Best fighter in the world in 1940? Spitfire, 109, Zero, or something else

[Milosh]

Another source of Lw OoB.
Luftwaffe Campaign Orders of Battle

Includes 'on hand' and 'serviceable numbers'

 

[Milosh]

This doesn't sound right. German servicibilty rates did drop, but FC was in still in a poorer position in comparison. Of course the Germans concentrated on destroying British fighters, and the British on destroying German bombers (which started with a very low servicibility rate after the BoF in the first place, ie. 67% readiness on 10 August with the deployed units)

Between the 24 August and 4 September German serviceability rates, which were acceptable at Stuka units, were running at 75% with Bf 109s, 70% with bombers and 65% with Bf 110s. Serviceability rates in Fighter Command's fighter squadrons, between the 24 August and 7 September, were listed as: 64.8% on the 24 August; 64.7% on 31 August and 64.25% on the 7 September 1940, indicating a slow decline.

One only has to look at the number of German fighters available throughout the BoB. parsifal's statement is true as the number of Lw fighters steadily declined.

 

[Marcel]

Dave
As others have pointed out, because the RAF was on the defensive, it had to spread itself out allover the british isles , which meant that only a fraction of its strength could be deployed to the battle at any given time.

This is one of those things that has been disputed over time. The decision to mainly use 11th group to counter the Germans was mainly made by Dowding, a decision which made him receive a lot of criticism. This coupled with the failure to solve the bitterness between 11th group and 12th group commanders makes one wonder what would have happened if 12th group would have been involved more in the defence of the southern sector. Maybe RAF would not have been so hard pressed, more fighters could have been in the air at any given time over south-east England. But as I said, it's a discussion that has been going on for years.

 

[Hop]

operational mean?

Serviceable with pilot.

The RAF had fighters in reserve. I don't believe the Germans did.

However, only an operational fighter can actually take part in combat.

As to sortie numbers, Kurfurst is using an unsourced figure that probably comes from the British estimates of German operations.

Hooton gives German sorties:

maybe but we need do watch only the units that go in the battle and not all.

Yes. I did a chart of JG deployments, from figures I think you posted on the board some time ago:

A black line indicates a unit which had been disbanded or hadn't been formed. Red means they were deployed away from NW France, green means they were deployed on the Channel coast.

The vertical yellow line indicates Eagle Day.

Fighter Command Deployments for 7 September:

The numbers in the red circles show how many FC squadrons based at a particular field, and the large black circles are a 120 mile radius from the German fighter bases. That's a bit beyond the Luftwaffe's practical radius of action.

In total the RAF had 60 fighter squadrons. About 25 were based outside the normal combat area. However, if you look at the events on 7 September, it highlights the problem for the RAF. The Luftwaffe concentrated on London, which means the squadrons in the West Country were out of the battle area as well.

 

[Vincenzo]

