Best/Favourate Tank in the west

[Freebird]

Those who argued for the 6 pdr stated that the lack of a 6 pdr HE round in North Africa had created an unfortunate impression against the 6 pdr as a tank main armament. positions.

There were some HE rounds, just not enough.

There are accounts of British 6 pdr anti-tank gun crews making their own case shells for close defence against infantry assault. This was done by removing the A.P. shell head, filling the cartridge with a suitable piece of cloth, filling the shell case with stones and gravel, and sealing it with another piece of cloth or encasing the shrapnel content in thick axle grease. This tactic was quickly improvised in the North African campaign, und there is some indication that tank crews employed it with the 6 Pdr. L.45 as well.

 

[vinnye]

May be old news to some - I have just seen the Discovery Channel investigation into who killed Michael Wittmann.
I am not sure that the ranges quoted in Villers Bocage engagement were exactly right - if they were it suggests that even at 50 yds a British tank could not take on the frontal armour of a Tiger! Could not say if the tanks knocked out by Wittmann's Tiger were Cromwell's or Churchills - I think the former. But both would have been fitted with 6 pdrs?
One British tank had a perfect side on shot at point blank range - but could not shoot because the gunner was out of the tank relieving himself! How lucky / unlucky is that!
During the engagement were Wittmann's Tiger was knocked out - a Yeomanry Sherman Firefly engaged 3 Tigers from a position about 800m away (in a wood) knocking them out!
Wittmann's Tiger was engaged by Canadian Shermans from his left flank at under 200m. It looked like the hit that brewed up his Tiger hit at the rear left corner and set the fuel on fire - which ignited the ammo blowing the turret off!
I like to see the technical arguments that some of you guys have - using test data - but the real performance that matters is in the field. The Firefly guys said they could engage a Tiger out to 1200m but preferred to do so at 800m if they could.

 

[dunmunro1]

May be old news to some - I have just seen the Discovery Channel investigation into who killed Michael Wittmann.
I am not sure that the ranges quoted in Villers Bocage engagement were exactly right - if they were it suggests that even at 50 yds a British tank could not take on the frontal armour of a Tiger! Could not say if the tanks knocked out by Wittmann's Tiger were Cromwell's or Churchills - I think the former. But both would have been fitted with 6 pdrs?
One British tank had a perfect side on shot at point blank range - but could not shoot because the gunner was out of the tank relieving himself! How lucky / unlucky is that!
During the engagement were Wittmann's Tiger was knocked out - a Yeomanry Sherman Firefly engaged 3 Tigers from a position about 800m away (in a wood) knocking them out!
Wittmann's Tiger was engaged by Canadian Shermans from his left flank at under 200m. It looked like the hit that brewed up his Tiger hit at the rear left corner and set the fuel on fire - which ignited the ammo blowing the turret off!
I like to see the technical arguments that some of you guys have - using test data - but the real performance that matters is in the field. The Firefly guys said they could engage a Tiger out to 1200m but preferred to do so at 800m if they could.

IIRC, Whitman's Tiger at Villers Bocage was crippled by a 6 pdr hit, and he ended up walking away from that battle. However, during that battle the majority of Cromwells and Churchills were most likely armed with the 75mm OQF gun, which was much less of a threat to a Tiger than the 6 pdr, especially on the frontal armour.

 

[pbfoot]

here is part 5 of the excellent show which discussed the demise of Wittman the conclusion was that tank of the Sherbrooke Regiment knocked off wittman from a range pf 142 metres it was impossible for the Yeomanry guys to even see Wittmans tank

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qp2GKAEup5I
All the previous 4 parts are are here also
. The show is a very recent production of the canadian History channel

 

[vinnye]

You may well be right Dunmunro1 - the Cromwells and Churchills could well have been fitted with the 75mm.
But even so for them to have engaged at near to point blank (under 100yds) and not take the Tiger out would have been very un-nerving to say the least!

 

[dunmunro1]

You may well be right Dunmunro1 - the Cromwells and Churchills could well have been fitted with the 75mm.
But even so for them to have engaged at near to point blank (under 100yds) and not take the Tiger out would have been very un-nerving to say the least!

According to the documentary, Whitman's Tiger was penetrated on the rear hull, at ~150 yds, and at this range even the 75mm M3 could penetrate the Tiger's side armour.

