Best bombs against Oil and Industrial Targets

[Greyman]

The 1,000-lb. M.C. bomb which was introduced into the Command in the spring of 1943 proved to be a most valuable and effective weapon. Supplies, however, were always inadequate, and during 1944, in spite of many requests for increased output from this Command, recourse had to be made to American type bombs, to 500-lb. British bombs, and even to 250-lb. bombs. The shortage of 1,000-lb. M.C. bombs at times gave rise to the gravest concern and stocks had to be husbanded with the very greatest care.
- Harris

 

[33k in the air]

The 1,000-lb. M.C. bomb which was introduced into the Command in the spring of 1943 proved to be a most valuable and effective weapon. Supplies, however, were always inadequate, and during 1944, in spite of many requests for increased output from this Command, recourse had to be made to American type bombs, to 500-lb. British bombs, and even to 250-lb. bombs. The shortage of 1,000-lb. M.C. bombs at times gave rise to the gravest concern and stocks had to be husbanded with the very greatest care.
- Harris

Bomber Command dropped a fair number of U.S. GP and SAP bombs of 500 lb and 1,000 lb weights in 1944. It also dropped some U.S. M17 aimable incendiary clusters (these carried 110 x 4-lb incendiaries).

 

[Greyman]

Bomber Command dropped a fair number of U.S. GP and SAP bombs ...

To Harris again for a quick summary:

During 1944, large quantities of American A.N.M.44, 58 and 64 (500-lb.) and A.N.M.59 and 64 (1,000-lb.) bombs were used. The A.N.M. 58 and 59 were S.A.P.s of about 33 per cent. C.W. ratio, the other types being equivalent to the British M.C. range, but slightly less powerful owing to their 50/50 Amatol or straight T.N.T. filling. These bombs gave good service, and were quicker and easier to fuze and tail than their British counterparts, but the American box type tails seriously reduced the number which could be carried in British aircraft. A design of British type drum tail was therefore prepared, but supplies of these tails never matched up with the supply of bombs; moreover the drum tail slightly reduced the stability of the bombs.

...

In order to supplement supplies of the No. 14 cluster projectile, the production of which was insufficient to meet the Commands full requirements, trials were being arranged in February, 1941, with the American cluster A.N. M.17, in order to determine their suitability for use in this Command. These clusters contained 110 by 4-lb. I.B.s and functioned in a somewhat similar manner to the British version. As a result of these trials, it was found that the wooden boxes and compressed cardboard cylinders used to protect the clusters during transit caused complications at operational stations. In September, 1944, I informed the Air Ministry that, due to the number of operations necessary to prepare this cluster for use, it could only be accepted in this Command in the event of an emergency. A modified form of the M-111 fuze was used in this cluster, the modification consisting of the fitting of a tetryl booster in place of the black powder booster. Early in September 1944, information was received that the M-127 fuze had not been accepted for Service use, but that M.A.P. had designed an adapter booster No. 1, Mark I, to be used in conjunction with the No. 42, Mark IV, fuze which would permit this fuze being used with the M.17 cluster. First consignments of this adaptor booster were placed on trial and gave very unsatisfactory results, five out of six failing to function correctly. At the end of March, 1945, a new consignment of modified adaptors were received. These also failed to give satisfactory results during trials. Indeed, up to the end of the European War no suitable or safe fuze had been designed for this cluster.

 

[33k in the air]

Possibly. There was a shortage of bombs. Dad took 4 x 250 lb gp bombs to Dresden and also on one or two other ops. These were next to useless. It turns out, and I'd have to find a reference, there was a shortage of different bomb types, possibly due in part to the growth of the USAAF 8th and their requirements. Dad carried US ANM bombs on several raids.

jim

My understanding is that British bomb production lagged behind requirements, resulting in Bomber Command having to make up the ordnance shortfall from the ample supply of U.S. bombs.

 

[33k in the air]

These bombs gave good service, and were quicker and easier to fuze and tail than their British counterparts, but the American box type tails seriously reduced the number which could be carried in British aircraft. A design of British type drum tail was therefore prepared, but supplies of these tails never matched up with the supply of bombs; moreover the drum tail slightly reduced the stability of the bombs.

