You are going into battle against other tanks. You are not concerned with how many tanks are made, you are concerned with staying alive. My Tiger, manually traversing the turret, will blow you up before you get close enough to kill me. The Panther had a better gun, perhaps better frontal armor, but was a tin can everywhere else. The Sherman was a piece of junk that could not beat any of the top tanks without a clear numerical superiority. How many T-34's where slaughtered by a force one quarter the size? Really, British tanks???
Best Tank of WW2
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parsifal
Colonel
I think it is well understood that the germans held a qualitative advantage over all their rivals, but this comes at a price, which you are attempting to excorcise from the equation. German tanks typically cost many times that of any comparable Allied or Soviet tank. And they paid for that cost in numbers. Without the numbers, they simply could not win their battles. Individually there is no argument, German tanks were technological marvels....operationally they were clumsy, few in number and vulnerable because of that.
The best defence is numbers....the russian experience is proof of that. The worst defence is sacrificing numbers for quality....and the germans proved that too.
The question is what is the best tank. Given equal resources, not being bombed day and night, there is no doubt the Germans would've had twice the numbers in battle as there were. the numbers alone are staggering. It took damn near the entire modernized world to stop the Germans and their damned engineering capabilities.
The T-34 was what, 3-4 years developed by the time of Kursk, the German attack was held up waiting for an unproven tank yet that tank left an impression of destruction that is still hotly debated today. This is not a question of numbers as the Russians had far more manpower to make the tanks, fight in the tanks, and ultimately, die in the tanks. In a straight up fight, nothing made that saw service in the war could expect to win against a Tiger(there are many questions regarding the actual ability of the crews operating the IS-2s and JS1-2's).
That a faltering and crumbling infrastructure couldn't keep up the production in 1944 is not a fault of the tank design itself...rather a knock against the situation it was constructed in.
If you are going into battle, die if you lose, what vehicle do you want to be in?
How many T-72s are equal to 1 Abrahms, or 1 Leopard 2s? Therin lies my point. This question aint industry or sheer numbers. WHAT IS THE SINGLE BEST TANK?
The T-34 was what, 3-4 years developed by the time of Kursk, the German attack was held up waiting for an unproven tank yet that tank left an impression of destruction that is still hotly debated today. This is not a question of numbers as the Russians had far more manpower to make the tanks, fight in the tanks, and ultimately, die in the tanks. In a straight up fight, nothing made that saw service in the war could expect to win against a Tiger(there are many questions regarding the actual ability of the crews operating the IS-2s and JS1-2's).
That a faltering and crumbling infrastructure couldn't keep up the production in 1944 is not a fault of the tank design itself...rather a knock against the situation it was constructed in.
If you are going into battle, die if you lose, what vehicle do you want to be in?
How many T-72s are equal to 1 Abrahms, or 1 Leopard 2s? Therin lies my point. This question aint industry or sheer numbers. WHAT IS THE SINGLE BEST TANK?
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By your wording, youd rather be with 70 T-72s vs an Abrahms line of 33 tanks. Even if 2/3rds of the Abrahms malfunction, you would expect to live? Now, back to what you were saying....Air support is not around, 'tis a fight to the death... Hello Iraq circa 1990s, NOTHING IN WW2 WAS EQUAL TO A TIGER. Qote numbers, quote production...that isn't the question. What's a previous posters quote? Dieing for your country doesn't win wars....
Shortround6
Major General
The biggest, baddest tank in the world that is 20 miles from the fighting isn't doing any good at all.
The biggest, baddest tank in the world that is stuck in a depression because it's power to weight ratio won't let it get out isn't much good.
The biggest, baddest tank in the world that is stuck on the wrong side of a river because it is too heavy to use any bridge in the area isn't much good.
The biggest, baddest tank in the world that eats in own transmissions and engines at much higher rate than lesser tanks on routine road marches also doesn't do much good in the fight.
Many battles were NOT fought on large billiard table flat open areas with no cover that allowed for 360 degree vision for several miles.
The biggest, baddest tank in the world that is stuck in a depression because it's power to weight ratio won't let it get out isn't much good.
The biggest, baddest tank in the world that is stuck on the wrong side of a river because it is too heavy to use any bridge in the area isn't much good.
The biggest, baddest tank in the world that eats in own transmissions and engines at much higher rate than lesser tanks on routine road marches also doesn't do much good in the fight.
Many battles were NOT fought on large billiard table flat open areas with no cover that allowed for 360 degree vision for several miles.
parsifal
Colonel
The question is what is the best tank. Given equal resources, not being bombed day and night, there is no doubt the Germans would've had twice the numbers in battle as there were. the numbers alone are staggering. It took damn near the entire modernized world to stop the Germans and their damned engineering capabilities.
The question is the best, thats true, but the best is the best al round tank, and that should include its cost of production. The costs of production for german tanks was quite staggering. Though it is not entirely accurate to do so, the best estimate i can come up on the cost of a t-34 is around 40000RM, versus 312000RM for a tiger. A Panther cost 190000 whilst a a MkIV cost just over 100000. A Sherman cost around 80000. So the question is, are you better off with 1 tiger, 1.6 Panthers, 3 mkIvs, 4 Shermans or 8 T-34s. Given the average exchange ratio on the eastern front was about 3:1 against the russians, and somewhere around 2:1 against the Americans, the low cost options utilized by the allies over the high cost uber tanks of the germans starts to make sense
The T-34 was what, 3-4 years developed by the time of Kursk, the German attack was held up waiting for an unproven tank yet that tank left an impression of destruction that is still hotly debated today. This is not a question of numbers as the Russians had far more manpower to make the tanks, fight in the tanks, and ultimately, die in the tanks. In a straight up fight, nothing made that saw service in the war could expect to win against a Tiger(there are many questions regarding the actual ability of the crews operating the IS-2s and JS1-2's).
