Blackburn Botha to Gloster Reaper

[tomo pauk]

Beaufighter, Hampden, suitable modicied Blenheim and/or Battle - all of these can carry a torpedo. Battle with Merlin VIII, or Taurus, or even better the Hercules, obviously just one engine needed.

The Gloster was tested with Peregrine power egg; bare engine was at 517 kg. The single-speed Merlin would do for the Gloster for a good part of the war, those engines were at ~635 kg dry, leaves more 2-speed engines for Mosquito. The Gloster with 4 cannons should be able to do fighter job today, carry a torpedo tomorrow, carry bombs the day after.
There were 2-engined jobs around that received heavier & more powerful engines - Mosquito (received 2-stage, intercooled Merlins), Bf 110 (DB 601A to DB 605A; I won't mention the Jumo 210s that were instelled because there was no DBs initially in production); Me 210 when became 410; Pe-2 was tested with ASh-82, while the M-105 versions became both more powerfule and heavier; the DB-7 got R-2600 (even was tested with turbed R-2600s) in order to became A-20 etc.

 

[Shortround6]

s

Indeed. Bristols mixed and matched a limited number of cylinder sizes and strokes to make their different engines. Crudely put, they just made a new crankcase for a given layout.

It is a bit crudely put as many makers of air-cooled engines "just" made new crankcases for different cylinder arrangements. In-line 4s, in-line 6s, V-8s, V-12s. 5,7,9 single row radials. Bristol even made a 3 cylinder engine using Jupiter cylinders, vibration must have been horrendous. And that brings up the complications of many later (30s and on) engines, what looked simple turned into nightmares of vibration problems and bearing problems in high powered engines. Bristol was importing ball/roller bearings from Sweden for the Hercules during the war using blockade runners and aircraft (Mosquitos). A bearing design/set-up that works fine for 7 cylinders on one crank-pin at say 2600rpm may not work for 9 cylinders on a crank-pin at 2750rpm or higher. Two row engines introduce a rocking couple, front of the engine is trying to go up while the rear of the engine is trying to go down and the forces swap ever 180 degrees of crankshaft rotation.

They kept on building the Bothas for two years despite the first flight findings. The idea is to get G39's produced instead. Not for the Botha role but in it's own right. What that role might be is another debate.

Here we run into timing and long range planning. The Botha may have been running late (in part due to changing requirements) but it was in response to a 1935 requirement while the Gloster was built to a 1937 requirement. The Botha was "ordered" off the drawing board which means hundreds had been ordered before the prototype ever flew. This means production tooling, jigs, fixtures etc were being designed and built before the prototype flew. Long lead items where already in the pipeline, like landing gear parts and special extrusions if needed. We also have the RAF expansion schemes, which while somewhat flexible, called for certain numbers of bomber squadrons and certain numbers of fighter squadrons and certain numbers of other squadrons by specific target dates. Cutting hundreds of bombers and adding hundreds of fighters shifts squadron numbers by 10-15 squadrons.

On the structure side. It was stressed to operate as fighter with a heavy turret. If that is not up to other tasks (not a torpedo carrier I would suggest) then the Welington was not strong enough to replace Pegasus with Hercules, the Spitfire certainly could not carry a Griffon much less a Bf109 a DB605 or a Fw190 the Jumo 213. Why would you add several thousand pounds to a G39? It comes off the drawing board with x5 cannon or hundreds of lb of turret/gunner. Hurricanes. Spitfires, P40s, P47, P51 etc. etc. managed to carry bomb loads of 500lb to 2,000lb without huge structural changes.

Actually the F.9/37 was not designed to use a turret, that had been the F.34/35 which was powered by Aquila engines (talk about underpowered).
But lets assume that it was, 600lbs for the turret, 200lbs for the gunner and 140-150lbs for ammo. 200imp gal of fuel is over 1400lbs not including tanks.
I would note that the Wellington gained about 4000lbs in tare weight with the switch to the Hercules engines of which only about 1400lbs can be attributed to the bare engines alone. I am certainly not claiming that the Wellington gained 2600lbs worth of structural weight due to the engine change alone but something got changed somewhere. The Douglas DB-7 gained 2270lbs when they put in the R-2600 engines. The engines alone only account for about 1000lbs. Later A-20s gained even more weight with more protection, larger fuel tanks and greater war loads, even an A-20C of mid 1941 went another 2000lbs more than the first R-2600 powered versions ( 4,225lbs more than the early R-1830 versions.) thee are empty weights. Now please try to stick a Griffon in a Spitfire MK I or II production airframe. Or stick a DB 605 in a 109C airframe.