Regarding the bolded, I've read that in places before, but looking at the bomb loads given in squadron ORBs, I'm not really seeing a reduction in numbers, unless the supply of the modified tails was plentiful in the time period I've looked at.

The Halifax III, for example, could carry a total of 16 x 500-lb British bombs, be they MC, GP, or a combination thereof. Yet when US 500-lb bombs were in the load out, the total number of 500-lb bombs carried remained the same: 8 x 500-lb British bombs and 8 x 500-lb US bombs, or 16 in total.

 

[JDCAVE]

Very good, Greyman. That is from Harris's Despatch on War Operations. I read that section a few days ago.

I'm not at home right now and am away from my sources. I believe SAOG, either Vol III or IV, indicated that the British 500 lb bombs had a higher number of duds when compared with the American equivalent.

Jim

 

[33k in the air]

According to Table 46 in the USSBS Oil Division report, of the attacks on oil facilities included in the table and for which the bomb origin was identifiable, overall, 12.06% of 8th Air Force bombs failed to explode (2,004 out of 16,620) as compared to 18.98% of RAF bombs (1,168 out of 6,154). Of the unidentified bombs, 23.88% failed to explode (1,827 out of 7,652).

 

[wuzak]

According to Table 46 in the USSBS Oil Division report, of the attacks on oil facilities included in the table and for which the bomb origin was identifiable, overall, 12.06% of 8th Air Force bombs failed to explode (2,004 out of 16,620) as compared to 18.98% of RAF bombs (1,168 out of 6,154). Of the unidentified bombs, 23.88% failed to explode (1,827 out of 7,652).

Would unexploded bombs still cause problems for those facilities?

Until unexploded bombes had been properly disposed of, repairs in that area would be delayed?

 

[MikeMeech]

Greyman quotes Speed's letter to Hitler, Jan, 1945: "during the last quarter of 1944 of all Western plants, especially Scholven, Wesserling, Welheim, and Gelsenberg."

Dad was on the raid to Bottrop Welheim, Sept 27, 1944 and to Scholven Buer, Dec 29, 1944. The first target wasnt hit very hard due to cloud cover, although I have an Aiming Point photo by Slim Barlow.

The raid to Scholven in miserable weather was highly successful. It was an Oboe guided attack. Dad carried 1 x 4,000 lb cookie and 16 x 500 lb bombs.

Dad's 419 ORB entry:
KB721 "B" Up 1510 down 2128. Target SCHOLVEN with 1 x 4000 lb HC Tinatol [sic, "Trinatol?], 6 x 500lb MC TD.025 and 10x 500 lb GP TD.025. Primary through 10/10th cloud, tops 3/5000 ft. at 1903.6 from 17,000 ft. Target ident. By TI's and Gee. Bombed TI and flares. One big explosion seen in T/A. Good attack.

View attachment 649881

Hi

For information, here is a translation of Speer's January letter to Hitler (same as source mentioned in my previous post):

Mike

 

[JDCAVE]

Interesting mention of "scarecrow".

This is what dad had to say on the subject of Scarecrows during his audio memoir for the daylight raid to Duisburg, Oct 14 (daylight), 1944.

"When we got to the target, we found that the flak was moderate to intense—I say in my logbook, it was "predicted" and I report in there that there were four "scarecrows" that were all over us. Well, we found out later, I found out later that there was no such thing as [a] "scarecrow []" they were pathfinder aircraft which had been hit and were going down. It was a little bit frightening to suddenly see them burst over the top of you and you might say well how the hell did you know there wasn't an aircraft over the top of you? God there were always aircraft over the top of us…you couldn't let your eyes rest on any one thing for very long, as a pilot anyway. My eyes were going around and round and round and head was going around and round and round. I couldn't see the actual target because the view was blocked out for me. I could see parts of it by looking out over the side every once in a while, or from looking out one side or the other I could see the target area. But it was a very heavy attack and it was a very frightening place to go to. Our bombload consisted of one 4,000 lb bomb and the rest of it were incendiaries."

