Better German naval strategy 1930-1945?

[Shortround6]

Yes, they just jumped over that school ship from '35-'36 (after AGNA) and with the first GZ project went over half the tonnage. So instead of keeping the given tonnage (which was never the case) they added half more.

Sort of like Queen Victoria's yacht. Everybody who passed even close came up with some improvement/necessity that just had to be incorporated until the poor thing keeled over in the dry dock when they tried to launch it.

Naval architecture should be left to Naval architects and not monkeyed about with people who just think "such and such would be nice".

 

[marathag]

U-boats were their best bet to win the battle of the Atlantic. But they needed next generation u-boats deployed in 1943 to stand a chance against the Allies introducing improved ASW technology and doctrine.

It was too late at this point by June 1943, even if the Walthers HOOH Boats worked (that they wouldn't, given the postwar RN experiments with Peroxide power).

KM has a window of time for Subs to work to knock the UK out of the War, and that ends once the USN shows up in force and the air coverage gap is closed, it's over. KM is just sending crews out to their deaths, with little to show for it.
Marginally better subs just isn't enough to stop the convoys across the Atlantic.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

It was too late at this point by June 1943, even if the Walthers HOOH Boats worked (that they wouldn't, given the postwar RN experiments with Peroxide power).

KM has a window of time for Subs to work to knock the UK out of the War, and that ends once the USN shows up in force and the air coverage gap is closed, it's over. KM is just sending crews out to their deaths, with little to show for it.
Marginally better subs just isn't enough to stop the convoys across the Atlantic.

And still there's no better strategy for the German navy to apply.

 

[marathag]

At the beginning of 1936 Japan has Hosho & Kaga in commission and needed for support operations in China,

1936?
China is near all IJA affair at this point in NE China/ Manchukuo, being before the Marco Polo 'Incident' in July 1937, where the IJA and IJN agreed to operational jurisdictions, where the IJN got a slice of Central and Southern China to operate.

Their big move in 1936 was walking out from 2nd London Treaty and rearming/armoring/repowering Hiei while waiting for Washington and 1st London to expire, after signing onto the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany.

This would be time for Germany to get a ship from the IJN, plus its a time where the Big Gun faction was still above the Carrier gang.

 

[z42]

I think it's clearly better to have maritime patrol subordinated to the navy. It prevents turf wars and reduces the acquisition of inappropriate aircraft, not to mention keeps the chain-of-command simpler and therefore more responsive to exigency.

Well, the navy getting control over their own aviation would mean winning the turf war over who controls naval aviation, not that it would prevent turf wars. Secondly, you seem to underestimate the mind of the determined petty bureaucrat:

• I see here in the naval budget paragraph XYZ that an increase in budget is requested to fund development of aircraft related thingy. This is very much unnecessary, as we (the air force) are already doing it. It would be better for that money to be allocated to us so we can develop a common widget. (Never mind that if we succeed, we don't have any intention of allowing your service to use said widget.)
• I protest vehemently over your plans to strike the harbor on island X! That is clearly a ground target, thus it's our job, not yours! Your mission is strictly limited to MARITIME recon and strike! (Never mind that we don't have the aircraft with sufficient range to strike said harbor from any of our bases.)
• No, we won't take care of basic training for your naval flyboys. Our flight schools are for our pilots only!
• No, we won't let you use our maintenance facilities, even if we both operate variants of the same aircraft.
• Sorry, no, you cannot use our airfield X. X is very busy. Go build your own if you want to operate in this area!
• I'm very sorry to hear you think your aircraft are obsolete. But the importance of our mission means our projects must have priority at aircraft designer and manufacturer X, Y, and Z.
• And so on and on.

 

[GrauGeist]

Could the German aviation industry support both Luftwaffe and Kreigsmarine aircraft production?

The Graf Zeppelin was intended to use modified Luftwaffe ground-based aircraft.
How long would it take to create actual maritime aircraft built to Kreigsmarine specifications and how would that affect the current production of aircraft the Luftwaffe needed?

 

[SaparotRob]

... you seem to underestimate the mind of the determined petty bureaucrat:

 

[EwenS]

1936?
China is near all IJA affair at this point in NE China/ Manchukuo, being before the Marco Polo 'Incident' in July 1937, where the IJA and IJN agreed to operational jurisdictions, where the IJN got a slice of Central and Southern China to operate.

Their big move in 1936 was walking out from 2nd London Treaty and rearming/armoring/repowering Hiei while waiting for Washington and 1st London to expire, after signing onto the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany.

This would be time for Germany to get a ship from the IJN, plus its a time where the Big Gun faction was still above the Carrier gang.

Hosho & Kaga had been involved in the war in China as early as 1932. But yes there was then a gap, during which Kaga was reconstructed, before they again became involved in 1937.

Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in Feb 1933. It had decided to leave the Naval Treaty system in 1934. It formally gave the required 2 years notice of that under the terms of the 1922 Washington Treaty in Dec 1934.

The 1935 London Naval Conference began on 9 Dec that year. Japan withdrew on 15 Jan 1936 when It was clear that, as she already considered the most likely outcome following on from previous negotiations, she was never going to achieve anything like parity with Britain & the USA that she sought.. The 1936 London Naval Treaty was signed on 25 March 1936.

The Anti-Comintern Pact of Nov 1936 was directed against the USSR and communism. The USSR being a threat to Japan and it's conquests in Manchuria, Korea etc.

Hiei was a victim of the 1930 London Treaty, with Japan being allowed to retain her as a training ship provided certain things were done to her, like removal of aĺl but 3 of her 4 turrets, torpedo tubes and conning tower and side armour. Some work on her reconstruction actually took place from Jan 1934-Mar 1935 when she had her shell rooms rebuilt and ballast fitted in place of no.4 turret i.e.work not visible to the naked eye. This was the first step in the complete reconstruction that started on 1 April 1937 and lasted through to Jan 1940 (a timespan very similar to that of the RN large repairs and reconstructions of the 1930s). But that wasn't planned in the 3 months following the expiration of the 1922 Washington Treaty and 1930 London Treaty.

So no, there is no way Japan would give up any part of its navy in the mid-1930s.

 

[EwenS]

Could the German aviation industry support both Luftwaffe and Kreigsmarine aircraft production?

The Graf Zeppelin was intended to use modified Luftwaffe ground-based aircraft.
How long would it take to create actual maritime aircraft built to Kreigsmarine specifications and how would that affect the current production of aircraft the Luftwaffe needed?

Not entirely, as she was originally conceived. You are forgetting the Fiesler Fi167 torpedo bomber / Recce aurcraft designed specifically to operate from her deck. Production died with the suspension of GZ in 1940. These would have operated alongside the Me109T and Ju87C.

Fieseler Fi 167 - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

When plans to complete were resurrected in 1942 the air group was to be built around a new Ju87 version and the Me155 (in its first incarnation)

Blohm & Voss BV 155 - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

 

[z42]

It was too late at this point by June 1943, even if the Walthers HOOH Boats worked (that they wouldn't, given the postwar RN experiments with Peroxide power).

KM has a window of time for Subs to work to knock the UK out of the War, and that ends once the USN shows up in force and the air coverage gap is closed, it's over. KM is just sending crews out to their deaths, with little to show for it.
Marginally better subs just isn't enough to stop the convoys across the Atlantic.

Ah, I had forgotten about the Walther boats (such a thing figured in Neal Stephenson's Cryptonomicon, IIRC). I was thinking more something like the Type XXI, with better hydrodynamics for increased submerged speed, longer endurance to reduce reliance on the 'milch cows'. Add in snorkels, burst radios and doctrine less reliant on constant chatter, maybe homing torpedoes, and they might have a better chance of surviving? OTOH, the requirement to keep your head down much of the time, reduced radio traffic, and allied air cover chasing away the Condors means those subs, even if they survive, will have a much harder time finding targets to sink.

As for peroxide, that's an interesting topic. At high concentrations it's quite spicy stuff, much different from the diluted solutions you might have used to blond your hair in the folly of your youth. It was also studied quite a lot post-war for use as oxidizer in rockets (John Clark's "Ignition!" has a chapter on it. As an aside, it's a very entertaining book, highly recommended! I think it's out of print, but you can find a PDF online.) . That super-toxic fuel/oxidizer combos like hydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide eventually won out is testament to the difficulties encountered with peroxide. The problem is that the decomposition of peroxide into steam and oxygen is exothermic, and even minute amounts of impurities in a storage tank can catalyze this reaction. By the time you hear a sharp PING from you peroxide tank and/or notice a pressure rise on the gauge, it's time to leg it. Oh, I forgot, you're on a submarine, there's nowhere to run. See also the 2000 Kursk submarine disaster, most likely caused by a torpedo using peroxide as the oxidizer.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Ah, I had forgotten about the Walther boats (such a thing figured in Neal Stephenson's Cryptonomicon, IIRC). I was thinking more something like the Type XXI, with better hydrodynamics for increased submerged speed, longer endurance to reduce reliance on the 'milch cows'. Add in snorkels, burst radios and doctrine less reliant on constant chatter, maybe homing torpedoes, and they might have a better chance of surviving? OTOH, the requirement to keep your head down much of the time, reduced radio traffic, and allied air cover chasing away the Condors means those subs, even if they survive, will have a much harder time finding targets to sink.