The reason the Germans found it necessary to develop the Panther, can be found directly from their experiences in encountering the T-34. It was found to be a near perfect blend of firepower, mobility, and protection, which are the three main ingredients to effective tank design. The panther paid rather more emphasis on firepower and protection, at the expense of mobility, which the germans could afford to do because they were not being asked to execute significantly mobile operations by the time the panther was being introduced. Panthers never performed outstandingly in the attack, though they were adequate in this role.
The tiger was not inspired by the T-34, but it was upgunned and uparmoured as a result of German experiences with the Heavy allied tanks of 1940, principally the Char B and the Matilda. To me it represented the heaviest in firepower and protection, but was a very poor tank in terms of mobility and range, and also suffered in any sort of attack role. During the fighting in the Ardennes the unit supporting Peipers attack on the Americans left with 45 Tigers, and a week later returned with none. These were not encircled...they simply ran out of fuel, or more embarrassingly broke down. I think just 7 succumbed to enemy action.
So, it is quite wrong to insist that ina "straight up" fight the german tank would always win.....it depends on the circumstances, and often the weaknesses in German designs, their lack of range and mobility, and to a certain extent their poor serviceability, meant they fought at a distinct disadvantage. That, in part is why they hardly ever got to fight in a "straight up" fight....it was inherent in their design failings that they seldom got that opportunity.
And even though your last claim is essentially nothing could stand up to the german tank forces, in fact the Germans lost nearly all the battles after 1943 that they were involved in. They put up a helluva fight, and shot up more tanks than they lost, but they still lost.....
That a faltering and crumbling infrastructure couldn't keep up the production in 1944 is not a fault of the tank design itself...rather a knock against the situation it was constructed in.
I agree with this to a point, and yet the very designs you are talking about are reflective of the regime that produced them. Often overlooked, it is telling to note that the germans commanded the second biggest economy in the world in 1938, easily many times that of their future principal enemy, the russians. If you were to index the German Industrial potential in 1938 at 15, the Russian Industrial period at that same time was just 5....yet they at least matched the germans in tank outputs, by making far better use of their resources, and that included designing tanks that were built for mass production. German tanks were not, as is amply shown in Speers comments about the monstosities the heer was demanding at that time.
So the germans in their tank designs like so many of their other technological endeavours became intoxicated with size and firepower, and paid a heavy price in the outputs they achieved. This lack of produceability ultimately lost them the war, but it also made the outnumbered germans in the field highly vulnerable. The vaunted superiority in design of tanks like the Tiger simply could not compensate for the faults inherent to the design, many of which displayed themselves off the battlefield, but nevetheless had an effect on the battle.....
If you are going into battle, die if you lose, what vehicle do you want to be in?
If I was faced with a single Tiger, I would opt for the 8 T-34s that I know I could have inexchange. Statistically the tiger will kill 3 of the t-34s, or in other words ther is a 37.5% chance of my tank being knocked out. However statistically, these eight T-34s will have killed the Tiger 2.7 times, meaning ther is a 270% chance of me being killed if I am in the Tiger
How many T-72s are equal to 1 Abrahms, or 1 Leopard 2s? Therin lies my point. This question aint industry or sheer numbers. WHAT IS THE SINGLE BEST TANK?
Well in terms of what happened in Iraq, the majority of tanks destroyed in 1991 were not T-72s at all, they were T-55s, though they there were quite a few T-72s destroyed. However, as usual, this does not take into account the circumstances....the Iraqi tanks lacked proper night vision equipment and lacked many of the high performance rounds used by the US. We can draw very little in design comparisons from the experiences in Iraq, though there is no doubt in my mind the Abrams is a much superior tank. If ther is little to be drawn in analysis of this battle in a contemporary context, then there is nothing to be learnt from the iraqi experiences in the WWII context.
Incidentally, a much better picture of just how capable "modern" Soviet armour actually is, is obtained by examining the Israeli usage of the T-55, T-62s and T-72s that they captured and used for quite a few years themselves. They did update their electronics, and communications, but as tanks, they found them to be very satisfactory.
The question is the best, thats true, but the best is the best al round tank, and that should include its cost of production. The costs of production for german tanks was quite staggering. Though it is not entirely accurate to do so, the best estimate i can come up on the cost of a t-34 is around 40000RM, versus 312000RM for a tiger. A Panther cost 190000 whilst a a MkIV cost just over 100000. A Sherman cost around 80000. So the question is, are you better off with 1 tiger, 1.6 Panthers, 3 mkIvs, 4 Shermans or 8 T-34s. Given the average exchange ratio on the eastern front was about 3:1 against the russians, and somewhere around 2:1 against the Americans, the low cost options utilized by the allies over the high cost uber tanks of the germans starts to make sense
The T-34 was what, 3-4 years developed by the time of Kursk, the German attack was held up waiting for an unproven tank yet that tank left an impression of destruction that is still hotly debated today. This is not a question of numbers as the Russians had far more manpower to make the tanks, fight in the tanks, and ultimately, die in the tanks. In a straight up fight, nothing made that saw service in the war could expect to win against a Tiger(there are many questions regarding the actual ability of the crews operating the IS-2s and JS1-2's).
