Best/Favourate Tank in the west

[Soren]

Are you sure that is the right version? It looks like the L38, not the L31 version?

M2
A version used on the early Medium Tank M3.

Barrel length: 31 calibres
Muzzle velocity: 588 m/s (1,929 ft/s)
Shell weight (M72 AP): 6.32 kg (14 lbs)
Armour penetration (M72 AP shell, 457 m, at 90 degrees): 60 mm

M3
Longer derivative of the M2. Equipped American and British vehicles such as the Medium Tank M4, the later models of the Medium Tank M3 and the Churchill III/IV (scavenged from General Sherman tanks in the North African theatre).

Barrel length: 38.5 calibres (3 m)
Muzzle velocity: 619 m/s (2,031 ft/s)
Shell weight (M72 AP): 6.32 kg (14 lbs)
Armour penetration (M72 AP shell, 457 m, at 90 degrees): 76 mm

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No it was actually info on the 7.5cm M1 L/31 gun I provided, MV is listed as 1,850 fps. I didn't notice that on the other page the 7.5cm M3 L/38.5 was mentioned, here is its' performance:

7.5cm M3 L/38.5 penetration performance against vertical 240 BHN RHA armour:

M72 APCBC, MV = 2,030 fps:
500m = 81mm
1,000m = 73mm
1,500m = 65mm
2,000m = 59mm
2,500m = 53mm
3,000m = 47mm

Also, I believe that the Pz IV F2 KwK 40 was not at Gazala, it only began production Mar 42, and if any had arrived in Africa by May, they had not made the trek to the front line

I don't believe any were at Gazala either, I was just mentioning the F2 because it arrived just after the battle of Gazala and the Pz.III was still extensively used at that time, and engaging the Matilda at ranges of over 500m was generally left for the Pz.IV F2s, 88's Pak40's to do.

 

[parsifal]

QUOTE=Soren;619290]
You can't really neutralize any armoured thread with MG fire, that would be fruitless.
.[/QUOTE]

Im referring to the Towed ATGs, not the tank mounted guns. MG against the crews of Towed ATGs was extremely effective, at ranges of 600 metres or less. Rommel tended not to use his tanks in armoured clashes, though there were many exceptions to this, as it was the British intention to always engage his armour head on, and in the words of Montgomery "write it down".

Rommel would tend to use his tanks as bait, to lure the British onto his AT Traps. This was because the many of his tanks were not even equipped with 5cm short barrelled weapons. In March 1941, 5pz regt had 20PzIs, 45 PzIIs, 71 PzIII (Gs) and 20 PzIVDs (with short barrelled Infantry support guns) . Even as late as October 1942, 44 of the 77 Mk IIIs were of the G model, and there were only 18 Mk IV F2s on strength with the regiment. The 15 Panzer Div in January 1942, prior to the commencement of Rommels drive to Alamein, had 29 mkIIs, 131 Mk IIIs (a mix of short barrelled Gs and H's) and 22 MkIV Ds. I believe the first long barrelled Ausf Ls and Js did not arrive until May 1942, along with some MkIVf-2s.In August further assets were absorbed, including Panzerjager 38s with Russian 7.62 cm ATGs fittedsome italian Semovente and M14-41s

Rommel in '42 relied heavily on captured Russian 76.2 mm guns, which he used mainly in the ATG role.

I do not believe the germans possessed a qualitative superiority to British tanks until the latter part of 1942, and by then the Sherman was being introduced. This explains why the british were always willing to accept an engagement with German Tanks, and Germans were far less willing to do so. The damage to the British Tank forces did not come from German Panzers, it was delievered by the ATGs attached to DAK. On those occasions that pure tank versus tank engagements occurred, the british actually did quite well. But if the the germans were able to take the field (which they often did....eventually) they could recover and repair many of the tanks they had lost. If they wre forced to retreat, the shortage of ARVs in the desert meant that they tended to lose a big perccentage of their broken down vehicles

 

[Soren]

The reason that Rommel avoided pure tank on tank engagements was not that his tanks were inferior to the British, no it was because he simply had far fewer tanks than the British. And his tactic of luring British tanks into the AT traps was so successful that he saw no need to risk losing his panzers in tank on tank fighting.

