Better luck for the RN carrier force 1939-1941

[Admiral Beez]

Cram the hangar with stripped down aircraft and spares, now she doesn't have a large air detachment there should be space for workshops and a foundry.

Hermes never had a large air detachment, at best twelve Swordfish. The hangar is very narrow and also short - not a great start for a maintenance ship. Some earlier discussion HMS Hermes (95), reasonable interwar rebuild

 

[Admiral Beez]

For me, good uses for Hermes? Out of CFB Esquimalt for the June 1942 Aleutian Campaign, countering the two Japanese CVLs. With her small size Hermes will need a forward Alaskan base and a tender for avgas, bunker oil and munitions.

At Esquimalt the British have their largest drydock in the Pacific and a yard that could get Hermes ready. With outriggers, crash barrier and a flattened aft deck, along with a supply tender Hermes can operate at least thirty folding Martlets and Albacores. With the loss of Malaya, Singapore and Rangoon (and the loss of the Burma road to China), and with the US fighting over Britain's Solomon and PNG territories at Coral Sea, Hermes lead in defending Alaska will go a long way to redeeming King's opinion of the RN and British abilities.

Ideally I'd want Britain to field a second carrier alongside Hermes. If HMS Courageous and Glorious are still operational this may free up HMS Argus to head to Esquimalt to have outriggers and barrier installed, first stopping in Puget Sound, WA to load up with a dozen folding Martlets to serve alongside her half dozen Swordfish or Albacores. Now we're talking something exciting. Here's my imagined HMS Hermes and Argus arriving at Esquimalt. How will they do at the Battle of Dutch Harbour?

 

[Admiral Beez]

Putting unarmored carriers into close waters within range of large land-based air forces doesn't seem prudent to me. But keeping them in the Med is just asking for sailors to swim. Those were hotly-contested waters with the Axis controlling plenty of the shoreline and airbases lining it.

Fair points, but we should note that much of the RN's carrier ops In the Mediterranean was undertaken by unarmoured carriers. Little HMS Argus was very active in the Med, including supporting Operation Torch and surviving Italian bomber attacks and her Fulmars claiming a few kills. In addition to Hermes, HMS Ark Royal, Eagle and Furious were all active supporting Malta and Ops against North Africa.

With HMS Illustrious and Formidable wrecked, HMS Victorious serving the USN in the PTO, there's only HMS Indomitable for the MTO, so the unarmoured carriers had to carry the load. I have no doubt HMS Courageous and Glorious would have served alongside them in the MTO. If any of these unarmoured carriers are hit like HMS Illustrious they will likely be destroyed, but that's why you have more than one CV, so that you can lose some and fight on.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Fair points, but we should note that much of the RN's carrier ops In the Mediterranean was undertaken by unarmoured carriers. Little HMS Argus was very active in the Med, including supporting Operation Torch and surviving Italian bomber attacks and her Fulmars claiming a few kills. In addition to Hermes, HMS Ark Royal, Eagle and Furious were all active supporting Malta and Ops against North Africa.

With HMS Illustrious and Formidable wrecked, HMS Victorious serving the USN in the PTO, there's only HMS Indomitable for the MTO, so the unarmoured carriers had to carry the load. I have no doubt HMS Courageous and Glorious would have served alongside them in the MTO. If any of these unarmoured carriers are hit like HMS Illustrious they will likely be destroyed, but that's why you have more than one CV, so that you can lose some and fight on.

Thy kept the Ark at Gibraltar so that it could sail east or west as needs arose.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Thy kept the Ark at Gibraltar so that it could sail east or west as needs arose.

Yes, but Gibraltar is in the Med. But not just Ark, HMS Furious, Argus and Eagle were all active in the MTO. It's the RN tradition of damn the torpedoes, and sally forth. And it paid off, with no RN carrier being sunk by bombers in the MTO, though, as you rightfully wrote earlier, none of the unarmoured ships would have survived the dozen or so hits HMS Illustrious took. But that the fortune of war, and two or three more RN fleet carriers into 1942 might have put more fighters into the air and may have stopped (or distracted/diluted) the strikes that so badly damaged Illustrious and Formidable.