The reason the Germans found it necessary to develop the Panther, can be found directly from their experiences in encountering the T-34. It was found to be a near perfect blend of firepower, mobility, and protection, which are the three main ingredients to effective tank design. The panther paid rather more emphasis on firepower and protection, at the expense of mobility, which the germans could afford to do because they were not being asked to execute significantly mobile operations by the time the panther was being introduced. Panthers never performed outstandingly in the attack, though they were adequate in this role.
The tiger was not inspired by the T-34, but it was upgunned and uparmoured as a result of German experiences with the Heavy allied tanks of 1940, principally the Char B and the Matilda. To me it represented the heaviest in firepower and protection, but was a very poor tank in terms of mobility and range, and also suffered in any sort of attack role. During the fighting in the Ardennes the unit supporting Peipers attack on the Americans left with 45 Tigers, and a week later returned with none. These were not encircled...they simply ran out of fuel, or more embarrassingly broke down. I think just 7 succumbed to enemy action.
So, it is quite wrong to insist that ina "straight up" fight the german tank would always win.....it depends on the circumstances, and often the weaknesses in German designs, their lack of range and mobility, and to a certain extent their poor serviceability, meant they fought at a distinct disadvantage. That, in part is why they hardly ever got to fight in a "straight up" fight....it was inherent in their design failings that they seldom got that opportunity.
And even though your last claim is essentially nothing could stand up to the german tank forces, in fact the Germans lost nearly all the battles after 1943 that they were involved in. They put up a helluva fight, and shot up more tanks than they lost, but they still lost.....
That a faltering and crumbling infrastructure couldn't keep up the production in 1944 is not a fault of the tank design itself...rather a knock against the situation it was constructed in.
I agree with this to a point, and yet the very designs you are talking about are reflective of the regime that produced them. Often overlooked, it is telling to note that the germans commanded the second biggest economy in the world in 1938, easily many times that of their future principal enemy, the russians. If you were to index the German Industrial potential in 1938 at 15, the Russian Industrial period at that same time was just 5....yet they at least matched the germans in tank outputs, by making far better use of their resources, and that included designing tanks that were built for mass production. German tanks were not, as is amply shown in Speers comments about the monstosities the heer was demanding at that time.
So the germans in their tank designs like so many of their other technological endeavours became intoxicated with size and firepower, and paid a heavy price in the outputs they achieved. This lack of produceability ultimately lost them the war, but it also made the outnumbered germans in the field highly vulnerable. The vaunted superiority in design of tanks like the Tiger simply could not compensate for the faults inherent to the design, many of which displayed themselves off the battlefield, but nevetheless had an effect on the battle.....
If you are going into battle, die if you lose, what vehicle do you want to be in?
If I was faced with a single Tiger, I would opt for the 8 T-34s that I know I could have inexchange. Statistically the tiger will kill 3 of the t-34s, or in other words ther is a 37.5% chance of my tank being knocked out. However statistically, these eight T-34s will have killed the Tiger 2.7 times, meaning ther is a 270% chance of me being killed if I am in the Tiger
How many T-72s are equal to 1 Abrahms, or 1 Leopard 2s? Therin lies my point. This question aint industry or sheer numbers. WHAT IS THE SINGLE BEST TANK?
Well in terms of what happened in Iraq, the majority of tanks destroyed in 1991 were not T-72s at all, they were T-55s, though they there were quite a few T-72s destroyed. However, as usual, this does not take into account the circumstances....the Iraqi tanks lacked proper night vision equipment and lacked many of the high performance rounds used by the US. We can draw very little in design comparisons from the experiences in Iraq, though there is no doubt in my mind the Abrams is a much superior tank. If ther is little to be drawn in analysis of this battle in a contemporary context, then there is nothing to be learnt from the iraqi experiences in the WWII context.
Incidentally, a much better picture of just how capable "modern" Soviet armour actually is, is obtained by examining the Israeli usage of the T-55, T-62s and T-72s that they captured and used for quite a few years themselves. They did update their electronics, and communications, but as tanks, they found them to be very satisfactory.
DonL
Banned
Sorry Parsifal
This is nothing but a myth.
A panther cost 117.100,- RM (without radio equipment) at Februar. 1 of 1943.
So at the beginnig of the production.
A Tiger I cost 250.800,- RM
Edit:
Comparison production of Pz IV to Panther (Pz V) at 1944:
3777 Panther were built at 1944 and 3125 Pz IV (the highest number of all years)
So I can't see that the Panther Tank was this expensive or difficult to mass produce
This is nothing but a myth.
A panther cost 117.100,- RM (without radio equipment) at Februar. 1 of 1943.
So at the beginnig of the production.
Next myth.
A Tiger I cost 250.800,- RM
Edit:
Comparison production of Pz IV to Panther (Pz V) at 1944:
3777 Panther were built at 1944 and 3125 Pz IV (the highest number of all years)
So I can't see that the Panther Tank was this expensive or difficult to mass produce
Attachments
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parsifal
Colonel
This sheet I have seen before, but I am told does not revela the full costs associated with delivery, manning, fitting of armament, optics and communications.
If i were to apply the same criteria to the T-34, its costs would drop down to around 25K per unit. There would be similar discounts applicable to US tanks.