 

[m kenny]

knocking out many British tanks at ranges in excess of 3 km. The assistance provided by dedicated range finding equipment also helped ensure very accuracy at long ranges.

Panzer Tracts title The Dreaded Threat. The 8.8cm Flak 18/36/37 In The Anti-Tank Role
2001 and thus 4 years after his Tiger books gives the hit probability/penetration for the Flak gun on page 15


9.5 kg Pzgr 810m/s
1000m 95% (64%) 87mm
2000m 58% (23%) 72mm
3000m 32% (10%) not given

Pzgr 39, 10.2kg..800m/s

1000 95% (60%) 106mm
2000 54% (20%) 88mm
3000 not given

These figures are lower than the results given for the Tigers main gun.

page 42. An engagement at 3-3.5 km.

"Because of the long range and poor visibility results could not be determined"
Note: the time was 'early mornimng so bad light was not the problem

Page 44. Engagement at 2.5-3 km.

"Result:
because of the long range, could not be clearly determined"

Page 47. Engagement at 4000 yds (3.65 km).

"the chance of scoring a hit at this range was slight.

The 8.8cm FlaK18/36 could punch a hole in the Matilda II frontally at ranges well exceeding 2.5km, some were knocked out at nearly 4km range by FlaK18/36's in Africa.

Given that there was no way of clearly seeing a target at 4km and even at 3 km only 10% of shots could be expected to hit a stationary target I think the claims of effective fire at 4 km is well nigh impossible.

 

[parsifal]

The reason that Rommel avoided pure tank on tank engagements was not that his tanks were inferior to the British, no it was because he simply had far fewer tanks than the British. And his tactic of luring British tanks into the AT traps was so successful that he saw no need to risk losing his panzers in tank on tank fighting.

err only half true...from the arrival of DAK there was an advantage in numbers, slightly, but 10th armoured that met Rommel initially was undertrained and lacking in most of its support. The first real clash between DAK and trained elements of the RAC occurred in May 1941, during operation Brevity, when the numbers were equal. Thereafter the British were in no conditions for any offensive action until the tanks from the Tiger convoy arrived and had been absorbed....that added 238 Tanks to the allied inventory. Balancing this, in June the 15 panzer arrived with over 120 Tanks attached, 5th Light wasable repair most of the losses it had suffered in the previous months, and the Italian Ariete armourewd Div, and very decent tank force that was to show its mettle in the following battle of Bir Hacheim, also arrived and possessed about 120 tanks. There were various odds and ends available to the Axis as well, whereas most of the independant brigades that had been serving in the western desert on the allied side were elsewhere engaged in Greece, the Levant, Iraq and Ethiopia at that time. Far from enjoying any advantage in tank numbers, the allies were lucky to have parity, or less.

Comparing a Crusader III or a Matilda II to a Mk III (g) is going to show very little difference in the AT performance and protection for any of these tanks, but remember that MkIIIs only accounted for a little over half his German forces, and well below that for the total axis force structure. The qualitative edge enjoyed by the British forces in their tanks was a definaite factor in determining the strategy and tactics used by Rommel in the desert.

Later on, mostly from Crusader on, what you are saying is valid....Allied numerical advantages did become a factor in the equation.

 

[Soren]

Panzer Tracts title The Dreaded Threat. The 8.8cm Flak 18/36/37 In The Anti-Tank Role
2001 and thus 4 years after his Tiger books gives the hit probability/penetration for the Flak gun on page 15


9.5 kg Pzgr 810m/s
1000m 95% (64%) 87mm
2000m 58% (23%) 72mm
3000m 32% (10%) not given

Pzgr 39, 10.2kg..800m/s

1000 95% (60%) 106mm
2000 54% (20%) 88mm
3000 not given

These figures are lower than the results given for the Tigers main gun.

