Bomber vs fighter

[stona]

I'd like to see a source for that 1943 OKL order. I know from many first hand accounts that several units were still adopting the head on tactic after this date. I'm not saying hat such an order didn't exist, I'm just saying that some of the men whose lives depended on which tactics they adopted ignored it.

A 'sturmstaffel' did usually attack from the rear.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Juha]

I agree with Stona, e.g. on 6 March 44 during the Berlin raid LW made at least two big formation head-on attacks, the first by SE fighters and the 2nd by TE fighters.

Juha

 

[stona]

Uwe Micheel's account, which I gave above, was in a letter to his brother written on 8th October 1943, just ten days before he was KIA.

There are many more, right up to the end of the war.

Steve

 

[swampyankee]

Since the USAAF found that unescorted bombers were subject to unacceptably high loss rates, and operations research found that casualties aboard the bombers were increased by the bombers' defensive armament, I think the answer is that bombers are going to lose more often against fighters than not.

 

[stona]

Since the USAAF found that unescorted bombers were subject to unacceptably high loss rates, and operations research found that casualties aboard the bombers were increased by the bombers' defensive armament, I think the answer is that bombers are going to lose more often against fighters than not.

it was a close run thing.

In the case of the US bombers their defensive armament and tactics made them a very difficult prospect to attack, even unescorted. In the end the unescorted day light bomber did lose the contest, but only just. It has a lot to do with the rapid increase in fighter performance from the mid 1930s onward.

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

Yes, a lot is written and made of the heavy attrition suffered by tyhe allies in the 1943 campaigns, without acknowledging the positively vicious attrition rates suffered by the Luftwaffe Reich defences to achieve that result. Whilst a few experten pilots were always around to give a seasoning of expertise in the LW fighter formations, the majority of garden variety LW pilots were pretty thin in terms of the experience and training they could draw on. Compared to the average allied pilots of the following year, these guys were straight up green horns, with much less chance of survival and more needed to shoot down a bomber than had previously been the case.

It was not all one way traffic by any means

 

[stona]

Exactly. Nowadays it is taken as a no brainer that unescorted formations of bombers are almost defenceless against fighter interception but this was certainly not the case in the 1930s. The prevalent idea that 'the bomber will always get through' was not far fetched at all.
It wasn't until October 1943 (barely 18 months before the end of the European war) that the USAAF conceded that it's method, though not its home grown strategic bombing doctrine might be flawed.

The Spanish civil war was observed with interest by many major air forces and yet they drew opposing conclusions. Many, notably the Soviet Union reckoned that the bomber did not always get through and was not always effective. It concentrated on supporting the army in what we now call CAS and interdiction.
The then assistant chief of staff of the USAC was a certain Brigadier General 'Hap' Arnold. In an editorial for the 'US Air Services' issue of May 1938 he explained that as a 'mere civil conflict' in an under developed country (Spain) which did not involve strategic bombing on any scale it should not effect the USAC's doctrine in this respect.
The British reached similar conclusions and the die was cast.

Cheers

Steve

 

[bobbysocks]

from the same site FlyboyJ posted....

Lt Franz Stigler, a 500mission veteran describes a 1944 attack against American bombers in the excerpt below:

"It was early 1944 and an unescorted formation of about 100 B-17's came up from the Mediterranean to bomb Germany. Our group of 36 aircraft was ordered off to intercept with my squadron flying high cover to ward off any escorting fighters, while the other two went after the bombers. We made contact just north of the Alps, a few miles from Munich.

We had a good chance to inflict maximum damage to the Fortresses below us and I led my 12-plane squadron down in a screaming dive. We flashed past the high combat box in an overhead pass, continuing through through in a breakaway before climbing back up for another attack.

With high speed built up in a dive, my aircraft made aircraft made a very fleeting target and the more vertical my descent, the more difficult it was for the top turret gunner to get an angle on me. I targeted the pilot's cabin, the engines and wing's oil and fuel tanks. On this type of approach, the firing time was extremely limited. I could get in only one short burst. But I was going so fast that I was also harder to hit and the real danger was that I might collide with my quarry. I was through the formation before he even saw me and climbing back for another pass."

Attacks from above had the advantage of placing the vulnerable oil tanks (inside of the inboard engine nacelles) and wing fuel tanks (inside the outboard engine nacelles) directly in the attacker's path.

