Best Procurement Efforts of the War - F6F and P-51?

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Part of the P-60 saga, and part of the whole US 1940-44 procurement saga is the Army/Continental IV-1430 hyper engine.

from Wiki
"The initial design contained in proposals to the United States Army Air Corps was for an aircraft based upon the P-40 design but featuring a low drag laminar flow wing, a Continental XIV-1430-3 inverted vee engine, and eight wing-mounted 0.5 in (12.7 mm) machine guns. This proposal was accepted and a contract for two prototypes was issued on 1 October 1940 with the aircraft designated the XP-53."
at least 5 different aircraft were intended to be powered by the IV-1430 but it was late, unreliable and didn't make the hoped for power. That didn't stop the Government from funding a 5 million dollar factory to build it. The Factory did do good work building P & W small radials and later Merlins. That is also part of the procurement story. Massive investment in factories and tooling with the ability to change direction or retool for a different product fairly quickly.
 
Part of the P-60 saga, and part of the whole US 1940-44 procurement saga is the Army/Continental IV-1430 hyper engine.

from Wiki
"The initial design contained in proposals to the United States Army Air Corps was for an aircraft based upon the P-40 design but featuring a low drag laminar flow wing, a Continental XIV-1430-3 inverted vee engine, and eight wing-mounted 0.5 in (12.7 mm) machine guns. This proposal was accepted and a contract for two prototypes was issued on 1 October 1940 with the aircraft designated the XP-53."
at least 5 different aircraft were intended to be powered by the IV-1430 but it was late, unreliable and didn't make the hoped for power. That didn't stop the Government from funding a 5 million dollar factory to build it. The Factory did do good work building P & W small radials and later Merlins. That is also part of the procurement story. Massive investment in factories and tooling with the ability to change direction or retool for a different product fairly quickly.
Thanks for this, Shortround6,

Not being that knowledgable about the development of individual power plants my sense is that the inability for engine developers to deliver on promised performance had a fairly significant impact on the development of new aircraft throughout the war and had a significant negative impact on the Luftwaffe in particular. In the context of this thread, the P-60 solicitation sounds like a classic example of a prescriptive specification solicitation which are generally considered to have higher risk factors than performance specifications. For clarification the solicitation specs fit under two broad categories:

Performance Specification (Best Value) - In this specification the buyer issues performance criteria that the proposer is free to develop designs to meet these criteria. The evaluation is done as a "best value" where the proposed design (aircraft in this instance) are tested against the desired performance criteria as well as against each competing design. All risk is on the proposer, however, the buyer has to be open to proposed solutions to meet goals. IIRC, the P-51 and F6F started out as in house design studies prior to any solicitation and were ready to be proposed when NAA and Grumman were issued a performance spec proposal.

Prescriptive Specification (Performance Goals/Limited Design Options) - In this specification the buyer issues performance criteria, however , these come with prescriptive requirements such as "use this engine" or "use this airfoil". In this proposal, the buyer assumes some risk if performance criteria can't be met due to the prescribed design limitations. The risk is made greater when a prescribed system, such as a power plant, is also in development or does not meet its own performance specifications. The P-60 seems to fit this model.

A subset of prescriptive specifications is technology advancement specifications which seem to be fairly common in the aerospace industry. In this specification, the buyer issues a performance specification, however, the performance criteria are intentionally overly ambitious and intended to spur the advancement of new technologies. These kind of specifications typically involve lengthy cost intensive design periods and novel solutions to technological challenges. One could think of the development of ultra long range bombers, such as the B-29, or ballistic missiles such as the V2 as fitting in this category. (or the US X-planes like the Swoose Goose)

Aside from the initial specification, there is also the execution of the solicitation by the buyer. How many design addenda are issued? Do design objectives change? Have evaluation criteria been shifted? Earlier, someone mentioned the Mosquito and reading through the development history one can see that the design concept was propose a number of times to shifting criteria. In the case of the Mosquito, it seems that the specification criteria ultimately evolved to meet the proposed design of the Mosquito rather than the other way round.
 