As for peroxide, that's an interesting topic. At high concentrations it's quite spicy stuff, much different from the diluted solutions you might have used to blond your hair in the folly of your youth. It was also studied quite a lot post-war for use as oxidizer in rockets (John Clark's "Ignition!" has a chapter on it. As an aside, it's a very entertaining book, highly recommended! I think it's out of print, but you can find a PDF online.) . That super-toxic fuel/oxidizer combos like hydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide eventually won out is testament to the difficulties encountered with peroxide. The problem is that the decomposition of peroxide into steam and oxygen is exothermic, and even minute amounts of impurities in a storage tank can catalyze this reaction. By the time you hear a sharp PING from you peroxide tank and/or notice a pressure rise on the gauge, it's time to leg it. Oh, I forgot, you're on a submarine, there's nowhere to run. See also the 2000 Kursk submarine disaster, most likely caused by a torpedo using peroxide as the oxidizer.

View: https://youtu.be/jG2eJdbkehw?si=EZpVn__5VwTAlVOu
Start watching At 2.35

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Well, the navy getting control over their own aviation would mean winning the turf war over who controls naval aviation, not that it would prevent turf wars. Secondly, you seem to underestimate the mind of the determined petty bureaucrat:

• I see here in the naval budget paragraph XYZ that an increase in budget is requested to fund development of aircraft related thingy. This is very much unnecessary, as we (the air force) are already doing it. It would be better for that money to be allocated to us so we can develop a common widget. (Never mind that if we succeed, we don't have any intention of allowing your service to use said widget.)
• I protest vehemently over your plans to strike the harbor on island X! That is clearly a ground target, thus it's our job, not yours! Your mission is strictly limited to MARITIME recon and strike! (Never mind that we don't have the aircraft with sufficient range to strike said harbor from any of our bases.)
• No, we won't take care of basic training for your naval flyboys. Our flight schools are for our pilots only!
• No, we won't let you use our maintenance facilities, even if we both operate variants of the same aircraft.
• Sorry, no, you cannot use our airfield X. X is very busy. Go build your own if you want to operate in this area!
• I'm very sorry to hear you think your aircraft are obsolete. But the importance of our mission means our projects must have priority at aircraft designer and manufacturer X, Y, and Z.
• And so on and on.

None of that is a positive argument for keeping maritime patrol in the hands of the Air Force. It's just a long-winded way of pointing out that the word "prevent" overstates the case, and that I should have written "reduces" instead.

 

[WARSPITER]

The Fleet Air Arm didn't do too well for aircraft or much else when they were under control of the RAF. This
is a good example of the need for a particular service to be in control of what it requires and develops.

 

[SaparotRob]

The Fleet Air Arm didn't do too well for aircraft or much else when they were under control of the RAF. This
is a good example of the need for a particular service to be in control of what it requires and develops.

Are you implying the TFX wasn't spectacularly successful for both the USN and USAF?

 

[Shortround6]

Are you implying the TFX wasn't spectacularly successful for both the USN and USAF?

Sure it was, Just like the WW II Republic naval fighter (hooked P-47) was a huge success for the Navy.
Grumman paid off hundreds of Historians to claim the F6F did the work but the truth is out there (cue manic laughter).

 

[SaparotRob]

...
Grumman paid off hundreds of Historians to claim the F6F did the work but the truth is out there (cue manic laughter).

You been hanging with P pbehn ?

 

[pbehn]

You been hanging with P pbehn ?

The story of the "blue paint mafia" is a long and dark one that needs to be told.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

The Fleet Air Arm didn't do too well for aircraft or much else when they were under control of the RAF. This
is a good example of the need for a particular service to be in control of what it requires and develops.

I'm not so sure about that. The Barracuda was the result of Navy thinking. They are at least partially responsible for their problems .

 

[Zmauky]

As much as I think the projected naval version of the F-111 looks better than the land version...

Walther peroxide boats, Type xxiii, and all secret super weapons are .. pigeon on tree, but .. magnetc mines are used by 1939 ?, snorkel by (Netherlands ) 1940, radar detectors from August 1942, acoustic G7e(TIV) Falke March 1943, zig -zag torpedoes are much simpler (but also to late), not to mention that Italian torpedo/bomb witch run in circles (used in Gibraltar). So why advanced guidance (active or mechanical which was more or less there earlier) was not used for torpedoes? Why did intelligence limp, and submarines sunk because of radio broadcasts?
Why advanced weapons to late ? The Allies adapted, used new weapons (and reachable variants, no wonder weapons - if the sensor only works a few hundred meters from you, not closer - you don't have to sail to the target - drop a depth charge by rocket there) and the most important part applied new tactics.
Kriegsmarine (u-boot command) failed here (fortunately) both technologically and tactically. And somehow it seems to me that the top leaders were a problem.

 

[WARSPITER]

I'm not so sure about that. The Barracuda was the result of Navy thinking. They are at least partially responsible for their problems .

Agree in that sense but the FAA missed out on time available to make mistakes and rectify them.