Best Japanese fighter

[Garyt]

Thanks for the cost info, GregP. Kind of roughly what I expected, other than it seems US prices went down as the war went on, I would have expected the opposite.

Assuming stagnant German prices, they could build roughly 3 ME109's for a P47 or P38. And I would think a bad economy due to the cost of war would have resulted in some major inflation, I think what I am really trying to get at is the cost in resources, I.E. manpower + materials as opposed to a comparison to currency. So I would think the 1941 German numbers would work well.

"Yes, there is more to it than range. Think of it as a min equipment list for the US aircraft. Two way radios, naviagtion radios, armor, IFR capable, guns w/good to great loadouts, self sealing fuel tanks, high dive speeds, and also manufacturers were new to "modern" construction techniques (and probably rounded up on anything of question adding more weight). The Japanese replacement for the Zero was the Reppu, and the Germans with the Fw-190D which both had/have weights that were within an RCH of the Mustang."

Funny. I thought the Reppu (Sam?) was still a fair amount lighter than US planes.

"It's my opine that the Germans needed a better pilot training pipeline, established MUCH earlier in the war, to feed it's aircraft production capability as well as it's attrition. They started the war with the most experienced / best fighter pilots and didn't build on that."

Fully agree Biff, though lack of fuel prevents training. Though if they would have started sooner while oil production was still at it's peak, they may have had a lot more sucess. They did not seem to have quite the same problems as the Japanese, who seemed to be having fuel shortage issues almost from day 1.

 

[Garyt]

"Funny. I thought the Reppu (Sam?) was still a fair amount lighter than US planes. "

Well, to my suprise I found out the empty weight of the Reppu was only about 500lbs lighter than the P51.

Interesting to me as well was the fact that the Reppu had about 1.5 times the amount of wing surface area of the P51
.

 

[Glider]

"It's my opine that the Germans needed a better pilot training pipeline, established MUCH earlier in the war, to feed it's aircraft production capability as well as it's attrition. They started the war with the most experienced / best fighter pilots and didn't build on that."

.

I think a similar statement could be made re the IJN. Excellent pilots at the start but the training programme to replace them was far below what was needed

 

[BiffF15]

Concour!
Cheers,
Biff

 

[GingahNinja]

Performance wise I'm not sure, but I have a soft spot for the Ki-61 and Ki-84 series.

 

[Garyt]

"Best for it's time" May well be the A6M2. It was certainly superior to the Bresters, Wildcats and P40's it ran into.

And I think the A6M2 variant had pretty well run it's course by the time the US next generation fighters came out like the Corsair and Hellcat, though I think the early P38 was around during the end of the A6M2's run, though this was the early version of the P38 as well, not the P38L.

Otherwise I like the KI84, about the fastest, great in the vertical plane, well armed, while not quite able to turn like a Zeke it was still a lot more nimble than the US fighters. Even had the armor and self sealing fuel tanks. Only thing I'm not sure about is whether it had a decent high speed roll.

 

[CobberKane]

The problem with these "What was the best" questions is the lack of context. If the context is "best relative to it's contemporaries" the answer might well be the Zero - better than the opposition for much of it's existence. If the context is in terms of outright performance the answer would probably be the Frank, although it never demonstrated the kind of performance advantage over the opposition as the Zero did pre-1943. Unless we are happy to limit ourselves to a handful of late war designs, to my mind a discussion of the 'best' is most useful if it examines the performance of an aircraft through successive models, with the contemporary opposition as a yardstick. By that criteria, and given the original question excluded the Zero from consideration, the answer would probably be the Oscar. For all it's flaws it was at least as good as most of the opposition for several years. Aside from the disqualified Zero, what other Japanese fighter could make the same claim?

 

[Thorlifter]

"Best for it's time" May well be the A6M2. It was certainly superior to the Bresters, Wildcats and P40's it ran into.

