Boulton Paul Defiant

stona said:

The RAF made a net gain of 261 Hurricanes and 175 Hurricanes between 6th July and 2nd November 1940. Production far outweighed losses with the exception of a few weeks in August/September. The loss of 537 airmen, mostly pilots, was a much bigger problem for the British. Here the advantage of fighting over friendly territory was vital. It has been calculated that 501 Squadron, which fought for most of the period in 11 Group, sustained 47% casualties (nineteen killed, eleven wounded), but, had those shot down who returned to the squadron not been able to do so, this figure rises to an unsustainable 72%. For example, the squadrons top scorer, James 'Ginger' Lacey, baled out and survived to fight again no less than three times during this period!

The best figures for losses on both sides are those in 'The Battle of Britain Then and Now' (page 705 of my edition). The RAF lost 1,023 aircraft, the vast majority single engine fighters, the Luftwaffe 1,887 of which 873 were Bf 109s or Bf 110s. Just about every source will give slightly different numbers, but the overall result is always similar.

The Bf 110 losses were over 2/3 of initial strength, but actually close to 100% (some give 94%) of operational strength at the beginning of the Battle. Operational ready rates for the Bf 110 were not great following the campaigns prior to the BoB.

Cheers

Steve

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Sorry but this is complete nonsence. RAF FC combat losses during July-October period were close to 1430 fighters FB/Cat 3! Of course, many of them were soon Re-Cat 2, but still with those originaly categorized as FB/Cat 2, losses were tremendous. The real advantage was great repair system of CRO. The true is that RAF fighter losses were much greater than Jagdwaffe and even higher than whole Luftwaffe combat losses. Problem for Luftwaffe was how to quickly replenish those lost planes, because severely damaged machines were transported to Germany by train for factory repair. I would love to write book about it, but unfortunatelly in our country corruption is such, that I was denied to do it. My project at Charles university was denied in favour of someone else.

stona said:

Luckily for Fighter Command it only operated two squadrons of Defiants, Nos. 141 and 264 during the Battle. They claimed 22 Luftwaffe aircraft, but for the loss of 28 aircrew, a figure made worse by the Defiant's crew of two. To put that negative ratio in perspective, the average Hurricane squadron claimed 5.7 aircraft for every pilot lost and the average Spitfire squadron 7.4.
If we accept the total Luftwaffe losses as 1,887 aircraft and Fighter Command aircrew losses at 537 the actual overall ratio is about 3.5 aircraft destroyed for each pilot lost, so the claims are unsurprisingly optimistic. The more important figure is that for every RAF aircrew killed the Luftwaffe lost nearly 5, with many more captured and removed from the fray.
Cheers
Steve

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Sorry, but your counting is based on virtual numbers. There is no such number as 1887 Luftwaffe planes lost in reality. It was badly counted by Cornwell and he knows it.

If you want to start discussion about real numbers, first look into Narrow Margin. The real kill/loss ratio in Hurricane and Spitfire squadrons was close to 1:1. Defiants did not destroy nearly any known plane during the Battle of Britain, not even the best known Dornier from the museum. Mabye, it should be finally counted after 76 years by British historians but their quality is very bad, unfortunatelly I like only few of them, otherwise it is....sad.

If you care to examine the source I quoted, many authors, edited by Winston Ramsey, you will find 134 pages listing all Luftwaffe losses between the beginning of July and the end of October 1940, gathered from many sources, including of course those of the Germans. You are free to challenge the numbers, but you will need some good sources and several years of research.

Fighter Command had some reservations about the Defiant from the beginning. There were no proper tactics devised for a turret fighter, and Dowding obviously doubted that those suggested would work in the long run (if at all). Before the type even reached a squadron Dowding was wondering what to do with it, and asked that assessments be made of it.



The results of those trials were very unpromising. Indeed, the conclusion was that the Defiant should be relegated to 'night use only'.
This was in January 1940, long before the Battle of Britain.



That the aircraft was ever used in daylight following this assessment was unfortunate, but not stupid. It was a numbers game, Fighter Command also counted its Blenheim squadrons as part of its overall establishment. There is an argument that the Defiant should have been officially withdrawn from day light operations earlier than it eventually was, but in reality it barely flew in the BoB, following losses in France.

You really cannot bandy about accusations about the quality of British historians, or the competence of RAF officers with no evidence whatsoever to support such claims and expect to escape unchallenged.

Cheers

Steve

In the ten days of intensive operations, which account for 25% of RAF and 24% of Luftwaffe casualties, the kill ratio in favour of the RAF was always positive, varying from 1:1 to 3.6:1. Average for the ten days, 1.8:1.

stona said:

The Specification for the Defiant is only 'bad' with hindsight. In the early and mid 1930s the RAF had severe doubts about the the effectiveness of fixed gun fighters, even with eight or ten machine guns, against formations of bombers.
Salmond, then AOC-in-C Air Defence of Great Britain clarified the issue in 1933 when he wrote

"I would suggest that the fixed gun single seater, which is the cause of this pessimism, was designed in the first instance rather for the needs of air fighting in France in 1916-18 than for the purpose of home defence fighting."

