Best fighter in the world in 1940? Spitfire, 109, Zero, or something else

[Shortround6]

I gotta disagree on the 303's. I figure if I won't deer hunt with it, then I wouldn't shoot airplanes with it either. Against Japanese, 4 50's would be enough, with a huge supply of ammo of course. 6 would be fine to if it didn't affect performance to badly. 4 20's would be overkill against Japanese aircraft. If you were dead on target everytime you sqeezed the trigger they would fine, since it would only take a couple of rounds to destroy one, but I think that you would spend a good portion of your time missing and trying to get on target and I don't think you would have enough ammo with 4 20's to do that. By the time you miss with 2 or 3 bursts, your out of ammo.

Depends on the plane, I guess.

Hurricane had 90rpg. Not enough you say.

Early Zero's had 55-60 rpg and then were down to a pair or .303 mg's.

109E's had 55-60rpg and then were down to a pair of 7.9 mg's

so 2 or 3 bursts for them and then a pathetic armament.

Not to mention that both of those plane's 20mm cannon were slower firing (less rounds per same length burst) and much lower in velocity making defection shooting much harder. Trying to use the mg's to range on the target and then fire the cannon only works at short range because of the flight times of the guns.

BTW> " I would like to opt for 4 or 6 50's and a large supply of ammo" for the Wildcat wasn't happening, at least the 6 gun part. Wildcats either carried 4 guns with a large supply of ammo or 6 guns with about the least amount of .50 cal ammo per gun of any US fighter. I believe only a few P-40 "stripper" versions carried less.

 

[riacrato]

But look at all the aircraft powered throughout the war by the Merlin engine.I can't imagine many Spitfire or Mustang or Mosquito or Lancaster pilots saying "this would be a great aircraft if only it had fuel injection"
I happen to agree about the Spitfire MkI and Bf109E,nothing in it. I don't know enough about the Zero to have an informed opinion.
Cheers
Steve

Hmm, all the Merlins/Packards in the later half (Spitfire IX, P-51, Mosquito XX) had pressure carburettors no? For a 4 engined bomber fuel injection is not that important.

 

[claidemore]

On the subject of Hurricane vs Zero (or Ki-43), it's been discussed at length on these forums, particularly regarding the CBI theatre. My conclusion, FWIW, is that none of the performance advantages of the Hurricane could be employed tactically to give an advantage over the Zero or Oscar on a regular basis. Combine that with the RAF's 'colonial' attitude in the CBI and the rest is history!

The .303 British is an excellent deer cartridge, ballistically it is very close to the .308 Winchester (7.62 Nato). Here in Canada it has been (and continues to be) used for everything up to and including moose and grizzly bears. (not my first choice for grizzly). I personally carred a No. 5 jungle carbine as a back up gun while guiding for moose and bears in northern BC. (also carried a 30-30 Winch and a .444 Marlin, witnessed a 500 yard one shot kill on a moose with the .30-30. Pure outhouse luck on that one.)

I think the RAF would have been more effective against the Luftwaffe bombers during BoB if they had been armed with .50 mgs instead of .303, but the .303s did manage to shoot down a lot of aircraft.

Pretty much every airforce in the world had switched to 20mm cannon by the end of WWII, so the theory that a cannon would miss too often and make it ineffective doesn't carry much weight. Missing or hitting is primarily a product of training or lack of training and sighting systems, not weapon selection.

 

[stona]

Hmm, all the Merlins/Packards in the later half (Spitfire IX, P-51, Mosquito XX) had pressure carburettors no? For a 4 engined bomber fuel injection is not that important.

No point in splitting hairs but that is not what I understand by fuel injection.
Cheers
Steve

 

[davebender]

I don't think they would have won, but the battle would have been more costly for the British.

I agree. 1940 Germany didn't have anywhere near enough aircraft to overwhelm the RAF. However the solution is more Me-109s plus drop tanks. Not a similiar number of A6M2s.

A significant increase in Me-110s available for fighter sweeps would also make a difference. The Me-110C was faster then a Hurricane and almost as fast as a Spitfire. If not chained to the bombers it would be difficult for the RAF to intercept low level (i.e. invisible to radar) Me-110 attacks on airfields.

 

[Colin1]

...it would be difficult for the RAF to intercept low level (i.e. invisible to radar)...

but not to the Observer Corps

 

[pinsog]

On the subject of Hurricane vs Zero (or Ki-43), it's been discussed at length on these forums, particularly regarding the CBI theatre. My conclusion, FWIW, is that none of the performance advantages of the Hurricane could be employed tactically to give an advantage over the Zero or Oscar on a regular basis. Combine that with the RAF's 'colonial' attitude in the CBI and the rest is history!