Aside from the initial specification, there is also the execution of the solicitation by the buyer. How many design addenda are issued? Do design objectives change? Have evaluation criteria been shifted? Earlier, someone mentioned the Mosquito and reading through the development history one can see that the design concept was propose a number of times to shifting criteria. In the case of the Mosquito, it seems that the specification criteria ultimately evolved to meet the proposed design of the Mosquito rather than the other way round.
This is actually normal in industry. A client cant write a specification for something that cannot be made so specifications in the first instance are written by manufacturers and clients together. An air ministry has requirements and asks manufacturers to tender designs and it goes from there, the winning design then has a spec. written defining what it is so that is what gets delivered. From there the work really starts ironing out all the problems, additional needs, uprating of performance etc etc. I saw a video on the Corsair F4U which was a good plane from the start but there were a staggering number of minor changes made between first flight of prototype and the final settled design, to get it right or better.
 
This is actually normal in industry. A client cant write a specification for something that cannot be made so specifications in the first instance are written by manufacturers and clients together. An air ministry has requirements and asks manufacturers to tender designs and it goes from there, the winning design then has a spec. written defining what it is so that is what gets delivered. From there the work really starts ironing out all the problems, additional needs, uprating of performance etc etc. I saw a video on the Corsair F4U which was a good plane from the start but there were a staggering number of minor changes made between first flight of prototype and the final settled design, to get it right or better.
Thanks Pbehn,

Agreed that there will always be developmental changes with a new aircraft. I should clarify that what I meant by addenda and or design objectives. In this case it would be when the buyer redirects the development process by changing mission (from say level bomber to dive bomber) or adding addition mission criteria well outside of the original solicitation.

I don't completely agree with the idea that you can't write a specification for something that can't be built. That is the purpose of a technology advancement specification. A couple that come to mind (more recently) would be the X-33/VentureStar or the currently in development F-35. There are more, but those were the quickest to come to mind.
 
Thanks Pbehn,

Agreed that there will always be developmental changes with a new aircraft. I should clarify that what I meant by addenda and or design objectives. In this case it would be when the buyer redirects the development process by changing mission (from say level bomber to dive bomber) or adding addition mission criteria well outside of the original solicitation.

I don't completely agree with the idea that you can't write a specification for something that can't be built. That is the purpose of a technology advancement specification. A couple that come to mind (more recently) would be the X-33/VentureStar or the currently in development F-35. There are more, but those were the quickest to come to mind.
I think you misunderstood the nuance. You can issue a requirement for something that does what an F-35 does but not a specification for what it is, until someone has developed all the stuff needed to make an F-35. When the tech has been developed then you can write a specification to absolutely define what an F-35 is so the people buying get them all the same and can in, theory at least, ask someone else to build one. In my working life I saw the specifications for something as simple as a mechanically lined pipe (API 5LD) grow from a couple of pages to a book, and within all the clients special requirements were certain distinctive phrases that were slightly odd English, because they were said and agreed by Italian and German quality managers in factories right at the start of the development, with UK or American clients.

With the Mosquito the wingspan was increased to cope with the extra weight of bombs when it was found that if you shorten the bombs it can carry more. The Bomb bay was given a bulged door arrangement to carry a cookie. Two roles at which the Mosquito excelled didnt exist when it was first discussed at de Havilland. A dedicated recon plane and a dedicated night fighter weren't in the "brief".
 
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I think you misunderstood the nuance. You can issue a requirement for something that does what an F-35 does but not a specification for what it is, until someone has developed all the stuff needed to make an F-35. When the tech has been developed then you can write a specification to absolutely define what an F-35 is so the people buying get them all the same and can in, theory at least, ask someone else to build one. In my working life I saw the specifications for something as simple as a mechanically lined pipe (API 5LD) grow from a couple of pages to a book, and within all the clients special requirements were certain distinctive phrases that were slightly odd English, because they were said and agreed by Italian and German quality managers in factories right at the start of the development, with UK or American clients.