I need to stress that the figures I quoted are estimates only, for the tank in a combat worthy form and delivered to the units at the front. When these costs are included, one arrives at the figures I suggested.
But this argument about individual unt costs is largely irrelevant, and i wish i had not raised it because it detracts from the important thing to note. How did Germany, with a production base at least twice, and probably closer to three times that of its main enemy, manage to only produce less tanks than them. If we compare apples to apples, and look at MkIV production plus MkV production, vs T-34 production one arrives at figures of approximately 11000 AFVs (from memory) compared to over 60000 for the t-34. This difference cannot be explained by bombing.....Germans lost an estimated 10% of their productive capacities in 1943 and 19% (some sources say 35-40%) in 1944. By comparison, the Soviets lost 35% of their productive capacity due to enemy occupation (from Overy). Then there are the impacts of production from the occupied territories.
There are many variables, of course, but I think the inescapeable conclusion is that German tanks were complex and very expensive to prduce. This is certainly backed up by comments from Speer, who constantly complained about the difficulty of producing German types, and held up the Sherman as an example of what Germany should be producing
If i were to apply the same criteria to the T-34, its costs would drop down to around 25K per unit. There would be similar discounts applicable to US tanks.
I need to stress that the figures I quoted are estimates only, for the tank in a combat worthy form and delivered to the units at the front. When these costs are included, one arrives at the figures I suggested.
But this argument about individual unt costs is largely irrelevant, and i wish i had not raised it because it detracts from the important thing to note. How did Germany, with a production base at least twice, and probably closer to three times that of its main enemy, manage to only produce less tanks than them. If we compare apples to apples, and look at MkIV production plus MkV production, vs T-34 production one arrives at figures of approximately 11000 AFVs (from memory) compared to over 60000 for the t-34. This difference cannot be explained by bombing.....Germans lost an estimated 10% of their productive capacities in 1943 and 19% (some sources say 35-40%) in 1944. By comparison, the Soviets lost 35% of their productive capacity due to enemy occupation (from Overy). Then there are the impacts of production from the occupied territories.
There are many variables, of course, but I think the inescapeable conclusion is that German tanks were complex and very expensive to prduce. This is certainly backed up by comments from Speer, who constantly complained about the difficulty of producing German types, and held up the Sherman as an example of what Germany should be producing
Mikey I will agree that the Tiger and Panther were the best overall tanks, however what others are saying to you is true as well. In the end the best tanks were the tanks that could be massed produced in extremely large numbers.
The allies had it right. Better to have 100 Sherman's than 5 Tigers. Those Sherman's that you call a "piece of junk" still won the war. Why it could easily be built in large numbers. The Germans were never going to win the war with the Tiger.
The allies had it right. Better to have 100 Sherman's than 5 Tigers. Those Sherman's that you call a "piece of junk" still won the war. Why it could easily be built in large numbers. The Germans were never going to win the war with the Tiger.
parsifal
Colonel
From Wiki…….
One source has cited the cost of a Panther tank as 117,100 RM). This compared with 82,500 RM for the StuG III, 96,163 RM for the Panzer III, 103,462 RM for the Panzer IV, and 250,800 RM for the Tiger I. These figures did not include the cost of the armament and radio. In terms of RMs per ton, therefore, the Panther tank was one of the most cost-effective of the German AFV's of World War II. However, these cost figures should be understood in the context of the time period in which the various AFVs were first designed, as the Germans increasingly strove for designs and production methods that would allow for higher production rates, and thus steadily reduced the cost of their AFVs. For example, another source has cited the total cost of the early production Tiger I in 1942–1943 to be as high as 800,000 RM..
The process of streamlining the production of German AFVs first began after Speer became Reichminister in early 1942, and steadily accelerated through 1944; production of the Panther tank thus coincided with this period of increased manufacturing efficiency. German AFV manufacturers at the start of World War II utilized only heavily labor-intensive and costly manufacturing methods unsuitable for the needs of mass production; even with streamlined production methods, Germany never approached the efficiency of Allied manufacturing during World War II.
An important point to note is that the unit costs of German AFVs tended to decrease as the war progressed, so coming up with a consistent unit cost can be difficult to agree upon. This phenomenon occurred for all nations as production runs increased.
There are inherent inaccuracies in comparing unit costs with the Soviets, not least of which is the currency conversion issue, so perhaps it is better to compare the numbers of man hours needed to produce T-34s with MkVs. According to one source, T34 = 3000 manhours versus Panther= 55000 manhours.
This is a link to a Russian site that gives some indication of the costs of the T-34.
Ñåáåñòîèìîñòü íåêîòîðûõ òèïîâ ñîâåòñêèõ òàíêîâ ïî ãîäàì
In dollar terms the T34/85 cost 71000 Roubles to produce and field in 1945. Determining an appropriate exchange rate is fraught with difficulties, but in 1938, the following exchange rates are known to apply.
(source (World Almanac and Book of Facts 1940))
Exchange Rates- based on Average NY stock exchange noon-time exchange rates 1938
RM = 0.40 US Dollars
UK PND = 4.88 US Dollars
Franc = 0.029 US Dollars
Ruble = 0.20 US Dollars (used for internal pricing/ exchange)
Chevronets = 8.23 US Dollars (at gold par) (used for foreign trade),
I think therefore, that the unit cost of 75000 Rb equates to approximately $14000 USD (though I am open to suggestions on an appropriate exchange rate….this is perhaps the most difficult thing to do in a WWII comparison). That's about RM 36000 per unit, but this is admittedly very rough.
