Blackburn Skua was it that bad?

[parsifal]

As far as time of introduction, the Fulmar was not a significantly earlier plane than either F4F or Zero, slightly. And the Buffalo operated as a carrier plane in the USN manageably, as far as just taking off and landing from carriers. Arguing that only Fulmars were available, or had to be used in part even in 1942 is again kind of going around in a circle. That begs the question of why a concept like that was pursued as carrier fighter so that only it was available. That said, all along I have said history shows the Fulmar was a passable carrier fighter v relatively low performance unescorted bombers when it didn't have to face single engine fighters, and that concept did have a realistic basis in likely RN carrier operations when the concept was formed. But again, its near contemporaries among single seat carrier fighters could also do the former, plus meet landbased fighters on more equal terms, generally better than equal terms when it came to the Zero, some cases well into 1943.
/QUOTE]

Joe I am surprised that you would attempt to mount an argument like this. The F2A was not a "manageable carrier borne" fighter as the flight test reports from the USN and the RN clearly show. It was a near total failure in fact, and was grounded from the carrier operations within two weeks of the outbreak of war. Previous to that, going back all the way to 1939, it had chalked up just a handful of hours, spending most of its time on shore bases because of the fatal and catastrophic structural defects that prevented it from making hard landings safely from any carrier.

The F4F was at least carrier capable, but until April 1941 was not fitted with wing folding, and suffered a series of of continual problams that prevented it from being truly operational in any sense. It would not have been ready for combat prior to April '41 if called upon to do so, or if forced to do so, would have suffered very heavy attritional losses as planes fell out of the sky due to technical in flight failures of the type, or jammed guns whilst in combat, or any of the other identified problems that kept it from operational status until well into 1941. What was the RN meant to do in the meantime????????

As for the zero, I am less sure about its prewar operational status. We all know of its combat debut over China, but this was an experimental, LAND BASED, unit, and delivery of the Zero was at a very low rate until well into 1941. The Japanese carriers began recived the type after April 1941, and the delivery of sufficient zeroes was a factor in the delay of the japanese attack on the US.

Your claim that the Fulmar could only operate outside of enemy fighter range is also patently untrue. The Fulmar could and did, operate successfully within the range of enemy fighters, and managed to shoot down a number of them, and their charges in the process. You are assessing the effectiveness of the type from an essentially Pacific centric perspective....that is that carrier aircraft had to take and hold control of the airspace over large formations of enemy land based air. This was the more mature US view on carrier operations from the beginning of the 1943 offensives on, but in 1940 it had no place in RN strategy. At that time the RN could simply not afford the planes or the pilots, or risk its small number of carriers duking it out with the very large elements of land based air ranged against the FAA. What the Fulmar couyld and did do was to fulfil the role of fleet defence which the type did quite well, and that was regardless of whether the enemy strikes were escorted or not.

 

[buffnut453]

The Buffalo couldn't fit on the RN's carriers and if you read back through my posts, I've never suggested that it could nor that it was a viable replacement for either the Skua or the Fulmar (for that very reason). But it certainly was a contemporary (actually it came out earlier than the Fulmar). One small point, the RAF procured 170 Buffalos - I think you'll find overall production for all variants was somewhat greater than the figure you posted.

I think you'd agree that there's a world of difference between "starting to report" and the example you cited for the -3 where most of a squadron was out of action because of undercarriage problems. There are several inconsistencies here that can only be solved by delving into primary source material...and even then the answers may not be apparent.

Firstly, if the F2A-1 suffered such significant undercarriage problems, why did the USN order the -3 model which was much heavier, carried 4x50cal guns and armour plate and extra fuel and oil, and then put it onboard carriers? Perhaps Brewsters assured the USN that the undercarriage problems had been fixed. Irrespective, procurement of the -3 is an illogical thing to do, particularly if the manufacturer has displayed quality control issues and workforce problems.