From my knowledge it was only superior in certain combat situations (i.e. close quarter dog fighting). Once better tactics were in place (boom and zoom), it was basically a 1:1 kill ratio

 

[Hiromachi]

It's not so easy to say B&Z and Zero is over. Zeros did very well over China in 1940 when they fought against more agile planes like I-152 (or I-15 bis), they did very good in 1941/1942 offensive campaigns, for example in fights for New Guinea from April 1942 to September 1942 Japanese lost 18 Zeros, 4 G4M1 and one J1N1 while Allied forces lost 41 P-39's, 5 P-40's, 10 P-400's, 2 B-17's, 3 B-26 and 4 A-24's. Yes, I know they fought elite Tainan Kokutai but still, statistically Allied fighters were faster.

Even in 1943 they could fight the enemies, despite being outperformed by planes like F4U or P-38. In 1943 reports like the one made by Lt. Cdr. Mitsugu Kofukuda from Yokosuka Kokutai ("Research on Fighter Tactics Learned in Battle Lessons", 1943), he reported that "the performance of the Type Zero fighter is generally excellent, I do not feel at the present time any particular inferiority in opposing the American air force fighters ...".
And indeed Japanese still could fight with US forces pretty well, unless they were outnumbered or simply caught by surprise.
I can bring a couple of encounters and results :
- on April 1st 1943 in combat Japanese lost 9 planes while Americans 6
- May 13th, 1943 - Japanese lost 4 planes, Americans 5
- June 7th, 1943 - Japanese lost 9 planes and Allies also 9
- June 12th, 1943 - Japanese lost 7 planes, Allies 6
Even later, in interception actions like the one on 18th July 1943 when 56 US bombers covered by 134 fighters were trying to bomb Buin airfields, were intercepted by 40 Zero's, Half of them engaged almost 30 F4Fs (which covered SBD formation), while rest attacked B-24 formation and their escort containing P-38s and F4U's. From those combats, one TBF, six F4Fs and three F4Us failed to return while only two Zeros were shot down.

The series of fighter vs fighter sorties which occurred in early to mid 1943 Japanese all over lost 29 Zeros while US 28 planes (from that eleven were brand new and considered as outperforming enemy, P-38s and F4U Corsairs), plus another 3 US planes were unrepairable due to combat damage.

The true problem was not a combat ratio, but fatality ratio among pilots, for 3 Japanese pilots only 1 American was killed which simply led to deterioration of Units. Especially when we consider that US Units could be replaced by others due to very effective rotation system, while Japanese unable to train so quickly pilots had to fight till the end.

But once again, I would not be so quick on saying B&Z can cure everything. It didn't work so easily earlier and later, Japanese still could fight 1:1. When I read the memoirs of pilots who fought at that time (1942-early 1944) they had a high respect toward enemy and knew that they are fighting dangerous enemy. After all even Pappy Boyington was shot down in his Corsair ...

Sources:
- Richard L. Dunn - "Exploding fuel tanks. Saga of technology that changed the course of the Pacific air war"
- D. Wagner, May 1942 - "Report on first action against Japanese by P-39 type airplane"

Anyway, I hope my small input wont be taken negatively, I only wanted to add something.

And about the best Japanese fighter ... I am not sure what to say. What fighter ? What time ?
For the escort purposes the A6M2 Zeros wins every time due to exceptional range.

For interceptions ... Ki-44-II Shoki and J2M3 Raiden look "tasty", also if working properly, the Ki-84 was a dangerous opponent.

For overall performance with easiness of handling and good dive performance - Ki-100.

Hiromachi

 

[Thorlifter]

I understand your point completely and thank you for the statistics above. And please don't take my point that the zero was an easy kill. I never said B&Z cured everything. I simply meant that with better tactics the Zero's dominance wasn't so great. Somewhere on this forum are statistics showing that once better tactics were put in place, allied fighters fared much better against the Zero. I'd point to it but I can never find anything.

And your statistics show my point exactly. I said with better tactics it was basically 1:1. The four dates you show is 29 to 27 and your mid 1943 reference is 29 to 28. That's basically 1:1.

You have an excellent point in the allied planes protected the pilots better and had a much better survivability over the Japanese planes, which were more prone to catching fire. More experience pilots could be returned to duty while the experienced Japanese pilots had a much higher morality rate when shot down.

