper.	19​
Aircraft	U.E.	382​
Aircraft	Str.	427​
Aircraft	Serv	295​
Crews	No.	368​
A/C & Crew	No.	284​

 

[33k in the air]

AIR 22/203 Mosquito in Bomber Command. Official Totals, 1,631.7 long tons by day, 24,922.7 by night, total 26,554 long tons, including 100 Group fighter bombers. (Napalm 1 gallon = 6.5 pounds) Bomb raids: 3,632 day and 25,007 night sorties despatched, 2,472 and 22,489 attacking. (776+141+7469)*100/(2472+22489) = 33.6% dropped 4,000 pound bombs (first attack 23/34 February 1944). There were 2,451 attacking sorties in 1942/3 (official) and 848 such sorties 1 January to 22 February 1944 (unofficial). Take them away and the percentage of attacking sorties that dropped 4,000 pound bombs 23 February 1944 onwards is 38.7%. For 1945 it is 8,478 attacking, 3,266x4,000 pound bombs dropped, 38.5%. Unofficially 4,707 flares dropped.

H.E. Bombs
4000​	HC	776​
4000​	MC	141​
4000​	M2	7,469​

Thanks for that. You always seem to have detailed data available to post.

Regarding the matter of explosive filling, from Harris' Despatch on War Operations:

In the middle of 1943, improved fillings became available for HE bombs, the first of these being RDX/TNT, which was filled into 500-lb and 1,000-lb MC bombs from July onwards. At approximately the same time, small quantities of Torpex became available, and this was used in 12,000-lb HC bombs. Towards the end of the year, Minol was filled into 4,000-lb HC bombs, becoming standard for these bombs and also, subsequently, for the smaller MC types. No troubles were encountered with any of these fillings and their increased power over Amatol fillings proved of great value. In 1944 American filled 4,000-lb HC bombs, and a few 500-lb and1,000-lb bombs were receieved filled with Tritonal. This mixture of TNT/AL was satisfactory.​

RDX/TNT 60-40 was known as Composition 'B' in American parlance.

The relative peak blast pressure strength of the mentioned explosive fillings, based on experimental tests. Note that the figures do vary slightly depending on the reference source.

095 = Amatol 60-40 (60% ammonium nitrate, 40% TNT)
097 = Amatol 50-50 (50% ammonium nitrate, 50% TNT)
100 = TNT
110 = RDX/TNT 60-40 (60% RDX, 40% TNT)
112 = Tritonal (80% TNT, 20% aluminum)
115 = Minol-2 (40% ammonium nitrate, 40% TNT, 20% aluminum)
122 = Torpex (42% RDX, 40% TNT, 18% aluminum)

 

[SaparotRob]

Go Torpex!

 

[JDCAVE]

The cookies that dad dropped were variously filled with "unspecified", Amatol, Tritonal and Minol. Tritonal was often misspelled as "Trinatol" in the ORB's. In March-1945, he might drop a Tritonal cookie one day and Minol the next day.


This ORB page shows variously, TNT, Minol and "Trinatol" fillings, from a/c to a/c.

Royal Canadian Air Force operations record book... - Héritage

Royal Canadian Air Force operations record books : C-12292

heritage.canadiana.ca

Jim

 

[33k in the air]

The cookies that dad dropped were variously filled with "unspecified", Amatol, Tritonal and Minol. Tritonal was often misspelled as "Trinatol" in the ORB's. In March-1945, he might drop a Tritonal cookie one day and Minol the next day.


This ORB page shows variously, TNT, Minol and "Trinatol" fillings, from a/c to a/c.

Royal Canadian Air Force operations record book... - Héritage

Royal Canadian Air Force operations record books : C-12292

heritage.canadiana.ca

Jim

419 Squadron is on my list of squadrons to go through as its ORBs consistently list the bomb loads on its aircraft. (A project I hope to return to someday.) According to the 1944 USNBD document British Bombs and Fuzes, the fillings used were:

4,000 lb GP = Amatol 60-40 or Amatex
4,000 lb MC = Amatol 60-40, RDX/TNT, or Amatex
4,000 lb HC = Amatol 60-40, Amatol 50-50, RDX/TNT, Minol-2, or Torpex-2

The TNT- and Tritonal-filled 4,000 lb HC bombs were U.S.-made.