Secondly, the undercarriage issue tends to be applied to the entire range of Brewster fighters. As noted in one of the other threads, not one accident involving RAF Buffalos in the Far East was attributed to undercarriage failure. Across 167 aircraft and numerous landing accidents both prior to and during the war, not one of them was due to the aircraft - all were attributed to pilot error. I accept that landing on a carrier is a very different proposition to landing on an airfield but the RAF Buffalos were much, much heavier than the F2A-1s so I would expect any undercarriage weakness to become apparent, particularly given the inexperience of most RAF Buffalo pilots.

As I stated, we'd need to delve into the primary source material not third-hand reporting to determine the nature, causal factors and true extent of the undercarriage problems (and, for the record, I know Jim Maas is an expert in the Buffalo but a book as brief as an In Action volume cannot hope to convey the complexities of the politics, engineering decisions and operational factors).

Once again, I'm not arguing that the Buffalo could have replaced the Skua or the Fulmar. They were very different types built for very different purposes. Guesstimating how they would have fared in a combat against a particular adversary is feasible but, as you have successfully pointed out, there are wider considerations in delivering a capability (like actually fitting it within the space constraints of the carrier).

 

[buffnut453]

Hi Dunmunro

These points and more have been pointed out on repeated previous posts in this thread, but it intereferes with the preconceived views on the combat effectivenes of the Buffalo. I doubt that people will accept anything less than the notion that the F2A was the best thing since sliced bread as a carrier borne aircraft before the introduction of the Zero and F4F, and that the F4F and the Zero were fully operational types prior to April 1941.

And you say I put words you YOUR mouth, Parsifal! I have consistently NOT stated that the Buffalo was the best thing since sliced bread. Please, PLEASE start reading what I say and stop inserting blanket, slapdash statements into your post.

The RN doesn't do flight tests - that's the job of A&AEE which always has been a joint organisation...and, for the most part, they praised the Buffalos handling. None of the UK Buffalos could be trialled on a carrier because they were procured by land-based air arms and hence had no arrestor gear. One unofficial trial was attempted in the Middle East (again without arrestor gear being fitted to the aircraft) on HMS Eagle which, unsurprisingly, failed.

Parsifal, you once stated our opinions aren't too far apart and you're probably right but I'm really tired of sweeping statements that, upon closer inspection with the actual contemporary documentation don't align with received "wisdom". The Buffalo was an operational failure. I make no bones about that. What I'm interested in is why it failed and it's a much more complex area than you seem willing to accept.

 

[dunmunro1]

One small point, the RAF procured 170 Buffalos - I think you'll find overall production for all variants was somewhat greater than the figure you posted.

.

Yes, total production of both the Fulmar and Buffalo was greater, but I only gave to stats to the end of 1940, to show that Brewster didn't have the capacity to meet demand.

 

[dunmunro1]

Firstly, if the F2A-1 suffered such significant undercarriage problems, why did the USN order the -3 model which was much heavier, carried 4x50cal guns and armour plate and extra fuel and oil, and then put it onboard carriers? Perhaps Brewsters assured the USN that the undercarriage problems had been fixed. Irrespective, procurement of the -3 is an illogical thing to do, particularly if the manufacturer has displayed quality control issues and workforce problems.

Because Grumman couldn't meet demand either! The USN was so desperate for a modern fighter that they gambled on the F2A-3, but this gamble failed utterly to produce a viable CV based fighter, and most F2A-3 ended up in OTU squadrons.

Secondly, the undercarriage issue tends to be applied to the entire range of Brewster fighters. As noted in one of the other threads, not one accident involving RAF Buffalos in the Far East was attributed to undercarriage failure. Across 167 aircraft and numerous landing accidents both prior to and during the war, not one of them was due to the aircraft - all were attributed to pilot error. I accept that landing on a carrier is a very different proposition to landing on an airfield but the RAF Buffalos were much, much heavier than the F2A-1s so I would expect any undercarriage weakness to become apparent, particularly given the inexperience of most RAF Buffalo pilots.