Scarecrows were thought to be explosive devices dropped by the Luftwaffe over the bomber stream. That was the belief held by aircrews and by command. There were other myths that were found to have no substance after the war, but some still survive today as "legend" I guess.

Jim

 

[Greyman]

I thought it was just a rumour among crews not something officially reported.

Definitely reported through official channels.

Often and early enough that it made it into Intelligence Summary No.7 (Phenomena Encountered Over Enemy Territory) 18 Dec 1942

EDIT: able to get the portion dealing with 'scarecrows'. Makes for a bit of harrowing reading knowing what we know now ...

 

[JDCAVE]

Very good Greyman. Dad recorded 3 more scarecrows in his logbook for the op to Essen, March 11, 1945. This would account for all 3 aircraft lost on this raid of 1,100+ bombers.

Jim

 

[MikeMeech]

Hi
W. Hays Parks' contribution to 'Airpower Theory and Practice' (ed. John Gooch, Cass, 1995), ' 'Precision' and 'Area' Bombing: Who Did Which, and When?' includes the following on the oil offensive:

I hope that is of interest.

Mike

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Bomber Command usage of US GP and SAP 1,000, 500, M17 (110x4)

Day raids, first use, total dropped for war
US M17 (110x4 pound incendiary), 28 October 1944, 3,091
US 500 pound, 15 June 1944, 111,648
USA 500 pound SAP, 11 September 1944, 13,198
USA 1,000 pound SAP, 2 July 1944, 84,002
USA 1,000 pound GP, 18 April 1945, 1,661 (all dropped on this date)
USA 1000 pound, 19 August 1944, 83,755.
1,000 pound GP, 30 June 1941, 9,812
1000 pound MC, 14 May 1943, 78,093

Night raids, first use, total dropped for war
USA M17 (110x4 pound incendiary), 30 October 1944, 2,614
USA 500 pound, 6 May 1944, 113,350
USA 500 pound SAP, 16 September 1944, 11,865
USA 1,000 pound SAP, 4 July 1944, 45,572
USA 1,000 pound, 22 April 1944, 49,593
1,000 pound GP, 30 September 1940, 72,352
1,000 pound MC, 16 April 1943, 177,807

 

[GrauGeist]

Bomber Command usage of US GP and SAP 1,000, 500, M17 (110x4)

Day raids, first use, total dropped for war
US M17 (110x4 pound incendiary), 28 October 1944, 3,091
US 500 pound, 15 June 1944, 111,648
USA 500 pound SAP, 11 September 1944, 13,198
USA 1,000 pound SAP, 2 July 1944, 84,002
USA 1,000 pound GP, 18 April 1945, 1,661 (all dropped on this date)
USA 1000 pound, 19 August 1944, 83,755.
1,000 pound GP, 30 June 1941, 9,812
1000 pound MC, 14 May 1943, 78,093

Night raids, first use, total dropped for war
USA M17 (110x4 pound incendiary), 30 October 1944, 2,614
USA 500 pound, 6 May 1944, 113,350
USA 500 pound SAP, 16 September 1944, 11,865
USA 1,000 pound SAP, 4 July 1944, 45,572
USA 1,000 pound, 22 April 1944, 49,593
1,000 pound GP, 30 September 1940, 72,352
1,000 pound MC, 16 April 1943, 177,807

Source(s)?

 

[33k in the air]

From a quick scan of some the ORBs of 83 Squadron, it dropped some U.S. AN-M76 bombs (500-lb incendiary) on missions in April 1944.

(I've just started a project to go through the ORBs for some squadrons to make a detailed list of the bomb loads carried from August 1942 onward as availble, along with recording some other data. I've finished 433 Squadron, and have started in on 408. Plenty more to go after that!)

 

[33k in the air]

From a quick scan of some the ORBs of 83 Squadron, it dropped some U.S. AN-M76 bombs (500-lb incendiary) on missions in April 1944.