It should be noted that the penetration figures are against 30 degree angled plates of very high quality. Why accuracy figures are lower is simply a matter of there being greater difficulty in sometimes accessing wether a hit was made or not. It was not uncommon to fire at the same tank with numerous rounds even after it had been knocked out, if it didn't explode or burst into fire gun crews often couldn't see wether the enemy tank was defeated or not.

Given that there was no way of clearly seeing a target at 4km and even at 3 km only 10% of shots could be expected to hit a stationary target I think the claims of effective fire at 4 km is well nigh impossible.

If the range was judged correctly, which with the help of range finding equipment could be done quite easily (Range finding equipment was far from a common asset though, but some used them), then obtaining hits at ranges of 3+km was definitely possible and kills were registered at ranges exceeding 3km in Africa. On the eastern front Nashorn crews even achieved knocking out IS-2's at over 4km range. So it was possible, and it was done. But usually obtaining hits at such great distances was a matter of luck, but during long engagements with numerous rounds being fired hits were scored and enemy tanks were taken out.

 

[Freebird]

hi Freebird

Indeed the Ram tank series were a missed opportunity, and the design was a very fine one indeed.

Contrary to what most people think, Tanks are not the best weapons sytem to engage other tanks, and you dont use ones tanks to chargee, cavalry style, the enmies position. Rommel had this type of madness completely covered ....he would use his limited tank numbers to lure the British tanks out, and draw them over his AT screen of 88s and 50mm guns.

Although it was the relative weakness of the British Crusader Cruiser tanks that made this such a problem

Usually fire was opened up at around 1,200m to 1,500m range, and that to ensure the maximum number of hits were obtained whilst at the same time not being in danger of return fire. The British were usually quickly halted once this slaughter started, and it was when they were pulling back that the long range kills were achieved, the 88's not ceasing fire until the British tanks were completely out of sight, knocking out many British tanks at ranges in excess of 3 km. The assistance provided by dedicated range finding equipment also helped ensure very accuracy at long ranges.

This is the point that I was making - Of the British armour ONLY the Matilda II had any real chance to withstand AT hits at even long range (750 - 1,500m) but the lack of HE on the 2 pdr guns meant that they had no effective way to return fire. (As you pointed out)

I do not believe the germans possessed a qualitative superiority to British tanks until the latter part of 1942, and by then the Sherman was being introduced. This explains why the british were always willing to accept an engagement with German Tanks, and Germans were far less willing to do so. The damage to the British Tank forces did not come from German Panzers, it was delievered by the ATGs attached to DAK. On those occasions that pure tank versus tank engagements occurred, the british actually did quite well. But if the the germans were able to take the field (which they often did....eventually) they could recover and repair many of the tanks they had lost. If they wre forced to retreat, the shortage of ARVs in the desert meant that they tended to lose a big perccentage of their broken down vehicles

The Sherman was crap (pardon my bluntness)
The point that I was making was that Gazala was the perfect chance to crush Rommel's Africa Corps, but the chance was lost because the British Tanks were too weak to get the job done. Instead they lost the battle, surrendered 35,000+ men in Tobruk, and retreated all the way to Egypt In this battle (unlike at El Alamain, there were significant tank on tank battles, and while making a mobile attack could not use the 88's in the same degree as they could on the defensive.

We know from accounts of the battle that the British 6 pdr AT performed very well, knocking out a good number of Axis tanks. The Grant tank also made a good impression.