this is the 28 september page with add airports
Unit Type Est. On Str. Serv. Est. Pres. Ready Airport
I./JG2 Bf 109E 39 36 29 39 39 33 Beaumont-le-Roger (180 km from england cost)
Stab/JG2 Bf 109E 4 4 3 4 4 2 Beaumont-le-Roger (180 km from england cost)
II./JG2 Bf 109E 39 32 22 39 36 26 Beaumont-le-Roger (180 km from england cost)
III./JG2 Bf 109E 39 25 11 39 41 18 Le Havre-Octeville (130 km from england cost)
Stab/JG3 Bf 109E 4 3 3 4 2 2 Desvres (60 km from england cost)
I./JG3 Bf 109E 39 37 30 39 24 18 St. Omer-Wizernes (70 km from england cost)
II./JG3 Bf 109E 39 31 20 39 24 24 Arques (110 km from england cost)
III./JG3 Bf 109E 39 26 18 39 29 23 Desvres (60 km from england cost)
Stab/JG26 Bf 109E 4 4 2 4 3 1 Audembert (30 km from england cost)
I./JG26 Bf 109E 39 32 27 39 30 24 Audembert (30 km from england cost)
II./JG26 Bf 109E 39 34 26 39 31 20 Marquise-Ost (40 km from england cost)
III./JG26 Bf 109E 39 31 26 39 24 20 Caffiers (40 km from england cost)
Stab/JG27 Bf 109E 4 3 3 4 3 3 Guines (40 km from england cost)
I./JG27 Bf 109E 39 30 26 39 36 19 Guines (40 km from england cost)
II./JG27 Bf 109E 39 30 25 39 31 20 St. Inglevert (30 km from england cost)
III./JG27 Bf 109E 39 32 24 39 32 22 Guines (40 km from england cost)
Stab/JG51 Bf 109E 4 4 4 4 2 2 St. Inglevert/Pihen (30 km from england cost)
I./JG51 Bf 109E 39 37 26 39 30 18 St. Inglevert/Pihen (30 km from england cost)
II./JG51 Bf 109E 39 35 28 39 34 25 Aalborg (700 km from england cost)
III./JG51 Bf 109E 39 36 30 39 26 18 St. Omer-Nord (70 km from england cost)
Stab/JG52 Bf 109E 4 2 2 4 1 1 Calais-Marck (40 km from england cost)
I./JG52 Bf 109E 39 28 21 39 24 17 Cocquelles (30 km from england cost)
II./JG52 Bf 109E 39 25 24 39 29 17 Peuplingues (30 km from england cost)
III./JG52 Bf 109E 39 28 28 39 38 38 Berlin-Schönwalde (780 km from england cost)
Stab/JG53 Bf 109E 4 3 3 4 4 3 Etaples (60 km from england cost)
I./JG53 Bf 109E 39 31 29 39 34 21 Etaples (60 km from england cost)
II./JG53 Bf 109E 39 28 18 39 24 19 Berck-sur-Mer (60 km from england cost)
III./JG53 Bf 109E 39 31 22 39 36 23 Le Touquet-Etaples (60 km from england cost)
Stab/JG54 Bf 109E 4 3 3 4 3 3 Campagne-les-Guines (40 km from england cost)
I./JG54 Bf 109E 39 24 15 39 32 23 Jever (420 km form england cost)
II./JG54 Bf 109E 39 43 29 39 38 20 Campagne-les-Guines (40 km from england cost)
III./JG54 Bf 109E 39 35 28 39 33 28 Guines-sud (40 km from england cost)
Stab/JG77 Bf 109E 4 4 4 4 4 4 Döberitz (760 km form england cost)
I./JG77 Bf 109E 39 31 30 39 25 22 Marquise (40 km from england cost)
II./JG77 Bf 109E 39 42 33 39 35 35 Kristiansand-Kjevik (580 km from scotland cost)
III./JG77 Bf 109E 39 26 17 39 38 34 Döberitz (760 km from england cost)
Stab/JG1 Bf 109E 4 4 4 4 4 3 Jever (420 km form england cost)
I./LG2 Bf 109E 39 27 19 39 34 25 Calais/Marck (40 km from england cost)
TOTAL - 1132 920 712 1132 917 676

of 676 serviceable pilots 162 were away from england

 

[davebender]

1940 Germany had nowhere near enough fighter and bomber aircraft to bring Britain to it's knees via aerial bombardment. Furthermore the Luftwaffe lacked essential equipment like drop tanks for the Me-109s and aerial mines for the He-111s and Ju-88s.

Replacing all the Me-109Es with an equal number of A6M2s (without drop tanks) is unlikely to change the result in Germany's favor. Germany survived a far larger Allied bombing campaign during 1943 with relatively little damge to their war effort.

 

[parsifal]

You may be right about the Jabos, but I disgree with JG losses you give. In the month 28 August through to 1 October, JG losses (were 300 SE fighters (109s) and 106 TE fighters (110s). By comparison the RAF lost a total of 471, though by that stage the numbers of pilots being lost was dropping. These are the figures that I know....the next bit is my best guess.