Counting the bomb loads of the fighters mentioned is total misdirection. Fighters (and bombers) are built to a certain load factor at a given weight. It is quite possible to fly the airplane at higher weights but certain maneuvers are either restricted or prohibited at the higher weights. Trying seeing how well one of those fighters would stand up to 6 G turns while carrying 1000-2000lbs of bombs under wing.

The Botha should have never been ordered in the first place. It was grossly underpowered fully service laden and could be out climbed by a man on a ladder. A recce machine that the pilot can't see out of? Even a Beaufort had trouble hold height fully laden on Taurus engines. To be fair to Blackburns (which I find difficult with the Roc, Botha and Firebrand) they recognised the problem and wanted Taurus but there was not the spare production (which is the real issue for the 'lets put the Taurus on Whirlwinds' school) being all allocated to Beauforts and Albacores.

You are probably right on this, the Botha gained weight all during the design process. The big jump came with the change from 3 man crew to 4 man and the bigger fuselage but weight creep affected most aircraft. The vision problem, if not caught on paper should have been caught on examination of the mock up, that is one reason mock ups are built. to see if things actually fit in 3 dimensions vs two dimensions of paper.

Had the G39 proved valuable then future Perseus have the stretch to 1,200 bhp but replacing them with Hercules or Merlins would be better in engine production terms even though it would need work to accommodate the weight but then the Whirlwind was offered with Merlins so why not a G39 which was also stressed for Peregrines? But future development is not the point here.

The Perseus is a 9/14ths Hercules or 64%, call it 66.6% to make things easy. you won't see a 1200hp Perseus until you see an 1800hp Hercules. Even a 1675hp Hercules only gives you a 1115hp Perseus. Nobody is quite sure exactly what the Whirlwind with two Merlins would actually consist of. There are no drawings and no calculations (at least none in print) just a reference from a letter or conversation. Whirlwind had a smaller wing than a Hurricane. Westland could certainly make a plane using two Merlins based on the Whirlwind but the words 'based on' leave a lot of room for interpretation Grumman did two different studies of stuffing an R-2600 into an F4F and concluded that a new airframe was needed to get the best use of the engine.

Had the powers that be realised their error in ordering Bothas early enough then I see no reason why the G39 could not have been made instead. Bothas were not used for training and target towing because they were wanted for this. They were making the damned things so some use had to be found. The Beaufort was the 'modern' torpedo bomber alternative and the Hampden helped fill the Botha hole later on with both replaced by Beaufighters. I am open to suggestions as to what the Botha factories might have otherwise done

Build Blenheims with Perseus engines

It couldn't have been worse than the Botha.
Part of the problem with thinking of the F.9/37 as a Beaufighter lite is the fuel capacity. The Beaufighter carried 550imp gallons.
Even if we make the gross assumption that the F.39 can match the Bueafighter in speed/endurance using it's 9/14 engines that still means you need 350-360imp gallons of fuel or 180-190 gallons more than the F 39 actually carried. I wonder how well a Beaufighter would have climbed with only 200 gallons in the tanks? (2500lbs lighter than normal gross) Still no Spitfire but everything is a compromise.

I have problems with some of these late 30s-early 40s "wonder" fighters that displayed good performance on low powered engines in limited testing and at substantially less weight than a late 1940-early 1941 service version would have shown. I Include the FW 187 here and the Grumman F5F. They often exhibited good handling characteristics and good climb but some carried no armament or were ballasted (no drag from gun barrels or ejection slots), they had no self sealing tanks and no armor or bullet proof glass. Operational weights were going to go way up. The FW 187 was armed but service versions would have used much heavier engines which does help speed/climb but may hurt turn/roll.

 

[nuuumannn]

I have problems with some of these late 30s-early 40s "wonder" fighters that displayed good performance on low powered engines in limited testing and at substantially less weight than a late 1940-early 1941 service version would have shown. I Include the FW 187 here and the Grumman F5F. They often exhibited good handling characteristics and good climb but some carried no armament or were ballasted (no drag from gun barrels or ejection slots), they had no self sealing tanks and no armor or bullet proof glass. Operational weights were going to go way up. The FW 187 was armed but service versions would have used much heavier engines which does help speed/climb but may hurt turn/roll.