However, had they used the Ram Tank they could have won the battle:

The Ram tank was invulnerable except from 88's, and from the Pak 38/40's, and
The Pz Kwk 39 could punch through a Grant or Crusader at 2,000 m or more, but not on the sloped armour of a Ram Tank beyond about 500 m, if even that. (Remember that the KwK 39 was found to be largely ineffective against the KV-1, and the Ram tank was more heavily armoured than that (Ram - 87mm, KV-1 - 70 - 75mm)

On the other hand, the Grant Crusader (51mm 40mm) were vulnerable to ALL German tank guns, 37's, 50's short 75's

If I remember correctly the UK 6 pdr was similar in performance to the US 75mm, and superior to the short 75 of the Grant.

At this point in mid-42 Rommel had a limited numbber of 88's (about a dozen?), and very few of the newer Pak 40's

Does anyone have any info the OB's at Gazala?

Rommel's plan started to go wrong at Bir Hacheim. The Ariete and Trieste divisions of XX Motorized Corps and elements of 21st Panzer Division were held up for three hours by 7th Armoured Division's 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, dug in some four miles south east of Bir Hacheim and suffered heavy losses from their guns before over-running them.[12] The Bir Hacheim box, defended by the 1st Free French Brigade under Marie-Pierre Koenig, also proved to be a bigger problem than Rommel had anticipated, and the Ariete failed to take the position while suffering heavy losses from the French 75mm guns in the process.[13][14]

Further to the east the 15th Panzer Division had engaged 7th Armoured Division's 4th Armoured Brigade which had been ordered south to support the 3rd Indian and 7th Motorised Brigades, and inflicted heavy casualties but also took significant losses, surprised by the range and power of the 75mm guns on the newly arrived Grant tanks. The 4th Armoured Brigade then withdrew towards El Adem and spent the night bear the Belhamed supply base east of El Adem.
By late morning the Axis armoured units had advanced more than 25 miles (40 km) north but by midday their momentum had been blunted when they came into contact with and were held by 1st Armoured Division in heavy fighting which saw both sides taking losses.

On the far right of the Axis advance the 90th Light Afrika Division had engaged the 7th Motorised Brigade at Retma and forced it to withdraw east towards Bir el Gubi.
As planned, 90th Light division reached the El Adem area by mid-morning and captured a number of supply bases. The Allies were slow to react but by afternoon there was stiff fighting. The following day however, 4th Armoured Brigade were sent to El Adem and the 90th Light were driven back to the south west.

The tank battle continued for three days and with Bir Hakeim holding out, the Panzer Army Afrika found itself trapped in a region known as "the Cauldron", with Bir Hakeim to the south, Tobruk to the north, and the extensive mine belts of the original Allied front line to the west, and assailed by Allied armour from the north and east. Rommel's supply position by the evening of 31 May was getting desperate. Tasked to defend the German rear, the Ariete Armoured Cavalry Division in the meantime fought off repeated attacks by the British armoured brigades on 29 May and during the first week of June.

Panzer Army Afrika retains the initiative in "the Cauldron"
Finding himself trapped between an extensive minefield and stiff British resistance, Rommel was contemplating surrender. However, early on 29 May supply vehicles, supported by the Italian "Trieste" and "Ariete" Divisions, were able under heavy fire to penetrate the minefield north of Bir Hacheim, and move in much needed supplies to the trapped Axis forces, allowing Rommel to regain his composure.

On the night of 1 June Rommel sent the 90th Light and Trieste divisions south to renew the attack on Bir Hacheim from which position raiding groups were continually being sent to harass his supply line. Once again the assault failed and the struggle for Bir Hacheim was to continue for a further 10 days.

On 5 June Eighth Army finally launched its counter attack but the opposition had had a number of days to prepare and in the north XIII Corps made no progress. The attack by 7th Armoured and 5th Indian Infantry Divisions on the eastern flank of the cauldron launched at 2.50am on 5 June initially went well as the infantry secured objectives to plan. However, the main Axis defences were further west than expected and so when 22nd Armoured Brigade passed through they were met by intense fire and their advance checked. At dawn the 32nd Army Tank Brigade had joined the attack, advancing from the north, and had also run into heavy fire and lost 50 of 70 tanks involved.