Adding HMS Ark Royal, Courageous and Glorious to the MTO and/or North Atlantic campaigns changes so many factors.

 

[fastmongrel]

Gibraltar is in the Mediterranean ? When did it get moved.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Gibraltar is in the Mediterranean ? When did it get moved.

Where do you think it is? Gibraltar is on Spain's southern Mediterranean coast, just east of the Strait of Gibraltar. That puts Gib in the Med.

Per Encyclopedia Britannica, "its (the Mediterranean Sea's) west-east extent—from the Strait of Gibraltar between Spain and Morocco to the shores of the Gulf of Iskenderun on the southwestern coast of Turkey"

Mediterranean Sea | Facts, History, Islands, & Countries

But why don't we ask the Gibraltar government itself? Gibraltar Fact Sheets "Gibraltar is a British Overseas Territory situated at the southern tip of the Iberian Peninsula, strategically positioned at the western end of the Mediterranean."

 

[fastmongrel]

Clues in the name. Straits of Gibraltar you aren't in the Med until you pass Europa Point.

 

[Admiral Beez]

All things considered, the Skua is probably a better aircraft as it can actually divebomb. The Chesapeakes had their dive brakes wired shut and were incapable of true divebombing. They also had a rather poor power to weight ratio and it's unlikely that they could actually carry more than a 500lb bomb.

I like the Skua. It's the very first folding wing, retractable undercarriage, all metal naval dive bomber, and the only one with four forward machine guns (though the SBD's two .50 cal will do just fine). Given its pioneering origins, the lads at Blackburn got a lot more right than they got wrong. When it first flew in 1937 the IJN's dive bomber was the Aichi D1A, the USN's was the SBC. Not to knock the SBC though, faster and twice the bomb load of the Skua.

Had more carriers been available as I suggest the Skua might have carried on for a little longer. If they need to be taken off ship, send them all to HMS Simbang (RNAS Sembawang). As it was the total FAA aircraft present was, IIRC a single Swordfish and couple of Walruses.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Yes, but Gibraltar is in the Med. But not just Ark, HMS Furious, Argus and Eagle were all active in the MTO.

I like the idea of stationing the carriers at the Rock precisely because of the operational flexibility it provides. So long as you're in and out, and not running any gauntlets with 'em, sure. Once Fliegerkorps X is in theater, you're damning bombs as well as torps with any extended Med cruise.

Risking a major asset must be accompanied by a major potential reward. I could see them playing a role at Crete, where they could have killed Operation Marita if handled properly -- namely, stationing them at Alexandria, and keeping them between there and Crete to provide air cover for the evac fleet.

Aiding Malta, though, was so damned risky that I really wouldn't want the carriers within a couple hundred miles of Sicily.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I like the idea of stationing the carriers at the Rock precisely because of the operational flexibility it provides. So long as you're in and out, and not running any gauntlets with 'em, sure. Once Fliegerkorps X is in theater, you're damning bombs as well as torps with any extended Med cruise.

Risking a major asset must be accompanied by a major potential reward. I could see them playing a role at Crete, where they could have killed Operation Marita if handled properly -- namely, stationing them at Alexandria, and keeping them between there and Crete to provide air cover for the evac fleet.

Aiding Malta, though, was so damned risky that I really wouldn't want the carriers within a couple hundred miles of Sicily.

Gibraltar is ideally placed for what you propose. I'm surprised the Germans or Italians didn't try to invade or disable Gib on day one. While the Rock is said to have so many tunnels that the defenders could hold out for months, indeed Sir Ian Fleming was involved, but the Axis don't need to capture Gibraltar, only disable its use as a naval and air base. Here's the German's plan Operation Felix - Wikipedia, which needed Spain's support or at least compliance.