I agree Shortround, the unfortunate thing is that wartime experience proved that more power was needed to carry all the extra load around, combined with better design philosophies than what was available pre-war. That also includes the Blenheim Shorty; that airframe's not gonna take much more redesign before you might as well build a new aeroplane; remember it was designed in the early to mid 1930s, just throwing on a new engine isn't going to help it; it's a dead end. Bristol realised this and built the Beaufort and Beaufighter, rather than upgrade an existing airframe. Despite using design cues from each for the next aircraft, in production they were entirely new aircraft.

Prior to the outbreak of war Blackburn was undertaking a design called the B.28, which was a fast bomber/recon platform powered by two Griffons and armed with 4 X 20 mm cannon that was based on the Botha airframe. The Air Ministry showed interest and launched a specification to build it, B.3/40. performance wise, the manufacturers claimed it would go at 400 mph at 18,000 ft. Production was never undertaken and once the Mosquito prototype proved its astonishing performance in late 1940/early 1941, the B.28 was dropped.

The B.28 sounds like a more viable replacement for the woeful Botha on Blackburn's production lines, if anything.

 

[yulzari]

Build Blenheims with Perseus engines

But then surely we are back to the jigs and components problem are we not?

Actually there are two discussions getting conflated in this thread. One is about the role and development of the G39. The other is about using the resources otherwise used for the Blackburn Botha and I have suggested making G39s.

Given that the Mercury and Perseus perform similarly, the Blenheim is also a possibility and Bristol was making and drawing the jigs etc. for Yugoslav and Finnish production for whom UK components did not seem necessary. The Blenheim would be a safer choice as it was a known quantity. As to quality in 1940+?

I would contend that a G39 is more likely to survive to carry out it's tasks than a Blenheim, what ever they may be. Myself I would opt for battlefield interdiction and I don't see much chance of strapping a 1,600lb torpedo to either option. As to what use the actual Air Ministry/RAF would make of a G39 one has to look at it's specification F.9/37 as a cannon armed fighter and uses made of the Westland Whirlwind cannon armed fighter. In terms of development past the initial 580 unit order, F.29/40 points to the next stage being a Merlin engined radar night fighter. In some ways the development of the Messerschmitt Bf110 gives a closer guide to possible G39 development than the Beaufighter or Mosquito.

 

[Shortround6]

The Whirlwind had speed going for it and for a around a year it used guns only on strike missions. It was used instead of Blenheims in small numbers to try to lure the Luftwaffe up to fight while numbers of Spitfires waited to pounce. The Whirlwind was much more survivable than Blenheims in that role IF the Luftwaffe decided to play. A low powered F.39 with high drag radials would certainly have better than using Blenheims for this role but would have been slower than the Whirlwind. The F.39 doesn't have the endurance for most of the Beaufighters roles.
The Botha didn't enter production until about Dec 1939/Jan 1940 and large numbers only showed up in late spring/summer of 1940. The F.39 was about 1 year away from production at this point at best. Changes in engine/armament would delay things even more. Air Ministry thought in the fall of 1940 after the BoB crisis had past that usable numbers of F.39s (with Taurus engines?) would not show up until early 1942 if they gave the go ahead for production in the Fall of 1940.

The Blenheim was certainly no wonder plane and was forced to carry on well past it's expiration date. Changing poppet valves to sleeve valves on the same size engine sure wasn't going to change things much. Trouble is the British didn't have much of anything else in production or close to production that could use the Perseus engine at the time in question.

 

[stona]

There are 3 cannons behind pilot, plus there is some volume between pilot and cannon 'area'. Sure enough, the lower two cannons should be now pointing straight forward, rather than at angle.