By early afternoon on 5 June Rommel decided to attack east with the Ariete and 21st Panzer Divisions and northwards towards the Knightsbridge defensive box with elements of 15th Panzer Division. The eastward thrust towards Bir el Hatmat dispersed the tactical HQs of the two British Divisions as well as the HQs of the 9th and 10th Indian Infantry Brigades and other smaller units. Command and control broke down completely.22nd Armoured Brigade, having lost 60 of its 156 tanks, was forced from the battlefield by renewed attacks from 15th Panzer. Of the Allied attack, three Indian infantry battalions, a reconnaissance regiment and four artillery regiments were left in the cauldron. Unsupported by armour they faced an overwhelming task on 6 June and were one by one over-run.

Rommel continued to hold the initiative, building up his strength in the Cauldron and sending out thrusts at the various opposing strong points. Between 6 June and 8 June he launched further concerted attacks on Bir Hacheim but although the defensive perimeter was shrunk the French defenders continued to hold out and exact a heavy toll with their guns with the support of columns from the 7th Motor Brigade and 29th Indian Infantry Brigade which continued to harass the enemy's communications. Reinforced with a further combat group, the Axis attacked again on 9 June, finally breaking deep into the defences on 10 June. At this time the Free French position had become untenable and Ritchie ordered them to evacuate that evening.

The British Armour is heavily defeated
On 11 June Rommel pushed 15th Panzer and 90th Light Afrika towards El Adem and by 12 June had forced 201st Guards Brigade to withdraw from the Knightsbridge Box to the Tobruk perimeter. 29th Indian Infantry Brigade repulsed an attack on the El Adem box on 12 June but 2nd and 4th Armoured Brigades on their left were pushed back four miles by 15th Panzer and forced to leave their damaged tanks on the battlefield unretrieved. On 13 June 21st Panzer advanced from the west to join the battle, engaging 22nd Armoured Brigade.

 

[Soren]

I wouldn't really call the Sherman crap Freebird, it possessed a decent gun for the time when one considers the HE capability and the fact that most German tanks were thinly armoured. It also had pretty decent armour, although much of it was cast (not so good), but later versions featured RHA armour. It was designed to combat tanks like the Pz.III, and it could do that effectively as long as the range wasn't too long; The L/38.5 gun while packing the punch to be lethal against the Pz.III at long range simply lacked the MV to make it accurate at ranges in excess of 1,000m. But as pointed out the Sherman did have a good HE round, capable of bringing down a small house, so not something you'd want sent your way!

The Sherman was an ok tank IMO, it was just too often sent into situations it was never designed to be able to handle; The long stretched wide open battlefields of North Africa were ideal Panzer territory.

 

[Freebird]

I wouldn't really call the Sherman crap Freebird, it possessed a decent gun for the time when one considers the HE capability and the fact that most German tanks were thinly armoured. It also had pretty decent armour, although much of it was cast (not so good), but later versions featured RHA armour. It was designed to combat tanks like the Pz.III, and it could do that effectively as long as the range wasn't too long; The L/38.5 gun while packing the punch to be lethal against the Pz.III at long range simply lacked the MV to make it accurate at ranges in excess of 1,000m. But as pointed out the Sherman did have a good HE round, capable of bringing down a small house, so not something you'd want sent your way!

The Sherman was an ok tank IMO, it was just too often sent into situations it was never designed to be able to handle; The long stretched wide open battlefields of North Africa were ideal Panzer territory.

Ok, maybe not crap (the British armaments planning was crap )

The problem was that it was just barely adequate in the summer of '42, and went downhill from there.

The Sherman was inferior in every way to the Ram tank, so the British choice to go with the Sherman over the Ram was political, and stupid.