The .303 British is an excellent deer cartridge, ballistically it is very close to the .308 Winchester (7.62 Nato). Here in Canada it has been (and continues to be) used for everything up to and including moose and grizzly bears. (not my first choice for grizzly). I personally carred a No. 5 jungle carbine as a back up gun while guiding for moose and bears in northern BC. (also carried a 30-30 Winch and a .444 Marlin, witnessed a 500 yard one shot kill on a moose with the .30-30. Pure outhouse luck on that one.)

I think the RAF would have been more effective against the Luftwaffe bombers during BoB if they had been armed with .50 mgs instead of .303, but the .303s did manage to shoot down a lot of aircraft.

Pretty much every airforce in the world had switched to 20mm cannon by the end of WWII, so the theory that a cannon would miss too often and make it ineffective doesn't carry much weight. Missing or hitting is primarily a product of training or lack of training and sighting systems, not weapon selection.

As far as "missing or hitting is a product of training", I agree up to a point, but if your shooting a fast turning fighter like a Zero, Spitfire, Fw190 ect, he knows your behind him and he's flying for his life, it is still going to be difficult to hit him and you will have better luck with say 4 or 6 50's with between 250 and 400 rounds per gun and a high rate of fire, than you will with 2 or 4 20's with 50 to 90 rounds per gun and a low rate of fire.
Heavy bombers are a different story, 20's are the only way to go. Some mediums were very tough also, but ironically, they were mostly American built, B25,B26,A26.

I have a couple of friends that are amazing shots with shotguns, but they still use #8's for dove, not buckshot.

 

[parsifal]

I agree. 1940 Germany didn't have anywhere near enough aircraft to overwhelm the RAF. However the solution is more Me-109s plus drop tanks. Not a similiar number of A6M2s.

A significant increase in Me-110s available for fighter sweeps would also make a difference. The Me-110C was faster then a Hurricane and almost as fast as a Spitfire. If not chained to the bombers it would be difficult for the RAF to intercept low level (i.e. invisible to radar) Me-110 attacks on airfields.

You keep making statements like this, for which there is absolutely no historical backing. I am not trying to give you a hard time, merely to give a different opnion on your statements.

The LW in 1940 outnumbered the RAF by at least 2:1 in frontline aircraft. Thats an advantage at least as comparable as that enjoyed by the allies in 1944. Granted the reserves and the uncommitted forces in 1944 in the allied camp made losses largely irrelevant, but in terms of frontline strengths,. the Germans had enough strength to win (in 1940).

What they lacked was the right equipment a cogent war winning strategy, and the production and training regime to support a sustained campaign with heavy losses. Their bombers were too weakly defended, their bombloads too small, their fighters too short ranged, or too unmanouverable (in the case of the 110) to be of any use. Tactically they failed to concentrate properly which made none of their strikes decisive.

With regard to the Me 110 possibilities, I agree they were badly used, but they could not have been used in the way you describe to any great effect. Your suggestion was basically tried (with 109s and 110s) and failed due to the existence of the CL stations and for the need for the attacking fighters to approach at much less than top speed in order to conserve fuel. Sufficient early warning existed in the CL stations to give warning, and as the targets of these fighter sweeps were inevitably RAF airfields, this made positioning of RAF assets just easier, not harder. Moreover, Dowding after a couple of sucker punches refused to respond to such tactics, conserving his fighter forces for the bombers. The German fighter sweeps achieved nothing, because the civil defence measures at the airfields meant that strafing runs orfighter bomber raids would do nothing more than cause nuisance. Worse, such efforts simply weakened the fighter defences of the escort thereby making the RAFs job that much easier.

 

[Glider]

I agree. 1940 Germany didn't have anywhere near enough aircraft to overwhelm the RAF. However the solution is more Me-109s plus drop tanks. Not a similiar number of A6M2s.

A significant increase in Me-110s available for fighter sweeps would also make a difference. The Me-110C was faster then a Hurricane and almost as fast as a Spitfire. If not chained to the bombers it would be difficult for the RAF to intercept low level (i.e. invisible to radar) Me-110 attacks on airfields.

The 110 suffered very heavy losses when tied to bombers or freelancing against Spits or Hurricanes. They did use them for independent low level attacks of airfields and suffered for it

Its often forgotten that all German raids were invisible to radar once they had crossed the coast as nearly all the RAF radar was on the coast pointing out to sea. Once inland the British relied on the Observer Corps who worked well against all enemy aircraft low down or at altitude.

 

[Vincenzo]

The LW in 1940 outnumbered the RAF by at least 2:1 in frontline aircraft. .

maybe but we need do watch only the units that go in the battle and not all.