 

[CobberKane]

From my knowledge it was only superior in certain combat situations (i.e. close quarter dog fighting). Once better tactics were in place (boom and zoom), it was basically a 1:1 kill ratio

It could equally be said that the adoption of B Z tactics by early war allied fighters was effectively confirmation of the Zero's overall superiority. The only way a P-40 or Wildcat could reliably best a Zero one on one was by attacking with a height advantage to negate the Zero's performance advantage and doing a runner if that didn't work. Tactics and training gave the US pilots parity, but there was nothing inherent in the fighters they were flying that made things like the Thach Weave effective. Different story with later war fighters, of course. I don't think too many P-51 pilots would have hesitated to take on a Zero one one one at at equal altitude, even given the Japanese aircraft's advantages in climb and turn.

 

[Hiromachi]

You have an excellent point in the allied planes protected the pilots better and had a much better survivability over the Japanese planes, which were more prone to catching fire. More experience pilots could be returned to duty while the experienced Japanese pilots had a much higher morality rate when shot down.

Actually the book I based on ("Exploding fuel tanks") signals that, but not as much. The fuel tanks could not protect against 20 mm cannons, which were mostly the reason why F4U's were shot down. The protection of fuel tanks rather allowed pilot to have more time to bail out - as time between hits into main fuel tanks in Zeros and explosion was usually short, while in F4U pilot with his back protected from any bullets, and protected fuel tanks could safer leave the plane.

The part of the problem was also that in 1942/1943 a lot of actions took place near US bases (vide Guadalcanal) so shot down pilots could be rescued, while for Japanese any action from Rabaul would be a suicide. Also ability to return often granted to strength of US planes is a little bit exaggerated while it is way easier to land with damaged plane when you have 10-30 miles (or generally closer to Henderson Field) than you have to continue flight in damaged machine way back to Rabaul.


I very much enjoyed a book, because Mr. Dunn marked a lot of things which usually are avoided in discussions, like the range to bases, good rescue system, etc.

Japanese in this "areas" were in a disadvantage.

P-40

Not so much, at least New Guinea and Australia battle theaters shown that Zeros had an advantage.

Wildcat

Actually I found it very interesting that way slower and worse climbing F4F had better combat effectiveness than P-40 or P-39, I suspect a lot of that depended on better Navy training. But eventually such comments raised :

A report summarizing the combat performance of the P-400 and F4F-4 against the Zero over Guadalcanal in late September 1942 stated: "At all altitudes under 10,000 feet the P-400's can pull away from the Zero (P-400 speed about 360 m.p.h. F4F-4 about 40 m.p.h. slower). Zeros are faster than the F4F-4's at all altitudes and more maneuverable…" (Performance).
In a report based on questioning forty fighter pilots of VMF-121, 212 and 251 and VF-71 concerning combats in October 1942 the discussion of comparative performance was brief: "A Zero is faster, more maneuverable, and has a higher rate of climb than our F4F-4s" (Observations).
In an after action interview given in November 1942 Major John Smith, commander of VMF-223 at Guadalcanal , said little about the Zero's performance until asked a direct question and then replied: "They had much more performance than we had. I think they did because we just couldn't stay with them at all, and dog fight at any altitude."
The F4F-4s of VF-5 commanded by Lt. Commander LeRoy Simpler flew against Zeros from a carrier in August 1942 and were land based on Guadalcanal during September and October 1942. Upon returning to the U.S. Simpler was apprised of the test report that said an F4F-4 was equal in speed to a Zero at low level. His comment was that the report was "flat wrong."
The reports above are all measured pronouncements by command authorities after careful study or related by experienced combat leaders. In none of the comments in the reports cited above is there any hint that the F4F-4 could equal the Zero in speed even at low level. In fact the contrary is expressly noted. This is despite the fact that the Zeros were handicapped by an external fuel tank.
Untitled Document

 

[parsifal]

From my knowledge it was only superior in certain combat situations (i.e. close quarter dog fighting). Once better tactics were in place (boom and zoom), it was basically a 1:1 kill ratio

Nope. Zeroes lost in air combat for the whole of 1942 amounted to about 156, according to joe B, and he would know. Others were lost on the ground or on the deck, or simply wore out. In that time they shot down at least 800 aircraft that i know of. The only aircraft that came close to a 1:1 exchange rate in the first half of the war was the F4F

The revised tactics against the Zeke were adopted at the end of October 1942. Admittedly loss rates improved markedly in favour of the US, but Zeke loss rates remained quite low, and the exchange rate was well below 1:1 until the middle of 1943.