Follow-up: it was on the mission to Schweinfurt on April 26/27th. Here is what the bomb load descriptions show:

14 x 500-lb AN-M76 (3 aircraft)
6 x Red Spot Fires, 8 x 500 AN-M76 (3 aircraft)
1 x Yellow TI, 1 x Green TI, 12 x 500-lb Inc. (2 aircraft)
12 x 7" Hooded Flares, 2 x Green TI (5 aircraft)
12 x 7" Hooded Flares (1 aircraft)
6 x 7" Hooded Flares, 2 x Green Spot Fires, 2 x Green TI (1 aircraft)

It isn't clear if the "500-lb Inc." means the AN-M76 or some other bomb type.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Hi
The book 'Bombs Gone - The development and use of British air-dropped weapons from 1912 to the present day' by MacBean and Hogben, mentions (p.133) that Bomber Command despatched 389,809 sorties and dropped about 955,044 tons of bombs, made up of the following (p. 135):

Nice summary.

To an extent the bombs dropped are the official fiction, given how to count what happened to the bombs of aircraft that went missing, was it before, or after the target or an alternative?

The day bombers are recorded as dropping 32 different types of HE, and 22 different types of incendiary bombs, counting the clusters as a different bomb type, the night bombers 42 different HE types and 23 different types of incendiary bombs, plus 1,584 twenty pound fragmentation bombs on 4 July 1944 and 119 tins of deckers in July 1941.

Various minor types like 4,000 pound RDX (6), GP (217) and MC (537). What the graphic calls 4,000 pound MC is 4,000 pound M2.

2,000 pound AP, 1,051 by day and 1,239 by night. Interestingly mines dropped in canals in 1940 are 1,500 pound HE bombs in the records.

It isn't clear if the "500-lb Inc." means the AN-M76 or some other bomb type.

The 500 pound incendiaries were US ones. US 500 pound incendiaries dropped by Bomber Command,
360 on 5/6 April 1944
86 on 10/11 April 1944
166 on 26/27 April 1944
Total 612, all by Lancasters.

Also dropped on 26/27 April 1944, 109x250 pound TI, 55x250 pound spot fires and 460 flares.
(Mosquito 35 marker bombs, 8 spot fires, 18 flares, Lancasters, 74 marker bombs, 47 spot fires, 442 flares)

Number 16 incendiary cluster,
day raids, used 22, 25 and 27 March 1945
night raids used 13 February, 7, 8, 16 and 18 March 1945

Day raids incendiary clusters dropped,
No 4, 829
No 14, 19,010
No 15, 4,336
No 16, 426
No 17, 3,091
No 14 X, 1,167
No 15 X, 122

Night raids incendiary clusters dropped,
No 4, 28,686
No 14, 75,664
No 15, 11,243
No 16, 1,027
No 17, 2,614
No 14 X, 4,317
No 15 X, 131

Source Air 14/927 to 931, RAF Form 1273, Bomber Command Summaries, and Air 22/203 the 1945 War Room Manual, or else random number generator alpha 9c.

 

[wuzak]

The 500 pound incendiaries were US ones. US 500 pound incendiaries dropped by Bomber Command,
360 on 5/6 April 1944
86 on 10/11 April 1944
166 on 26/27 April 1944
Total 612, all by Lancasters.

Are you sure?

 

[33k in the air]

Are you sure?

View attachment 651352

According to the description given for this bomb: "This is a special purpose bomb designed primarily for low-level bombing operations. Its use will be restricted to special missions."


The document The Development of British Incendiary Bombs During the Period of the 1939–1945 World War includes a chapter on the 500 lb. Incendiary bomb:

In order to meet a requirement for an incendiary bomb for the attack of fortified objectives, the 500 lb. L.C. bomb, charged with incendiary fillings, was tried. The intention was that the bombs, which were filled with free-flowing incendiary liquids, should break up on the target and the filling should seep or flow through holes or cracks in the concrete.

. . . The development of this bomb as an incendiary was purely experimental and the series of trials to find the best bomb for the attack of fortified objectives had not been completed when the requirement was cancelled.