I haven't checked, but the angle of the cannon armament looks very much as if it was intended for 'no allowance shooting'. This was something with which minds at the Air Ministry were almost obsessed in the inter war years, though no successful operational British aircraft ever used it.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Shortround6]

BTW, the Vickers 40mm S gun used long recoil (barrel moved the length of the round) and weighed 134kg.
The Vickers 2pdr pom-pom used short recoil and weighed between 356-416kg. Some of that may have been water in the cooling jacket?
The "S" gun had been designed for aircraft use with a low trunion pull (low recoil force transmitted to aircraft structure). The Pom-Pom had been designed to be bolted to steel warship decks or concrete blocks on shore and to be mounted in substantial steel mounts.
It was also rather notoriously jam prone.
Ammo could be close to 3lbs per round so long belts (100 rounds?)are going to be heavy. Rate of fire is little better than the "S" gun. Maybe 115-120 rpm if the delay pawl is taken out vs the 100rpm of the "S" gun.

 

[nuuumannn]

Actually there are two discussions getting conflated in this thread. One is about the role and development of the G39. The other is about using the resources otherwise used for the Blackburn Botha and I have suggested making G39s.

Part of the problem with building G.39s is that Gloster were busy building Hurricanes and had little experience building all metal aeroplanes on a production line. Getting Blackburn to build them might be feasible, but, as I stated, better the firm build its own design, the B.28, which promised better performance and capability than an aircraft that might not live up to expectations - this is reflected in the changes made to come up with the Gloster Reaper design. Blackburn was busy building Swordfish; the Skua and Rocs were built by Boulton Paul, much to J.D. North's (head of BP) disappointment, so with its own design (the B.28) on the production line, the firm would have maintained continuity of production in the work force.

 

[yulzari]

better the firm build its own design, the B.28

The Blackburn B.28 may have been an excellent aeroplane but it was just a paper proposal in 1939 for engines that would not be available until 1942. The specification was F3/40. Perhaps intended as a follow on from Botha production, However. To use the Botha's resources better we need something that can be done earlier. The specification F3/40 was issued when Botha deliveries were actually in hand.

A Botha alternative really needs a decision in 1937 at the latest. The year in which F9/37 was promulgated. A G39 would certainly be a squeeze to do in time but not absolutely impossible. The Blenheim would be an easier choice but not a huge step forward (albeit Blenheims were still being used operationally into 1943).

The question remains, with a pair of factories being built and a supply of Perseus engines etc. sourced, what can you begin creating in 1937 (better 1936) that could be of better use than Blackburn Bothas? It has to be something that existed and used Perseus or Mercuries: Bristol 148, Bristol Blenheim, Gloster G39, De Havilland Herefordshire, Blackburn Skua, Miles Master, Gloster Gladiator, Bristol 146, Gloster F5/34 and just possibly Vickers Venom.

Obviously they often would have very different roles. Fans of the Gloster F5/34 will prick up their ears at the thought of a production run of 1,160 of them. FAA fans will be suggesting a Perseus Venom instead of Sea Gladiators and the Stuka ones imagining RAF Skua dive bombers.

 

[Shortround6]

While there is little doubt that the Botha pretty much rates a 0 or 1 on a 0/1-10 scale of aircraft most anything powered by the Perseus in 1940/41 is going to be doing good to be rated much above 6 or 7 if a Spitfire is 10. None of the prototype single engine fighters powered by a Mercury or Perseus is going to even match a Hurricane I for usefulness. The DH Flamingo (Herefordshire) might be a good use but I am not sure the British really needed 500 transports at that stage of the war.
Maybe more Miles Masters?

 

[tomo pauk]

It is a tough job to find a role for yet another 900 HP radial in the wind up to the ww2. Installation on the Blenheim is sensible - the airframe is relatively modern, it is in volume production, there are no vices, apart from maybe engine-out situation.
A fighter with Perseus - about as good as MC.200, ie. not as good as Hurricane, let alone the Spitfire.
A 3- or 4- engined bomber/transport/MPA?

 

[Shortround6]

Unfortunately it is not even the wind up to to WWII.

Botha production from both factories combined.

Oct 1939--5
Nov 1939--3
Dec 1939--8
Jan 1940--5
Feb 1940--7
Mar 1940--17
April 1940 22
May 1940 20
June 40---58
July 40----45
Aug 40----54
Sept 40---33
Oct 40----31

Dumbarton finished in June of 1941 building 3 planes in each of May and June while Brough continued on until May of 1942 building 8-12 planes a month from Sept of 1941 to the end.