Admittedly, the cost per unit dropped for the T-34 as the war progressed, and the T-34/43 and T-34/85 were actually about 30% cheaper to produce than the T-34/76 (M1941). In 1941 the unit cost for a T-34/76 was as high as 140K, which is equivalent to approximately RM71000 per copy
One source has cited the cost of a Panther tank as 117,100 RM). This compared with 82,500 RM for the StuG III, 96,163 RM for the Panzer III, 103,462 RM for the Panzer IV, and 250,800 RM for the Tiger I. These figures did not include the cost of the armament and radio. In terms of RMs per ton, therefore, the Panther tank was one of the most cost-effective of the German AFV's of World War II. However, these cost figures should be understood in the context of the time period in which the various AFVs were first designed, as the Germans increasingly strove for designs and production methods that would allow for higher production rates, and thus steadily reduced the cost of their AFVs. For example, another source has cited the total cost of the early production Tiger I in 1942–1943 to be as high as 800,000 RM..
The process of streamlining the production of German AFVs first began after Speer became Reichminister in early 1942, and steadily accelerated through 1944; production of the Panther tank thus coincided with this period of increased manufacturing efficiency. German AFV manufacturers at the start of World War II utilized only heavily labor-intensive and costly manufacturing methods unsuitable for the needs of mass production; even with streamlined production methods, Germany never approached the efficiency of Allied manufacturing during World War II.
An important point to note is that the unit costs of German AFVs tended to decrease as the war progressed, so coming up with a consistent unit cost can be difficult to agree upon. This phenomenon occurred for all nations as production runs increased.
There are inherent inaccuracies in comparing unit costs with the Soviets, not least of which is the currency conversion issue, so perhaps it is better to compare the numbers of man hours needed to produce T-34s with MkVs. According to one source, T34 = 3000 manhours versus Panther= 55000 manhours.
This is a link to a Russian site that gives some indication of the costs of the T-34.
Ñåáåñòîèìîñòü íåêîòîðûõ òèïîâ ñîâåòñêèõ òàíêîâ ïî ãîäàì
In dollar terms the T34/85 cost 71000 Roubles to produce and field in 1945. Determining an appropriate exchange rate is fraught with difficulties, but in 1938, the following exchange rates are known to apply.
(source (World Almanac and Book of Facts 1940))
Exchange Rates- based on Average NY stock exchange noon-time exchange rates 1938
RM = 0.40 US Dollars
UK PND = 4.88 US Dollars
Franc = 0.029 US Dollars
Ruble = 0.20 US Dollars (used for internal pricing/ exchange)
Chevronets = 8.23 US Dollars (at gold par) (used for foreign trade),
I think therefore, that the unit cost of 75000 Rb equates to approximately $14000 USD (though I am open to suggestions on an appropriate exchange rate….this is perhaps the most difficult thing to do in a WWII comparison). That's about RM 36000 per unit, but this is admittedly very rough.
Admittedly, the cost per unit dropped for the T-34 as the war progressed, and the T-34/43 and T-34/85 were actually about 30% cheaper to produce than the T-34/76 (M1941). In 1941 the unit cost for a T-34/76 was as high as 140K, which is equivalent to approximately RM71000 per copy
Do you think any modern MBT is easy to make? hile the T-34 may've been the very best ground weapon of the war, based on numbers and ability, in a straight out tank battle it got its butt whipped. Going back to Kursk, the Russian airforce and anti tank guns knocked out twice as many German tanks as the well positioned, dug in, Russian tanks did. For all the losses, the krauts did a phenominal job against impossible odds.
Look at the battlefield of Kursk, the defences, and just how far the panzers got...No other tank of the war could've done that(Is2 Js excluded...potentially)
The Ardennes? Any tank is going to run out of gas if not supplied. Tanks got through, supplies did not. Besides, you cannot blame the tank for flawed strategy against impossible odds. Germany fighting with triple the tank force, built of T-34's, would still lose. Once again, none of that has to do with the tank specifically.
Asfar as not winning a battle after 1943 goes here is a truth...The only times in modern history when an equally equipped army has won, while being completely outsized, was failure of the opposing commanders to press their charge. Soldiers will not stop if they're gonna get shot by their own troops for stopping. Quantity won the war, not quality. The moment Adolf decided to attack Russia, while England still stood, the war was lost. 10,000 Tigers and Panthers could not change that fact. Once again, numbers do not lie.
It isn't correct to look at unit cost of tanks. If the workers stopped working because of lack of pay, The Germans and the Russians would've had there military kill the ringleaders and made the people work. Price was no object, and to the Russians, neither was cost of life. They sent their tank crews to die...die in a woefully inadequate tank from 1944 on. Unfortunately there appears to be no tankmen from the war on this sight or else they could weigh in. The Allies feared the Tigers, the Germans feared the airplanes.
Look at the battlefield of Kursk, the defences, and just how far the panzers got...No other tank of the war could've done that(Is2 Js excluded...potentially)
The Ardennes? Any tank is going to run out of gas if not supplied. Tanks got through, supplies did not. Besides, you cannot blame the tank for flawed strategy against impossible odds. Germany fighting with triple the tank force, built of T-34's, would still lose. Once again, none of that has to do with the tank specifically.
