Bomber offensive vs. Gemany: you are in charge

Spurred by the discussion at the another thread:

We can take a look at the German RAF forces of the 1941-42.
The bulk of the LW fighters was, for maybe 8 months in 1941, comprised from the Bf-109F-1/F-2 fighters. There were some E-7s, plus maybe a small number of the F-0s. Out of those, the Friedrichs are good match for Spit V (109 a tad faster, Spit should offer a bigger punch, providing the cannons are installed), the E-7 less so. The next 109, the E-4, is being produced from June (July?) 1941, the DB-601E not allowed to make power on Notleistung setting. The clearance for Notleistung was issued between February and April 1942; the high speed on that setting is quoted to be from 635 to 670 km/h (faster than more powerful 109G-2 on Notleistung??), obviously slower with Steig Kampfleistung (prior Feb 1942 maximum).
The another plane entering the service is the Fw-190. 1st with the BMW-801C engine (the high speed figure as low as 590 km/h can be found (Notleistung banned?), anybody have better data?), than, with the 801D engine (installed/retrofitted in part of the A-2s and A-3s produced, installed in all A-4s). While the Notleistung was reduced (ban in effect from March 1942 - Oct 1942), the speed should still be at least 390 mph (410 from oct 1942, on full Notleistung). Such 190s have the edge over Spit V, in effect from start of 1942 (= introduction of the 801D).
The answer, in 1942, is the Spitfire Mk.IX, not allowing the LW to have a large performance edge*. At least not until the G-2 appears, but before the engine restrictions of the new DB-605A kick in. We are almost in the winter of 1942, though - the air battles are not that intense as in other 3 seasons.

*The Typhoon is still as gentle as boiled egg, in rare case everything works it's an useful airplane. At the low level the RAF can use the Mustang I, but those were historically part of the army cooperation units. Hurricanes need to be applied with care.

I'll venture to make a conclusion re. qualitative balance: in fighters. The RAF and LW are pretty evenly matched for all of the 1941. RAF lags behind from 1st half of the 1942 (introduction of the 801D powered Fw-190s, ban lifted on Notleistung for the Bf-109F-4). RAF's answer to this was the introduction of Spit IX, but the Mk Vs would remain dominant in service almost until 1944 - on aggregate the LW has the performance edge.

About quantitative balance: the opponents are evenly matched before the Germany turns East (April of 1941 vs. Yu and Greece, June 1941 vs Soviets), also some LW units go to the MTO in 1941. Luftwaffe can put maybe up to 200 SE fighters in the air after that, in ETO. So, in the second half of 1941 the time is ripe for a RAF daylight bomber offensive - it can outnumber the LW in fighters to maybe 3:1, and has some 730 bombers available (even if that makes only 600 operational). It can use the Coastal command Beaufighters Hampdens to further stretch LW thin. If Germans decide to relocate some fighter units from East and/or MTO, their forces there have less fighter protection, both bombers Heer.
As I've said before: this time on, the LW cannot choose what air battles to fight, and what ones to avoid at ETO - they need to try kill those hundreds of bombers, making possible for RAF fighters to challenge LW with definite advantage in numbers. Even trading a fighter and a bomber for a LW fighter makes RAF a winner.

Friedrich-4 was superior to Spit V in '41/2, 635 km/h @ FTH was the speed in Climb&Combat power. The F-4 go in combat almost from june '41, also if at time was very small fraction of jagdwaffe (8%), the emil were around 1/3 of jagdwaffe strenght in late june but almost half had N engine so no long away in performance to Spit V.
in late december '41 the emil were less 1/4 of strenght, around half F-4, around 1/8 anton

The anton-1 cruising a 590 km/h at 5 km at 2300 rpm 1.15 ata so max speed at 2550 rpm 1.30 ata is more, not many away from that of follower version

You are right, vicenzo, the 635 km/h is indeed achieved at Climb combat power. Thanks for clearing the BMW-801C issue.
So, the RAF must act quickly (maybe the best time being right after Op Barbarossa is started, making sure LW has a better part of it's fighter force deployed vs. SU?) and in full force (FC, BC, Coastal command bombers), in order to overwhelm the defenders, while not allowing the Germans to field the F-4s in good numbers. The targets being airbases, submarine pens in construction, fuel facilities, war material depots, marshaling yards, even venturing into Germany proper, to make themselves less predictable.

daylight bomber in german proper i think it's a massacre for the bomber crews, AAchen is around 350 km from England, of this ~250 over enemy territory, Bremerhaven flying over sea is almost 500 km from England, there are many trouble for the escort capacity

The attacks on the targets in Germany should be made on random intervals, so the defenders have hard time to make meaningful predictions preparations. The main attacks should be LW bases in N. France Low Countries, sub pens under construction, and other valuable targets in those parts of W. Europe.
BTW, here is an account from a 1941 bomb raid vs. targets in Germany, from parsifal:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/1941-best-airframe-single-engined-fighter-32273-7.html#post885593

for attacking 2 targets 400 km from england with 54 Blenheim, they used 24 bombers for diversion and 485 fighters for escort (main and diversion). they losses 12 Blenheim over 20% of attack force and 10 fighters they clamed destruction of targets and 4+5+10 enemy fighters. Foreman confirm 11 enemy planes (idk the book of Foreman and idk if he check german report). I don't see this as a successfull operation almost is not replicable in large scala.