With the Mosquito the wingspan was increased to cope with the extra weight of bombs when it was found that if you shorten the bombs it can carry more. The Bomb bay was given a bulged door arrangement to carry a cookie. Two roles at which the Mosquito excelled didnt exist when it was first discussed at de Havilland. A dedicated recon plane and a dedicated night fighter weren't in the "brief".
Greetings Pbehn,

I suspect we are talking similar concepts but using terminology in a way that confuses things due to our different professional backgrounds. In my profession (architecture and planning) specification is used to describe the client's initial needs and can be fairly conceptual. I can see how what you described has a different purpose and intent. What you are describing as a specification has a parallel in architecture, also called a specification, that gives the detail needed to construct a building. Trust me, it's even confusing to us.

take care.

k
 
With the Mosquito the wingspan was increased to cope with the extra weight of bombs when it was found that if you shorten the bombs it can carry more. The Bomb bay was given a bulged door arrangement to carry a cookie. Two roles at which the Mosquito excelled didnt exist when it was first discussed at de Havilland. A dedicated recon plane and a dedicated night fighter weren't in the "brief".

What's your source for the wingspan increase on the Mossies? Never heard of that before.

The engine nacelles were lengthened to the rear after the fist production run. On the original, the rear of the nacelle joined the wing right at the straight trailing edge. The longer nacelles on later airframes added a V fillet that extended beyond the wing trailing edge.
 
Greetings Pbehn,

I suspect we are talking similar concepts but using terminology in a way that confuses things due to our different professional backgrounds. In my profession (architecture and planning) specification is used to describe the client's initial needs and can be fairly conceptual. I can see how what you described has a different purpose and intent. What you are describing as a specification has a parallel in architecture, also called a specification, that gives the detail needed to construct a building. Trust me, it's even confusing to us.

take care.

k
In oil gas construction that is called a requisition and client specification. It details the base specification and additional requirements. You almost never look at the base spec because they were written years ago. All industries have ways to get to the same end.
 
Agreed

I do think that there are couple things that standout about the P-51. First, a "give us your best" solicitation and then leaving that to the manufacturer rather than providing a ton of oversight during initial design and second, the procurement of the re-engineering to the merlin/packard. The second was really an opportunity where a poorly managed procurement process could have turned the P-51 into a dog through additional performance/mission criteria.

I may have learned it wrong but my impression of the original Mustang procurement is different than what I am reading here.

The way I learned it the British Purchasing Commission approached North American with a proposal that they manufacture P-40s to augment the Curtiss production line, not to have NA offer their best design. North American didn't want any part of producing Curtiss designs and, since they had begun work on their own pursuit design, offered that instead.

The Purchasing Commission agreed to look at the proposed design, and the rest is history.

Does this get attributed to genius in procurement or genius in sales technique?

If anyone can document that the Purchasing Commission initially approached NA with an open-ended solicitation for their best design I would be happy to be proven wrong. After all, during my lifetime, so much of what was commonly believed about WWII has been subsequently proven wrong. If the British really did approach NA with the open-ended development contract that I see inferred here I would like to know.
 
I may have learned it wrong but my impression of the original Mustang procurement is different than what I am reading here.

The way I learned it the British Purchasing Commission approached North American with a proposal that they manufacture P-40s to augment the Curtiss production line, not to have NA offer their best design. North American didn't want any part of producing Curtiss designs and, since they had begun work on their own pursuit design, offered that instead.

The Purchasing Commission agreed to look at the proposed design, and the rest is history.

Does this get attributed to genius in procurement or genius in sales technique?

If anyone can document that the Purchasing Commission initially approached NA with an open-ended solicitation for their best design I would be happy to be proven wrong. After all, during my lifetime, so much of what was commonly believed about WWII has been subsequently proven wrong. If the British really did approach NA with the open-ended development contract that I see inferred here I would like to know.