900 hp engines have little place on combat aircraft in 1940 or later. Spitfire II showed little or no increase in performance (depending on altitude) over early MK I's despite more powerful engine due to increased weight and drag of operational equipment (protection and IFF gear).
Perseus engines on the Botha didn't really increase in power, the Botha with the 930hp engines was 33mph slower at 15,000ft than the ones with the 880hp engines due to the 930hp engine using a smaller diameter impeller which was more suited to low altitude work.
Climb at sea level improved from 820 ft/min to 985 ft/min despite a weight gain of about 800lbs but climb at 15,000ft dropped from 740ft/min to 355ft/min and service ceiling (altitude at which the plane could still climb 100ft/min) dropped from 23,600ft to 18,400ft.
Obviously the Perseus XA would have been a disaster as a fighter engine.

 

[stona]

I think that there are two separate issues to consider when debating British aero engine production.

The first was explained by Alec Cairncross in 'Planning in Wartime' far better than than I could ever do, so I will simply quote him.

"[The aero engine] lies at the heart of aircraft design, production and programming. This is partly because of the long interval between the inception of the design of a new engine and its production in quantity. This makes the aero engine the most difficult part of an aeroplane to vary quickly in supply and compels an effort to adjust the programme for the aircraft to the engines available or in prospect instead of the other way around."

In the specific case of Britain, in the early 1930s there were five companies producing aero engines, however, by the mid 1930s military production was dominated by just two, Bristol and Rolls Royce.

At the beginning of rearmament the demand for Rolls Royce engines was relatively low. The new Merlin engine was initially required for the Battle, Spitfire and Hurricane, all single engine types, and the Air Ministry believed that peace time requirements could be met without any 'special measures' to increase capacity. It should be remembered that in 1936 the Merlin was still not standardised for manufacture, and this may have influenced the Air Ministry to leave production firmly under Rolls Royce control.

In contrast Bristol's more standardised Pegasus and Mercury engines were required in large numbers and urgently as they powered many different aircraft including the Wellesley, Wellington, Harrow and Hampden bombers as well as the Gauntlet and Gladiator fighters, the Swordfish torpedo bombers and the Short, Supermarine and Saunders flying boats. The biggest demand came from proposed production plans for the Blenheim.
Because Bristol could not meet Air Ministry requirements for April 1939 the Committee of Imperial Defence's plans for using resources outside the aero engine industry were invoked and the first aero engine shadow scheme was launched. This was a dangerous policy. The rate of obsolescence for aero engines was very high in the mid-1930s and the engines then in production were reaching the end of their development. Secondly new aircraft designs were incorporating liquid cooled engines, better suited to the specifications issued in 1937/7. It was also becoming evident that the useful life of some aircraft could be extended by using the Merlin engine, the Whitley is a good example.

The result of this was that although Bristol and the motor firms gained valuable experience which would pay off when a second shadow scheme was established later for production of the Hercules, the urgent short term requirement for Bristol engines diverted official attention from the developing long term demand for Rolls Royce engines.
Even after the 'Anschluss' the Air Member for Supply and Organisation could write.

"so far as could be seen, the existing Rolls Royce factory should be just about sufficient for all engines of Rolls Royce types which would be required under the existing and any future programme at present contemplated."

It was only 'Scheme L' that led to the establishing of an additional plant (Crewe) followed, later, by two more under 'war potential planning.

The engines people are hoping for are either already spoken for or not available in the time frames proposed.

Cheers

Steve

 

[buffnut453]

The result of this was that although Bristol and the motor firms gained valuable experience which would pay off when a second shadow scheme was established later for production of the Hercules, the urgent short term requirement for Bristol engines diverted official attention from the developing long term demand for Rolls Royce engines.

Steve,

As always, interesting comments. I wonder if the issue you identified also impacted development of higher-performance radials that used more traditional valve arrangements rather than the troublesome sleeve valve which, although probably superior in the long-run, seems to have had considerable teething troubles.

'Fraid engines aren't my sweet spot so I really am just asking...and I fully realize I may be asking the wrong question because my perceptions, which led to the question, may also be wrong.

Sheessh...my brain hurts!

Cheers,
Mark

 

[merlin]

Interesting info - stona - I wonder the parameters that led to that decision that R-R can cope, would have been altered if rather than the Stirling being ordered, the Boulton-Paul design was instead. with its engine requirements being amended from four kestrels to four Merlins!?