From the period ordnance documents I've looked at, British bombs seemed to have a variety of fillings. U.S. bombs, in contrast, usually used either Amatol 50-50 or TNT, with some using Composition 'B' or Tritonal appearing late in the war. Amatol was used early on when it wasn't certain to what degree the U.S. would be able to increase its TNT production; as it happened, it was able to ramp up TNT production enormously, so TNT became the usual filling.

 

[JDCAVE]

419 Squadron is on my list of squadrons to go through as its ORBs consistently list the bomb loads on its aircraft. (A project I hope to return to someday.) According to the 1944 USNBD document British Bombs and Fuzes, the fillings used were:

4,000 lb GP = Amatol 60-40 or Amatex
4,000 lb MC = Amatol 60-40, RDX/TNT, or Amatex
4,000 lb HC = Amatol 60-40, Amatol 50-50, RDX/TNT, Minol-2, or Torpex-2

The TNT- and Tritonal-filled 4,000 lb HC bombs were U.S.-made.

From the period ordnance documents I've looked at, British bombs seemed to have a variety of fillings. U.S. bombs, in contrast, usually used either Amatol 50-50 or TNT, with some using Composition 'B' or Tritonal appearing late in the war. Amatol was used early on when it wasn't certain to what degree the U.S. would be able to increase its TNT production; as it happened, it was able to ramp up TNT production enormously, so TNT became the usual filling.

How common were Torpex filled HC bombs? I had thought that Torpex was only used in Tallboy and Grandslam bombs.

In general, the 419 ORBs are quite useful, however, I have found at least one error in one of the entries for dad, for Cologne 2-March-1945:

KB865 "E" Up 0644 down 1257. Target COLOGNE with bombload same as "A". [1 x 4000lb HC NI Trinatol, 1 X 500 LB USA GP ANM64 TD.025, 2 x 500 lb MC TD.0251] [Dad's logbook states 1x 4000 lb and 16 x 500 lb bombs. Assume this is correct]. Primary at 1011.7 hrs from 18,500 ft. 095 degs (t), 175 IAS. 2/10ths strat cu2 tops 5,000 ft. Vis very good. Ident visually and Gee Check. Undershot centre of upwind edge of smoke by 200 yds on MB's instructions. Bombing was very concentrated. 1 large orange explosion at 1010 hrs smoke rising to approx. 6,000 ft. After leaving target one small flack hole in bomb doors. Burst of heavy flak underneath. Camera run S and L. No Very cartridges fired.

Royal Canadian Air Force operations record book... - Héritage

Royal Canadian Air Force operations record books : C-12292

heritage.canadiana.ca

The stated load would only be 5,500 lbs, dad's logbook at 12,000 lbs, is more likely, IMO.

Lancaster PD337 'JO-V', of No. 463 Squadron RAAF, Waddington filmed the progress of the raid. This aircraft was converted for filming Bomber Command operations, and was fitted with a number of camera positions. It was later transferred to No. 5 Group Film Unit.18 An interesting comment appears in the ORB record: "Main stream a/c still do not adhere to flight planning heights." The film of the raid can be seen here:

RAF BOMBER COMMAND ATTACK ON COLOGNE [Allocated Title]

Day attack by Avro Lancaster bombers of RAF 1 Group and RAF 6 Group against Cologne, Germany. Filmed by on board cameras. Camera plane piloted by Flight Lie...

film.iwmcollections.org.uk

Notable observations in the film include a "scarecrow" exploding at the 6:06 mark and a bomb load going down at the 10:20 mark, a load that looks to be 1X4,000 lb HC and 16 or so 500 lb bombs, similar to the load F/Lt. Cave carried to the target.

Jim

 

[33k in the air]

How common were Torpex filled HC bombs? I had thought that Torpex was only used in Tallboy and Grandslam bombs.

I wish I knew. It's a level of detail that is pretty obscure and hard to find, at least for me in terms of resources available online. (Even more general bomb production data is hard to come by; U.S. production can be found in OMPUS but I've not found British production.) The only reference to explosive fillings in use I've come across are from Harris' Despatch on War Operations.