I think that by September the supply of JG pilots was starting to dry up, as in the preceding months there had been an exceptionally heavy drain on the german fighter forces over both France and England. I estimate they lost about 600 fighters in the BOF, and since July over England a further 342 pilots. In September you then have to add a further 406 fighters, and probably close to that number in pilots. Deliveries of replacement aircraft were about 150 new aircraft. There were therefore not enough aiframes to replace the losses sustained. I also believe that with only about 5000 DB601 engines produced in 1940 (and the majority of these being used in new production) that the serviceability rates of the existing fleet had to be suffering. But the shortfall in aircraft and replacement engines was not the limiting factor. I think the main problem for the LW was pilot shortages. they no longer had the pilots to fly those aircraft, very similar to the british, who enjoyed a huge advantage in aircraft reserves but lacked the pilots to fly them. But the pilot wastage for the RAF was much lower than that for the LW....roughly 1/2 to 2/3 of the pilots shot down were returning to duty, unlike the germans who were losing close to 100% of aircrew.

Your figures for available Luftwaffe fighters as at 28 September is completely at odds with at least four other very good sources that I have direct access to, unless you are including wrecks and write offs in that figure. Most sources quote that front line operational strenghts for the me 109 units had fallen to below 300. One source says that by the end of October the germans were down to as few as 238 SE fighters in the operational area. If you are correct on this figure, then the germans simply tired of winning and packed up. On the figures you believe are true they should have won the battle hands down....and clearly they did not

I disagree with your figures about serviceability rates, but suspect that the RAF might be keeping squadron strengths up by calling on those ready reserves mentioned earlier. AFAIK readiness rates in the south east were always maintained at a high level, though squadrons that were no longer ready were often shipped out for R&R, and after heavy fighting this might lead to less squadrons in the critical sector. It might need to be acknowledged as a moot point I guess

But th4e clincher here is that if you are right, and the Luftwaffe fighter strength remained above 700 through to October, then the British were heavily outnumbered throughout the campaign and not just at the beginning and in the middle as i am suggesting. It means either that the germans simply tired of the battle and gave up, or the advantages of the Spitfire are even greater than i had thought, since they were able to clinch victory despite being so heavily outnumbered. I dont believe that, but I am merely pointing out the inconsistencies arising from the claims you are making.....

 

[Colin1]

...or the advantages of the Spitfire are even greater than i had thought, since they were able to clinch victory despite being so heavily outnumbered. I dont believe that, but I am merely pointing out the inconsistencies arising from the claims you are making.....

The principal advantage
of the Spitfire was that the Bf109 was forced to engage it at the end of its endurance tether, the Luftwaffe simply couldn't stick around long enough to make any technical superiority/tactics/numbers count. This is borne out by the fate of the RAF when the initiative was handed to them after the Battle of Britain and they embarked on rhubarbs over the continent; Fighter Command losses over Europe mirrored Luftwaffe losses/causes over SE England with remarkable accuracy.

 

[pinsog]

QUOTE=Shortround6;676632]Yes but perhaps only if not carrying underwing ordnance. In some cases they were restricted to 267rpg.

Most people figure you are doing good if you can keep the opponent in the gun sight for 3 seconds at a time. Keeping the trigger pressed and hosing the sky isn't a good way to get hits. The .50 also had a problem with over heating . very long bursts ruined the barrel by eroding the throat and rifling. This lead to lower velocity and gross inaccuracy. It could also be accomplished in just few hundred rounds if the trigger was held down continuously for 20 seconds or so.

I agree. I didn't mean for the pilot to hold the trigger down and spray, but there are alot more 2 second bursts available with 250-400 rounds of 50 than with 100 or so 20mm. David McCampbell in a Hellcat with I think 400 rnds per gun(?) shot down 9 Japanese aircraft verified(maybe more) in one mission. I don't think a standard single engine fighter armed with 20's could have done that.

Hurricane was actually one of the the worst Hispano armed fighters that used a belt feed. Most carried 120-150 rpg.

But we are wandering somewhat off topic.

In 1940 the Spitfire carried either 300 or 350rpg for i'ts .303 depending on MK while the Hurricane carried 334rpg? at 20 rounds/sec or just under that gives them about 15-17 seconds of firing time or a fraction more if guns are a little slow. Zero runs out of cannon shells (assuming that the Zero really is a 1940 fighter) in 7 seconds or less and then is left with the remainder of it's 500rpg ammo load for it's synchronized .303 cowl guns. The 109 is pretty much in the same boat 20mm wise but it's faster firing syrcroed 7.9mm mg's have the rather strange amount of 1000rpg. Almost a full minute of firing time. If the 109 pilot fired in bursts he might run out of fuel before he ran out of mg ammo. Granted they only planed on 500rpg when the engine cannon was fitted and threw in the extra 500rpg when the engine cannon didn't work but it does make one think which guns the Japanese and Germans were getting their kills with and if the two cowl guns worked then why were eight wing guns so bad?[/QUOTE]

