Best Long Range Artillery Piece

[Shortround6]

I just got in "Field Artillery and Fire power" by Maj. Gen. J.B.A. Bailey.

Just a few quick peaks so far but very interesting, The German artillery branch in WW II was screwed up and over in a large number of ways. actual design of the guns may have been the least of their problems.

 

[parsifal]

For sure, I agree with that. The biggest issues for the German army IMO were their motorization programs....too many types, types too complicated, types not strong enough to withtand rough treatyment, but most of all, insufficient numbers. Fuel was never the limiting factor for the German army until later in the war....it was a constraint, but not the most critical constraint.

The other major problem was the shortage of manpower, which was actually made worse in some respects by their poor management of manpower resources. Too many skilled tradesmen ending up as frontline cannon fodder, whilst at the same time wasting too many men onh unneccessary rear area posts. But the manpower issue was never really a solvable problem, whilst the motorization program could have been much better managed

Ive probably overstated my criticism of German artillery. I happen to think that in most situations it perfortmed exceptionally well. My criticism extends to a specific situation....when faced with serious rapid enemy breakthroughs, the German artillery wasnt flexible enough, wasnt mobile enough, and its reaction times were just too slow. But in most situations other than when the Russians were pounding them along 300 KM of their front, or similar, they managed pretty well actually

 

[Shortround6]

So far, it seems the Artillery suffered some of the same problems as the Luftwaffe, drastic reductions in both gun and ammunition production in the fall/winter of 1941 and wide swings in programs and priorities as the war went on. Coupled with a rather mistaken notion/doctrine of maneuver warfare vs fire power ( and a poorly implemented maneuver warfare, the lack of transport) it seems there were a host of problems. Individual skill and dedication can only do so much.

 

[fastmongrel]

I just got in "Field Artillery and Fire power" by Maj. Gen. J.B.A. Bailey.

Interesting book but a bit of a disjointed read I thought, it will take me several re-reads to get everything out of it. Very good bibliography though, trying to buy all the references would bankrupt a small country never mind a private collector.

 

[pinsog]

DId we ever come to a consensus on this? Could the German 17cm K18 be mounted on a 155 Long Tom carraige and moved in one piece?

 

[davebender]

Germany had little choice in the matter. Their 1930s plate was overflowing with serious problems. Mass production of artillery towing tractors would have to wait.

Not that they were unaware of the issue. The Heer experimented with artillery towing tractors of various types even prior to WWI. By 1918 they were serious about the problem. During May and June 1918 a series of meetings were held to select an artillery towing tractor design for mass production. The tractor chosen would have been a variant of the LKII light tank, which was also selected for mass production.

 

[parsifal]

Yes, the German auto industry was not well placed for mass production, that has to be concceded, but surely you agree that their handling of the industrial potential they did have was poorly managed. I think it was the Schnell program, essentially a production rationalization that wanted to reduce the number of different types in service from about 100 different types to about 10 or so....but this was not implemented until 1939, and then never completely...in fact as the war progressed and the germans were forced to use foreign manufactured types and ex-civilian types, the situation actually got much worse. This truck park of about 500000 vehicles always suffered heavy losses, but in Russia it became an unmanageable nightmare for the germans. By 1942, the germans could no longer undertake general frontwide offensives because much of their infantry lacked the necessary MT, and from the end of 1943, the Heer had degenerated to a more or less static line force, except for a few mobile formations....movements by infantry could only be undertaken on a unit by unit basis as wholesale simultaneous movements were no longer possible due to MT (and draft animal) shortages. The German army of 1943 was a far less mobile formation than the 1939 army

Could the germans have done better??? I think so....what was needed was to settle on one or two specific types and then just churn those limited number of types out as fast as possible. Get foreign manufacturers to build components rather than whole units. At all costs avoid the menagerie of types that the Heer was stuck with from the commencement of hostilities. For artillery, I think tracked or half tracked prime movers in preference to wheeled transport, and for wheeled transport, double rear axle rathr than single rear axle types. Forget using armoured halftracks as prime movers....a profligate waste of resources for the germans IMO.

 

[davebender]

IMO that hardly matters.

Most tracked vehicles are produced in purpose built facilities such as the Detroit Tank Arsenal. Construction of tank factories in 1930s Germany had to compete with construction of border defenses, coast defenses, factories for the production of ammunition, small arms, artillery, aircraft, aircraft engines, army field gear, hydrogenation plants to produce fuel, synthetic rubber plants, synthetic textile plants etc. Building border defenses and a military-industrial complex from scratch isn't easy, quick or cheap.

 

[Shortround6]

DId we ever come to a consensus on this? Could the German 17cm K18 be mounted on a 155 Long Tom carraige and moved in one piece?

It might be possible. There are two problems, one is moving the parts, the other is firing the weapon and either not breaking it or having it be stable enough for quick repeat shots.

While the basic carriage did carry the British MK VI 7.2 howitzer barrel that weighed about 1500lbs more than the 155 barrel that barrel is still going to be several thousand pounds lighter than the German 17cm barrel. The German barrel is also about 45in longer than the 155 barrel and over 80in longer than the British barrel. Even with the barrel pulled back to full recoil positions there may be be balance issues.
The next question is if the US carriage could handle the recoil. Both Allied howitzers could have roughly 25-30% more recoil than the 155 but the 17cm has more recoil still. The long range shell is about 45% heavier than the 155 and is fired several hundred FPS faster, this requires over double the powder charge.
While the late 50s, early 60s 175mm M07 used the same elevating gear and basic recoil system as the 155 gun and 8in how the empty self propelled carriage went 25,915kg (no fuel, ammo, crew). the hydraulic shock absorbers in the suspension were locked when the gun fired so there was no suspension movement. Recoil was transmitted to the ground through both the recoil spade at the rear and through both tracks.

 

[parsifal]

IMO that hardly matters.

Most tracked vehicles are produced in purpose built facilities such as the Detroit Tank Arsenal. Construction of tank factories in 1930s Germany had to compete with construction of border defenses, coast defenses, factories for the production of ammunition, small arms, artillery, aircraft, aircraft engines, army field gear, hydrogenation plants to produce fuel, synthetic rubber plants, synthetic textile plants etc. Building border defenses and a military-industrial complex from scratch isn't easy, quick or cheap.

I think you are mixing automotive manufacture up with AFV production. Both are rather distinct from each other. Armour plate needs special rolling and milling gear, more akin to a heavy industry or locomotive manufacturing process , whereas soft skinned vehicles are a relatively light industry producing items that are essentially consumer goods. What could be done through mass production were established by men like Henry Ford that managed to turn large quantities of motor vehicles (MVs) for very low cost. The Europeans were slower to adopt those procedures, and the germans, hardly at all. Despite having the worlds second biggest economy, and the one most geared to military production its output of MVs was really quite modest. In comparison, the British, who started with a larger, but more stuffed auto industry than the german, embraced mass production and rationalization on a much wider scale than the Germans and reaped huge benefits from it. Despit havng an industrial base only about 2/3 that of Germany, and an MV industry at least as innefficient prewar, the Brits managed to turn out roughly 420K MVs during the war to about 300K for the germans. The british rationalized, streamlined, and poured a lot into getting their lines more efficient, the germans did not, despite having a far higher potential for military output. It was a failure of management, rather than a failure of resources. Even the canuck, a far smaller military economy, managed to pump out over 800000 vehicles from memory.

 

[tomo pauk]

A great thread indeed, many thanks to the contributors