When the tail hook engages the arrestor cable, much of the momentum is exerted on the hook and the fuselage but it is easy to see that much of the momentum of the aircraft is also expended as a downward force on the LG. Brewster had a whole year and a half to try and strengthen the gear for the F2A-3 and they couldn't do it.

 

[buffnut453]

Yes, total production of both the Fulmar and Buffalo was greater, but I only gave to stats to the end of 1940, to show that Brewster didn't have the capacity to meet demand.

Sorry, you didn't make the date cut-off clear in your post. I don't disagree - the Brewster factory was set up for low-rate inter-war production schedules not ramp up to conflict or actual war.

 

[buffnut453]

Brewster had a whole year and a half to try and strengthen the gear for the F2A-3 and they couldn't do it.

By that stage, the USN probably had enough Grummans and wasn't going to give any more money to Brewster, and Brewster wasn't going to fix it out of the goodness of their hearts. Harsh business reality? Perhaps. Some of the Brewster leadership weren't necessarily the most trustworthy of individuals.

 

[dunmunro1]

By that stage, the USN probably had enough Grummans and wasn't going to give any more money to Brewster, and Brewster wasn't going to fix it out of the goodness of their hearts. Harsh business reality? Perhaps. Some of the Brewster leadership weren't necessarily the most trustworthy of individuals.

The order for 108 F2A-3s was driven by Grumman's own production problems:

"Jan 21 1941 - The USN orders 108 F2A-3 models to keep the Brewster production line going because the F4F-3 cannot be produced fast enough." America's Hundred Thousand, p445 By Dec 1941, the USN still didn't have enough F4F-3s to meet their peacetime needs.

To the end of 1941, Brewster built 487 Buffaloes of all types. (including exports)
Total production of all F4F models to the end of 1941 was 431. (including exports)
From April 1940 to Jan 1942, Fairey had built about 500 Fulmars.

 

[buffnut453]

Because Grumman couldn't meet demand either! The USN was so desperate for a modern fighter that they gambled on the F2A-3, but this gamble failed utterly to produce a viable CV based fighter, and most F2A-3 ended up in OTU squadrons.

But it's a gamble that makes no sense (aside from the fact that conservative organisations like the Armed Forces seldom gamble when it comes to procurement of equipment). Why start production of the heavyweight F2A-3 when the F2A-2 was available? The -2 still suffered from problems but most of the undercarriage issues had been resolved (in part by beefing up the hydraulic retraction struts but also the simple expedient of increasing tyre pressure) and it was considered by pilots to be the best of the breed. Given this, why overload the aircraft yet again in its -3 form (and even try to put it on carriers). It just doesn't make sense to replace a better aircraft with a worse one.

But this thread is supposed to be about the Skua so I'll shut up and just say that the Skua was an effective dive bomber of its vintage, and its radius of operation was quite substantial. However, the concept of a combined-role fighter/dive-bomber was seriously flawed but, as has already been discussed at length, viable options for a dedicated fighter were few when examining all the requirements that had to be met, and the timescales within which the aircraft were required. Perhaps the key fault lies in the post-1918 "10 year" rule which effectively stalled defence spending, forcing the sorts of compromises that led to the Skua.

 

[parsifal]

And you say I put words you YOUR mouth, Parsifal! I have consistently NOT stated that the Buffalo was the best thing since sliced bread. Please, PLEASE start reading what I say and stop inserting blanket, slapdash statements into your post.

The RN doesn't do flight tests - that's the job of A&AEE which always has been a joint organisation...and, for the most part, they praised the Buffalos handling. None of the UK Buffalos could be trialled on a carrier because they were procured by land-based air arms and hence had no arrestor gear. One unofficial trial was attempted in the Middle East (again without arrestor gear being fitted to the aircraft) on HMS Eagle which, unsurprisingly, failed.