In general, the 419 ORBs are quite useful, however, I have found at least one error in one of the entries for dad, for Cologne 2-March-1945:

Yes, from the several squadron ORBs I've gone through, there are occasional typos or missing information. (There are also occasional changes in format of the data recorded, which I presume is due to a different person taking over responsibility for filling them out.)

KB865 "E" Up 0644 down 1257. Target COLOGNE with bombload same as "A". [1 x 4000lb HC NI Trinatol, 1 X 500 LB USA GP ANM64 TD.025, 2 x 500 lb MC TD.0251] [Dad's logbook states 1x 4000 lb and 16 x 500 lb bombs. Assume this is correct].

It probably is. 1 x 4,000 lb and 16 x 500 lb seems to have been a common load out used later in the war. Presumably the details of the other thirteen 500 lb bombs was accidentally omitted from the ORB entry.

 

[JDCAVE]

Yes, from the several squadron ORBs I've gone through, there are occasional typos or missing information. (There are also occasional changes in format of the data recorded, which I presume is due to a different person taking over responsibility for filling them out.)

Yes. There are different levels of details in the ORBs, month to month, and I'm sure you are right, that it has to do with who is filling it out. The 419 Squadron ORBs for November-1944, are quite sparse compared to other months. The 405 Squadron ORBs are highly detailed. If the Intelligence Officer who was filling it out knew how much people such as ourselves spent looking at them 80 years later, perhaps they would have put more into it.

Incidentally, the Form B for the Cologne raid, above, clearly specified 1 x 4,000 lb, NI and 16x500 lb bombs. Can't recall if they were GP or MC.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Weights, short tons, from The UK Statistical Digest, or "Fighting with Figures". I thought the RN had priority for Torpex.

Type	Total	Total Weight	HE	AP & AS	Incendiary	Smoke
Quarter	Filled weight	Explosive Weight	Filled	filled	filled	filled
"9-12/39"	5,055​	1,078​	3,864​	1,191​	N/A	0​
Q1/40	5,504​	N/A	4,673​	831​	N/A	0​
Q2/40	11,303​	N/A	8,043​	3,260​	N/A	0​
Q3/40	13,120​	N/A	10,687​	2,433​	N/A	0​
Q4/40	21,166​	N/A	17,849​	3,317​	N/A	0​
Q1/41	26,673​	4,179​	23,794​	2,879​	N/A	0​
Q2/41	45,020​	8,562​	41,365​	3,655​	N/A	0​
Q3/41	37,641​	8,764​	32,842​	4,799​	N/A	0​
Q4/41	38,514​	12,644​	34,486​	4,028​	N/A	0​
Q1/42	39,959​	N/A	34,946​	5,013​	N/A	0​
Q2/42	48,309​	N/A	41,848​	6,461​	N/A	160​
Q3/42	58,218​	N/A	51,137​	7,081​	N/A	183​
Q4/42	64,562​	N/A	56,319​	8,243​	N/A	140​
Q1/43	50,601​	20,717​	41,401​	9,200​	N/A	404​
Q2/43	38,511​	15,963​	32,930​	5,581​	N/A	600​
Q3/43	53,342​	25,585​	50,570​	2,772​	N/A	783​
Q4/43	81,353​	42,579​	79,845​	1,508​	N/A	2,071​
Q1/44	71,453​	39,490​	70,795​	658​	32,977​	1,638​
Q2/44	71,880​	41,237​	71,202​	678​	33,045​	1,626​
Q3/44	74,871​	40,744​	74,846​	25​	25,646​	891​
Q4/44	91,162​	46,747​	91,135​	27​	15,072​	11​
Q1/45	103,640​	52,290​	103,580​	60​	5,710​	45​
Q2/45	90,703​	44,470​	90,693​	10​	3,402​	582​
Q3/45	50,155​	20,542​	50,145​	10​	0​	423​
1940​	51,093​	6,389​	41,252​	9,841​	N/A	0​
1941​	147,848​	34,149​	132,487​	15,361​	N/A	0​
1942​	211,048​	73,610​	184,250​	26,798​	52,373​	483​
1943​	223,807​	104,844​	204,746​	19,061​	102,138​	3,858​
1944​	309,366​	168,218​	307,978​	1,388​	106,740​	4,166​