 

[parsifal]

In 1943 there was a very lively debate in the UK over whether to keep the 6 pdr or move to the 75mm OQF, and although they were hopes of fitting the 77mm to the Cromwell and Churchill, this proved impossible to do. Those who argued for the 6 pdr stated that the lack of a 6 pdr HE round in North Africa had created an unfortunate impression against the 6 pdr as a tank main armament. They (including the UK minister responsible for tank production) argued that the 6 pdr HE round, which became plentiful in 1943 was sufficiently effective and that the increased AP performance of the 6 pdr made it a far better choice than the 75mm. Unfortunately, UK troops in Italy preferred the better HE of the 75mm, probably because German armour was relatively rare in Italy in 1943 and the terrain did not favour tanks. However, in Normandy, the 21st AG soon found itself facing 70-90% of all German armour in Francem during the entire Normandy campaign, and the lack of the 6 pdr in their tanks was a disaster.

I think it is very clear that the 6 pdr was a far superior tank gun than the 75mm M3/OQF and the Normandy campaign would have ended much sooner if 21st AG tanks had the 6 pdr as their primary armament because German tank losses would have increased while Allied tank losses would have decreased, and inevitably this would have led to the collapse of the German position much sooner. The 75mm gun allowed the Tiger, Panther and SP guns to effectively counter 21st AG numerical superiority in tanks by destroying them from hull down positions. The 6 pdr, especially with APDS, would have increased losses to German armour in hull down positions, and thus reduced Allied tank losses. It would have also greatly increased Allied tank moral by giving them a weapon capable of dealing with most German armour, even when met in hull down positions.

I agree with most of this, except there are a few observations that migh affect the debate. To start with the 75 mm calibre was the standard tank armament adopted by the Allied forces, and this was because the majority of tanks being fielded into the front line formations were US Shermans. By standardizing the ammunition supply, the Allies achieved a far better logisitical situation that the Germans could only dream of. Given the logistical difficulties faced by the allies following the breakout, I would think attention to logistics to be a far more important issue than an increase in lethality.

You also mention that there was some kind of disaster facing the Allies in their tank formations. Whilst I am the first to acknowledge the tough fight faced by the allies in the Hedgerows, I hardly think it was a disaster.....Allied Tank losses were heavy, but never cataastrophic (unlike the germans experiences). There is much debate in this and other places about the ratio of losses for specific battles, but overall the loss exchange rate was actually heavily in favour of the allies, after the debacles of Falaise, Cobra and the Ardennes are taken into account. As an example, during the vaunted Ardennes campaign, Peipers battlegroup suffered the loss of no less than 33 Panthers for no loss to the US forces, in just one engagement. I am unsure yet as to whether the Panthers were immobilised for lack of fuel (it seems likley), but so what..... a win is a win in my book, and just because the germans chose to adopt a plethora of differnt types, and pursue production choices that sealed their own fate, is still part of the equation in my book.

I actually think the decision to adopt the 75mm calibre was the right decision, whan the whole picutre is considered.

 

[dunmunro1]

I agree with most of this, except there are a few observations that migh affect the debate. To start with the 75 mm calibre was the standard tank armament adopted by the Allied forces, and this was because the majority of tanks being fielded into the front line formations were US Shermans. By standardizing the ammunition supply, the Allies achieved a far better logisitical situation that the Germans could only dream of. Given the logistical difficulties faced by the allies following the breakout, I would think attention to logistics to be a far more important issue than an increase in lethality.

You also mention that there was some kind of disaster facing the Allies in their tank formations. Whilst I am the first to acknowledge the tough fight faced by the allies in the Hedgerows, I hardly think it was a disaster.....Allied Tank losses were heavy, but never cataastrophic (unlike the germans experiences). There is much debate in this and other places about the ratio of losses for specific battles, but overall the loss exchange rate was actually heavily in favour of the allies, after the debacles of Falaise, Cobra and the Ardennes are taken into account. As an example, during the vaunted Ardennes campaign, Peipers battlegroup suffered the loss of no less than 33 Panthers for no loss to the US forces, in just one engagement. I am unsure yet as to whether the Panthers were immobilised for lack of fuel (it seems likley), but so what..... a win is a win in my book, and just because the germans chose to adopt a plethora of differnt types, and pursue production choices that sealed their own fate, is still part of the equation in my book.

I actually think the decision to adopt the 75mm calibre was the right decision, whan the whole picutre is considered.

I have to disagree. IMHO, the adoption of the 75mm gun was a seriously retrograde step that allowed heavy tanks such as the Panther and Tiger to remain almost invulnerable when in hull down positions. Consequently Allied offensives that relied upon armour to punch a hole through the German lines in Normandy, simply stalled when faced with even a handful of hull down tanks or SP guns. The German army found the static, towed, AT gun to be relatively less effective in Normandy than elsewhere because of the intensity of Allied artilliery fire and the complete Allied aerial supremacy. Only AFV borne AT guns could retain their effectiveness after an Allied prepartory bombardment, and these AFVs repeatedly stalled Allied attacks, since Allied tanks simply could not cope with them with the OQF/M3 75mm gun, since the narrow frontage of 21st AG attacks precluded gaining a flanking position, in most cases.