 

[Shortround6]

I agree up to a point, but if your shooting a fast turning fighter like a Zero, Spitfire, Fw190 ect, he knows your behind him and he's flying for his life, it is still going to be difficult to hit him and you will have better luck with say 4 or 6 50's with between 250 and 400 rounds per gun and a high rate of fire, than you will with 2 or 4 20's with 50 to 90 rounds per gun and a low rate of fire.

the Wildcat with 4 .50s had a Max of 430 rpg. With a rate if fire of about 14 rounds per second per gun that gives 56 rounds per second. It did vary a bit. It also means the F4F-3 had about 30 seconds of firing time. The F4F-4 with 6 guns carried a max of 240rpg. or just over 17 seconds of firing time. Both set ups have much more firing time than the 4 Hispanos in the Hurricane which were good for about 9 seconds or three 3 second bursts. However at 600rpm or 10 rounds a second per gun the Hurricane was throwing FORTY 20mm shells a second which isn't that many fewer than the four .50s and is a far cry from the 18 or fewer 20mm shells per second from the 109 or Zero. The Hurricane also had a good 2 seconds more firing time than the 109 or Zero and with shells that had a MV 280m/s faster than all but the German "mine" shell the Hispano was easier to hit with than the early Axis cannon.

 

[davebender]

BoB OOB September 1940.
Document-49: Fighter Command Order of Battle Sept 15th 1940
I see no reason to think RAF fighter aircraft were outnumbered during the Battle of Britain.

RAF Bomber Command flew over 17,000 sorties at night from May to December 1940 while losing 340 aircraft. I suspect that compares well with German bonber sorties over Britain during the same time frame.

 

[pinsog]

the Wildcat with 4 .50s had a Max of 430 rpg. With a rate if fire of about 14 rounds per second per gun that gives 56 rounds per second. It did vary a bit. It also means the F4F-3 had about 30 seconds of firing time. The F4F-4 with 6 guns carried a max of 240rpg. or just over 17 seconds of firing time. Both set ups have much more firing time than the 4 Hispanos in the Hurricane which were good for about 9 seconds or three 3 second bursts. However at 600rpm or 10 rounds a second per gun the Hurricane was throwing FORTY 20mm shells a second which isn't that many fewer than the four .50s and is a far cry from the 18 or fewer 20mm shells per second from the 109 or Zero. The Hurricane also had a good 2 seconds more firing time than the 109 or Zero and with shells that had a MV 280m/s faster than all but the German "mine" shell the Hispano was easier to hit with than the early Axis cannon.

9 seconds isn't very long when your chasing a hard turning single engine fighter and it was the best of the 20mm group for both firing time and weight per second. Didn't the P47 carry around 400 rpg?

 

[Shortround6]

9 seconds isn't very long when your chasing a hard turning single engine fighter and it was the best of the 20mm group for both firing time and weight per second. Didn't the P47 carry around 400 rpg?

Yes but perhaps only if not carrying underwing ordnance. In some cases they were restricted to 267rpg.

Most people figure you are doing good if you can keep the opponent in the gun sight for 3 seconds at a time. Keeping the trigger pressed and hosing the sky isn't a good way to get hits. The .50 also had a problem with over heating . very long bursts ruined the barrel by eroding the throat and rifling. This lead to lower velocity and gross inaccuracy. It could also be accomplished in just few hundred rounds if the trigger was held down continuously for 20 seconds or so.

Hurricane was actually one of the the worst Hispano armed fighters that used a belt feed. Most carried 120-150 rpg.

But we are wandering somewhat off topic.

In 1940 the Spitfire carried either 300 or 350rpg for i'ts .303 depending on MK while the Hurricane carried 334rpg? at 20 rounds/sec or just under that gives them about 15-17 seconds of firing time or a fraction more if guns are a little slow. Zero runs out of cannon shells (assuming that the Zero really is a 1940 fighter) in 7 seconds or less and then is left with the remainder of it's 500rpg ammo load for it's synchronized .303 cowl guns. The 109 is pretty much in the same boat 20mm wise but it's faster firing syrcroed 7.9mm mg's have the rather strange amount of 1000rpg. Almost a full minute of firing time. If the 109 pilot fired in bursts he might run out of fuel before he ran out of mg ammo. Granted they only planed on 500rpg when the engine cannon was fitted and threw in the extra 500rpg when the engine cannon didn't work but it does make one think which guns the Japanese and Germans were getting their kills with and if the two cowl guns worked then why were eight wing guns so bad?

