syscom3 said:
Gen Kenneys opinions of the A26 were framed by his pilots. They said that flying at low altitudes required the pilots to be able to see their targets and obstacles.
There is no way the A26 could have performed the low level strafing and skip bombing the B25's did.
I've been in the cockpit of both aircraft and the visibility is about the same, I give the B-25 points to be able to carry the 75mm cannon, the A-26s cockpit just needed a re-design and once that was completed it was more than capable and eventually replaced all B-25s, 26s, and A-20s.
Operators in the ETO had little complaints about the aircraft...
Here's the real story....
"The A-26 entered combat testing in mid 1944, when 4 of the aircraft assigned to the Fifth Air Force began operating in the Southwest Pacific. Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney, Commanding General of the Far East Air Forces, grounded the planes after less than 175 hours of total flying time and stated shortly afterwards, "We do not want the A-26 under any circumstances as a replacement for anything." Ironically, about 4 years before, as a colonel in charge of the Wright Field Production Division and a strong proponent of attack aviation, Kenney had strongly urged the aircraft's development. General Kenney's statement and his mid 1944 decision to ground the planes appeared justified. A-26 production had slipped badly; the B-25s and A-20s that the A-26s would replace had proven satisfactory; and
the canopy of available A-26s was poorly designed. A new canopy was needed to improve visibility. Without it, pilots could not safely fly the formations required for low level tactics. While the Wright Field Production Division agreed that the A-26 could not replace current types of light and medium bombers, Maj. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Commanding General of the Ninth Air Force, was much less critical than General Kenney. The few A-26s introduced in the European theater towards the end of the summer were performing well. Undoubtedly, the aircraft's marginal visibility needed attention. But new productions were seldom free of problems, and General Vandenberg thought the A-26 was a satisfactory replacement for the B-26s and A-20s in Europe.
Regardless of the mixed reports generated by the performance of the early A-26 (A-26As or A-26Bs), the Army Air Forces' plans to re-equip all B-25, B-26, and A-20 units with A-26s were reaffirmed in November 1944. In December, 2 more contracts were approved, and in April 1945 both of the new agreements were supplemented, bringing to 4,000 the total of new A-26s ordered since mid 1944. However, the German surrender on 8 May 1945 prompted a re evaluation of military requirements. Production which had been scheduled to increase to 400 A-26s per month was cut to 150. The procurement orders of 1944 and 1945 were canceled.
Douglas adopted several long standing suggestions by General Arnold: engineering personnel at Long Beach established closer liaison with the Tulsa plant; extra well qualified personnel were placed in the 2 plants; and the number of stations in the production lines was raised. These production changes facilitated modifications of the aircraft, which were designed to improve its effectiveness. An all purpose gun nose was devised and the faulty nose landing gear redesigned. A-26s (redesignated as A-26Cs) that came off the production lines after January 1945 featured an enlarged, raised canopy which provided increased visibility.