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That may be true, and I won't argue that it was not.From what I understand -- the thinking was that it was important that firms' design staffs were kept in being and a semblance of continuity in the development of engines/aircraft be kept during peacetime.
That may be true, and I won't argue that it was not.
However in regards to the thread on early 1000-1200hp escort fighters,
which British bombers should they have planned to escort?
Over what distance?
At what speed?
180mph and over 1000 miles
View attachment 523427
in 1938?
206mph and 1700 miles
View attachment 523428
in 1939?
Or the prototype Manchester and Halifax flying in 1939 with service use planned for late 1940 or early 1941 (didn't make it).
View attachment 523429
The "goals" of escort fighter were constantly shifting and it is a lot easier to make a big, slow long ranged airplane than a small, fast long ranged airplane.
We know the Manchester didn't make it but imagine trying to design an escort fighter for it in 1939/40 to be in service in 1941?
I don't know when they knew the Manchester wasn't going to make the planned 275mph cruise
Frankly, I'm not entirely sure what question is being asked here. Is it "Why did Britain have so many bomber designs?" or is it "Given that Britain put so much effort into bombers, why didn't the Air Ministry invest in a long-range fighter to escort them?"
We also need to consider the evolution of thought when it came to bomber missions. The concept of "the bomber will always through" was thoroughly dismembered by the Battle of Britain when 2 clear conclusions became apparent: that bombers of the time in the numbers employed simply couldn't bring about the desired strategic effect promised by Douhet et al, and that a well-organized, short-range fighter defence could successfully blunt an offensive by unescorted bombers.
Firstly, the number 18 is a tad high. It would also be good to have a tighter definition of what is meant by "bomber". At the very least, we should remove the following from that list:
- Anson which was procured for maritime reconnaissance.
- Hector - army co-op.
- Lysander - army co-op.
- Bombay which was designed as a transport with a secondary role as a bomber.
- Botha was designed as a reconnaissance/torpedo bomber to the same spec as the Beaufort and only ever entered service in a maritime reconnaissance role so it's hardly fair to consider it a discrete bomber type.
Some context to the political landscape is also in order. For example, the Battle was procured because of fears of an arms limitation treaty banning the use of heavy bombers. You're also including aircraft in-service and their replacements that were still in prototype form, some of which wouldn't see service for another couple of years.
Given that technology was advancing at an incredibly rapid rate and that the RAF was desperately trying to expand to meet the emerging threat from Nazi Germany, I think it's hardly surprising that we see such a broad spread of types as the RAF sought to catch up both numerically and qualitatively with the threat posed by the emerging global situation.
I included the Anson because, had things )combat) started earlier, it might have been pressed into service. A list of British bomber squadron from Jan 1st 1938 has at least 16 squadrons still equipped with Hawker Hinds. How fast they got rid of them I don't know but since they built over 500 of them between 1935 and 1938 (another plane to equip the brand new squadrons that was only suitable as a trainer) it might be a flip of the coin as to going into battle with either one.
Army co-operation planes need fighter escort too, just a different one than long range escort.
The reason for including the prototypes that flew in 1939 was to show that the requirements for an "escort fighter" were going to change drastically from the type of airplane that could escort even Hampdens and Pegasus powered Wellingtons. And the Air staff knew it or should have known it as teh designs for the Prototype aircraft were one to two years old when they flew.
I hope some of the above shows that I am in agreement with you even if I word it a bit different.
Not sure about this. For the most part, army co-op aircraft performed more isolated, independent functions that didn't align well with providing fighter escort. Communications, signal dropping and battlefield visual reconnaissance typically weren't of sufficient priority to justify fighter escort...and that goes for all combatants. Aircraft like the Henschel Hs126 or Fieseler Storch, which had similar roles to the Lysander, certainly didn't fly around with much in the way of fighter escorts.
My issue with this statement is that 1939 precedes the Battle of Britain which, as posted earlier, thoroughly debunked the concept of unescorted daylight bombing raids. Without that operational lesson, it would require considerable foresight to develop requirements for a dedicated escort fighter. The USAAF had no concept for a long-range escort fighter until operational experience drove them to that solution after the losses sustained in the latter half of 1942 and into mid-1943. Thus to claim that the Air Ministry "should have known it" is applying too much of the retrospectroscope (IMHO).
From my perspective, we're just having a thought-provoking exchange of ideas about an interesting topic. It's certainly worth discussing why the RAF had so many different bomber types. Then again, we could say much the same about other air forces. For example, did the Luftwaffe really need the Do17 and He111? Similarly the number of twin-engine medium bombers developed for the USAAF in a relatively short space of time: Hudson, Ventura, Maryland, Boston/Havoc, B-25, B-26 etc etc.
Not sure the "Lysander" would be considered a bomber? I could toss stuff out of my Supercub too...
The "Bomber always get's through" might be true, at least some of them. Losses be dammed. However the thing not appreciated was the real lack of damage compared to what was expected. Perhaps it was thought a few bombs sprinkled around Berlin or London would cause a clamor for surrender?
However the thing not appreciated was the real lack of damage compared to what was expected. Perhaps it was thought a few bombs sprinkled around Berlin or London would cause a clamor for surrender?