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Were the requirements that stringent?What I thought made the F4F better was that the Navy gave Grumman not only a second chance, but relaxed the requirements too.
I read somewhere (not any of Prof. Propwash's work) that after the acceptance trials the Navy decided the requirements were too stringent. This allowed the Wildcat some advantages in the fuselage over the Buffalo. Grumman had already realized the XF4F1 was a poor effort.
This is why I usually don't answer threads seriously. I can't really back up my "facts". I was really hoping S Shortround6 , orbuffnut453 would have joined in.
Thank you. That clears a lot up.The competition which Brewster won is somewhat confused and confusing. Grumman originally fielded yet another derivative of its biplane fighter series, designated the XF4F-1, which was clearly inferior to the Brewster product. Grumman did a "quick" redesign, basically turning the prototype biplane into a monoplane with the designation XF4F-2. The XF4F-2 still proved inferior to Brewster's offering and so Grumman redesigned it again, designating it the XF4F-3, and this time they won a contract.
I suspect the Navy going with Grumman was largely down to the company's well-established history of delivering aircraft to the Service. Despite offering a better product during the procurement, Brewster was a risky proposition due to its lack of experience delivering and sustaining military aircraft.
Thank you. That clears a lot up.
It's my understanding that the Brewster factory wasn't really setup for high volume production, either (completed planes had to be lowered down from the second story?).
Do you know if they had already remedied that issue by the time of the Navy contract?
True. Thanks for indulging me.In short...no. That said, it must be remembered that high volume production wasn't really a thing when the Buffalo was first constructed. The Grumman F3F biplane fighter only managed a production run of 147, while its predecessor, the F2F numbered only 55. The US was a long way from being the arsenal of democracy when production of the F2A-1 began in 1938.
The 'two managers' were not Brewster Aeronautical officials, but salesmen who operated a Brewster-adjacent sales firm. Their stint in Lewisburg Federal Penitentiary was unrelated to Brewster but rather for breaking neutrality laws selling Curtiss Condors in South America. And the Fleet Air Arm did use the Brewster Corsair operationally in the Far East.I knew several Buffalo pilots including USN, USMC, and RAAF. All of them liked it AS A FLYING MACHINE. No less an authority than Marion Carl said he would've done as well at Midway in an F2A v. his F4F. New Zealand's leading ace against Japan, Geoff Fisken, said he liked the Brewster for its .50 caliber armament and dive performance. (His previous ride was a Vickers Vildebeest, IIRC.
As noted in this thread, the F2A suffered from poor carrier suitability (weak landing gear), and VF-3 kept some aircraft off the flight schedule in order to have a few for an emergency.
With limited production, some parts and even aircraft were hand-fitted, as I recall from one or two USN guys.
Also as noted, the company was rotten with corruption (two managers went to prison) and incompetence. I do not think that any F3A Corsairs went to combat--retained for operational training.
You will find that some of the FAA front line squadrons used the Brewster built Corsair III while working up, but they swapped them out for Vought built Corsair II or Goodyear built Corsair IV before joining their parent carriers and entering combat. Corsair III also turn up in second line squadrons, including in Ceylon, for use in things like refresher training, where they occasionally turned up on carriers during deck landing training.Andm the Fleet Air Arm did use the Brewster Corsair operationally in the Far East.
This is what Dana Bell said almost year ago.In the book "Corsair KD431 The Time Capsule Fighter" they describe the 'restoration" of a British Goodyear-built Corsair which fortunately remained almost original because it was given to a mechanic's training school. They figured out that the wings possibly were built by Brewster.
"All of them liked it AS A FLYING MACHINE."
Which is why I'd rather have an F2A than any other WWII aircraft. And nobody else would have one.
I miss him. Dont know what happened but why isnt he with his people?Dana Bell
It is possible to make some realistic estimates on overclaiming. Finnish overclaiming was different in periods of 1939/40 (smaller) and of 1941/44 (significantly larger). If you consider the AA claims you come on the the value of 2-2.5 for total overclaiming. And I have to repeat: there are historians who try to find out the truth by scrupulously analyzing EVERY loss/victory in the air war. And their work deserves the highest respect.Well, if we apply a consistent factor of overclaiming across all claims (e.g. 2.5), we can still get a relative indicator of a fighter's operational performance. It's probably no less accurate than trying to solve the unsolvable with bad/missing data.
Yes, it is. It's a matter of national pride in Finland.I'm not sure there's a "mass audience" for Brewster kills while in Finnish service. There isn't much of a "mass audience" for the Buffalo at all. Indeed, in this day and age, aviation history is a pretty niche area of interest.
Don't attribute to me what I have not stated. I stated that using claims instead of confirmed victories or enemy data is a way of propaganda.As to your last point, you've previously stated that history is about "truth" and now you're claiming that authors use claim ratios for propaganda purposes. Neither are correct, IMHO.
Without quantitative estimates, the reasoning of historians is of zero value. I don't need ready-made answers, I need reliable data and/or archival documents put into circulation. And obtaining such data is the primary task of historians. Statistics (and figures) is not boring, it is charming.Historians seek to explain WHY something happened rather than trot out a boring set of statistics or figures.
I do not need concepts. I need reliable data.That's why we have the concept of historiography so historians can review how positions/attitudes on a topic have changed over time.
In many cases it is an achievable. And can be used further for reasonable estimations/extrapolations.I still say that trying to chase down data on every single kill/loss is an unachievable goal
Sometimes it avoids the misconceptions that the available data provide.and actually doesn't inform much more than data that's more readily to hand.
I have ordered books by Geust on the subject, after reading and analyzing them I will be able to comment on the topic of operational outcome.I admire the devotion of people who seek to do that but, at the end of the day, it's the operational outcome that matters.