 

[southjn1982]

For me, I think the best place for the older courageous class carriers is with the home fleet. This has several main advantages one it minimizes exposure to enemy air attacks and their short range is less of an issue. This also frees up more modern carriers for use in other theatres i.e HMS Victorious is replaced for the raids on Tirpitz etc. While one of the other big advantages is with the two extra carriers in 1941 both the Battleship groups sent to cover the main routes of entry into the Atlantic in the Bismarck operation have carriers support thus on the eve of Denmark Straight Holland doesn't lose contact with Bismarck doesn't need to send his destroyers away to search for her and can harras her with aircraft all-night so even if no damage is done the Bismarcks crew are tired and on edge making the next days battle a guaranteed British victory and saving Hood at the same time.

 

[EwenS]

I think the answer is "Yes."

The HMS Glorious was lost due to operational errors; the RN would make similar changes to its operational procedures whether the ship was lost or was towed into port, listing, flooded, and smoldering. The Ark Royal was lost due to problems with damage tolerance and damage control; a severely damaged Ark Royal that's towed into harbor would provide more information about the nature of the damage than would one that's under a few scores of meters of disputed sea. I think an Ark Royal that's a constructive total loss would actually provide better information about how to design ships and damage control procedures than what actually occurred.

Given that this thread has been resurrected, a few comments about some of the posts.

A lot was learned from the Ark Royal sinking because most of her crew survived. And some of it was implemented very quickly.

One major fault with Ark Royal's design was that having been torpedoed on the starboard side and having her starboard boiler room flood, that flooding was able to spread to the centre and then port boiler rooms via the compartment above the boiler rooms that contained the cross ship ducting to the funnel. Arrrangements were made for the Illustrious class , which also had this feature, to be refitted with half height bulkheads to at least slow this happening. Probably first fitted to Indomitable after her Op Pedestal damage. This was also done in the Implacables. It also caused a redesign of the Audacious class to carry the boiler uptakes higher in the ship before being taken across to the funnel. That design was finalised in mid/late 1942. When Indomitable was torpedoed in a boiler room in July 1943 another lesson from Ark Royal was that quick counterflooding was carried out in order to stabilise her.

There's nothing wrong with using carriers to attack subs, and with more than two dozen depth charge armed Swordfish four destroyers is probably sufficient. So the tools and the mission are not to blame. But the carrier should have been running at 30 knots in erratic manoeuvres and operating at least fifty miles away from wherever u-boats were predicted to be.

Without wishing to become involved in whether or not Courageous should or should not have been used, a number of points come out of the above.

Firstly, ASDIC could not be used over 18-20 knots. So her escorts would have been blind travelling above that speed. Only late in the war did sets appear in the US Allen M Sumner and Gearing class destroyers that were capable of being used at higher speeds.

Secondly, speed is not of itself a defence against a submarine lying in wait. Ask the Japanese. Taiho was torpedoed while travelling at 26 knots and Shokaku at 25 knots in June 1944. Speed also substantially increases the fuel burn so reducing range.

AIUI Courageous had stopped zig zagging in order to be able to launch and recover aircraft. Unfortunately her aicraft couldn't stay airborne forever!

In terms of escort numbers, and the criticism that 2 were not enough, with the other 2 having been sent off to assist a merchantman, I would draw attention to the hunter killer tactics employed later in the war. From 1944 both the RN and the USN were sending out an escort group, usually of 6 vessels, with an escort carrier specifically to hunt down subs known to be in an area, usually through signals intelligence. In the RN the procedure was for the escort group commander to take 4 of the escorts off to form a line of search to run down a bearing. The remaining two escorts would be left to provide escort to the carrier following some distance behind. It was while being engaged on such a mission that the US escort carrier Block Island CVE-21 was sunk.

Somewhere in a post someone commented that the CVEs were expendable. Not to the RN. That is why, after the loss of the Dasher and then the Avenger that they insisted on modifications to make them more survivable. The proof was in the survival of Nabob & Thane in 1944/45 after they both suffered torpedo hits. Compare that with the torpedoing of USS Liscombe Bay in Nov 1943. Hit by a single torpedo she exploded and sank within 30 mins.

Hi

Rather limited air power, two Walrus or two Seafox, plus the cruiser has to 'stop' to pick them up in an area they are searching for submarines! Maybe lessons of Cressy, Aboukir and Hogue are relevant here?

