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Hermes never had a large air detachment, at best twelve Swordfish. The hangar is very narrow and also short - not a great start for a maintenance ship. Some earlier discussion HMS Hermes (95), reasonable interwar rebuildCram the hangar with stripped down aircraft and spares, now she doesn't have a large air detachment there should be space for workshops and a foundry.
Fair points, but we should note that much of the RN's carrier ops In the Mediterranean was undertaken by unarmoured carriers. Little HMS Argus was very active in the Med, including supporting Operation Torch and surviving Italian bomber attacks and her Fulmars claiming a few kills. In addition to Hermes, HMS Ark Royal, Eagle and Furious were all active supporting Malta and Ops against North Africa.Putting unarmored carriers into close waters within range of large land-based air forces doesn't seem prudent to me. But keeping them in the Med is just asking for sailors to swim. Those were hotly-contested waters with the Axis controlling plenty of the shoreline and airbases lining it.
Fair points, but we should note that much of the RN's carrier ops In the Mediterranean was undertaken by unarmoured carriers. Little HMS Argus was very active in the Med, including supporting Operation Torch and surviving Italian bomber attacks and her Fulmars claiming a few kills. In addition to Hermes, HMS Ark Royal, Eagle and Furious were all active supporting Malta and Ops against North Africa.
With HMS Illustrious and Formidable wrecked, HMS Victorious serving the USN in the PTO, there's only HMS Indomitable for the MTO, so the unarmoured carriers had to carry the load. I have no doubt HMS Courageous and Glorious would have served alongside them in the MTO. If any of these unarmoured carriers are hit like HMS Illustrious they will likely be destroyed, but that's why you have more than one CV, so that you can lose some and fight on.
Yes, but Gibraltar is in the Med. But not just Ark, HMS Furious, Argus and Eagle were all active in the MTO. It's the RN tradition of damn the torpedoes, and sally forth. And it paid off, with no RN carrier being sunk by bombers in the MTO, though, as you rightfully wrote earlier, none of the unarmoured ships would have survived the dozen or so hits HMS Illustrious took. But that the fortune of war, and two or three more RN fleet carriers into 1942 might have put more fighters into the air and may have stopped (or distracted/diluted) the strikes that so badly damaged Illustrious and Formidable.Thy kept the Ark at Gibraltar so that it could sail east or west as needs arose.
Where do you think it is? Gibraltar is on Spain's southern Mediterranean coast, just east of the Strait of Gibraltar. That puts Gib in the Med.Gibraltar is in the Mediterranean ? When did it get moved.
I like the Skua. It's the very first folding wing, retractable undercarriage, all metal naval dive bomber, and the only one with four forward machine guns (though the SBD's two .50 cal will do just fine). Given its pioneering origins, the lads at Blackburn got a lot more right than they got wrong. When it first flew in 1937 the IJN's dive bomber was the Aichi D1A, the USN's was the SBC. Not to knock the SBC though, faster and twice the bomb load of the Skua.All things considered, the Skua is probably a better aircraft as it can actually divebomb. The Chesapeakes had their dive brakes wired shut and were incapable of true divebombing. They also had a rather poor power to weight ratio and it's unlikely that they could actually carry more than a 500lb bomb.
Yes, but Gibraltar is in the Med. But not just Ark, HMS Furious, Argus and Eagle were all active in the MTO.
Gibraltar is ideally placed for what you propose. I'm surprised the Germans or Italians didn't try to invade or disable Gib on day one. While the Rock is said to have so many tunnels that the defenders could hold out for months, indeed Sir Ian Fleming was involved, but the Axis don't need to capture Gibraltar, only disable its use as a naval and air base. Here's the German's plan Operation Felix - Wikipedia, which needed Spain's support or at least compliance.I like the idea of stationing the carriers at the Rock precisely because of the operational flexibility it provides. So long as you're in and out, and not running any gauntlets with 'em, sure. Once Fliegerkorps X is in theater, you're damning bombs as well as torps with any extended Med cruise.
Risking a major asset must be accompanied by a major potential reward. I could see them playing a role at Crete, where they could have killed Operation Marita if handled properly -- namely, stationing them at Alexandria, and keeping them between there and Crete to provide air cover for the evac fleet.
Aiding Malta, though, was so damned risky that I really wouldn't want the carriers within a couple hundred miles of Sicily.
I think the answer is "Yes."
