Blackburn Skua was it that bad?

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This is the same mix of contradictions all along. I said the Fulmar was viable against relatively low performance unescorted bombers, which is what almost all its successes were, as have been documented in the thread. In the last part you seem to agree, but in first part seem to suggest Fulmars would have stood any chance against IJN Zero units of 1942 in some other circumstance; not unless some uniquely favorable circumstance. Hurricanes had remarkably few successful combats against Zeroes or Japanese Army Type 1's across an entire 2 year period through the end of *1943*, kill ratio 5:1 in favor of the Japanese fighters and hardly any better for the Hurricane in 1943 than 1942*, especially notable in view of the general trend against the Japanese air arms in 1943. The Hurricane's consistent lack of success against the early war Japanese fighters is one fact making it obvious the Fulmar would have been meat on the table to the same opposition, if flown by the same or similar air arm, as it would have been. And the Zero was of course operational (albeit in small numbers, but a small number dictating the terms of the air war over a large theater, China) in 1940, not a brand new plane in 1942.

*according to each side's loss report, including only combats where both side's losses are known, see Bloody Shambles and Air War for Burma. In 1942, Hurricanes downed 6 Zeroes for 35 air combat losses, 4 Type 1's for 20 losses; in 1943 no Zeroes for 3 losses, 12 Type 1's for 55 losses.

Joe
 
First off, not stating the tactical situation does little to illuminate the probable outcome of Fulmars against single engined fighters in the period 1940-42 and the for the Fulmar, given the small number of combats recorded, the one SNAFU over Ceylon completely distorts the stats. It seems probable that given the disparity in performance that the Fulmar would come out on the losing end of encounters with single engine fighters, but it also seems likely that it would not be massacred during these encounters.

The Hurricane stats you quote tell us more about the tactical situation than anything else.
 
What exactly 'makes it seem likely they wouldn't be massacred'? I don't get that. The Hurricane stats, note again, are over a 2 year period of the war in Far East, early '42 to end of '43. If Fulmars were used in the same actions as the Hurricanes, they would have faced the same 'tactical situation', not one day's situation, 2 years' situation, and been slaughtered, unless we can somehow credibly argue the Fulmar would have been a stronger opponent v Zero and Type 1 than the Hurricane, which doesn't seem credible at all.

Fulmars could shoot down unescorted SM79's, Ju-87's, He-111, etc. and faster bombers like Ju-88's in certain situations where it could catch them. Fulmars survived one combat with Bf109E's over Kirkenes with some but not disastrous loss because the Bf109's were busy slaughtering the Albacores the Fulmars were escorting. Fulmars mananaged to stay away from Bf109's at the edge of their combat radius on a few Axis escorted missions in the 1942 Med convoy battles, where Sea Hurricanes and Wildcat/Martlets were the main British fighters. Fulmars shot down the odd lesser capability single engine fighter here and there but suffered at least as many losses to them. How does any of this demonstrate that Fulmars would have been in any way viable against an opponent which racked up a 5:1 kill ratio against the Hurricane in a long series of combats over a two year period? (ie. Zeroes and Type 1's). I don't think you've done much to convince, just keep repeating kind of semi- contradictory assertions, sometimes seeming to admit the Fulmar wasn't a viable opponent to modern 1940-42 single engine fighters (yes, obviously), sometimes seeming to say it could have competed against 1942 IJN Zero units (no, obviously).

Fulmars could shoot down obsolescent German and Italian bombers with no or with highly fuel constrained escorts...now which of the possible alternatives (say Sea Hurricane or Widlcat) couldn't also do that?

Joe
 

On the one hand you like to quote stats but then on the other hand are quite willing to throw them away when they don't prove your point. The stats say that the Fulmar could stand up to single engined fighters in 1941/42 when we both know that isn't true. Stats lie. The tactical situation is the primary determinant of the outcome of fighter versus fighter combat and fighters, often of dramatically lower performance than their opponents, can achieve very good results when handled well and/or achieve an altitude or surprise advantage. Your oft quoted, "Hurricane in the far east results", demonstrate this.

BTW, the Ju-88, He-111, Ju-87 and SM-79 were in not in anyway obsolescent when the Fulmar was shooting them down, and in May 1941 constituted the most modern units in the Axis inventory. During this same time frame neither the Sea Hurricane nor the Wildcat was available, and neither became available in sufficient numbers to displace the Fulmar until well into 1942.
 