Maybe this contibuted to the reputation of American fighters being so difficult to destroy? When your out of 20mm and down to 2 rifle caliber cowl guns vs 6 50's on the other plane, I would think it's time to go home. Saburo Sakai said he shot a Wildcat with 500-600 rnds with his cowl guns and it wouldn't fall, so ended up using his 20mm to finish it. (I'm sure you've read that in SAMURI). Oh well, I still think 6 50's were the best weapon of the time period against single engine aircraft. Just my opinion.

 

[Milosh]

The statement of RAF FC squadrons having a serviceability rate of ~65% requires some clarification.

Is this 65% of the establishment or of the flying combat component of the squadron? If the former, then that gives 13 a/c available for combat but if the later only gives 8 a/c available for combat. (establishment = 20 a/c)

If the former then the squadron would have the full combat component available or a serviceable rate of 100%+.

Another thing is, though it might be said that FC had 750 fighters 'on hand', this is not an indication that this was the number capable of participating in the air battles. Approx. 2/3 of the RAF FC a/c were in the combat zone of southeast England which gives 500 a/c establishment strength. One then has to factor in the combat component of the squadron which gives a number of ~330 a/c.

For the Lw, iirc, a Gruppe had a establishment strength of 40 a/c (3 staffel x 12 a/c + 4 stab a/c). If as it is stated that Lw serviceable rate was 75%, then only 30 a/c were available.

Clearly the RAF had a better serviceability rate than the Lw when compared with establishment numbers.

 

[davebender]

That's to be expected when the RAF were operating out of airfields in Britain (i.e. no logisitics pipeline) and the Luftwaffe were operating out of recently captured French airfields.

 

[Kurfürst]

The RAF had fighters in reserve. I don't believe the Germans did.

IMHO its pretty obvious they had plenty of fighters in reserve, after all, up to July 1940, some 2212 Bf 109Es were produced (plus 1065 Jumo engined ones that were largely retired by WW2, but I suppose they didn't throw those away either).

Now, at the end of June 1940, they had 1087 Emils with the frontline units, after 250 Bf 109s became a total loss during the Battle of France. A couple of dozen, perhaphs became a loss in Poland, and during the Sitzkrieg, but I would very much doubt it would be much - iirc a mere 200 109s were deployed against Poland, and, half of them were old Jumo engined ones.

2212 109Es produced - 1087 present with units - 250 lost = 875 Bf 109s being in reserve, minus perhaps a hundred at most that were lost in accidents and minor skirmishes during the winter. In addition, during the Battle of Britain, they produced some 718 new ones.

Fighter airframes were never a concern to the Germans during the Battle of Britain. They had plenty in reserve, just do the math.

As to sortie numbers, Kurfurst is using an unsourced figure that probably comes from the British estimates of German operations.

No, and I do wonder why you keep selling the same false story when a couple of weeks before you told the same story, and the origin and the source of the numbers were made clear to you, not to mention a good deal before you yourself admitted that the sortie numbers I posted and the numbers you posted are from the same source, just counted differently (Hop's source German single engined fighter sorties, twin engined fighter sorties and even fighter-bomber sorties together; mine appearantly counts Jabo sorties as bomber sorties, which they were.)

Hop wants to boast the German sortie numbers a bit, to show how much outnumbered the Fighter Command was, which is making his arguements a bit schizophrenic: at one time he argues the Germans had no fighters available to them, and at another time that their fighters blocked the sun from the sky...

In total the RAF had 60 fighter squadrons. About 25 were based outside the normal combat area. However, if you look at the events on 7 September, it highlights the problem for the RAF. The Luftwaffe concentrated on London, which means the squadrons in the West Country were out of the battle area as well.

What was the practical combat range of a Hurricane or Spitfire - zero miles ie. incapable of anything else but to hover over their own base...? At least it would seem so if I go by your reasoning, ie. if a RAF Fighter Sqn's base was not within the range of the 109s, then they were out of the Battle somehow..