The HMS Glorious was lost due to operational errors; the RN would make similar changes to its operational procedures whether the ship was lost or was towed into port, listing, flooded, and smoldering. The Ark Royal was lost due to problems with damage tolerance and damage control; a severely damaged Ark Royal that's towed into harbor would provide more information about the nature of the damage than would one that's under a few scores of meters of disputed sea. I think an Ark Royal that's a constructive total loss would actually provide better information about how to design ships and damage control procedures than what actually occurred.
Without wishing to become involved in whether or not Courageous should or should not have been used, a number of points come out of the above.There's nothing wrong with using carriers to attack subs, and with more than two dozen depth charge armed Swordfish four destroyers is probably sufficient. So the tools and the mission are not to blame. But the carrier should have been running at 30 knots in erratic manoeuvres and operating at least fifty miles away from wherever u-boats were predicted to be.
The RN ships were able to recover aircraft without stopping. The recovering ship would sail in an arc to provide an area of calm(er) sea on which the aircraft would land and taxi alongside the ship to be hooked on a cable hung over the side. You can see the methods of launch and recovery in this RN instructional video.Hi
Rather limited air power, two Walrus or two Seafox, plus the cruiser has to 'stop' to pick them up in an area they are searching for submarines! Maybe lessons of Cressy, Aboukir and Hogue are relevant here?
Mike
The 4 Admiral class were laid down between Sept and Nov 1916 but the design was immediately subject to change to incorporate the lessons of Jutland. By the spring of 1917 only the construction of Hood was allowed to proceed. The remaining 3 were finally cancelled in Feb 1919, long before the Washington Conference. The ships cancelled as a result of the Washington Treaty were their successors, the G3 battlecruisers.They were canceled due to the Washington Treaty. None of the other signatories would have acceded to the qualitative limits had the RN been able to build these ships without comparable concessions. Also, Britain's economy was a wreck due to extensive debt (private and governmental) and and the demographic damage from the casualties of the Great War (losing some 700,000 men, predominantly between 18 and 40 [Records for the War Dead of WW1] on a population of 43 million is significant. See also Four charts that show the impact the First and Second World Wars had on the UK's population - CityAM).
The largest failure of Britain's inter-war diplomacy wasn't the disarmament treaties; it was not backing up France with regard to German post-war violations of the Versailles Treaty.
???The bomb was carried using the same lugs as the slipper DT.
There are clues as to howw the Admiralty would have allocated its carriers in a 1939 planning document that looked forward to 1942 under 3 situations - peace, war with Axis (Germany & Italy) and war with Japan. Note one or other not both together. For Axis warI was thinking back to this thread. Given the need for the armoured carriers in home waters, were Glorious, Courageous Furious able to operate in the Indian and Pacific waters? I ask, as at Ceylon in 1942 the Revenge class with their original machinery were unable to condense sufficient water to keep their crews alive. And of course there's no air conditioning, but on that score you've got big hangar doors both fore and aft for ventilation. IIRC, these three carriers are rather short ranged.
Between the wars the only carriers serving East of Suez were the Hermes and Eagle.IIRC, they all served in the Pacific pre-war, and Glorious was serving in the IO when war started. IMHO, they would have been invaluable as aircraft ferries, if nothing else. In an single sortie Glorious could have doubled the number of Hurricanes on Ceylon, for example.
The folded width of a Skua was 16ft 2in and its length 35ft 7in.The Skua going by my 1/72 scale model folded to 10 ft (3m) x 36 ft (11m) so roughly 2 Skuas per Val in the hangar.
AFAIK Furious was not damaged during Operation Bellows, her first Spitfire delivery mission that accompanied Op Pedestal to Malta. After flying them off she retured to Gibraltar with an escort of a few destroyers (one of which, Wolverine, rammed a U-boat en route), immediately picked up another load of Spitfires and made a second delivery run (Op Baritone) before the end of Aug 1942. Then it was back to the Home Fleet for 6 weeks before another Malta run (Op Train) and participation in Op Torch, the landings in Algeria. Then back to the Home Fleet. Her next refit was in Aug-Dec 1943 before another 9 months service with the Home Fleet before being pensioned off in Sept 1944. So she was an operational carrier, not a ferry throughout 1943/44.They are lightly built for certain. Check out the collision damage to HMS Glorious below. The merchant ship she hit looks like it was made of stronger stuff. HMS Glorious Collision, SS Florida 1938.