Greetings NEWST,

I don't think you have it wrong. The Purchasing Commission did approach NAA to manufacture the P-40. IIRC, they approached other manufacturers as well. NAA offered the B-25, but the Commission was really after fighters and NAA countered that they could design and build a better fighter more quickly than they could build a new manufacturing line for the P-40. NAA had been developing a concept for a fighter and had a big jump on the design effort. Yes, it was genius marketing. On the other hand, the Commission's criteria was that it had to be better than the P-40. In other words give us your best. The following is quoted from Joe Baugher's website:

"In April of 1940, Kindelberger was summoned by the British Air Purchasing Commission and asked to manufacture the Curtiss Hawk 87 (P-40D) under license for the RAF. Kindelberger countered that NAA could do better than that airplane and that they could design a real fighter in the same time that it would take to put the P-40 into production. The British commission felt that they could take Kindelberger at his word, and on April 10, 1940 they accepted his proposal on the condition that the first prototype be ready in 120 days. The design was assigned the company project name of Model NA-73. At that time, the USAAC reserved for itself the right to block any foreign aircraft sales that it regarded as not in the Army's interest, for whatever reason. On May 4, 1940, the US Army reluctantly agreed not to block the British sale, but they added a condition. Two examples of the initial lot for Britain were to be transferred to the USAAC for testing free of charge. The NA-73X prototype contract was signed on May 23, 1940. The British insisted that a heavy eight-gun armament be fitted. NAA had actually been quietly working on such a fighter project since the summer of 1939, and by that date they had actually already completed much of the detail design. On May 29, a provisional RAF procurement was issued for 320 aircraft, contingent on satisfactory testing of the prototype. NAA agreed to start deliveries in January 1941. RAF serial numbers were to be AG345 through AG664, and the aircraft was given the name Mustang I in RAF service. Another urban legend surrounding the Mustang is that it owed a great deal to the Curtiss P-40, and, in fact, stole numerous design features from that fighter. Although NAA did pay $56,000 for technical aerodynamic data on the Curtiss XP-46, the NA-73X owed virtually nothing to any previous design and certainly did not owe anything to the Curtiss P-40."

To me, what makes this an outstanding effort on the Purchasing Commission is 1) a clear performance benchmark was established that the proposed design had to meet or exceed (the P-40D), and 2) there was minimal involvement on the part of the buyer to specify design conditions (such as an unproven engine). I have been looking for the official procurement documents, but my research skills for these documents have not been up to the task.
 
Greetings NEWST,

I don't think you have it wrong. The Purchasing Commission did approach NAA to manufacture the P-40. IIRC, they approached other manufacturers as well. NAA offered the B-25, but the Commission was really after fighters and NAA countered that they could design and build a better fighter more quickly than they could build a new manufacturing line for the P-40. NAA had been developing a concept for a fighter and had a big jump on the design effort. Yes, it was genius marketing. On the other hand, the Commission's criteria was that it had to be better than the P-40. In other words give us your best. The following is quoted from Joe Baugher's website:

"In April of 1940, Kindelberger was summoned by the British Air Purchasing Commission and asked to manufacture the Curtiss Hawk 87 (P-40D) under license for the RAF. Kindelberger countered that NAA could do better than that airplane and that they could design a real fighter in the same time that it would take to put the P-40 into production. The British commission felt that they could take Kindelberger at his word, and on April 10, 1940 they accepted his proposal on the condition that the first prototype be ready in 120 days. The design was assigned the company project name of Model NA-73. At that time, the USAAC reserved for itself the right to block any foreign aircraft sales that it regarded as not in the Army's interest, for whatever reason. On May 4, 1940, the US Army reluctantly agreed not to block the British sale, but they added a condition. Two examples of the initial lot for Britain were to be transferred to the USAAC for testing free of charge. The NA-73X prototype contract was signed on May 23, 1940. The British insisted that a heavy eight-gun armament be fitted. NAA had actually been quietly working on such a fighter project since the summer of 1939, and by that date they had actually already completed much of the detail design. On May 29, a provisional RAF procurement was issued for 320 aircraft, contingent on satisfactory testing of the prototype. NAA agreed to start deliveries in January 1941. RAF serial numbers were to be AG345 through AG664, and the aircraft was given the name Mustang I in RAF service. Another urban legend surrounding the Mustang is that it owed a great deal to the Curtiss P-40, and, in fact, stole numerous design features from that fighter. Although NAA did pay $56,000 for technical aerodynamic data on the Curtiss XP-46, the NA-73X owed virtually nothing to any previous design and certainly did not owe anything to the Curtiss P-40."