Mike

The RN ships were able to recover aircraft without stopping. The recovering ship would sail in an arc to provide an area of calm(er) sea on which the aircraft would land and taxi alongside the ship to be hooked on a cable hung over the side. You can see the methods of launch and recovery in this RN instructional video.

They were canceled due to the Washington Treaty. None of the other signatories would have acceded to the qualitative limits had the RN been able to build these ships without comparable concessions. Also, Britain's economy was a wreck due to extensive debt (private and governmental) and and the demographic damage from the casualties of the Great War (losing some 700,000 men, predominantly between 18 and 40 [Records for the War Dead of WW1] on a population of 43 million is significant. See also Four charts that show the impact the First and Second World Wars had on the UK's population - CityAM).

The largest failure of Britain's inter-war diplomacy wasn't the disarmament treaties; it was not backing up France with regard to German post-war violations of the Versailles Treaty.

The 4 Admiral class were laid down between Sept and Nov 1916 but the design was immediately subject to change to incorporate the lessons of Jutland. By the spring of 1917 only the construction of Hood was allowed to proceed. The remaining 3 were finally cancelled in Feb 1919, long before the Washington Conference. The ships cancelled as a result of the Washington Treaty were their successors, the G3 battlecruisers.

The bomb was carried using the same lugs as the slipper DT.

???

Ah, as shown below.

View attachment 578461

I'm pretty sure that the downward projections are not bomb racks. They are the forward set of catapult spools. RN catapults of the period used a trolley on which the aircraft sat with its tail up. See below a Fulmar being loaded on the trolley.

I have one photo of a Fulmar with the drop tank and it sat in that position so they may have been repurposed to carry that. While it was capable of carrying 2x250lb SAP or GP bombs or 2x100lb or 2x250lb AS bombs I've never seen a photo of them being carried.

I was thinking back to this thread. Given the need for the armoured carriers in home waters, were Glorious, Courageous Furious able to operate in the Indian and Pacific waters? I ask, as at Ceylon in 1942 the Revenge class with their original machinery were unable to condense sufficient water to keep their crews alive. And of course there's no air conditioning, but on that score you've got big hangar doors both fore and aft for ventilation. IIRC, these three carriers are rather short ranged.

There are clues as to howw the Admiralty would have allocated its carriers in a 1939 planning document that looked forward to 1942 under 3 situations - peace, war with Axis (Germany & Italy) and war with Japan. Note one or other not both together. For Axis war

Home - Formidable, Illustrious, Indomitable and Furious (as a training carrier)
Gibraltar - Victorious
Alexandria - Implacable & Indefatigable
Singapore - Ark Royal
Halifax - Hermes
Jamaica - Courageous
Freetown - Glorious

War against Japan
Home - Formidable, Illustrious, Victorious and Furious (as a training carrier)
Gibraltar -
Alexandria -
Trincomalee - Courageous
Singapore - Ark Royal, Indomitable, Implacable, Indefatigable and Glorious
Halifax -
Jamaica - Hermes
Freetown -

Note there is no mention of Argus or Eagle in either of these scenarios so presumably they are no longer in front line service as the Illustrious class complete.

Of course the plan goes to pot on the outbreak of war when delays to completion start and priorities need to change.

The big hangar doors at the forward end in F, C & G were sealed up when the forward flying off deck ceased to be used in the 1930s.

IIRC, they all served in the Pacific pre-war, and Glorious was serving in the IO when war started. IMHO, they would have been invaluable as aircraft ferries, if nothing else. In an single sortie Glorious could have doubled the number of Hurricanes on Ceylon, for example.

Between the wars the only carriers serving East of Suez were the Hermes and Eagle.

Glorious began her war in the Med. She was only in the Indian Ocean between 9 Oct 1939 and Dec 1939 hunting raiders when she returned to the Med to refit at Malta and then in April was ordered home due to the German invasion of Norway.

The Skua going by my 1/72 scale model folded to 10 ft (3m) x 36 ft (11m) so roughly 2 Skuas per Val in the hangar.

The folded width of a Skua was 16ft 2in and its length 35ft 7in.