The unpublished Ministry of Aircraft Production reports use weekly averages, for quarter, nothing on fillings, in fact they are Empty bomb bodies except 4 pound incendiary are filled, figures are weekly averages for quarter, yearly totals in thousands calculated from weekly figures, PB = Practice, LC and SL = Chemical

Type

250GP

500GP

1000GP

1900GP

4000GP

250MC

500MC

1000MC

4000MC

2000HC

4000HC

8000HC

12000HC

12000DP

22000DP

Q1/39

693​

1,279​

Q2/39

476​

1,312​

Q3/39

188​

1,842​

Q4/39

138​

2,053​

Q1/40

104​

2,337​

Q2/40

78​

3,273​

Q3/40

812​

2,966​

13​

Q4/40

2,758​

2,367​

129​

Q1/41

6,086​

2,342​

207​

11​

Q2/41

7,395​

2,657​

356​

13​

0​

0​

0​

0​

0​

0​

52​

Q3/41

7,436​

2,791​

485​

16​

0​

0​

2​

0​

0​

28​

177​

Q4/41

4,344​

5,102​

682​

54​

0​

0​

15​

0​

0​

63​

225​

Q1/42

902​

6,403​

978​

90​

0​

0​

6​

0​

0​

146​

275​

Q2/42

113​

7,372​

1,813​

124​

1​

0​

31​

0​

0​

33​

631​

Q3/42

104​

5,847​

2,727​

155​

1​

0​

424​

0​

0​

38​

864​

3​

Q4/42

71​

3,896​

3,003​

95​

10​

0​

1,777​

1​

0​

37​

907​

4​

Q1/43

510​

33​

1,917​

38​

15​

0​

5,899​

86​

0​

72​

378​

10​

Q2/43

637​

0​

219​

0​

23​

0​

7,788​

1,079​

0​

499​

77​

11​

Q3/43

543​

0​

0​

0​

3​

0​

8,326​

2,266​

2​

591​

84​

12​

Q4/43

483​

0​

0​

0​

0​

1,236​

8,157​

3,316​

10​

303​

365​

27​

Q1/44

67​

0​

0​

0​

0​

2,119​

6,598​

3,689​

19​

290​

907​

27​

11​

2​

Q2/44

0​

0​

0​

0​

0​

299​

6,186​

3,726​

17​

815​

811​

43​

25​

7​

Q3/44

0​

0​

0​

0​

0​

0​

7,358​

3,363​

10​

840​

702​

33​

51​

8​

Q4/44

0​

0​

0​

0​

0​

0​

11,213​

3,591​

12​

21​

586​

0​

61​

18​

Q1/45

0​

0​

0​

0​

0​

0​

15,028​

3,541​

22​

144​

521​

0​

55​

23​

2​

Q2/45

0​

0​

0​

0​

0​

0​

15,258​

3,525​

28​

584​

468​

0​

13​

27​

3​

Q3/45

0​

0​

0​

0​

0​

0​

10,030​

2,896​

24​

193​

120​

0​

12​

14​

8​

Q4/45

0​

0​

0​

0​

0​

0​

126​

510​

0​

0​

0​

0​

0​

15​

2​

1939​

19.1​

84.3​

1940​

48.7​

141.6​

1.9​

1941​

330.2​

171.8​

23.0​

1.3​

0.0​

0.0​

0.3​

0.0​

0.0​

1.3​

6.1​

1942​

14.6​

301.8​

109.6​

5.9​

0.2​

0.0​

28.3​

0.0​

0.0​

3.2​

34.4​

0.1​

1943​

28.2​

0.5​

28.7​

0.5​

0.5​

15.6​

319.5​

86.7​

0.2​

19.2​

11.8​

0.8​

1944​

0.8​

0.0​

0.0​

0.0​

0.0​

31.1​

408.6​

186.9​

0.8​

25.6​

38.9​

1.3​

1.9​

0.5​

1945​

0.0​

0.0​

0.0​

0.0​

0.0​

0.0​

528.8​

135.9​

1.0​

12.4​

13.3​

0.0​

1.0​

1.0​

0.2​