The Ram's armour of 87mm vs the 51mm (Sherman front hull) and 38mm (sides) gave it tough protection vs 1942 Axis guns, and better chance vs the later Kwk40 88mm at longer ranges (compared to Sherman)

The 6pdr gun was effective vs 1942-1943 PzIII PzIV. Obviously going to be inadequate vs Tiger but so was the Sherman's 75mm gun.

It has been mentioned that the Ram's turret ring was to small for the 75mm gun, but this is not actually correct. The smaller Aussie Sentinal had the same size turret ring, yet was modified to take the 17 pdr.

They could have very easily modified the Ram in 1943 to take a 17pdr, which would give you the same firepower as a Sherman Firefly, but with 50% better protection. In fact, a 17pdr armed Ram would be reasonably equal in power to a Panther, unlike the weaker armed Sherman75mm.

 

[dunmunro1]

In fact the Ram could accept a 75mm gun, since the UK designed the 75mm OQF to fit any tank that could accept a 6 pdr. A number of RamII tanks were sold to the Netherlands, post war after conversion with 75mm OQF guns. The decision to abandon the 6 pdr as a tank main armament and the decision to not use the Ram in combat was a very bad mistake, IMHO. The Ram could have been present in limited numbers at Gazala and in much larger numbers at El Alamein. The 6 pdr APDS combination would have made the Ram almost equal to the Firefly in AT effectiveness, and far superior to any 75mm gunned Allied tank.

 

[Vincenzo]

i know for Gazala battle there were 4 italian tank btls (around 220/230 M-1314) and around 300 german tanks (Pz II, III, IV, a few of PZ III with 50/60 (~20)) for italian intelligence (so need a check from british source) there were 4 "british" tank btls and 5 "british" tank brigade (3 in the armoured division and 2 as army assets) for 650 tanks (many Grant)

p.s it's not clear if the 4 "indipendent" btls were part on army tanks brigade

 

[Freebird]

i know for Gazala battle there were 4 italian tank btls (around 220/230 M-1314) and around 300 german tanks (Pz II, III, IV, a few of PZ III with 50/60 (~20)) for italian intelligence (so need a check from british source) there were 4 "british" tank btls and 5 "british" tank brigade (3 in the armoured division and 2 as army assets) for 650 tanks (many Grant)

p.s it's not clear if the 4 "indipendent" btls were part on army tanks brigade

There were 167 Grant tanks at Gazala, most in the 4th brigade.

The Montreal factory had built ~160 Ram mk II by mid-March 1942, so they could have been sent over straight away to Africa.

 

[Vincenzo]

i found this Axis History Forum • View topic - Gazala OoB


p.s. for the italian OoB i just saw a error, the 3° gruppo of Lancieri di Novara was not there the 26th may, the first L-6/40 come in Africa the 30th may

 

[Freebird]

i found this Axis History Forum • View topic - Gazala OoB


p.s. for the italian OoB i just saw a error, the 3° gruppo of Lancieri di Novara was not there the 26th may, the first L-6/40 come in Africa the 30th may

Thanks for the link!

In fact the Ram could accept a 75mm gun, since the UK designed the 75mm OQF to fit any tank that could accept a 6 pdr

In fact there would be little point in converting a 6pdr to the 75mm, as it was weaker vs tanks.
And that was vs. the L38, the Grant's L31 was even worse performance

(From Soren's gun penetrating ranking)

12. 7.6cm M1 L/55
13. 7.5cm KwK40 L/48
14. 5.7cm 6 pdr
15. 5cm KwK39 L/60
16. 7.62cm F34 Zis-5 L/41.4
17. 7.5cm M3 L/38.5

 

[Juha]

Hello Freebird
one must remember that good HE round was also essential, that's why of tank's ammo load at least half was usually HE shells. British had learned in N Africa how dangerous A/T guns were, so they needed a decent HE shell, that's why the selected the 75mm gun as their main tank gun. They had hoped to get HV 75mm gun into Cromwell but that didn't work out. British were usually able to desigh very good AP shots but because of their tank guns had so high MV, their HE ammo was often, at least initially, rather ineffective. Germans instead usually succeeded to develop good AP and HE rounds for their tank guns.