Vincenzo said:
just a note wildcat (martlet) first fight 25 december 1940
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The first G36A fighters that the FAA received were not carrier capable, had fixed wings, and no armour or self-sealing tanks. The first Marlets that went to sea were the Martlet II in August 1941 on the CVE Audacity. The MartletII had a maximum speed of 295mph at 5300 ft, so it was only ~25mph faster than the FulmarII at low altitude and had a top speed of 317mph at 14000ft. Time to 15000ft was 7.5 minutes versus 12 minutes for the FulmarII.
 
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Vincenzo said:
F4F-3 either haven't that and were carrier capable.
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The Martlet 1 (G36A) wasn't equipped with a tail hook for carrier landings. The versions received by the UK had lower performance engines than the F4F-3, and the f4F-4, in fact also received a lower rated engine, as it only had a single stage supercharger.

Carrier borne Fulmars scored their first kill in Sept 1940.
 
Dunmunro1 is correct with regard to the martletI....they were not ready in RN service for service aboard carriers until the latter part of 1941, and lacked wing folding until after April 1941 (in US service.....in Brit service I believe the wing folding Martlets started to arrive either at the very end of 1941, or early 1942.

I am less sure about the the Zero, but am willing to bet that through to the end of 1940, less than twenty had entered squadron service, and not one was cleared or ready for carrier operations until well into 1941. The only carrier capable fighter of the same generation as the Fulmar was the Buffalo, and this aircraft was found to be incapable of operating in a carrier borne role.

Much as it irks you guys, the Fulmar was the best carrier borne fighter available to any nationality in production and in widespread service until April 1941. It was competitive until the entry of Japan, and still performed credibly even after that, in the ETO right up to August 1942
 
wait a moment the F4F-3 were embarked in january 41 in USN, 2 carrier on 6 this is enough widespread for the times


p.s. an other 2 carrier have the F2A-2
 
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But you are taking tiny samples of combats and equating them to prolonged consistent situations. I just noted that there is one example of Fulmar v Zero, I did not say that one incident proved much. And obviously the very few brushes of Fulmars with single engine fighters in the ETO/MTO don't prove much, handful of fighter-fighter kills on each side.

The Hurricane situation in the FE in contrast is quite a number of combats involving loss of cumulatively 113 Hurricanes in air combat shooting down 25 Zeroes and Type 1's, over 2 years, in about 17 combats in 1942, and twice that many in 1943. That's is, or should be to anyone objective, a lot harder to brush off as 'statistics lie'. And by inference, unless the Fulmar was a comparable to superior fighter-fighter combat machine to the Hurricane (obviously not) it would have done as badly or worse over the whole long period, against those particular opponents, assuming similar pilots/units, which is a reasonable assumptiong subsituting one British plane for another in British fighter units.

In contrast your logic about the Hurricane seems pretty circular. You seem to assume it was an effective fighter v types like Zero or Type 1, so if it did poorly it must have been some strange (repeated constantly over 2 years in 50+ combats) situation. The simpler explanation is just that 1942-43 IJN/IJA fighter units were more effective than the Hurricane units they met, and that's why they consistently beat them. And by inference those results would have been even more one sided if Fulmars had been substituted in the Hurricane's place.

As far as time of introduction, the Fulmar was not a significantly earlier plane than either F4F or Zero, slightly. And the Buffalo operated as a carrier plane in the USN manageably, as far as just taking off and landing from carriers. Arguing that only Fulmars were available, or had to be used in part even in 1942 is again kind of going around in a circle. That begs the question of why a concept like that was pursued as carrier fighter so that only it was available. That said, all along I have said history shows the Fulmar was a passable carrier fighter v relatively low performance unescorted bombers when it didn't have to face single engine fighters, and that concept did have a realistic basis in likely RN carrier operations when the concept was formed. But again, its near contemporaries among single seat carrier fighters could also do the former, plus meet landbased fighters on more equal terms, generally better than equal terms when it came to the Zero, some cases well into 1943.

Joe
 
Vincenzo said:
wait a moment the F4F-3 were embarked in january 41 in USN, 2 carrier on 6 this is enough widespread for the times
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Perhaps, but these earlier types were without wing folding, which was not introduced into the type until April 41. They are one of the reasons why the type was used widely by the RN until 1942, and only on a limited scale in 1941. Dont know too much about F4FR usage in the USN, but is also quite irrelevant to the thread topic.
 
Vincenzo said:
wait a moment the F4F-3 were embarked in january 41 in USN, 2 carrier on 6 this is enough widespread for the times
Click to expand...


Perhaps, but these earlier types were without wing folding, which was not introduced into the type until April 41. They are one of the reasons why the type was used widely by the RN until 1942, and only on a limited scale in 1941. Dont know too much about F4FR usage in the USN, but is also quite irrelevant to the thread topic.