 

[Milosh]

Fighter airframes were never a concern to the Germans during the Battle of Britain. They had plenty in reserve, just do the math.

If that so Kurfurst, then why did the number of 109s available in France steadily decrease during BoB? The Germans should have been able to replace those 109s lost very easily.

 

[Kurfürst]

You may be right about the Jabos, but I disgree with JG losses you give. In the month 28 August through to 1 October, JG losses (were 300 SE fighters (109s) and 106 TE fighters (110s). By comparison the RAF lost a total of 471, though by that stage the numbers of pilots being lost was dropping. These are the figures that I know....the next bit is my best guess.

This seems about right, if you count every kind of loss, including damaged ones, to all causes, including outside operations.

I think that by September the supply of JG pilots was starting to dry up, as in the preceding months there had been an exceptionally heavy drain on the german fighter forces over both France and England. I estimate they lost about 600 fighters in the BOF, and since July over England a further 342 pilots.

Actual German JG permanent losses (ie. completely destroyed aircraft) during the Battle of France were 250 (Murray gives 257, and notes that 169 of these were to enemy action), plus 126 aircraft that were damaged recoverable (Murray: 150, to all causes, inc. outside operations). They operated over enemy terrotory, so I would guess that about 150 pilots become loss, 25-50% of them dead, but most of the rest were libarated and returned to service when France surrendered (most notably Werner Moelders).

Your figures for available Luftwaffe fighters as at 28 September is completely at odds with at least four other very good sources that I have direct access to, unless you are including wrecks and write offs in that figure. Most sources quote that front line operational strenghts for the me 109 units had fallen to below 300. One source says that by the end of October the germans were down to as few as 238 SE fighters in the operational area.

Hmm. In a post earlier you said that the Germans had some 500 fighters, now its "below 300", and perhaps even as few as a mere 238...?

I would like to know this source because the figures I posted are taken from German strenght reports directly from files at the BA-MA.

If you are correct on this figure, then the germans simply tired of winning and packed up. On the figures you believe are true they should have won the battle hands down....and clearly they did not

Certainly the Germans did not packed up and went to mind their own business in the automn - at least not until May 1941. They certainly failed to crush the RAF in a week of heavy hammering, though they came close to bleeding them dry of reserves by early September.

On the other hand, they pretty much bombed everything they wanted in Britain for almost a year (July 1940 - May 1941), until the LW re-deployed against the USSR.

 

[parsifal]

Though we disagree on many points, it seems your original position that the LW was outnumbered is now being contradicted by your own information, by your own reasoning it had some thousands of fighters, and actually outnumbered the effective RAF strength by at least 2:1 until the very end.

Intersting conclusions that you reach that effectively the LW won the battle. I dont think any other student of this period, with any credibility would support that notion. You do realise this puts you in the category of being "out there", dont you?

The refernce to 500 a/c, is both SE and TE types, the 300 a/c is simply SE types

 

[Kurfürst]

Though we disagree on many points, it seems your original position that the LW was outnumbered...

This wasn't my position. To clarify, my position is that Fighter Command wasn't heavily outnumbered by the German fighters, ie. the common notion that runs in BoB mythology. By the time the Germans launched their operations proper in mid-August, the RAF was able to rebuild its numbers from the crippling losses in France.

is now being contradicted by your own information, by your own reasoning it had some thousands of fighters, and actually outnumbered the effective RAF strength by at least 2:1 until the very end.

In that case you didn't fully grasp the information I provided.

Intersting conclusions that you reach that effectively the LW won the battle. I dont think any other student of this period, with any credibility would support that notion. You do realise this puts you in the category of being "out there", dont you?

Again you seem to fail to grasp my actual position - or you distort it proposefully.

Fighter Command survived the Luftwaffe's attacks, but I fear that is all that can be said about it.

The refernce to 500 a/c, is both SE and TE types, the 300 a/c is simply SE types

I see. In that case the unnamed reference you are using is clearly contradicted by the actual daily strength reports by Luftwaffe daylight fighter units, as shown.

 

[Vincenzo]

for LW availability on 28th september of bf 109 see my post 105th, there were 514 pilots and 583 fighters within 200 km form british cost

 

[Glider]

Kurfurst I do wonder where you get your figures. I have gone back to this posting as it contains most of the information you supplied regarding numbers.