In order to break up enemy formations in the short time available Salmond suggested that

"the design of the home defence fighter and the tactics employed should be such as to produce the maximum of fire effect in the minimum time."

To get the concentration required would require the attacking aircraft to make their attack in formation, and this ruled out fixed gun fighters, because

"A pilot cannot aim a gun and at the same time accurately maintain his position in formation."

It is these perfectly reasonable arguments, at the time, which led to the development of the specifications which would result in the Defiant. By April 1935 the Operational Requirements Committee were discussing 'Air Staff Requirements for a Single Engine Two-seater Day and Night Fighter'. The resulting Air Staff requirement showed the quandary resulting from the desire to have a multi seat fighter in conjunction with a failure to agree viable tactics for its use. The Requirement called for a fighter which

"..can bring fire to bear from a moveable battery of at least four machine guns over the upper hemisphere...; thus conferring on it the ability to attack from below and behind, below and in front, or on the flank of an enemy formation, at the same time enabling the batteries of all fighters to be trained on to the target simultaneously while in formation."

The draft F.9/35 was approved by Ellington and circulated to industry that month, a full specification followed in May, and the Defiant was ordered in 1938. By the time it entered service two years later, viable tactics for its employment had still not been worked out, and the rapid development of aircraft elsewhere had rendered it virtually useless as a day fighter.

Cheers

Steve

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The general concept of a bomber destroyer was certainly not unique, as witnessed by the Bell Airacuda, and multi-seat fighters were fielded by several air forces, but I think that the RAF, which wrote the spec, was somewhat guilty of wishful thinking in assuming that a bomber destroyer would not need to deal with escorts, especially as their most likely enemy was less than 500 km, by air, from London.

What I meant was fighters such as the Vickers FB5

And F.E.2b

Had been tried and found wanting even for attacking observation balloons and German reconnaissance aircraft compared to fixed gun fighters. There were others with similar configuration.
The B.F.2b

Had trouble defending itself against single seat fighters when flown in formation and depending on the rear gun/s for defense. When flown as a "fighter" using the front gun and mixing it up with the attackers it gained a rather formidable reputation.

The RAF had Hawker Demons with power turrets from about the end of 1936. One wonders if they ever conducted any experiments with a "formation" (say 6 or more) Demons intercepting a formation of bombers (6 or more) using gun cameras or some sort of recording devices to actually see if this scheme was practical. AS in trying to coordinate the fighter formation (radios? hand signals?. wing wagging? ) while attacking the "bombers" and what happens if the bombers do something as simple as a 30-45 degree turn away from the fighters?
Attacking a formation of bombers that are 100mph slower than the fighters may offer a good chance of success but attacking a group of bombers that are flying at close to the speed of the turret fighters really limits the attack possibilities. Neither side can operate at full speed (limited by slowest aircraft of the formation

ARRRGH, system ate the rest of the reply twice, will post later.

Shortround, the RAF may very well have done that and ignored the results as unimportant or the result of the limits on the rules of the exercise.

Thank you.
The turret fighter as a defense against bombers would only work, under suitable conditions, until the attacking bombers had turrets to shot back with. Perhaps a narrow window of opportunity? Depending on your enemy/s NOT to develop their own turrets and/or heavy aircraft guns doesn't seem like good planning either.
French Leo 451 bomber.

Top speed about 4mph slower than a Defiant. And trading "broadsides" of .303 bullets and 20mm cannon shells doesn't sound like the best idea either.
The Defiant II was first delivered in Aug of 1941, the Same month that saw the delivery of 14 B-25Bs with both top and bottom twin .50 power turrets (the bottom turret was a dud against maneuvering fighters), well over 100 B-26s (no letter) had been delivered with a twin .50 top turret and Sept, 5th 1941 would see the first B-17E fly with top turret, belly turret (periscope sight, not ball turret), manual twin .50s in the tail and more manual single, 50s sticking out in assorted directions. Yes these are allied aircraft but show that the British did NOT have a lock on power turrets and that assuming that Britain's enemies would NOT be able to develop power turrets during the time to took to design, build and bring the Defiant (and Roc and.....) into service was a gamble. Yes the Germans failed to develop power turrets in a timely fashion but that had more to do with doctrine than engineering capability.
Yes this much more of a test rig than planned operational aircraft but shows the extent of British thinking along these lines.

and this 1/2 scale flying model

of the Boulton-Paul P.92/2

Four 20mm guns in a turret.