To me, what makes this an outstanding effort on the Purchasing Commission is 1) a clear performance benchmark was established that the proposed design had to meet or exceed (the P-40D), and 2) there was minimal involvement on the part of the buyer to specify design conditions (such as an unproven engine). I have been looking for the official procurement documents, but my research skills for these documents have not been up to the task.

Thanks. I can't disagree with what you say.
 
The only thing I find fanciful about the story is that NA said "we will build a better plane than the P-40" and the trusting British said "Ok dear chap, give it your best shot". I have no proof at all but I think the British decision was based on N/A explaining in great detail why their design was/would be better based on a lot of wind tunnel tests and design studies. In my opinion most of the work was done and they knew what the plane would be, just the hard yards of production engineering, which needs a contract to do, remained to be done.
 
The only thing I find fanciful about the story is that NA said "we will build a better plane than the P-40" and the trusting British said "Ok dear chap, give it your best shot". I have no proof at all but I think the British decision was based on N/A explaining in great detail why their design was/would be better based on a lot of wind tunnel tests and design studies. In my opinion most of the work was done and they knew what the plane would be, just the hard yards of production engineering, which needs a contract to do, remained to be done.

Greetings PBEHN,

An astute observation. Yes, the British were not swayed by a meeting over coffee. I'm copying below the following pages from Martin Chorlton's book "Allison-Engine P-51 Mustang" which describes in better detail the process.

If Mr Chorlton is a member of this forum or anyone knows him, my apologies in advance if I'm using them improperly. Please let me know and I will replace with a link to google books/preview.

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I would propose the B-17 as also a candidate. The request was for a multi engine bomber, Boeing went for 4 engines when all the other contenders went for two. Although it didn't win the contract it was designed for the powers that be recognised the potential in it and so still ordered development to proceed. Or at least that's what I've read.
 
The only thing I find fanciful about the story is that NA said "we will build a better plane than the P-40" and the trusting British said "Ok dear chap, give it your best shot". I have no proof at all but I think the British decision was based on N/A explaining in great detail why their design was/would be better based on a lot of wind tunnel tests and design studies. In my opinion most of the work was done and they knew what the plane would be, just the hard yards of production engineering, which needs a contract to do, remained to be done.
I agree and I think this myth is just a "sound bite" of what happened. The English were in high esteem here. Not necessarily trusted but liked. This is from watching old movies, reading old magazines, etc.
It's way easier to simply say:
The British wanted more fighters. North American said "Hey, we got something better!" The Brits said "cool". The P-51 was born. Over time this shorthand became "fact".
Whenever WW2 subjects come up, I sometimes take these shortcuts too. I don't want to bore those with little interest in the subject
 
For procurement, the Ford procurement contract for Willow Run, after its start up issues, was a one of the success stories of the war.
I think if we want to go there, then the single most important procurement of the war would be the creation of the Defense Plant Corporation in August 1940 and then the rapid expansion of defense plant capacity later that year. (This includes Willow Run). Throughout 1941, before the US entered the war, the DPC more than doubled America's production capacity giving the United States a massive jump start in ramping up for war. The DPC was active throughout the war and new production capacity roughly doubled each year.

If you go back and read US architecture and construction magazines from late 1940 and throughout 1941 you will find that the content is almost exclusively focused on defense plant factory construction and design, new worker housing, building communities from scratch, efficient use of materials that had become suddenly scarce (2x4 studs), building camouflage, bomb shelter design, and so forth. All before the US was ever in the war.
 
I agree and I think this myth is just a "sound bite" of what happened. The English were in high esteem here. Not necessarily trusted but liked. This is from watching old movies, reading old magazines, etc.
It's way easier to simply say:
The British wanted more fighters. North American said "Hey, we got something better!" The Brits said "cool". The P-51 was born. Over time this shorthand became "fact".
Whenever WW2 subjects come up, I sometimes take these shortcuts too. I don't want to bore those with little interest in the subject
I think it does N/A a disservice as if there was an element of luck in the British decision.
 

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