Parsifal, you once stated our opinions aren't too far apart and you're probably right but I'm really tired of sweeping statements that, upon closer inspection with the actual contemporary documentation don't align with received "wisdom". The Buffalo was an operational failure. I make no bones about that. What I'm interested in is why it failed and it's a much more complex area than you seem willing to accept.

Fair enough about putting words into your mouth, and you do acknowledge the medicrity of the type, I also agree that there were many other factors as well to account for the defeats in the pacific.

According to the FAA website 30 F2As were acquired by the FAA, but they were rejected for carrier operations and the carrier gear was removed early on. I am not as sure now about this, given what you are saying but would like to see some sort of proof before accepting that the FAA F2As weree not purchased with carrier operations in mind.

The reason I say what I say about your position is that I believe your position about admitting the inferiority of the type is laced time and again with caveats and excuses about why the type should be excused for its part in those failures. The following are just a few examples:

So lets see how you express the inferiority of the F2A relative to its opposition….

At Post 188

They recognised that it lacked performance, and that there were maintenance issues but many of the problems were also relevant to other types in service at the time (eg gun firing problems in the P-40 and the Boomerang).

In terms of pilots killed by enemy action whilst flying Buffalos, there were 13 in Malaya/Singapore (5 Aussies and 8 Kiwis) and a further 7 in Burma (5 Kiwis and 2 Englishmen). Loss rates of 20 pilots across 5 squadrons for 80 days of continuous operations (100 days in the case of 67 Sqn) against a numerically superior adversary doesn't seem significantly worse than, say, loss rates for Hurricanes and Spitfires in the Battle of Britain...and that's with considerably more advantages in terms of early warning and enhanced logistics support.

This suggest that you think the F2A to be on par with the hurricane and Spitfire, do you really think this is acknowledging the types problems and inferiority. Sorry, I don't buy this as being a sincere acknowlewdgement

Again at Post 188, you stated:

You're totally ignoring operating enviroment - the Buffalo squadrons were hugely outnumbered (about 3-to-1 in fighters across the entire force (7-to-1 for northern Malaya during the initial Japanese onslaught)), the RAF fighter force had no effective early warning system, and no robust third-line repair capability. But it's still the aircraft's fault that success wasn't achieved?

This looks for all the world like an apology for the aircraft to me….another way of saying…."the aircraft could have won the day, if it wasn't so badly outnumbered". Yet, such a numerical advantage never existed, at least in strategic terms, until after the type had failed to achieve its stated tasks as a fighter, that is until the Japanese had shot it up so badly that it ceased to be there in the nunbers that it should have been. Your comments about the Japanese outnumbering the Buffalo, from a strategic or force availability point of view are totally spurious, and you know it, but never post any sort of correction to such statements. Your last sentence in this extract is truer than you care to admit, but the way you are saying is disingenuous in the extreme…in reality you are attempting to shift all blame away from your pet aircraft, and not looking at the issue objectively, in any sense of the word

At Post 190 you state

For the record, I'm not re-writing history to paint the Buffalo as an operational success - that patently can't be done. However, the operational failures in Malaya were less down to individual aircraft performance and more due to lack of numbers (4 sqns to defend a country the size of England is inadequate, even if those units were equipped with Spitfires), an inadequate early warning system and general lack of leadership and dynamism from the leadership in Singapore.

Another version of "Im not supporting the aircraft, however"…..blaming everything but the aircraft. You indicate elsewhere that there were 145 Buffaloes in Malaya, against approximately 140 Japanese fighters (not including the IJN fighters, and conveniently ignoring that these fighters were not well positioned to participate in the fight until later….I still don't believe that JAAF appeared over the critical central sector of Malaya until after the 15th, by which time the damage had already been done, and can categorically state that the JAAF fighters were not the mainstay defenders over the invasion convoys….if so it would be the first and only time that they ever undertook this mission….this was always an IJN responsibility, and it was no different at Singora and Khota)