Asfar as not winning a battle after 1943 goes here is a truth...The only times in modern history when an equally equipped army has won, while being completely outsized, was failure of the opposing commanders to press their charge. Soldiers will not stop if they're gonna get shot by their own troops for stopping. Quantity won the war, not quality. The moment Adolf decided to attack Russia, while England still stood, the war was lost. 10,000 Tigers and Panthers could not change that fact. Once again, numbers do not lie.
It isn't correct to look at unit cost of tanks. If the workers stopped working because of lack of pay, The Germans and the Russians would've had there military kill the ringleaders and made the people work. Price was no object, and to the Russians, neither was cost of life. They sent their tank crews to die...die in a woefully inadequate tank from 1944 on. Unfortunately there appears to be no tankmen from the war on this sight or else they could weigh in. The Allies feared the Tigers, the Germans feared the airplanes.
...by the same logic, Ford Taurus must be better than Ferarri Enzo because there's 10,000,000 Taurus' on the road vs 500 Enzos. Since Ford can make so many cars, I guess the Enzo just isn't really that good of a car...especially how frequent the maintence requirements are. Yet, going from New York to San Francisco, which do you want to be in?
pbfoot
1st Lieutenant
The Taurus without one word of a lie and I hate them
parsifal
Colonel
Do you think any modern MBT is easy to make? hile the T-34 may've been the very best ground weapon of the war, based on numbers and ability, in a straight out tank battle it got its butt whipped. Going back to Kursk, the Russian airforce and anti tank guns knocked out twice as many German tanks as the well positioned, dug in, Russian tanks did. For all the losses, the krauts did a phenominal job against impossible odds.
Look at the battlefield of Kursk, the defences, and just how far the panzers got...No other tank of the war could've done that(Is2 Js excluded...potentially)
In answer to the first point, no all tanks represent a high investment of military capital, but in the case of the German heavy tanks of the late war period, the investment was much higher per unit than any other nation was prepared to pay. The Germans entered this race for heaviest meanest tank, without having considered the implication of their procurement strategy
There is a strong argument to suggest that the uber tanks on which the Germans pinned their hopes for victory, actually cost them that victory. The strong defences that you mention actually were made possible b the delay in kicking off the offensive. And the offensive was delayed primarily because of the desire to get the Panther into action.
And you seem to jump to the conclusion that the excellent performance by the germans was due to the performance of the Panther Tank (and to a lesser extent the Tiger). In fact there is no evidence to support that notion. The majority of the damage to the Russian mobile forces was done by the lighter more proven types in the german, inventory, principally the mkIIIs and Ivs. The mkVs were actually rather a failure.
According to OKH reports, of the 200 that kicked off on the opening day of the offensive only 9 were still operational by the second day. The overwhelming majority had simply broken down due, mostly to transmission failures. Most of these were recovered, but then lost for good in the Soviet counteroffensive. By the 1 August AGS retained just 6 out of that original batch of 200.
For the loss of that 194 tanks, the Panther equipped formations are credited with the destruction of 267 Soviet AFVs….hardly a "butt kicking" as you refer to it.
The Ardennes? Any tank is going to run out of gas if not supplied. Tanks got through, supplies did not. Besides, you cannot blame the tank for flawed strategy against impossible odds. Germany fighting with triple the tank force, built of T-34's, would still lose. Once again, none of that has to do with the tank specifically.
I agree that the defeat in the Ardennes was not directly the fault of the tank itself, but it was still part of the surreal lack of reality that gripped the Heer in those final months of the war. The heavy tanks developed by the germans, at the expense of numbers, reliability, and mobility was symptomatic of the general malaise afflicting german military thinking at that time. The Germans believed that their wonder weapons would tip the balance for them….and that included the equipment of their tank parks. They were wrong about the effects of their super weapons generally, and they were wrong about their uber tanks specifically.
It is doubtful that after the formation of the grand alliance against them, therir was anything that Germany could do about staving off defeat. Its an open question if they could have done better with amore conventional tank force…Rommel certainly thought so, and advocated the use of massed AT defences rather than continuing to turn out small numbers of super tanks, as they did. Whilst the majority of the front, particularly the easter front, was forced to fight a "poor mans war" with inadequate quality and quantity of AT weapons, the germans continued to fulfil its unrealistic dreams of producing super tanks but in completely inadequate numbers.
I personally think they would have been far better to follow Rommels suggestion and produce large quantities of AT weapons…towed guns and Stugs mostly
Asfar as not winning a battle after 1943 goes here is a truth...The only times in modern history when an equally equipped army has won, while being completely outsized, was failure of the opposing commanders to press their charge. Soldiers will not stop if they're gonna get shot by their own troops for stopping. Quantity won the war, not quality. The moment Adolf decided to attack Russia, while England still stood, the war was lost. 10,000 Tigers and Panthers could not change that fact. Once again, numbers do not lie.
Germany was defeated comprehensively, not just by numbers. And it was not just "Adolph" that was responsible for that, though he played a big part in it. The decision to attack Russia was never seriously opposed by any member of the General Staff, in fact they enthusiastically supported it.
The problem was never with just one individual, or one decision, it was a comprehensive failure by the whole. I have seen this argument so many times…"oh it was Hitlers fault", or "Germany's fatal mistake was this or that"….variations to the "we were stabbed in the back" argument that followed the heels of the defeat in 1918.
The facts are that the German military system was defeated not just one individual or one decision.