 

[stona]

Interesting info - stona - I wonder the parameters that led to that decision that R-R can cope, would have been altered if rather than the Stirling being ordered, the Boulton-Paul design was instead. with its engine requirements being amended from four kestrels to four Merlins!?

Rolls Royce, like everyone else in 1936/7, was operating at a time when much uncertainty surrounded the future of the rearmament programme. The company was well aware that long term requirements for Rolls Royce engines was increasing and by late 1937 had unilaterally implemented a major programme of internal reforms. Substantial sums were also invested in buildings and plant, and an extensive network of subcontractors was established. Between 1934 and 1936 Rolls Royce employed 1,300 extra workers, spent £411,000 on capital extensions and sub contract man hours increased from 60,000 to over 700,000. In October 1936 50% of the machinery in the Rolls Royce factory was more than 20 years old and that too had to be addressed.
There were technical problems too. Rolls Royce scrapped 65% of the cylinder head castings manufactured for the Merlin 1 and 80% of the first 300 cylinder head castings for the Merlin 2. The reforms instituted were badly needed!

In the end the factor determining the requirement for Merlin engines was the slow development of airframe production. The Merlin production programme was steadily reduced through 1938 from 2,220 to 1,470 engines. By May 1938 Rolls Royce had delivered more than 1,000 Merlin engines, but just 160 had flown. This level of production did not absorb Rolls Royce's maximum capacity, so had anyone wanted more engines in 1938 then there was the capacity to build more Merlins.
The Air Ministry had calculated that an annual output of 10,000 Rolls Royce engines would be required during wartime, but in January 1938 when Sidgreaves (at R-R) wrote to Swinton at the Air Ministry hoping to secure a larger 1938 order for Merlins he was told that the matter was under discussion and that he could expect a decision "in the fairly near future."
The Air Ministry was not even considering the creation of extra capacity at Rolls Royce in 1938, it couldn't even exploit the capacity already existing at the firm.

When projected demand for Rolls Royce engines finally did exceed capacity a shadow scheme was proposed. How that came about and Rolls Royce's initial resistance to that scheme are another story.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

If I'm reading all of this, and other stuff right - if we want a British aircraft that is not just a performer, but that can be put in a volume production, it better use RR engines, the Merlin in particular.

 

[Shortround6]

Well, in 1938, 39, 40 that seems so. If you don't want a "performer" that does open things up

 

[stona]

If I'm reading all of this, and other stuff right - if we want a British aircraft that is not just a performer, but that can be put in a volume production, it better use RR engines, the Merlin in particular.

In early 1938 there was some slack available at the rolls Royce factory, it was not running at full capacity. This slack did not amount to thousands of engines, but certainly several hundred.

In July 1937 concerns were voiced about the lack of war potential for Rolls Royce models. At the same meeting the decision was taken to re-engine the Handley Page P.13/36 with four Merlins, knowing that enough Merlins would be ready for the number of aircraft then ordered which was just 100.
It wasn't until the approval of Scheme L, in April 1938, that serious consideration was given to a future shortfall in production of Rolls Royce engines and the company was asked to submit proposals for expansion. This is just 18 months before the outbreak of the war!
Rolls Royce wanted to fulfill the expansion by more sub contracting and by using its own car division. It was only when the company failed to find an alternative site for its car factory in Derby that the factory in Crewe was agreed. Rolls Royce had spent £750,000 of its own money since rearmament started and would not foot the bill for the new plant, the Air Ministry accepted liability for the cost on 23rd May 1938, before a brick had been laid.

Edit: To put the production of Rolls Royce engines into perspective, the company produced fewer Merlins than expected in 1937, partly due to problems changing from the Kestrel and yet still cut production in 1938 (as above). It then received large orders which it could not immediately fulfill but by the third quarter of 1938 production was again exceeding foreseeable demand. Almost unbelievably the shadow industry was forced to reduce its production in early 1939 and did not reach its potential until after the start of the war.
In the run up to the war the production of aero engines was occupying a false place in the overall aircraft programmes. After the war started the aero engine industry would assume primary importance and the availability of engines would exert a decisive influence over aircraft deliveries. In the rearmament years there were no engine shortages and the Air Ministry focused largely on the airframe sector. It wasn't until 1939 that the supply of aero engines started to cause official concern.

Cheers

Steve