But HMS Furious soldiered on into 1944 before being withdrawn as being totally clapped out, granted she was mostly used as an aircraft ferry after taking a machinery-wrecking near miss off Malta during the same op where HMS Eagle was sunk.
So, it's autumn 1941 and we have HMS Glorious and Courageous at Puget Sound, WA loading up with non-folding Martlet and Dauntless, plus the folding wing Chesapeake. The plan is to use US-compatible aircraft in the Pacific as part of Force Z. On the morning of Dec 7th both carriers having left Puget Sound with their American aircraft, are now found at CFB Esquimalt making a courtesy call to BC's capital Victoria. Commanding Officer Pacific Coast, Commodore William Beech interrupts a meeting of the RN senior officers to announce the Pearl Harbour attack. Now what?
BTW, anyone interested in the RCN naval list would find this informative The Navy List - CFB Esquimalt Naval and Military Museum
I missed this point last night. The RN did perceive the opportunity to operate multi carrier task groups long before anyone else. In fact from the early 1930s.Thumpalumpacus no worries
What I'd like to see is someone in the RN perceive the opportunity to operate the greater number of RN carriers in groups of two or more ships. The devastation of Taranto is likely good evidence of the theory in practice. And Bismarck with Prinz Eugen will be in a heap of trouble if Ark Royal and Victorious are joined by two Courageous class.
Thanks for this very informative post. One thing I've often thought about the Kido Butai is how it still operated each carrier individually rather than as a single combined airbase with four or six runways. For example, imagine at Midway if the KB had two carriers assigned for fighter rotation and the other two assigned for strike preparation. This would enable the KB to simultaneously launch, land, refuel, rearm and re-launch Zeros in quick succession while the KB can continue to arm, fuel and launch its strike aircraft. If one of the carriers assigned to fighter support is hit and crippled the roles for the other carriers can be adjusted. By keeping a solid CAP aloft for longer there's a better chance that the KB carriers do not get kit, and as soon as the USN fighters have left (or if a large threat is detected) the KB can immediately launch its strike aircraft - reducing thr odds of the SBDs hitting hangars and decks filled with transitioning aircraft.By way of comparison, the IJN didn't form their infamous Kido Butai until 10 April 1941 initially with 4 ships (Akagi, Kaga, Soryu & Hiryu) later expanded to 6 (Zuikaku & Shokaku joined in Sept 1941) in time for Pearl Harbor.
Throughout the inter war period the US operated its carriers in single carrier task forces and continued to do so throughout the early war period. It wasn't until the strike on Rabaul in March 1942 that 2 US carriers linked up as part of single task group (Yorktown & Lexington). Then they went their separate ways again. It was mid 1943 before increasing carrier numbers allowed this to happen on a regular basis.
Why does everyone today think that there is a better way of doing something than the guys on the spot some 80 years ago? I don't think any carrier group has operated in the way you suggest. The nearest might be the decision by the USN in Aug 1945 to strip the torpedo bombers from the CVL but that was part of a greater reorganisation of the air groups.Thanks for this very informative post. One thing I've often thought about the Kido Butai is how it still operated each carrier individually rather than as a single combined airbase with four or six runways. For example, imagine at Midway if the KB had two carriers assigned for fighter rotation and the other two assigned for strike preparation. This would enable the KB to simultaneously launch, land, refuel, rearm and re-launch Zeros in quick succession while the KB can continue to arm, fuel and launch its strike aircraft. If one of the carriers assigned to fighter support is hit and crippled the roles for the other carriers can be adjusted. By keeping a solid CAP aloft for longer there's a better chance that the KB carriers do not get kit, and as soon as the USN fighters have left (or if a large threat is detected) the KB can immediately launch its strike aircraft - reducing thr odds of the SBDs hitting hangars and decks filled with transitioning aircraft.
Why does everyone today think that there is a better way of doing something than the guys on the spot some 80 years ago? I don't think any carrier group has operated in the way you suggest.
Because they lost all their deployed fleet carriers in a single day. Are we really accepting that historical military fails like those led by Nagumo, Percival, Phillips, MacArthur, or going back further Chelmsford or Quintilius Varus, shouldn't be analyzed for unseized opportunities to deploy or use their available forces more effectively?Why does everyone today think that there is a better way of doing something than the guys on the spot some 80 years ago?
Not sure it is.The use of Enterprise and Saratoga as fleet night-fighter carriers is very similar in concept.