It isn't correct to look at unit cost of tanks. If the workers stopped working because of lack of pay, The Germans and the Russians would've had there military kill the ringleaders and made the people work. Price was no object, and to the Russians, neither was cost of life. They sent their tank crews to die...die in a woefully inadequate tank from 1944 on. Unfortunately there appears to be no tankmen from the war on this sight or else they could weigh in. The Allies feared the Tigers, the Germans feared the airplanes.
Err, the simple facts are these, in 1944, the Germans destroyed 23000 Russian AFVs whilst losing about 9000 of their own. At those rates, the uber tank concept was bound to fail, because of the unit cost argument that you believe to be irrelevant. In fact the economic realities of equipment costs affected the Russians and the germans just as much as everybody. Probably moreso in fact, since the democracies had a certain amount of elasticity in their credit systems that could absorb losses and costs for a time at least, whereas Nazi Germany in particular was living a hand to mouth existence with no credit reserves to call on.
I would say the allies had a respect for the German tank crews, not so much a fear. The same could be said of the german view of allied airpower.
As far as ther being no tankmen on this site...I beg to differ. there just is no one willing to take on the argument, as we have suffered casualties in this debate before
Look at the battlefield of Kursk, the defences, and just how far the panzers got...No other tank of the war could've done that(Is2 Js excluded...potentially)
In answer to the first point, no all tanks represent a high investment of military capital, but in the case of the German heavy tanks of the late war period, the investment was much higher per unit than any other nation was prepared to pay. The Germans entered this race for heaviest meanest tank, without having considered the implication of their procurement strategy
There is a strong argument to suggest that the uber tanks on which the Germans pinned their hopes for victory, actually cost them that victory. The strong defences that you mention actually were made possible b the delay in kicking off the offensive. And the offensive was delayed primarily because of the desire to get the Panther into action.
And you seem to jump to the conclusion that the excellent performance by the germans was due to the performance of the Panther Tank (and to a lesser extent the Tiger). In fact there is no evidence to support that notion. The majority of the damage to the Russian mobile forces was done by the lighter more proven types in the german, inventory, principally the mkIIIs and Ivs. The mkVs were actually rather a failure.
According to OKH reports, of the 200 that kicked off on the opening day of the offensive only 9 were still operational by the second day. The overwhelming majority had simply broken down due, mostly to transmission failures. Most of these were recovered, but then lost for good in the Soviet counteroffensive. By the 1 August AGS retained just 6 out of that original batch of 200.
For the loss of that 194 tanks, the Panther equipped formations are credited with the destruction of 267 Soviet AFVs….hardly a "butt kicking" as you refer to it.
The Ardennes? Any tank is going to run out of gas if not supplied. Tanks got through, supplies did not. Besides, you cannot blame the tank for flawed strategy against impossible odds. Germany fighting with triple the tank force, built of T-34's, would still lose. Once again, none of that has to do with the tank specifically.
I agree that the defeat in the Ardennes was not directly the fault of the tank itself, but it was still part of the surreal lack of reality that gripped the Heer in those final months of the war. The heavy tanks developed by the germans, at the expense of numbers, reliability, and mobility was symptomatic of the general malaise afflicting german military thinking at that time. The Germans believed that their wonder weapons would tip the balance for them….and that included the equipment of their tank parks. They were wrong about the effects of their super weapons generally, and they were wrong about their uber tanks specifically.
It is doubtful that after the formation of the grand alliance against them, therir was anything that Germany could do about staving off defeat. Its an open question if they could have done better with amore conventional tank force…Rommel certainly thought so, and advocated the use of massed AT defences rather than continuing to turn out small numbers of super tanks, as they did. Whilst the majority of the front, particularly the easter front, was forced to fight a "poor mans war" with inadequate quality and quantity of AT weapons, the germans continued to fulfil its unrealistic dreams of producing super tanks but in completely inadequate numbers.
I personally think they would have been far better to follow Rommels suggestion and produce large quantities of AT weapons…towed guns and Stugs mostly
Asfar as not winning a battle after 1943 goes here is a truth...The only times in modern history when an equally equipped army has won, while being completely outsized, was failure of the opposing commanders to press their charge. Soldiers will not stop if they're gonna get shot by their own troops for stopping. Quantity won the war, not quality. The moment Adolf decided to attack Russia, while England still stood, the war was lost. 10,000 Tigers and Panthers could not change that fact. Once again, numbers do not lie.
Germany was defeated comprehensively, not just by numbers. And it was not just "Adolph" that was responsible for that, though he played a big part in it. The decision to attack Russia was never seriously opposed by any member of the General Staff, in fact they enthusiastically supported it.
The problem was never with just one individual, or one decision, it was a comprehensive failure by the whole. I have seen this argument so many times…"oh it was Hitlers fault", or "Germany's fatal mistake was this or that"….variations to the "we were stabbed in the back" argument that followed the heels of the defeat in 1918.
The facts are that the German military system was defeated not just one individual or one decision.
It isn't correct to look at unit cost of tanks. If the workers stopped working because of lack of pay, The Germans and the Russians would've had there military kill the ringleaders and made the people work. Price was no object, and to the Russians, neither was cost of life. They sent their tank crews to die...die in a woefully inadequate tank from 1944 on. Unfortunately there appears to be no tankmen from the war on this sight or else they could weigh in. The Allies feared the Tigers, the Germans feared the airplanes.