At Post 192 you state

Again, just for the record, the Buffalo was not a wonderful aircraft. It was mediocre at best. But it certainly was at least as good as a number of other types that operated without the operational constraints, or the widespread castigation, that the Buffalo suffered. The P-36 immediately springs to mind. In performance terms, the Buffalo (as tested by RAF pilots in the Far East - and this was a war-weary ex-67 Sqn Buffalo) performance was on a par with the Hurricane. I've never claimed the Buffalo was great,

So here we go again….giving lip service to the inferiority of the type, and then proceeding to say it was the equal of the Spitfire, P-36, Hurricanes P-40s (elsewhere), and so on. You protect the obvious flaw in your argument by acknowledging in a cavalier fashion the mediocrity of the type, and then proceed to caveat and protect the type by all sorts of argument. If ever there was an analogy for the "dog ate my homework", this has to be the aeronautical equivalent…..

 

[buffnut453]

Ok, here we go...

According to the FAA website 30 F2As were acquired by the FAA, but they were rejected for carrier operations and the carrier gear was removed early on.

The Brewsters given to the FAA were all ex-Belgian aircraft that were never fitted with arrestor gear because Belgium didn't have any aircraft carriers. 'Nuff said.

This suggest that you think the F2A to be on par with the hurricane and Spitfire, do you really think this is acknowledging the types problems and inferiority. Sorry, I don't buy this as being a sincere acknowlewdgement

I'm not saying the Buffalo was on a par with the Spitfire - I'm saying that 4 squadrons of Spitfires instead of Buffalos could not have changed the outcome in Malaya and Singapore under the given operating conditions. The performance of the Buffalo was on a par with the Hurricane in all aspects apart from armament and high-altitude operation (although neither were necessarily a disadvantage in Malaya against unarmoured Japanese aircraft and operating altitudes typically around 20,000ft, and perhaps even other theatres (eg the Middle East and North Africa), but it certainly would have been a problem in the Battle of Britain). My issue is that other aircraft also lacked armament and high-altitude performance (eg the Mohawk) but they don't seem to attract the bile of the aviation community as does the Buffalo.

This looks for all the world like an apology for the aircraft to me….another way of saying…."the aircraft could have won the day, if it wasn't so badly outnumbered"....Your comments about the Japanese outnumbering the Buffalo, from a strategic or force availability point of view are totally spurious, and you know it, but never post any sort of correction to such statements. Your last sentence in this extract is truer than you care to admit, but the way you are saying is disingenuous in the extreme…in reality you are attempting to shift all blame away from your pet aircraft, and not looking at the issue objectively, in any sense of the word

Strategically, the RAF fighters were massively outnumbered but even operationally they were outnumbered. I've provided Japanese-sourced evidence of IJAAF fighter operations over northern Malaya before your pet date of 15 Dec 41 - you're just choosing not to accept it. The IJAAF could, and did, attack at times and places of their choosing. To be effective, the defending fighters had to be able to engage the enemy. There was one squadron of Buffalos in northern Malaya (21 Sqn RAAF - largely assigned an Army Coop function) plus a section from 243 Sqn when the Japanese attacked. Without adequate air warning and ground controlled intercept, your only real option would be to put all those aircraft up in the air, stooging around trying to find the enemy but the odds of succcess aren't great. In hindsight, perhaps that was a better option than leaving them on the ground where they were caught by IJAAF bombers on the first day of the campaign while the RAF command system sat on its hands. Thereafter, the RAF was in a sorry mess all over northern Malaya. Sorry, but it's all a bit late when your early warning system comprises one of your airman standing at the end of the runway and waving his arms 'cos an enemy raid is approaching - but such was the case for the RAF in December 1941.