 

[Milosh]

BoB OOB September 1940.
Document-49: Fighter Command Order of Battle Sept 15th 1940
I see no reason to think RAF fighter aircraft were outnumbered during the Battle of Britain.

Don't look at total numbers. Most of the fighting was done by 11 Group with a little help supplied by 10 and 12 Groups. 13 group was just too far away from the combat over south east England.

 

[Hop]

Document-49: Fighter Command Order of Battle Sept 15th 1940
I see no reason to think RAF fighter aircraft were outnumbered during the Battle of Britain.

They certainly weren't towards the end of the battle.

The beginning is another matter. On 10 July the RAF had 570 operational Spitfires and Hurricanes. The Luftwaffe had about 1,100 operational 109s and 110s.

By 7 September the RAF was up to 620 operational Spits and Hurricanes, the Luftwaffe down to 770 operational 109s and 110s.

Even then, though, the Luftwaffe was pretty much concentrated against the SE of England, whereas the RAF was spread over the UK.

 

[Vincenzo]

They certainly weren't towards the end of the battle.

The beginning is another matter. On 10 July the RAF had 570 operational Spitfires and Hurricanes. The Luftwaffe had about 1,100 operational 109s and 110s.

By 7 September the RAF was up to 620 operational Spits and Hurricanes, the Luftwaffe down to 770 operational 109s and 110s.

Even then, though, the Luftwaffe was pretty much concentrated against the SE of England, whereas the RAF was spread over the UK.

operational mean?

 

[Kurfürst]

They certainly weren't towards the end of the battle.

The beginning is another matter. On 10 July the RAF had 570 operational Spitfires and Hurricanes. The Luftwaffe had about 1,100 operational 109s and 110s.

The RAF wasn't outnumbered in the beginning either. Now, usually the Hops like to quote strenght figures for the RAF at the beginning of July, and of course count only British single engined fighters while 110s are 'naturally' included.

But that was hardly representative of their relative strenght, since Fighter Command was rapidly expanding at the time, and, the Germans didn't start the Battle proper until mid-August. In specific number, although only 871 fighters were present with RAF fighter squadrons (644 being ready for ops), in just two weeks, by 20 July there were 1052 British fighters, altough the number available for ops remained pretty much the same (658).

Of course during July 1940 not much happened, ops were largely limited to small skirmishes, with light losses - the Germans for example reported just 34 Bf 109s and 19 Bf 110s lost to enemy action during the whole month. In August, when they started the battle proper, the figures were 177 and 114.

When the Battle started, there was pretty much parity between the number of fighters on both sides.

The Germans weren't committing all of their strength against Britain, either, although Hop quotes figures for the entire Luftwaffe (including that in Germany and elsewhere not taking part)

The number of fighters employed against the British Isles on 10th August, when the Germans begun to launch serious operations, was 805 servicable Bf 109s and 224 servicable Bf 110s, out of a force of 934 and 289, 1223 in total "present" (ie. both servicable and unservicable aircraft). The 110s weren't all used as fighters either, as they often acted as light bombers.

Against this, the British reported, on the same day, 1106 fighters present, out of which 749 were serviceable, mostly single engined fighters.

By 7 September the RAF was up to 620 operational Spits and Hurricanes, the Luftwaffe down to 770 operational 109s and 110s.

Even then, though, the Luftwaffe was pretty much concentrated against the SE of England, whereas the RAF was spread over the UK.

Not all of the LW was flying every day, either. Units were rested from operation in the same manner as RAF Sqns, its only that they stayed at their base, and didn't transfer to the safe backyard as RAF Sqns did; the LW airfields in France were much less exposed to the RAF than vica versa.

In any case, the British doesn't seem to have been outnumbered at any part of the Battle, even when their situation was the worst in the first week of September, the British flew some 5513 fighter sorties against 2355 German. British bombers flew 642, Coastal Command 921 in addition, while the Luftwaffe's bombers flew 2855.

 

[parsifal]

Dave
As others have pointed out, because the RAF was on the defensive, it had to spread itself out allover the british isles , which meant that only a fraction of its strength could be deployed to the battle at any given time. This was admittedly less of a handicap than it might otherwise be, since Dowding needed to constantly rotate units and rest and rebuild them during the battle, which he did by rotating worn units to the quieter sectors.

Just the same the total numbers are entirely misleading. A more accurate estimate is to assume about 2/3 of RAF Fighter command as being available at any given time.

The figures i am giving for the Germans only represent the forces committed to the battle in the Southwast. i have ignored those units on garrison in the east, over Germany and in Norway.