How good a defence the LW can put up into air with RAF venturing into German-held Europe on daily basis, with some 1300 planes (BC, FC, while suitable types from CC attack coastal targets)? They have 200 SE fighters on-hand there, plus maybe 50 TE fighters after Op Barbarossa is started. The 1st targets being air bases (plus radars, once those are in function).

The raids that cost RAF one bomber and one fighter, for each fighter LW looses is far more sustainable for RAF in second half of 1941, than it's the case for LW.

i've many doubt on lw losses cited in that mission FC heavy overclaimed in '41 so it's very strange that lw actual losses are more of claimed sure destroyed, probably the actual losses were 1 or 2 planes or this day was very lucky for FC but other days were much badest

RAF indeed suffered some big losses, that's why I've started the thread about the RAF LW losses in 1941-42.

IMO the way of 'baiting' LW into combat was very wrong - really small number of bombers, with big number of fighters waiting for the LW to show up. Once the LW understood the game, they reasoned that small number of bombers is hardly to make any damage, if they attack from high altitudes. If the bombers fly lower, the Flak can do the damage to them. So LW decided it can sit on the ground while such a bombing 'raid' is under way. In case LW ground controllers assume that it would be worthwhile to attack the RAF while over NE Europe, they can direct the fighters to the most favorable position (achieving local superiority, thus enabling them to make plenty of kills vs. small number of own losses). IIRC many of the RAF fighters wer claimed by light Flak, too.
With 600 bombers being the 'bait' (attacking 1st the targets I've listed in the above posts), LW cannot choose to sit down. They need to scramble and try their best to destroy as much of them as possible - RAF has LW fighters right where they want them. Not a great prospect for the LW, since they will be significantly outnumbered for last 7 months of 1941 (vs. UK-based fighters, not to mention vs. all that RAF can throw there) and on.

FC outnumbered lw fighters if they combat over channel but it they combat over Cologne or over Hamburg?

Of course, the RAF was not able to go there prior 1944.
I'm trying to make feasible ways of attacking (and destroying) land-based German assets by RAF, while inflicting as much casualties as possible on LW. The Germans would be forced to increase the expanses even more than they did historically, cutting somewhere else (= beneficially for the Allied war effort).
The RAF tried to destroy land-based German assets mostly by BC night offensive. The efforts were unfruitful, forcing the BC to adopt the notorious dehoussing, in second half of 1942. The day bombing should allow for more precise bombing, the targets being closer to the UK will mean less navigational errors (compounded by fact the bombing is during the daylight).
RAF's FC should have better chances of destroying the LW Noorth-West of Ardenes-Paris-Brest line (where those two JGs were located), even if losses are as high as historically at the beginning (June 1941). The greatest losses for the LW should be the pilots, far less replaceable than planes. With LW fighting in the high altitude(trying to kill bombers), there is less of the need to go down, meaning less losses by Flak.
With more war material destroyed there (plus the U-boat pens, under construction, attacked frequently), the Germans will have to relocate the war material (fighters, Flak) from East or MTO to the West, easing the pressure from those two fronts.

(sorry if I'm too repetitive )

One less obvious type of target I would cover would be the high tech wood glue producers. The RAF did knock out the two primary ones but more by luck than planning. If left intact the German aero industry has the option of wood instead of aluminium.We can note the structural failures of the Ta154 and He 162 due to having to use poor performance glues. Of course this would still leave the Luftwaffe with the problem of finding fuel for the aeroplanes, wooden or metal. It was the loss of territory supplying oil and the invasion of France putting tactical attacks on transport into range that crippled the Luftwaffe. Perhaps others can point to similar opportunities for strategic surgery?

Chemical industry was supplying German/Axis war effort by producing the fuel, ammonia, fertilizers, artificial rubber etc. With the chemical plants destroyed, or heavily damaged, the German war machine becomes immobile hungry, lacking explosives for their shells warheads. The hunger would act towards civil population as devastatingly as the infamous 'dehoussing' (I hate when civilians suffer, but I'm realist, too).
Attack on submarine pens by some kind of bouncing bomb (akin to the dam-busters' weapon) could provide quite a shock there.

tomo pauk said:

Attack on submarine pens by some kind of bouncing bomb (akin to the dam-busters' weapon) could provide quite a shock there.

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I believe that was considered as a further use for Upkeep. I will check later.

The pens could have been bombed prior to the tops being enclosed but as mentioned before it was a higher priority to pay back

It wasn't Upkeep but Highball which was considered to attack U-boat pens:

Of the five Biscay ports that had U-boat pens, only Brest was considered assailable by Highball. Direct hits on several pens would be necessary which would not be possible unless a large force was used. Even then the attackers would be dependent on maintaining surprise until the last moment. Each port's defences were strong and it was doubtful if even a few aircraft could reach their targets. There were also two locks at Saint-Nazaire and one at La Pallice through which teh U-boats had to pass, butthose presented the same problems as the canal ones [strong opposition, high accuracy required, multiple locl gates need to be destroyed to make it worthwhile].