You indicate elsewhere that there were 145 Buffaloes in Malaya, against approximately 140 Japanese fighters (not including the IJN fighters, and conveniently ignoring that these fighters were not well positioned to participate in the fight until later….I still don't believe that JAAF appeared over the critical central sector of Malaya until after the 15th, by which time the damage had already been done, and can categorically state that the JAAF fighters were not the mainstay defenders over the invasion convoys….if so it would be the first and only time that they ever undertook this mission….this was always an IJN responsibility, and it was no different at Singora and Khota

Again, you're misquoting me. There were approx 145 Buffalos in total but the reserve airframes were not available for operations so there were never more than around a third of that number with the squadrons. The reserve aircraft lacked guns, gunsights and radios - fitting these GFE items was a squadron responsibility. It took so long to re-equip 21 Sqn because all their groundcrew were in northern Malaya and nobody had the common sense to have reinforcement aircraft being prepped by other units in Singapore.

You are choosing not to accept the presence of IJAAF fighters over northern and central Malaya despite my citing of Japanese sources which state they were: I can't fight your lack of acceptance on this topic. The Ki-97s were assigned with convoy protection of the invasion force operating initially from Phu Quoc and then, from 10 Dec onwards, from Singora. Again, I can't fight your unwillingness to accept Japanese sources upon which I base this statement.

The damage that was done by 15 Dec was the loss of air superiority over northern Malaya (ie one squadron had been mauled, mostly by losing aircraft in Japanese bombing and strafing raids due to lack of early warning) which gave the IJAAF free rein to operate over northern Malaya but, as I have indicated, they were already operating over Malaya long before your 15 Dec date.

So here we go again….giving lip service to the inferiority of the type, and then proceeding to say it was the equal of the Spitfire, P-36, Hurricanes P-40s (elsewhere), and so on. You protect the obvious flaw in your argument by acknowledging in a cavalier fashion the mediocrity of the type, and then proceed to caveat and protect the type by all sorts of argument.

No, no, no! Again, you're misquoting me. As I've said above, the Buffalo's flying characteristics and overall capability as a weapons system were broadly equivalent to that of a Mohawk or Hurricane NOT a Spitfire . Both the Hurri and the Mohawk were better armed, and the former had a performance advantage at altitude, but otherwise they were pretty similar (eg the AFDU comparison of the Buffalo and the Hurricane - the Buffalo could out-turn and out-dive the Hurricane). The Buffalo was mediocre by late 1941. I keep saying it. I'm not caveating it. But so was the Mohawk as a fighter. So was the Hurricane as a fighter. Both performed admirably in other roles - close air support, and tactical reconnaissance - but by late 1941 standards both were obsolescent in the fighter role...as was the Buffalo. The Spitfire was a different breed altogether, and far superior in performance (although even the Spit struggled in in its first encounters with Japanese fighters). None of this changes the fact that the Buffalo was an indifferent aircraft, with poor climb performance and a number of maintenance issues (some resulting from the Brewster Corp, some from Wright's, some from GFE (eg radios and guns)).

The Buffalo in RAF service was most definitely a failure as a fighter but in the context of the Malayan campaign I simply ask could anything else have done a better job? Had the Buffalos been replaced, one for one, with Spitfires in, say, August 1941, the outcome of the Malayan Campaign would have been no different because of all the systemic problems - lack of experienced pilots, inadequate training, no real early warning system, and lack of leadership - that plagued the Far East Air Force in 1941. One squadron (plus an extra section) of Spitfires in northern Malaya on 8 Dec 41 would still have been caught on the ground when the IJAAF (or IJN if you prefer!) attacked so the Japanese would still have gained air superiority on Day 1 of the campaign over northern Malaya. Provision of reinforcement aircraft would still have presented problems - availability of radios, guns and gunsights was an issue. Lack of flexibility and aggression in command would have remained a limiting factor because AHQFE was focussed on providing air cover over Singapore so that reinforcements could arrive by sea. The shorter range of the Spitfire would not have improved loss-rates in the appalling northeast monsoon season - several Buffalos force-landed and were wrecked when the pilots became lost in cloud and poor visibility - nor would the narrow track undercarriage have improved accident rates on waterlogged grass airfields. The logistics and spares to keep the Spitfire's cooling system (there were no in-line, liquid-cooled engines in Malaya in 1941) may have further hindered rapid operational deployment to ill-equipped forward operating bases. The pilots were still as untrained, the supporting elements would still have been just as bad. The Buffalo was inadequate as a fighter but in the context of the Malayan campaign, the crucial issue was not aircraft performance - overall unpreparedness (ie systemic problems) and an inabilty to focus a weight of fighter force at critical times and locations were the key drivers. Whether it was margarine or butter was irrelevant - there just wasn't enough of it to cover the bread.