They are lightly built for certain. Check out the collision damage to HMS Glorious below. The merchant ship she hit looks like it was made of stronger stuff. HMS Glorious Collision, SS Florida 1938.

But HMS Furious soldiered on into 1944 before being withdrawn as being totally clapped out, granted she was mostly used as an aircraft ferry after taking a machinery-wrecking near miss off Malta during the same op where HMS Eagle was sunk.

AFAIK Furious was not damaged during Operation Bellows, her first Spitfire delivery mission that accompanied Op Pedestal to Malta. After flying them off she retured to Gibraltar with an escort of a few destroyers (one of which, Wolverine, rammed a U-boat en route), immediately picked up another load of Spitfires and made a second delivery run (Op Baritone) before the end of Aug 1942. Then it was back to the Home Fleet for 6 weeks before another Malta run (Op Train) and participation in Op Torch, the landings in Algeria. Then back to the Home Fleet. Her next refit was in Aug-Dec 1943 before another 9 months service with the Home Fleet before being pensioned off in Sept 1944. So she was an operational carrier, not a ferry throughout 1943/44.

So, it's autumn 1941 and we have HMS Glorious and Courageous at Puget Sound, WA loading up with non-folding Martlet and Dauntless, plus the folding wing Chesapeake. The plan is to use US-compatible aircraft in the Pacific as part of Force Z. On the morning of Dec 7th both carriers having left Puget Sound with their American aircraft, are now found at CFB Esquimalt making a courtesy call to BC's capital Victoria. Commanding Officer Pacific Coast, Commodore William Beech interrupts a meeting of the RN senior officers to announce the Pearl Harbour attack. Now what?

BTW, anyone interested in the RCN naval list would find this informative The Navy List - CFB Esquimalt Naval and Military Museum

Britain only got 111 fixed wing Marlet I/III between Aug 1940 and March 1941, all but 10 coming from French and Greek orders. It deliberately delayed the rest of its own initial order for 100 by some 6 months in order to get the folding wing version to maximise the number of fighters able to be carried on its carriers. No more would be forthcoming from US orders as the USN badly needed modern fighters for its own squadrons. So there is a difficult choice for you. Do you want 90 more (because that was all that was on order) fixed wing Martlets from April 1941 or the historical position?

Historically, Britain's first folding wing Martlet II came off the production line on Long Island on 4 Oct 1941 (the prototype only flew in June). The first 36 were delivered by 12 Dec 1941 and were shipped to the UK in Illustrious and used to equip 3 of the fighter squadrons that went to the Indian Ocean on Illustrious and Formidable in Feb/Mar 1942. The remaining 54 aircraft of the batch (only 7 delivered before the end of 1941 with the rest in Mar/Apr 1942) were shipped direct from New York to India/Ceylon in Mar/Apr 1942, effectively as attrition replacements. The next batch, from Lend Lease orders, took place between June and Nov 1942 and totalled 220 aircraft.

Folding wing F4F-4 for the USN began to come off the production line in Nov 1941, but the last front line squadron didn't re-equip until just before Midway.

As for the 50 Vought Chesapeakes, they were all delivered to Britain in early 1941, and production for the USN had by then ceased. For the Dauntless, the USN/USMC had only taken delivery of 144 SBD-1/2 by March 1941 when production of the SBD-3 began (584 by the end of 1941). Good luck with persuading the USN to give up production capacity to Britain when it still had some of its new divebomber squadrons flying biplane Curtiss SBC Helldivers in Spring 1942.

The companies producing naval aircraft in the US are simply not geared up in 1941 to produce large numbers of aircraft for the USN plus allow the US to give more aircraft to Britain. Procurement decisions would have to have been taken much much earlier than historical for the RN to achieve what you want.

Aden
This port had been a coaling station for the RN since the late 1830s. By 1939 it held substantial oil stocks and was a major stopping off point for shipping using the Suez Canal as many ships had to limit their fuel loads to minimise their draughts. I don't think there was much in the way of facilities there other than for fuelling.