There was an awful lot of time, money and effort expended on a theory that doesn't seem to have a lot of actual testing done before committing to hardware. And not a lot done to explore alternatives (like holding gunnery training/camp more than once a year?) so the pilots would actually be better shots.
I don't know about the gunnery training but actual bomb training was a once a year event. Squadrons moved to the bombing range/s from their home bases and conducted exercise for a one or two week period and then back to home base for another year without dropping full sized bombs. Perhaps not even 20lb training training bombs when flying from home bases?

The time wasted on theories that didnt work was not confined to the pre war years. The big wing theory persisted until about 1941 I believe.

If not longer, but if the basic weapon/s (airplane-guns-sights, etc) are not too biased or compromised then you can change tactics (stop trying to use the big wing) without having to change production, If you have compromised the weapons to suit the theory (cruiser tanks and infantry tanks or turret fighters) then you have to design and build new weapons to go along with the change in theory/doctrine/tactics.

I will grant that using hind sight makes flawed theories easier to pick out or criticize but looking back to WW I and then to the 1930s, it sure seems like a lot of what was learned (or at least known about even if not popular) was thrown away and new/untested weapons/tactics/theories were adopted in many areas of warfare.

BTW it didn't all stop in WW II, some weapons/theories of the 1950s almost defy common sense. At least the amount of time, money and effort put into some of them without even decent test results. The love affair with unguided rockets for bomber interception for one.

The problem with theories is that people of high rank attach their egos to them. The claims of the big wing were accepted even though there was absolutely no evidence to support them. If they had shot down 40 or 50 bombers over London there would be some wrecks on the ground. It was all too difficult to accept and tell those at the top, much easier to get rid of Dowding and Park. As others have said, if the turret fighter was tested against bomber formations or single engined fighters then the results would be conclusive but they would also probably be ignored.

They were so in love with the concept of the turret fighter they fitted the Mosquito prototype with a dummy turret


And built a turret fighter prototype, W4053

And the Beaufighter had one installed.


However the night fighters had a somewhat different reason. The flying in formation and firing broadside tactic was forgotten. Instead the turret was supposed to offer more opportunity for engagement, either allowing for off angle or for a longer duration burst at a fleeting sighting.
The early radars had a minimum distance after which they blanked out. They would get the nightfighter to within several hundred yds of the target after which the crew had to visually spot the target. All too often the target was to one side or the other of nose or higher or lower or both higher and to one side making it very difficult to bring the fixed guns to bear. Doing a 360 turn to try to approach the target again often meant loosing the target/contact. The number of contacts/sightings well exceeded the actual firing opportunities in the early days.

Shortround6 said:

Yes these are allied aircraft but show that the British did NOT have a lock on power turrets and that assuming that Britain's enemies would NOT be able to develop power turrets during the time to took to design, build and bring the Defiant

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I am sure the Brits did not think they had a lead in powered turrets since the Bolton Paul turret in the Defiant was based on licenses purchased from SAMM aka Societe d'Applications des Machines Motrices

Shortround6 said:

However the night fighters had a somewhat different reason. The flying in formation and firing broadside tactic was forgotten. Instead the turret was supposed to offer more opportunity for engagement, either allowing for off angle or for a longer duration burst at a fleeting sighting.

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I don't believe that the Mosquito turret fighter prototype was a night fighter. Certainly not at that stage.

wuzak said:

I don't believe that the Mosquito turret fighter prototype was a night fighter. Certainly not at that stage.

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Everything I have read about it said it was a mock up to satisfy someones requirement. In every field of combat a turret armed mosquito eliminated all the designs advantages. The turret weighed more than the bomber versions bomb load.

pbehn said:

Everything I have read about it said it was a mock up to satisfy someones requirement. In every field of combat a turret armed mosquito eliminated all the designs advantages. The turret weighed more than the bomber versions bomb load.

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They mocked up a turret on the original prototype, W4050.

They also built a turret fighter prototype, W4053, with a functional turret. But the turret did not function all that well in flight, even getting stuck in flight with a passenger aboard (John de Havilland).

Sometimes it has been suggested that the turret was for defence on the bomber version, but the weight is too much, as you noted, and the turret cuts into the bomb bay space.

wuzak said:

Sometimes it has been suggested that the turret was for defence on the bomber version, but the weight is too much, as you noted, and the turret cuts into the bomb bay space.

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I can imagine the conversation when the turret version was completed. "Here is your turret armed bomber" ...."Oh that is interesting, where do the bombs go".

"Ah, well. Well alter the fuselage, extend the wings, add a couple more engines, and call it Lancaster !"

The USAAF's non-functional hypothesis was that bombers flying in close formation could successfully defend themselves against fighters operated by pilots willing to press home attacks. They even tried to develop "escort bombers," the YB-40 variant of the B-17 and the YB-41 variant of the B-24, an idea that was, in some ways, even more bonkers than the Defiant.