 

[merlin]

After all the debate off-thread, I thought a piece on the Skua may be of interest - taken from Dive Bomber by Peter C Smith p.145

The last operational dive bomber unit with the british forces, other than experimental units, was No 810 squadron, still operating under Coastal Command direction, though sometimes embarking aboard carriers to conduct strikes against coastal shipping and land installations of Norway with the fleet. This was now a hard-flying, tough unit who had developed a sturdy independence and pioneered many new dive bombing innovations off their own backs. They still came up against a wall of ignorance as to how their aircrcraft could be properly employed and suffered much frustrations, being given missions and tasks impossible to carry out in safety. Their end came abrutly when the Luftwaffe attaked their base at St Eval and destroyed many Skuas parked near the control tower. It is on record that many of the crews openly cheered and applauded this destruction of their aircraft, so bitterly did they feel they had been mishandled by their new masters. a sad end to what could have been a potentially invaluable unit.

 

[dunmunro1]

Here's a list of resources for the Buffalo.

http://www.warbirdforum.com/buff.htm

Regarding the Buffalo versus the Hurricane, the comparison states that similarly equipped that the aircraft would be equal in speed at 6000ft but at 14700 ft, the Hurricane would be 12mph faster. It seems almost certain that these speeds for te Hurricane were with 6lb boost, and that 12lb boost would give the Hurricane another ~30mph at 6000ft and a much higher climb rate.

 

[parsifal]

we have strayed from the original thread topic.....I guess the redefined topic causing such a hot debate is whether the FAA was well served by the Fulmar and the Skua. A subsidiary debate has arisen that the F2A Buffalo would have served the RN better in the carrier role, something I remain totally unconvinced of....

A further argument that arose is whether the RN could have relied on the F4F in the operational state that it existed in June 1940, and in the numbers it was receiving them, to meet its needs in that critical period June 1940-May 1941. I have made my opinions abundantly clear on this claim as well. The F4F ended up being greatly superior to the Fulmar, but at the time the Fulmar was introduced, and the numbers that it was available, the Wildcat was not a satisfactory substitute for the Fulmar

 

[merlin]

Well I did make a comment earlier that the Skua could've been replaced in the FDB role by the 'Sea Henley'.
With the addition of forward firing guns, maybe cannon in a mk II, - no need for the Fulmar. Would initially confuse enemy aircraft - think it's a Hurricane!
I think a carrier mix of Swordfish, Sea Henley and Marlet, being more effective in say 1941 than OTL.

But, since there was a nil reaction, I assume I must be on some sort of 'ignore' list!

 

[Shortround6]

A lot of decisions at the time were based on timing and expected production needs/capacities.

How long would it take to design and test a folding wing for the Henley?
Landing gear suitable for carrier operation?
Who will do the redesign work?



What was the availability of 20mm cannon, not did they exist but how many were being produced per month and did any other aircraft (like the Beaughfighter) have first call on them? were they drum feed or belt?

There might be some argument as to if the Henley would even offer much of a performance advantage over the Fulmar if both are similarly equipped and powered. Fulmars used Merlins that were optimized for low altitude performance while some Henley speed figures are for altitudes 8-9000ft above the Fumars best altitude. Thinner air=less drag.

If the "naval" Henley doesn't offer much improvement and won't show up in numbers until 3-5 months after the Fulmar it might not be that good a choice.