The F4F-3 prior to April 1941 continued to suffer serious developmental problems, leading me to believe it cannot be considered combat ready at that time. The lack of wing folding prior to April 1941 is the obvious problem, but it was not the only one. Inflatable flotation bags were fitted under the wings for ditching at sea, but after the bags spontaneously inflated in flight a few times, leading to crashes, they were abandoned. Electronics included a radio and, at least eventually, a radio direction finder and an identification friend or foe (IFF) unit.

Two 12.7 millimeter Browning machine guns were mounted on each wing, for a total of four guns. The guns were mounted inboard, close together on each wing, with the inner gun staggered forward slightly. Ammunition capacity was 450 rounds per gun. The first two production machines had twin 7.62 millimeter Brownings in the engine cowling and a single 12.7 millimeter Browning in each wing, but this armament was seen as too light, and no full production Wildcat had cowling guns.

The Browning guns would prove prone to jamming when the Wildcat finally found itself in combat, even though such problems hadn't been observed during trials. As it turned out, the trials hadn't been conducted with full ammunition loads, and when a full supply of ammunition was provided the ammo belts would shift around in their ammo cases during combat maneuvers, leading to jams. Spacers were quickly fabricated and inserted into the ammo cases, solving the problem.

Early production aircraft had a 1930s telescopic-style gunsight, but in 1941 production shifted to a deflection-type sight. An armor glass windscreen and self-sealing fuel tanks were also added later. The self-sealing tanks led to some problems early on, since they could shed particles of their lining, leading to clogged fuel lines and aircraft losses. There was a stores rack under each outer wing for a 45 kilogram (100 pound) bomb.

The folding wing used on the Martlet II had been in the works since March 1940, when the US Navy awarded Grumman a contract to modify the last production F4F-3 with folding wings. Designing the wings so they folded straight up would have been relatively straightforward, but that made demands on the height of carrier hanger decks, and so Grumman came up with an ingenious scheme in which the wings were folded back along the fuselage. The "span" of the folded wings was only 4.37 meters (14 feet 4 inches).

The modified Wildcat, performed its first flight on 14 April 1941, and was handed over to the Navy in May. It proved overweight, partly because it was fitted with a relatively cumbersome hydraulic wing-folding scheme. Grumman proposed a manual wing-folding scheme to cut weight and the Navy authorized production of the variant with this feature as the "F4F-4", which reached line service after the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942.

The wing-folding mechanism was actuated by a crank inserted into a socket and turned by the deck crew team chief, with the rest of the team helping the wings along to folded position. Once folded, struts were attached between the wingtips and the tailplane to keep the wings in place. The F4F-4 also featured improvements as dictated by British combat experience, such as more armor and self-sealing tanks.

Whilst squadron service began in 1940 in the USN, it was not available to the RN until November 1940, when 10 were delivered. The original French and Greek orders were completed by April 1941, but none of these aircraft were useful in a carrier born role for the RN (with its very small CAGs) and so saw only very limited usage at sea on escort carriers and the like. The Maretlet II, based on the g-36B began to enter squadron service in August 1941, did have wing folding and saw quite a bit of service afloat.

A lot of this post is direct extract from web material.....
 
Vincenzo said:
Hi buffnut you know if this comparation test it's available on line?
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Hi Vicenzo,

I can't find an online reference to the "trial" in the Far East - it was not official but it is recorded (I just can't find which book mentions it at present).

However, I did find a comparison done by the Air Fighting Development Unit in the UK:

http://www.warbirdforum.com/eagle.htm

Scroll down to the part which discusses comparative performance of the Buffalo and Hurricane. In essence, the Buffalo out-performed the Hurricane up to around 15000ft after which the Hurricane had the edge except in a dive. Overall, I'd say honours even between the 2 aircraft.

Hope this at least partially answers your question.
 

In fact there were two examples of Fulmars versus Zeros, one where the Fulmars were caught taking off, and one where Fulmars intercepted Zero escorted Vals over ther already sinking HMS Hermes.