I dont understand why you think the strengths given at 15 Septmeber represent an accurate figure for the initial forces. by 15 September, the Luftwaffe was beginning to feel the strain, which shows in their readiness numbers. The RAF, in contrast was beginning to grow stronger by that time, so quoting numbers from that time period is neither accurate.

The figures I am giving are frontline operational numbers. Though it can be argued that the RAF enjoyed replacements about two to three times as great as the LW, they also laboured under an acute shortage of pilots, which initially affected the LW less at the beginning. As the battl;e progresed and pilots were killed or more commonly shot down over enemy territory, the Germans too suffered heavily in pilots. Later, because they did not have an adequate air training scheme in place (having planned for a short duration conflict only) they were unable to replace pilots at a fast enough rate and or at a reasonable standard of training.

Lastly a word about readiness rates. As the battle progressed, the poor replacement and logistic system supporting the germans (again as a result of the German lack of depth in thair prewar planning) German readiness rates plummetted in comparison to the RAFs.

I have a number of sources that I could use, but decided to use the most pro-Axis that I could find, being Ellis's statistical index. The figures at selected dates during the battle are as follws

Jul06

FC: 644
JG: 980
KG: 1280
SG: 220

FC/LW ratio 0.25
FC/JG Ratio 0.67

Aug10

FC: 749
JG: 1030
KG: 1078
SG: 261

FC/LW ratio 0.28
FC/JG Ratio 0.73

Sep07

FC: 745
JG: 752
KG: 772
SG: 180

FC/LW ratio 0.45
FC/JG Ratio 0.95

Sep28

FC: 792
JG: 510
KG: 750
SG: 340

FC/LW ratio 0.56
FC/JG Ratio 1.6


I apologise but my ratios are approximate....i cannot find my calculator....but they are good enough to make the point. Throughout the critical months of July and August the Germans held a critical advantage in numbers. By early September they had been defeated, in particular the Me109 forces so often touted as superior to the RAF FGighters had ben demonstrably cleared from the field of battle. It was a blow that the LW never really recovered completely from.

But the main point I wanted to make is that at tha the beginning and up to about half way through the battle the LW in all critical categories held a substantial numerical advantage...

It would be intersting to compare this with the operational strewngths of the 8th AF and the Reich Defences in 1944-5

 

[Kurfürst]

Dave
As others have pointed out, because the RAF was on the defensive, it had to spread itself out allover the british isles , which meant that only a fraction of its strength could be deployed to the battle at any given time. This was admittedly less of a handicap than it might otherwise be, since Dowding needed to constantly rotate units and rest and rebuild them during the battle, which he did by rotating worn units to the quieter sectors.

I often wondered about that arguement - while its true the RAF Group in the SE bore the brunt of the fighting, the other Groups too did make a contribution.

I wonder if there are any figures for how many victory claims were by the RAF FCs Groups respectively?

Lastly a word about readiness rates. As the battle progressed, the poor replacement and logistic system supporting the germans (again as a result of the German lack of depth in thair prewar planning) German readiness rates plummetted in comparison to the RAFs.

This doesn't sound right. German servicibilty rates did drop, but FC was in still in a poorer position in comparison. Of course the Germans concentrated on destroying British fighters, and the British on destroying German bombers (which started with a very low servicibility rate after the BoF in the first place, ie. 67% readiness on 10 August with the deployed units)

Between the 24 August and 4 September German serviceability rates, which were acceptable at Stuka units, were running at 75% with Bf 109s, 70% with bombers and 65% with Bf 110s. Serviceability rates in Fighter Command's fighter squadrons, between the 24 August and 7 September, were listed as: 64.8% on the 24 August; 64.7% on 31 August and 64.25% on the 7 September 1940, indicating a slow decline.

Jul06

FC: 644
JG: 980
KG: 1280
SG: 220

FC/LW ratio 0.25
FC/JG Ratio 0.67

Aug10

FC: 749
JG: 1030
KG: 1078
SG: 261

FC/LW ratio 0.28
FC/JG Ratio 0.73

Sep07

FC: 745
JG: 752
KG: 772
SG: 180

FC/LW ratio 0.45
FC/JG Ratio 0.95

Sep28

FC: 792
JG: 510
KG: 750
SG: 340

Something is not right for September... I mean, fighter units drop down by 240 in twenty days (with all permanent losses reported being 220 for the whole month due to all causes!), while Stuka units doubled in size...? Besides that all JG units (everywhere, excluding those in the Nachtjagd) reporting Single engine fighters - 28.09.40 920 Bf 109s present, 712 of them servicable on the same day on the 28th September..?

I suspect that your source counts the 109 Jabo conversions in September as Stukas/dive bombers or something like that for the 28th, but still as "JG" for the 7th.