 

[merlin]

A lot of decisions at the time were based on timing and expected production needs/capacities.
How long would it take to design and test a folding wing for the Henley?
Landing gear suitable for carrier operation?
Who will do the redesign work?
What was the availability of 20mm cannon, not did they exist but how many were being produced per month and did any other aircraft (like the Beaughfighter) have first call on them? were they drum feed or belt?
There might be some argument as to if the Henley would even offer much of a performance advantage over the Fulmar if both are similarly equipped and powered. Fulmars used Merlins that were optimized for low altitude performance while some Henley speed figures are for altitudes 8-9000ft above the Fumars best altitude. Thinner air=less drag.
If the "naval" Henley doesn't offer much improvement and won't show up in numbers until 3-5 months after the Fulmar it might not be that good a choice.

The Henley first flew in March 1937 - was in the RAF Hendon display of '37. Likewise, the Skua also flew in 1937, and was also shown at the Hendon display. Therefore doesn't seem too implausible for FAA people to compare the two - Henley had a speed advantage of about 70 mph, and a bigger bomb load. If someone asked - 'Can it carry guns?' Do you think Hawker will say no? Then, when the RAF's interest is only for a 'target-tug' either the FAA will express an interest -'Well if you don't want it as a dive bomber, we may!', or Hawker offer it to the Admiralty as a private venture.
This, could all take place before the specification for the Fulmar was issued. Fairey might even be sub-contracted to do the naval version i.e. wing folding, and arrester gear, etc.
Hence, IMHO, to be available to supplant/replace the Skua in mid to late 1940, with the next 'mark' - with bigger engine and heavier armament.
It in turn is replaced by either a Griffon Barracuda, or a Blackburn Firebrand (at least that could have been the expectation).

 

[Shortround6]

Where does that 70mph difference take place?

there is a 40mph difference in the speed of an early Hurricane between 5000ft and 15-20,000ft.
If you are comparing the Speed of a Henley at 16-17,000ft to the speed of a Fulmar at 5-7,000ft the Henley is going to look awfully good. It also doesn't have the folding wing, the beefed up landing gear, or the armament provisions. There may be a difference in radio fit.

For two aircraft that used the almost the same engine ( at least in prototype form) , were both 2 seaters and had wings of almost identical size I am having a hard time figuring out why the Fulamr would be so much slower at the SAME altitude.

SEE: Hawker Henley

It is not the the Henley is a model of aerodynamic cleanliness

of course I don't have my own wind tunnel and I could be wrong.

 

[merlin]

I thought my last post clear enough - the first paragraph was all about the Henley Skua, no other aircraft is mentioned. Therefore, if I make a comment about 70 mph difference - why do you think it relates to a different aircraft?
In Dive Bomber by Peter Smith (an excellent book if you are interested in dive bombers in WW2) on p.100 in a table of the principal dive bombers at the start of WW2, it gives the Blackburn Skua-II as having a max speed of 222 mph. Tony Butler's British Secret Projects p.73 gives the Henley as having a max speed of 300 mph, and in The Lion Has Wings by L F E Coombs p.49 " The Hawker Henley caused a 'stir' in the New Types Park at the 1937 Hendon Pagent. Here was an aircraft with a top speed close to 300 mph able to carry 1,000 lb of bombs" . So according to that I could have said 'about 80 mph'!
Sure, a naval Henley would gain weight - due to arrester gear, folding wing, life raft, better radio etc. But I can still the advantages that the FAA woud gain from such an aircraft, and it would negate the need for the spec that resulted in the Fulmar. If you think otherwise - fine.

 

[dunmunro1]

Did the Henley have dive brakes? If not, then it wasn't really in the running to replace the Skua. OTOH, it might have replaced the Fulmar, but the prototype Fulmar (P.4/34) was also somewhat faster than the production Fulmar, and lost about 30mph after it was fully navalized.