RN and the Pacific
The criticism is often levelled that RN ships compare badly with those of the USN in terms of range. But each navy, particularly in Treaty tonnage limited times inter war, built the ships that suited it for the wars it intended to fight. So the USN knew that if it went to war with Japan it would have to travel from the US West Coast with the next stop Hawaii and after that, hopefully the Philippines or maybe an intermediate base. Despite knowing that its replenishment oiler fleet was wholly inadequate in 1941.

The RN never intended to fight in the Pacific at all. Its war with Japan was planned to take place in the South or East China Seas. To get there it would use its network of bases worldwide. A fleet would leave Britain to reinforce that Eastern Fleet and call at Gibraltar, Malta, Alexandria, Aden, Trincomalee to arrive at the new naval base at Singapore. From there it would sortie towards Hong Kong and Japan after securing use of a forward base, perhaps at Cam Rahn Bay or in the Philippines depending on the political situation. Each of these ports held substantial stocks of fuel and could be topped up from oil from the Persian Gulf, Burma and the DEI. The quantiries of oil storage at these bases is quite staggering. So range is nowhere near so important to the RN when comapred to the USN.

 

[EwenS]

Thumpalumpacus no worries

What I'd like to see is someone in the RN perceive the opportunity to operate the greater number of RN carriers in groups of two or more ships. The devastation of Taranto is likely good evidence of the theory in practice. And Bismarck with Prinz Eugen will be in a heap of trouble if Ark Royal and Victorious are joined by two Courageous class.

I missed this point last night. The RN did perceive the opportunity to operate multi carrier task groups long before anyone else. In fact from the early 1930s.

In 1931 the RN created the post of Rear Admiral Aircraft Carriers and the first appointee in June that year was Rear Admiral Reginald Henderson who had been the Captain of HMS Furious earlier in his career. He played a major role in the development of the FAA and RN carriers through the 1930s until his untimely death in May 1939.

Reginald Henderson - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

His role was defined as being responsible "for the tactical operations of the carriers and of the carrier borne aircraft in that [Atlantic] Fleet" and " the recognised Naval Adviser to other Fleets on all matters connected with the Fleet Air Arm".

Between the wars the Home Fleet would deploy to the Med to join the Mediterranean Fleet on exercise. Under Henderson's leadership the RN was able to draw multiple carriers together in one group for these exercises. Photo of F,C&G together at Malta for one of these is below. On another occasion, Eagle, Furious and Courageous worked together as a single group.

He and his successors worked out how to form up aircraft from multiple carriers, night torpedo strikes and the possibility of Taranto style attacks on an enemy fleet.

Problem was that in the early days of WW2 (1939/40), before Italy's entry into the war, the opportunities to use those tactics didn't exist. The German Fleet was bottled up in various harbours with extensive fighter and AA cover. When they came out it was all about hunting down raiders in the far oceans. Better then to use carrier's search power on an individual basis. By the time opportunities for multiple carrier operations began to arise in the Med in late 1940, C&G, which had the largest aircraft capacity after Ark Royal, had been lost. It was then 1942 in the IO and then during Op Pedestal in the Med before such multiple carrier power could really be wielded.

By way of comparison, the IJN didn't form their infamous Kido Butai until 10 April 1941 initially with 4 ships (Akagi, Kaga, Soryu & Hiryu) later expanded to 6 (Zuikaku & Shokaku joined in Sept 1941) in time for Pearl Harbor.

Throughout the inter war period the US operated its carriers in single carrier task forces and continued to do so throughout the early war period. It wasn't until the strike on Rabaul in March 1942 that 2 US carriers linked up as part of single task group (Yorktown & Lexington). Then they went their separate ways again. It was mid 1943 before increasing carrier numbers allowed this to happen on a regular basis.

 

[EwenS]

Fulmar bomb racks
Finally tracked it down. There was a single bomb rack under each wing outboard of the wing fold joint and inboard of the gun bay, and in line with the landing light on the port wing.