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Flower, A Hell of a Bomb.

The British persevered with area-bombing because by 1943-44 they had a huge force of four engine bombers that were suitable for nothing else. In the early part of the war they had tried precision daylight bombing and found their bombers had neither the technology to deliver their payloads accurately enough or the defensive capability to survive fighter attacks. So they tried precision night bombing and everything was going great until a review discovered that only one in five bombs fell within five miles of the designated target. By this time Britain had dedicated about 20% of it's wartime economy to building bombers so failure was not an option. Lacking any way to improve bombing accuracy to the required level, Bomber Command took the alternative route and selected bigger targets – cities.
USAAF experience pretty much followed the same path. Certainly bombing accuracy improved markedly during the war, but never to anything like the degree required to attain the USAAF ambition of taking out factories in the midst of cities. By the standards of the time, dropping most bombs within a kilometre of the target would have been considered excellent accuracy. American strategists grew to accept that hitting a designated target inevitably involved bombing an extended area around it
In short, the British precision-bombed area targets by night and the Americans area-bombed precision targets by day.
After the war an American study into strategic bombing in Europe found than German military production rose steadily throughout the campaign and peaked in 1945 before dropping off sharply as ground forces overran production sites. It was also found that the impact of bombing in reducing output was secondary to effect of the Germans dispersing their production sites to decrease vulnerability. It would be silly to say that Allied bombing did not have an effect on German military production but the idea that German industry was devastated by Allied bombing is optimistic to say the least.
Probably the greatest contribution made by USAAF daylight bombing was the destruction of the Luftwaffe. Thanks to the bomber crews and their escorting fighters the LW was a shadow of its former self by D-Day. This is where speculation that the De Havilland Mosquito could have done the job of the B-17 falls flat – the Mosquito could never have inflicted on the Luftwaffe the kind of losses caused by the heavily defended armadas of Flying Fortresses. Air superiority allowed the Allied aerial interdiction campaign to decimate German transport and fuel supplies. By the last months of the war the Germans still had plenty of fighters, just no fuel and no experienced pilots to fly them.
So what should have been changed in retrospect? The RAF should have restricted their bombing to targets large enough to be vulnerable at night – ports and large industrial complexes – until such time as technology (oboe etc) and tactics (pathfinders) increased their accuracy. This would have required a reduced force and the resources saved could have been committed elsewhere. The USAAF should have restricted their bombing to targets within range of the escort fighters of the time while they waited for the P-51. This would have minimised losses and inflicted maximum damage on the Luftwaffe, which as it transpired was to be their greatest contribution.

CobberKane said:

Probably the greatest contribution made by USAAF daylight bombing was the destruction of the Luftwaffe. Thanks to the bomber crews and their escorting fighters the LW was a shadow of its former self by D-Day. This is where speculation that the De Havilland Mosquito could have done the job of the B-17 falls flat – the Mosquito could never have inflicted on the Luftwaffe the kind of losses caused by the heavily defended armadas of Flying Fortresses.

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Actually, no it doesn't.

The Luftwaffe was not destroyed by the guns of the B-17s - which really weren't that effective - but by the long range escort fighters, such as the P-51. The effect was even greater when the escort fighters were released from close escort duties and tasked with hunting and destroying the Lutwaffe. By that stage the bombers were largely bait.

The Luftwaffe didn't help their cause either, with the edict that the defending fighters were to ignore the escorts and go after the bombers.

wuzak said:

Actually, no it doesn't.

The Luftwaffe was not destroyed by the guns of the B-17s - which really weren't that effective - but by the long range escort fighters, such as the P-51. The effect was even greater when the escort fighters were released from close escort duties and tasked with hunting and destroying the Lutwaffe. By that stage the bombers were largely bait.

The Luftwaffe didn't help their cause either, with the edict that the defending fighters were to ignore the escorts and go after the bombers.

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Certainly the P51 was the terrible swift sword, but it was only able to be so because large scale daylight bombing dragged the Luftwaffe into the air and made them vulnerable. Remember, when the RAF had been flying their Rhubarbs over occuppied Europe the Luftwaffe, knowing the miserable number of bombers involved were incapable of causing any significant damage, could choose to engage or not. But they couldn't ignore a hundred B-17s over Germany

CobberKane said:

Certainly the P51 was the terrible swift sword, but it was only able to be so because large scale daylight bombing dragged the Luftwaffe into the air and made them vulnerable. Remember, when the RAF had been flying their Rhubarbs over occuppied Europe the Luftwaffe, knowing the miserable number of bombers involved were incapable of causing any significant damage, could choose to engage or not. But they couldn't ignore a hundred B-17s over Germany

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So Mosquitos bombing the **** out of German industry wouldn't get the Luftwaffe in the air?

And if the LW don't send the fighters, all the better for the bombers.