 

[Aozora]

I'd like to see a source for that 1943 OKL order. I know from many first hand accounts that several units were still adopting the head on tactic after this date. I'm not saying hat such an order didn't exist, I'm just saying that some of the men whose lives depended on which tactics they adopted ignored it.

A 'sturmstaffel' did usually attack from the rear.

Cheers

Steve

+1 - there are other post-August 43 actions described in the book that mention frontal attacks being carried out; eg: 23rd March 1944

At 11:00 hrs, contact was amde with the 296 B-17s of the 1st Bombardment Division....The German formation [II. IV./JG 3 and Sturmstaffel 1] overflew the bomber Pulk from the left, wheeled ahead and at 11:20, from north of Hamm, launched a mass frontal attack. Within the space of 10 minutes Sturmstaffel 1 accounted for six B-17s shot down or forced out of formation.

So even Sturmstaffel 1, which was supposed to attack from the rear, attacked from the front well after the OKL order was issued.

 

[Milosh]

I believe it is a book called 'Bomber' which has a graphic which shows as a percentage the direction of attacks on B-17s and B-24s.

Iirc there wasn't much difference between head on and rear attacks.

 

[GrauGeist]

Steinhoff referred to the "swooping" attacks with Me262s as "rollercoaster attacks".

 

[stona]

From memory the #3 engine on a B-17 was a primary target as this drove the hydraulic pump. I've read several accounts in which Luftwaffe pilots mention this.

There is a good picture of a captured B-17 ( probably Wulf Hound) in which the vulnerable areas have been marked out in white paint or tape as part of a Luftwaffe instructional course. They are pretty much as Stigler described above.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Garyt]

I recall reading about a couple 262 pilots that conducted "swooping" passes through a box formation, starting their run above and behind, diving through and giving short bursts as they went. Once through the formation, they passed ahead and climbed above the formation coming about for another pass, then diving through just as they had before, just in the opposite direction.

Interesting with the ME262. I could see why a different attack method was sued. above and behind gives them a longer time with guns on the target - and the 30mm cannon needed 4-5 hits I think on average from behind? Which means without having to get 20 hits or so, a pass from above could be far more successful.

 

[bobbysocks]

i had also read somewhere of the lw emplying a yo yo attack where they would attack from underneath and really only be partly exposed to the lower ball turret and porpoise up and down......but i have yet to read of an actual pilot who used this tactic.

 

[GrauGeist]

Interesting with the ME262. I could see why a different attack method was sued. above and behind gives them a longer time with guns on the target - and the 30mm cannon needed 4-5 hits I think on average from behind? Which means without having to get 20 hits or so, a pass from above could be far more successful.

The "20 hit" theory applied mostly to the 20mm, the 30mm Mk108 could bring a B-17 down with three hits on average. The 30mm "Minengeschoss" round was 11 ounces of high-explosive and was devastating to anything it struck.

 

[Garyt]

The "20 hit" theory applied mostly to the 20mm, the 30mm Mk108 could bring a B-17 down with three hits on average.

4-5 I've heard, but that was indeed my point. The more powerful 30mm round would have a major effect on tactics - because with far less hits being needed to down a plane, an approach from above and rear would keep the guns on the target longer, resulting in greater chances of hits.

 

[kettbo]

I was at the Flying Heritage Collection in Everett, WA, USA yesterday

.50 cal vs 30mm Mk 108

 

[GrauGeist]

A single Minengeschoss round could take the wing off a P-51, it didn't take many to cripple a bomber, especially when the Me262 was diving down on a B-17 and targeting the wing area.

There were quite a variety of the 3cm rounds used, all of them nasty.

In case anyone wants a little more info on the Mk108/103 ammo used, here's a great thread full of references:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/weapons-systems-tech/30mm-mine-shell-12821.html

 

[pbehn]

I was at the Flying Heritage Collection in Everett, WA, USA yesterday

.50 cal vs 30mm Mk 108

View attachment 258667View attachment 258668

Saw a similar comparison between RAf spit and hurricane bullets and the Bf109 cannon round, different leagues.

 

[Garyt]

Add to this that the 30mm round used often in the Mk108 had far more explosive filler than other 30mm rounds, and the .50 cal US round had at best a bit of incindiary filler.