The 60 Imp Gal overload fuel tank was mounted on the fuselage centre line with its trailing edge six inches ahead of the wing trailing edge position. Its forward end would have sat between the two forward catapult spools. The mounting for that would then have been strong enough to carry a 500lb bomb (1 Imp Gal of fuel = 7.3lbs so 60 gal = 438lbs plus weight of the tank). While this capability was tested on the Mk.II it was not used operationally.

 

[Admiral Beez]

By way of comparison, the IJN didn't form their infamous Kido Butai until 10 April 1941 initially with 4 ships (Akagi, Kaga, Soryu & Hiryu) later expanded to 6 (Zuikaku & Shokaku joined in Sept 1941) in time for Pearl Harbor.

Throughout the inter war period the US operated its carriers in single carrier task forces and continued to do so throughout the early war period. It wasn't until the strike on Rabaul in March 1942 that 2 US carriers linked up as part of single task group (Yorktown & Lexington). Then they went their separate ways again. It was mid 1943 before increasing carrier numbers allowed this to happen on a regular basis.

Thanks for this very informative post. One thing I've often thought about the Kido Butai is how it still operated each carrier individually rather than as a single combined airbase with four or six runways. For example, imagine at Midway if the KB had two carriers assigned for fighter rotation and the other two assigned for strike preparation. This would enable the KB to simultaneously launch, land, refuel, rearm and re-launch Zeros in quick succession while the KB can continue to arm, fuel and launch its strike aircraft. If one of the carriers assigned to fighter support is hit and crippled the roles for the other carriers can be adjusted. By keeping a solid CAP aloft for longer there's a better chance that the KB carriers do not get kit, and as soon as the USN fighters have left (or if a large threat is detected) the KB can immediately launch its strike aircraft - reducing thr odds of the SBDs hitting hangars and decks filled with transitioning aircraft.

 

[EwenS]

Thanks for this very informative post. One thing I've often thought about the Kido Butai is how it still operated each carrier individually rather than as a single combined airbase with four or six runways. For example, imagine at Midway if the KB had two carriers assigned for fighter rotation and the other two assigned for strike preparation. This would enable the KB to simultaneously launch, land, refuel, rearm and re-launch Zeros in quick succession while the KB can continue to arm, fuel and launch its strike aircraft. If one of the carriers assigned to fighter support is hit and crippled the roles for the other carriers can be adjusted. By keeping a solid CAP aloft for longer there's a better chance that the KB carriers do not get kit, and as soon as the USN fighters have left (or if a large threat is detected) the KB can immediately launch its strike aircraft - reducing thr odds of the SBDs hitting hangars and decks filled with transitioning aircraft.

Why does everyone today think that there is a better way of doing something than the guys on the spot some 80 years ago? I don't think any carrier group has operated in the way you suggest. The nearest might be the decision by the USN in Aug 1945 to strip the torpedo bombers from the CVL but that was part of a greater reorganisation of the air groups.

The KB was not a single entity of 4/6 carriers. It was made up of 3 carrier divisions each of two similar ships (Cardiv 1 Akagi & Kaga; Cardiv 2 Soryu & Hiryu; Cardiv 5 Shokaku & Zuikaku). This gave them great flexibility. So Cardivs 1,2&5 were together for PH. Then they separated. Cardivs 1&5 struck Rabaul on 20 Jan 1942 and then split again with Cardiv 1 repeating the attack on Rabaul while Cardiv 5 hit targets in New Guinea. Cardiv 2 meanwhile supported landings in the Ambon/Celebes area. And so on. The next time they all came together was in March before Operation C in the Indian Ocean. That operation is the odd man out as Kaga went back to Japan to repair grounding damage leaving only Akagi in Cardiv 1. Normally the IJN would have withdrawn both ships as happened at Midway with Cardiv 5.

By 1944, in time for the Marianas the IJN had reorganised their carriers into Divisions of 3 (Cardiv 1 Shokaku, Taiho, Zuikaku; Cardiv 2 Hiyo, Junyo, Ryuho; Cardiv 3 Chitose, Chiyoda and Zuiho), but with different reasoning by then.

So there is no time for them to co-ordinate all the changes you propose which would then have to vary from operation to operation and may not even be viable in a one Division operation.