The major factors affecting the exchange rate were a combination of factors, including increasingly long odds numbers wise, improving pilot skills for the allies, decreasing pilot skill for the japanese and increasing quality of the Allied mounts. The Japanese laboured under faulty strategic plans and a hopeless logistic support system.

As the war drew to a close the americans were able to move around the TO with massive sledgehammer sized forces to basically crack open the various walnuts that were the Japanese island outposts. In these battles, the losses did become one sided, but not just against the Zeke. Zekes suffered no worse a loss rate than even the very latest Japanese types. when you are outnumbered in a given scrap 20 or 60:1 it doesnt matter a jot how good or bad your mount is, you are going to lose that battle, and badly.

Zekes were a competitive aircraft until the end, but the conditions they laboured under (poor pilots, numbers, logisitcs and poor operational usage) made their lives very difficult.

 

[Garyt]

Another thing that hurt the Zeke and had nothing to do with it's performance was far better radar by the US. The US planes often had time to be where they wanted in a confrontation. Midway illustrates this in a way, namely that the Zekes were unable to deal with all groups of attacking planes and were pretty well suprised and caught out of position by the Dauntless flights. And of course this same advantage holds true in a fighter vs fighter situation.

Japanese radios were of course a problem as well, inferior airborne radio communication and inferior radar was a problem for the Japanese through the whole war. I think in general Japanese radio technology was OK for land based and ships, but they were nowhere near as advanced as the US when it came to minimizing the size of these components.

 

[Thorlifter]

It could equally be said that the adoption of B Z tactics by early war allied fighters was effectively confirmation of the Zero's overall superiority. The only way a P-40 or Wildcat could reliably best a Zero one on one was by attacking with a height advantage to negate the Zero's performance advantage and doing a runner if that didn't work. Tactics and training gave the US pilots parity, but there was nothing inherent in the fighters they were flying that made things like the Thach Weave effective. Different story with later war fighters, of course. I don't think too many P-51 pilots would have hesitated to take on a Zero one one one at at equal altitude, even given the Japanese aircraft's advantages in climb and turn.

Very true. That's what I'm saying. Better tactics gave the allies plane their advantage so they didn't have to take the Zero on in a good old dog fight. If you are in a boxing fight against a boxer with a good jab, you are not going to stand in front of him. You will adopt better tactics to avoid where you know you can be beat. I don't care what plane you were in and it's August 1st, 1945. It would be dumb to get in a dog fight with a Zero.

 

[Hiromachi]

Another thing that hurt the Zeke and had nothing to do with it's performance was far better radar by the US. The US planes often had time to be where they wanted in a confrontation. Midway illustrates this in a way, namely that the Zekes were unable to deal with all groups of attacking planes and were pretty well suprised and caught out of position by the Dauntless flights. And of course this same advantage holds true in a fighter vs fighter situation.

Japanese radios were of course a problem as well, inferior airborne radio communication and inferior radar was a problem for the Japanese through the whole war. I think in general Japanese radio technology was OK for land based and ships, but they were nowhere near as advanced as the US when it came to minimizing the size of these components.

Radar was a key to many achievements, as allowed to guide towards unsuspecting anything planes.

And Midway is not best example, even if Japanese would have a radar it wouldn't help much. There was simply not enough Zeros to take down all groups, TBD Devastators were massacred but to climb again and engage dive bombers there was no time. And ammo. Big disadvantage of A6M2 was amount of 20 mm shells, only 60 per gun. Pilots very often complained on that.


About radios, it is also not one sided stuff. Japanese radios were not horrible, they just had one frequency as the main doctrine of radio silence didn't require more than that. A lot of times radios were removed not only due to quality, but also weight and that they were not used in combat. And it also has to be separated, as Navy and Army used different equipment.