 

[Freebird]

I have to disagree. IMHO, the adoption of the 75mm gun was a seriously retrograde step that allowed heavy tanks such as the Panther and Tiger to remain almost invulnerable when in hull down positions. Consequently Allied offensives that relied upon armour to punch a hole through the German lines in Normandy, simply stalled when faced with even a handful of hull down tanks or SP guns. The German army found the static, towed, AT gun to be relatively less effective in Normandy than elsewhere because of the intensity of Allied artilliery fire and the complete Allied aerial supremacy. Only AFV borne AT guns could retain their effectiveness after an Allied prepartory bombardment, and these AFVs repeatedly stalled Allied attacks, since Allied tanks simply could not cope with them with the OQF/M3 75mm gun, since the narrow frontage of 21st AG attacks precluded gaining a flanking position, in most cases.

Well it just goes to show how one out-of touch senior commander can screw things up. Just as Admiral King had some disasterous naval policies, the US choice to reject any replacement of the 75/76mm guns was the work of Gen McNair, head of the AGF

Lesley J. McNair - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

----------------------------------------------------
Tactical doctrine controversies
McNair also espoused controversial theories on armored support of infantry forces, theories which were later found to be inadequate. He particularly came in for criticism over tank destroyer doctrine. As an artillery officer, McNair favored towed anti-tank artillery over self-propelled tank destroyers, even after it had become apparent that German forces were converting their anti-tank forces into self-propelled guns as soon as such vehicles could be produced. Due to inherent delays in deploying such towed guns, combined with greatly increased crew exposure to German small arms and mortar fire, American towed anti-tank artillery was never really effective during the war in Europe; instead, some units were tasked as substitute howitzers firing conventional artillery missions. When used in their original role as towed anti-tank guns against German tanks and defensive emplacements, the towed battalions suffered disproportionate casualties compared to the self-propelled tank destroyer battalions.

the M4 Sherman seemed to be the answer that addressed concerns about firepower against the German tanks. However, all participants in the debate were completely unaware of the inadequacy of the 76mm gun against the Panther tank's frontal armor. Ordnance, the Armored Force Board, and AGF had all failed to research the effectiveness of this gun against the new German tanks, which had already been encountered in combat.

 

[vinnye]

Hi Dunmunro1,
The original quote for the range at which a British tank could take on the Tiger was taken from the account regarding Villers Bocage -

"I am not sure that the ranges quoted in Villers Bocage engagement were exactly right - if they were it suggests that even at 50 yds a British tank could not take on the frontal armour of a Tiger! "

Wittmann's Tiger as you correctly pointed out was hit from the side at somewhere around 150yds. If it had been on the frontal armour - who knows if it would have disabled the Tiger?

 

[Freebird]

Hi Dunmunro1,
The original quote for the range at which a British tank could take on the Tiger was taken from the account regarding Villers Bocage -

"I am not sure that the ranges quoted in Villers Bocage engagement were exactly right - if they were it suggests that even at 50 yds a British tank could not take on the frontal armour of a Tiger! "

Wittmann's Tiger as you correctly pointed out was hit from the side at somewhere around 150yds. If it had been on the frontal armour - who knows if it would have disabled the Tiger?

With the US 75mm gun it is unlikely that they could, however a 6pdr could penetrate the frontal armour of a Tiger at 100 - 150 yards.

7.5cm M3 L/38.5 penetration performance against vertical 240 BHN RHA armour:

M72 APCBC, MV = 2,030 fps:
500m = 81mm
1,000m = 73mm
1,500m = 65mm
2,000m = 59mm
2,500m = 53mm
3,000m = 47mm

.

Here's a complete specifications list for most of the tank guns used during WW2.
5.7cm 6 pdr L/52

Projectile weight: 3.23 kg Mk.9T APCBC
Secional Density: 1.005
Muzzle Velocity: 831 m/s
Total Kinetic Energy: 1115 KJ
Kinetic Energy pr. cm^2: 43.69 KJ

Performance against 90 degree 240 BHN RHA armour:
500m = 103mm
1,000m = 90mm
1,500m = 78mm
2,000m = 68mm
2,500m = 60mm
3,000m = 52mm
_________________________________________________
.

Sure can, but like I've said before APDS was a poor ammunition type during WW2, it was inaccurate and poor against sloped armour, had poor killing power once penetration was achieved and in short supply. So I really do not understand why you're so obsessed with this projectile type. APCBC rounds were the most lethal AP projectiles used during WW2, and were prefered for that very reason, Firefly gunners prefering the APCBC over the APDS round.

5.7cm 6pdr L/52 gun with APDS:
500m = 160mm
1,000m = 140mm
1,500m = 123mm
2,000m = 108mm
2,500m = 95mm
3,000m = 83mm