Carrier groups also worked up by themselves before coming together in groups/divisions. So the fighter pilots in a group got used to working with their shipmates. It also allows flexibility in that different carriers can be allocated different targets if deemed necessary and a complete strike package, as it would be called today, dispatched. One set of briefings per ship eases the strain on the shipboard organisation. This was certainly happening with the US Task Groups come 1944 in the Philippines and later in July/Aug 1945 on the strikes againast the Japanese homeland.

Adopting your plan means that each strike carrier must launch more aircraft to make up a strike of given size. As there are no catapults this will inevitably take longer. So some of the early aircraft will be burning more fuel in the form up phase so reducing the group's range. It may also limit the weight of bombs that early aircraft might carry depending on the take off distance required. This was a problem for the USN with the SBD Dauntless at some points.

Each carrier was splitting its fighters between CAP and escort. Where are the latter coming from? Does it leave enough escort fighetrs on the designated strike ships.

Each strike carrier then has more aircraft to recover after the strike which takes longer and perhaps, depending on wind direction, may take the ships further in the wrong direction or expose them to submarine attack for longer.

The whole object with carrier ops is to keep the launch and recovery phases of the cycle to a minimum, so minimising the risk to the carriers from being on a fixed course from submarines. This became a real issue for example when the Midway class carriers were being designed with their air groups of 130.

The real problems for the IJN at Midway was the lack of radar and radio communication with the CAP as most IJN fighters did not carry radio in the early days of the war. As there was little or no direction (been a while since I read Shattered Sword) the whole CAP allowed itself to be drawn down to tackle the torpedo bombers so meaning it had to land having exhausted its fuel.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Why does everyone today think that there is a better way of doing something than the guys on the spot some 80 years ago? I don't think any carrier group has operated in the way you suggest.

The use of Enterprise and Saratoga as fleet night-fighter carriers is very similar in concept.

As for why people think there's better ways to handle KdB, that could be because it's very hard to imagine that Nagumo's decisionin' was the best possible.

Now, setting aside two carriers for fighter coverage would definitely require major doctrinal changes for the IJN, which I don't think will happen.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Why does everyone today think that there is a better way of doing something than the guys on the spot some 80 years ago?

Because they lost all their deployed fleet carriers in a single day. Are we really accepting that historical military fails like those led by Nagumo, Percival, Phillips, MacArthur, or going back further Chelmsford or Quintilius Varus, shouldn't be analyzed for unseized opportunities to deploy or use their available forces more effectively?

You make a good case that my proposal wouldn't work, but I can't accept that "the guys on the spot" always did things the better way, as you suggest. Admiral Phillips sailed Force Z within range of land based torpedo bombers without telling the RAF where he was going. After successfully evading the Royal Navy and RAF, Lütjens broke radio silence, broadcasting his location to all. But they were "the man on the spot", so who are we to judge?

 

[EwenS]

The use of Enterprise and Saratoga as fleet night-fighter carriers is very similar in concept.

Not sure it is.

The night CAGs had two roles. Firstly CAP for the Task Force at night and in bad weather when day fighters couldn't fly. And in that Saratoga's CVG(N)-53 was unusual in that it contained both a day fighter, VF-53, and a night fighter, VF(N)-53, squadron. And secondly a nighttime offensive role which used the night fighters in the intruder role along with a torpedo bomber squadron with radar equipped TBF/TBM Avengers for a heavier nighttime punch. Sometimes these squadrons teamed up for joint attacks.

You will find details here about the operations of CVG(N)-90 aboard Enterprise here.

VF(N)-90 Squadron History

The history of Night Fighting Squadron 90: a pioneering US Navy night and all-weather squadron, 1944-1945.

www.cv6.org

VT(N)-90 Squadron History

The history of Night Torpedo Squadron 90: one the first US Navy squadrons engaged in night and all-weather carrier operations, 1944-1945.

www.cv6.org

These night groups are in addition to the small numbers, usually 4-6, of night fighters that would be added to each CV fighter squadron before deployment to the combat zone from 1944 through to the end of the war even when there was a night carrier available.