Generally it is said that from 1943 the quality of radios used in Japanese planes improved by far from what was found in early models.

 

[Totalize]

Regarding the Zero.

I read somewhere the Saburo Sakai really hated it at first when his unit was issued the new airplane. He didn't like the cannons, had too little ammo and the muzzle velocity was poor, though damage was great once they hit home. He didn't like the canopy either. Found it too encumbering. Also, loading the ammo was a massive pain in the a$$ as the ammmo had to be loaded into a drum then loaded into the aircraft. It was not belt fed (A6M2 originally, changed to belt fed with the A6M5). One guy had to bend over while the drum was loaded onto his back then he had to raise himself up to allow the loader to put it into the aircraft. Sakai says many times this was so exhausting that he wanted collapse afterward.

 

[razor1uk]

It is generally thought of that Airforces have maintenance personnel as a seperate group to the piltos and flying crews, as fair as my reading about both the IJA IJN so far, IMHuO, the pilots and aircrews were trained to understand their aircraft and to do the maintenance work themselves when needed, say for when forward deployed to remote areas, where skilled maintainers were few in comparison to the number flying men, hence explaining Sakai's statement about re-arming being exhausting.

I wonder if other people have seen/read/noticed similar thoughts to that?

 

[Garyt]

"And Midway is not best example, even if Japanese would have a radar it wouldn't help much. There was simply not enough Zeros to take down all groups, TBD Devastators were massacred but to climb again and engage dive bombers there was no time. And ammo. Big disadvantage of A6M2 was amount of 20 mm shells, only 60 per gun."

There were about 30 Zeroes which flew CAP that morning, not all at on time though.

There were about 40 torpedo planes that attacked - but given enough warning from radar they would not have had all 30 chasing torpedo planes at low level. Probably would have split the attack, leaving about 15 for each. And you don't need near a 1:1 ration of fighter to bombers to disrupt the attack.

The CAP does not need to shoot down every bomber to be successful (though the Japanese came close to doing this with the torpedo bombers). Would this different deployment of the CAP stopped all bombs/torpedoes from striking home? Probably not. But it would have probably meant 1-2 carriers lost, not 3.

"About radios, it is also not one sided stuff. Japanese radios were not horrible, they just had one frequency as the main doctrine of radio silence didn't require more than that. A lot of times radios were removed not only due to quality, but also weight and that they were not used in combat. And it also has to be separated, as Navy and Army used different equipment "

Whether they were removed due to weight, inefficiency or doctrine is largely irrelevant. Point is they were not able to conduct radio communications as effectively as the US. And lack of radio communication would have made the proper vectoring of CAP very difficult, negating somewhat early warning radar even if available.

Yeah, Japanese radar and radios got better later in the war, but the strong US advantage in these 2 areas hurt the A6M2's ability to be as effective as it could have been.

By 1943 when Japan starts to get better radar and radios (though still behind the US technologically in these areas), the A6M2 no longer held a qualitative advantage to US fighters, as the 2nd generation of American fighters were beginning to see action.

 

[cherry blossom]

jim, The horse power listed in the TAIC reports was for a perfectly working engine. That was something not all Japanese A/C had in late 1944-1945. The power levels listed were not exact what was actually out in the field. The Ki.84's figures are for a 2,050 hp. A/C. From the information I have read, some in the field Franks were barely cranking out 1,800 hp.

...snip...

I found another view of the mystery of the Homare power at J-Aircraft F6F-5 Hellcat the Ki-100/ N1K2-J Shiden-kai where Wells posted:

Hiromachi provided some useful information from an official manual of the prototype Shiden-kai, which stated that Kawanishi had calculated a speed of 348 knots at 6000 m, but that the airplane only performed to 330 knots at the same height. This was because the Homare 21 engine was supposed to make 1700 HP, using +350 mm of boost at 3000 RPM but was de-rated to +250 mm and 2900 rpm. This is the same thing the US manuals say, when using 91 octane, instead of 100 octane fuel. You have to use a lower manifold pressure.

Thus at least some people are arguing that the Homare was designed for 100 octane fuel and could thus give more power if 100 octane fuel was available.