I reviewed Airwar for Burma, by Shores, et al. Between 10-12-42 and 29-11-43 I found 13 combats detailed where the numbers of Hurricane and Ki-43 fighters on each side were noted. The 13 combats involved 108 Hurricane and 199 Ki-43 sorties. 5 Ki-43s were shot down (2 more seemed likely including one where a IJAAF body was found but these were not confirmed by Shores) and 21 Hurricanes and 2 blenheims. In 8 combats the Ki-43s had a height advantage, while in only 2 combats was this the case for the Hurricanes. Only during 4 combats did the Hurricanes have superior numbers. So a situation existed where the Hurricanes were outnumbered by almost 2-1 by a enemy with a altitude advantage 60% of the time. The results, of course, were entirely predictable and say exactly nothing, about the relative merits of the two aircraft. In many other combats the numbers are not noted, but it is clear that the Hurricane was almost always outnumbered, often greatly so.

The Buffalo did not manage OK in simple carrier operations, and most embarked aircraft suffered LG failure, causing the type to be withdrawn:

"...For the next 5 days Brown operated south and west of Oahu, mainly seeking to stay out of trouble. Fighting two flew CAP on 9 and 10 December, but thereafter secured on alert status. Paul Ramsey was reluctant to fly his fighters because of defective landing struts. He would note on 11 December just before returning to port that Fighting Two had "ceased all operations until enemy contact became imminent." (6) During this cruise 3 more landing struts had failed, and of the 17 F2A-3s currently on strength, there were progressive strut failures in no fewer than 12..." The First Team, PH to Midway, p26:

The only CV borne F2A squadron was grounded due to strut failure within 4 days of Pearl Harbour! On the outbreak of war the USN was scrambling to find enough fighters to bring it's CVs up to strength, yet somehow the FAA is suppossed to do without Fulmars... Where, prey tell, would the FAA and the USN have found the needed aircraft in the absense of the Fulmar? The F2A was simply not CV capable as the USN proved beyond any doubt.

It is easy now to decry the 2 seat Fulmar as a mistake, but it was only the introduction of radar, and it's ability to vector carrier based fighters onto attackers, and it's ability to vector single seat fighters back to their carrier, that allowed the single seat fighter to be truely viable. Additionaly the Fulmar proved to be an excellent long range recon aircraft, and was strike capable, although not used in that role. Carrier based Fulmars were shooting down aircraft before the F4F and Zero ever put to sea.
 
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Dunmunro,

As I keep on saying, that was the heavyweight -3 version (which the USN specifically requested because they wanted longer range - even though the F2A was much longer-legged than the Hurri or Spit but not compared to the A6M). The F2A-1 and -2 were available earlier (ie in 1940) and did not suffer the same landing gear problems as the -3. If you want to talk about specific combats for the Fulmar, let's also be specific about which problems afflicted which versions of the F2A.

Kind regards,
Mark
 

Thanks
 

The earlier versions of the Buffalo were not available either. Brewster was never able to keep up with the demand and only built a total of 178 Buffalos, including prototypes, despite having large outstanding orders, from 1938 to the end of 1940, which was less than Fulmar production in the last 9 months of 1940.

"Jan '40 - 10 F2A-1 airplanes are in service with the USN squadron vf-3 on Saratoga. Several problems arise, including failures of a weak landing gear." America's Hundred Thousand, p444.

The armament of the F2a-1 was 1-.3" and 1-.5" mg in the nose, no armour and no SS tanks but an option for 1 additonal .5" MG in each wing. Now, we could suppose that the FAA might have been persuaded to go without the armour and SS tanks, but "...During the Spring of 1940 the USN decided to install the optional .5" MGs in the wings of the F2A-1. The increased weight of the MGs caused greater stress on the landing gear during carrier landing and VF-3 began reporting LG failures - a problem that would plague the Buffalo throughout it's service career." The F2A Buffalo in Action, p7.

No version of the Buffalo was ever CV capable, unless you are satisfied with an armament of one .3 and one .5" MG, no armour and no SS tanks. The Zero, of course never had these either, but at least it had a heavy armament, but OTOH, it and the Buffalo didn't have folding wings. So neither would have been a suitable replacement for the Fulmar.

The Fulmar, on Sept 02 1940, when it began shooting down aircraft while operating from a CV, had folding wings, SS tanks, armour, and 8 x .3" MGs, with 750 RPG. The F2A-1 would have had fixed wings, no SS tanks, no armour, and 1 .3", 1 .5" MG with 600 and 200 RPG, respectively, and presumably had to be landed on nearly empty fuel tanks to avoid LG failure.
 
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Hi Dunmunro

These points and more have been pointed out on repeated previous posts in this thread, but it intereferes with the preconceived views on the combat effectivenes of the Buffalo. I doubt that people will accept anything less than the notion that the F2A was the best thing since sliced bread as a carrier borne aircraft before the introduction of the Zero and F4F, and that the F4F and the Zero were fully operational types prior to April 1941.
 
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