Err, the simple facts are these, in 1944, the Germans destroyed 23000 Russian AFVs whilst losing about 9000 of their own. At those rates, the uber tank concept was bound to fail, because of the unit cost argument that you believe to be irrelevant. In fact the economic realities of equipment costs affected the Russians and the germans just as much as everybody. Probably moreso in fact, since the democracies had a certain amount of elasticity in their credit systems that could absorb losses and costs for a time at least, whereas Nazi Germany in particular was living a hand to mouth existence with no credit reserves to call on.
I would say the allies had a respect for the German tank crews, not so much a fear. The same could be said of the german view of allied airpower.
As far as ther being no tankmen on this site...I beg to differ. there just is no one willing to take on the argument, as we have suffered casualties in this debate before
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parsifal
Colonel
by the same logic, Ford Taurus must be better than Ferarri Enzo because there's 10,000,000 Taurus' on the road vs 500 Enzos. Since Ford can make so many cars, I guess the Enzo just isn't really that good of a car...especially how frequent the maintence requirements are. Yet, going from New York to San Francisco, which do you want to be in?
Actually this analogy does pretty neatly show up the weakness in your thinking. On the face of it, having a Ferraris would be an eminently better mount….but then you have not considered the circumstances that contest….what if you had to stay on unsealed roads the whole way, for example, or worse, on no roads. And what if you had to compete against those 10000 fords simultaneously, to see how many miles could be racked up by each group. Under both those circumstances the Ferrari might not be a good choice. In Australia with its notoriously bad outback roads it is a definite liability, notwithstanding the prestige effect such a car has.
So, as a general statement it probably does make sense to go for the Taurus under most circumstances. And similar conclusions can be drawn for the German tank arm in a lot of circumstances.
Actually this analogy does pretty neatly show up the weakness in your thinking. On the face of it, having a Ferraris would be an eminently better mount….but then you have not considered the circumstances that contest….what if you had to stay on unsealed roads the whole way, for example, or worse, on no roads. And what if you had to compete against those 10000 fords simultaneously, to see how many miles could be racked up by each group. Under both those circumstances the Ferrari might not be a good choice. In Australia with its notoriously bad outback roads it is a definite liability, notwithstanding the prestige effect such a car has.
So, as a general statement it probably does make sense to go for the Taurus under most circumstances. And similar conclusions can be drawn for the German tank arm in a lot of circumstances.
Of 200 of a brand new type, without the bugs having had a chance to be found, they destroyed 267 of the Russian tanks. Moreso, the Russians didn't destroy the German tanks, their own mechanical issues destroyed them. Take a look back at 1941 and the teething problems of the T-34, took a couple of years to make them right. That the Panthers and Tigers didn't have those years to develop, once again, isn't those tanks fault. The tanks were superior, the economy and reality of war doomed them. But you cannot sit there and say a T-34, a Sherman, a Firefly, a Cromwell, a Churchill an M-26 or any other tank produced was a superior tank in a tank battle. The time ran out to fix all the bugs but...here we talk about those tanks today as if they had all the relevence in the world.
I do agree that the German high command had as much to do with screwing things up as Hitler. There seemed to be an abundance of brilliant tacticians... some really keen minds, but the failures on top rolled the sh!t downhill.
You're right on this, numbers alone didn't cost Hitler his "fortress Europe". From the idiot Goering in charge of the LW, to trying to build a surface navy, bailing out the Italians in Greece(5 weeks!!!!!), declaring war on the US, desecrating millions of welcoming civilians, and not sending reinforcements day 1 to Normandy, Germany was destined to lose WW2 although, if you take out the numerical superiority, make an even odds fight, Europe would today be a one country continent and its flag would be German. They cost themselves the war they had pretty much wrapped up.
I do agree that the German high command had as much to do with screwing things up as Hitler. There seemed to be an abundance of brilliant tacticians... some really keen minds, but the failures on top rolled the sh!t downhill.
You're right on this, numbers alone didn't cost Hitler his "fortress Europe". From the idiot Goering in charge of the LW, to trying to build a surface navy, bailing out the Italians in Greece(5 weeks!!!!!), declaring war on the US, desecrating millions of welcoming civilians, and not sending reinforcements day 1 to Normandy, Germany was destined to lose WW2 although, if you take out the numerical superiority, make an even odds fight, Europe would today be a one country continent and its flag would be German. They cost themselves the war they had pretty much wrapped up.
"So, as a general statement it probably does make sense to go for the Taurus under most circumstances. And similar conclusions can be drawn for the German tank arm in a lot of circumstances".
Yes, a better car for the circumstances, but not THE better car.
I'm upset that there are vets on here who dont speak because of prior disrespect or slander. You guys have earned my respect for the jobs you did and and find it difficult to fathom alienating your firsthand source of information. I sit back and read, since I was 8, about this stuff. It's you who I read about, your exploits, places you've been, what you went through...Thank you for your time and your opinion.
Michael Georges
Yes, a better car for the circumstances, but not THE better car.
I'm upset that there are vets on here who dont speak because of prior disrespect or slander. You guys have earned my respect for the jobs you did and and find it difficult to fathom alienating your firsthand source of information. I sit back and read, since I was 8, about this stuff. It's you who I read about, your exploits, places you've been, what you went through...Thank you for your time and your opinion.
Michael Georges
parsifal
Colonel
I dont own it....its a quote from Wiki, but it looks very similar to the post made by DonL.
M_Kenny revealed this list from posted by DonL as not including the armament and comms equipment
I dont suppose you have any further information to contribute...