The RAF wasn't outnumbered in the beginning either. Now, usually the Hops like to quote strenght figures for the RAF at the beginning of July, and of course count only British single engined fighters while 110s are 'naturally' included.

This is understandable. During the conquest of Europe the Me110 had done everything that was asked of it as a fighter and the Luftwaffe were more than happy with it in the fighter role.

But that was hardly representative of their relative strenght, since Fighter Command was rapidly expanding at the time, and, the Germans didn't start the Battle proper until mid-August. In specific number, although only 871 fighters were present with RAF fighter squadrons (644 being ready for ops), in just two weeks, by 20 July there were 1052 British fighters, altough the number available for ops remained pretty much the same (658).

Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours, 20 July 1940
Blenheim - 62
Spitfire - 224
Hurricane - 308
Defiant - 11
Total - 605 of which 532 can be considered battleworthy

When the Battle started, there was pretty much parity between the number of fighters on both sides.
The Germans weren't committing all of their strength against Britain, either, although Hop quotes figures for the entire Luftwaffe (including that in Germany and elsewhere not taking part)

The number of fighters employed against the British Isles on 10th August, when the Germans begun to launch serious operations, was 805 servicable Bf 109s and 224 servicable Bf 110s, out of a force of 934 and 289, 1223 in total "present" (ie. both servicable and unservicable aircraft). The 110s weren't all used as fighters either, as they often acted as light bombers.

Against this, the British reported, on the same day, 1106 fighters present, out of which 749 were serviceable, mostly single engined fighters.

Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours, 10 August 1940
Blenheim - 60
Spitfire - 245
Hurricane - 382
Defiant - 22
Gladiator - 2
Total - 711

So if I understand you correctly, 627 Spits and Hurricanes equals 805 Me109s and 224 Me110s equals 60 Blenhiems. An interesting definition of the word Parity

Can I ask where you sourced your figures?

Mine are from the following site The Battle of Britain - Home Page

PS It should be remembered that the RAF figures are for all Fighter Command not just those in the South East of England compared to the 805 Me109's which as Kurfurst said were the number of fighters employed against the British Isles on 10th August

 

[Markus]

Ah, didn't know the B339-23 was also designated B439, but now found more about that designation on the net, thanks

Well, actually the B339-23 sucked big time (BTW it was actually the 3rd batch, preceded by the B339C and D). The B339-23 had a G5B engine (all ex-KLM DC3 engines) of around 1000hp, while the B339D had a G-205A engine of 1200 hp. The 23 model was based on the F2A-3, with the same weight penalty, so it was heavier than the D version, while having 200hp less.
Climb-rate dropped from D- to 23-version from 4700ft/min to 3100ft/min. Top-speed dropped from 307 to 264 ft/min. The KNIL only thought the B339-23 version capable for the training role and didn't intend to use them for the fighter role. They probably would have ended up in the fighter role anyway, but they would likely have been just some more turkeys to shoot for the Japanese (be it slightly easier than the others )

Hmm, "America´s 100,000" says she had a G-5E: 1,200hp at TO and 4,200ft, 1,000hp at 6,900ft and 14,200ft, 900hp at 15,200ft. The G-105A was 100hp weaker at TO, the other ratings are not for the same altitudes. And 3,100 ft/min would be a very good climb rate, the F4F-3 made 3,300, the F4F-4 just 2,500.

 

[Milosh]

This wasn't my position. To clarify, my position is that Fighter Command wasn't heavily outnumbered by the German fighters, ie. the common notion that runs in BoB mythology. By the time the Germans launched their operations proper in mid-August, the RAF was able to rebuild its numbers from the crippling losses in France.

There you go looking the total strength of RAF FC. How many times does it have to be said that not all of RAF FC was in south east England?

Then there is the German bombers which are conveniently forgotten about. It was RAF FC of mostly 11 Group vs Lw fighters AND Lw bombers. This RAF fighters vs Lw fighters is a convenient argument for those making excuses why the Lw failed in their mission to defeat the RAF.

One only has look at the combat reports to see that RAF FC was outnumbered in the air over south east England.