Juha

 

[dunmunro1]

Hello Freebird
one must remember that good HE round was also essential, that's why of tank's ammo load at least half was usually HE shells. British had learned in N Africa how dangerous A/T guns were, so they needed a decent HE shell, that's why the selected the 75mm gun as their main tank gun. They had hoped to get HV 75mm gun into Cromwell but that didn't work out. British were usually able to desigh very good AP shots but because of their tank guns had so high MV, their HE ammo was often, at least initially, rather ineffective. Germans instead usually succeeded to develop good AP and HE rounds for their tank guns.

Juha

In 1943 there was a very lively debate in the UK over whether to keep the 6 pdr or move to the 75mm OQF, and although they were hopes of fitting the 77mm to the Cromwell and Churchill, this proved impossible to do. Those who argued for the 6 pdr stated that the lack of a 6 pdr HE round in North Africa had created an unfortunate impression against the 6 pdr as a tank main armament. They (including the UK minister responsible for tank production) argued that the 6 pdr HE round, which became plentiful in 1943 was sufficiently effective and that the increased AP performance of the 6 pdr made it a far better choice than the 75mm. Unfortunately, UK troops in Italy preferred the better HE of the 75mm, probably because German armour was relatively rare in Italy in 1943 and the terrain did not favour tanks. However, in Normandy, the 21st AG soon found itself facing 70-90% of all German armour in Francem during the entire Normandy campaign, and the lack of the 6 pdr in their tanks was a disaster.

I think it is very clear that the 6 pdr was a far superior tank gun than the 75mm M3/OQF and the Normandy campaign would have ended much sooner if 21st AG tanks had the 6 pdr as their primary armament because German tank losses would have increased while Allied tank losses would have decreased, and inevitably this would have led to the collapse of the German position much sooner. The 75mm gun allowed the Tiger, Panther and SP guns to effectively counter 21st AG numerical superiority in tanks by destroying them from hull down positions. The 6 pdr, especially with APDS, would have increased losses to German armour in hull down positions, and thus reduced Allied tank losses. It would have also greatly increased Allied tank moral by giving them a weapon capable of dealing with most German armour, even when met in hull down positions.

 

[Vincenzo]

i'm not a expert of ammos supply but i think that 6 pdr APDS were very rare at time of normandy campaign, also if with APCBC the 6pdr was best of 75 US but not of 75 british
Data from "Fire nad Movement" RAC Tank Museum, Bovington 1975
6 pdr mk 3 or 5 APCBC penetration 80 mm at 1000 yds 30° MQ
same APDS 117 mm
same for 75 M2 or M3 APCBC 62 mm
same for 75 Mk 5 APCBC 94 mm

 

[m kenny]

i think that 6 pdr APDS were very rare at time of normandy campaign

217,000 rounds in 1944.

 

[Vincenzo]

that it's the production of all'44 and not the availability in a day in normandy campaign

and this need also for 6 pdr ATG..

 

[dunmunro1]

6 pdr mk 3 or 5 APCBC penetration 80 mm at 1000 yds 30° MQ
same ADS 117 mm
same for 75 M2 or M3 APCBC 62 mm
same for 75 Mk 5 APCBC 94 mm

The 6 pdr APDS round was available from the first day of the Normandy campaign. Supplies were limited initially, but then the standard APCBC round was quite capable of tackling most Axis tanks and the APDS could be reserved for handling hull down tanks and the frontal armour of Tigers, etc. The 75mm APCBC MkV round, OTOH, seems to be extremely rare and probably saw little service in WW2.

The data for the 6 pdr APDS penetration is probably for the Mk3 L43 gun, which was obsolete by D-day.