British bomber development in regards to long range fighters.

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Trying to get back to the original premises of this thread, in 1938-39 the British may have figured that any short range daylight bombing that needed escorts could be escorted by the standard RAF fighters. However the long range bombers were already flying (or soon would be) ranges of 3 to 4 times what the standard fighters could fly. A specialized fighter that could fly those distances (even with drop tanks) would have several performance penalties against it. And let's remember that that in 1938-39 such a fighter would have operate out of a much smaller field than fighters in 1943-44 would be operating out of and you would need special agreements to waive the tire pressure/ground loading requirement. You just can't add 150 gallons to a Spitfire and keep the same size tires without putting deep ruts in the grass fields (even if said Spitfire has constant speed prop and a more powerful engine than the SPitfire I.
 
Hmmm, a new thread, Grumman Goblins vs Lysanders, which was better?
goblins.jpg

Westland-Lysander-Mk--II--RCAF--Serial-No--421---No--2-Squadron---MIKAN-No--3203502.jpg

:D
 
Without checking all the combat aircraft in the battle of Britain flew 1936 or before (depending on whether the Defiant is a combat aircraft) and so by 1940 were at least 4 or 5 year old designs based on early 1930s design and military specs. So kinda set in stone. The British had no air power experience other than ww1 and colonial policing to go on. Modern air power such as the Spanish civil war would have happened too late to prove concepts.

Also I will happily take my radar and Hurricanes and Spitfires over money spent at some Uber fighter and it's Uber bomber if it means winning the BoB.

Can you imagine a new super fighter based on the Vulture or Sabre engines for long range escort burning money and not getting anywhere? The Miles M.20 would look pretty good in a hurry!
 
1) The "bomber boys" believed "the bomber would always get through", and nobody important was convinced enough otherwise to take issue.
2) The soon to be clear fallibility of that doctrine was not apparent pre-1939.
3) The engine power and aerodynamic sophistication to produce an escort fighter that could defeat topnotch interceptors 5 or 600 miles from home and fly home again didn't exist and was only dimly forseen. Multi engine attempts like the P38, BF110, and (OMG!) Airacuda just didn't quite fill the bill.
This has been a highly interesting and educational thread so far. I never cease to be amazed at the erudition and collegiality to be displayed here.
Cheers,
Wes
 
Yup, good points Basket, (and yes, the Defiant is a combat aircraft - it served in combat in that time; a reasonable definition- although not as successful as people would have wished for it) the problem was that the pace of technology overtook knowledge of how a contemporary battlefield scenario might pan out. It is also worth mentioning that none of the combattants that entered WW2 were entirely ready for what panned out. The German bomber crews flying over Britain during the summer of 1940 discovered to their horror that their bombers' defensive armament was wholly inadequate, and their fighter escorts just couldn't protect the bombers as effectively as they'd liked. The Bf 109 had too short legs and the Bf 110 was just too ponderous to tangle with interceptors.

The same with the USAAF. The B-17 in 1939 had the defensive armament of an He 111. Just imagine if B-17Cs went to war over Europe on daylight raids in '39 or '40? Results like the Battles, Blenheims and Wellingtons could be expected. In '41, the 'E model was a major step in the right direction, but subsequent armament mods through to the 'G model proved that there was work still to be done at the time the USAAF began full scale operations over Europe in 1942. Like I said earlier, the first US production bomber equipped with adequate defensive armament was a British only variant of the Liberator, fitted with Boulton Paul power operated turrets. It's also worth mentioning that almost all the USAAC/F's front line fighters and bombers of 1939 to 1941 went to war in British and French hands before they did in American hands. All sorts of deficiencies were found that would need to be rectified for the forthcoming conflict, despite the potential of individual designs.

Again, all this proves is that no one was properly prepared for what was coming, not least the British. Everyone had presumptions and expectations, however inadequate.
 
Lysanders? Audaxes? Come on guys. If it didn't serve with Bomber Command, it isn't worth including now, is it, particularly within the definition of the original premise of this thread.

Now I don't know who was supposed to operate the Fairey airplane or Hawker Henley but if it wasn't "Bomber Command" then they aren't bombers?

You've already answered your own question, mate.

Throwing out the two army co-operation planes and the the two colonial bomber/transports (or transport-bombers) and the obviously interim Hendon and Anson you still have 12 bombers capable of flying 1000 miles or more.
 
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Avoiding the irrelevancies of the "is the Lysander a bomber" and such other debates, to reinforce the British view of bomber defence prior to WW2, here are some passages from a few important bomber specifications issued.

B.12/36 was for a heavy bomber and was dated 15 July 1936 and contained the following regarding defence: "The aircraft must possess high performance but at the same time be strong in defence against attack from any direction."

Under a separate heading of Armament: it states the following: "Two guns in a power operated turret. Two guns amidships in a semi-streamlined and retractable turret beneath the fuselage. Four tail guns in a power-operated turret."

The Short Stirling won a production order to B.12/36.

P.13/36 was for a medium bomber and was dated 8 September 1936 and contained the following regarding defence: "...all round defence is essential. Power operated gun-turrets are to be located in the nose and tail."

Under a separate heading of Armament: it states the following: Two forward guns in a power operated turret under the control of the second pilot. Four tail gunsin a power operated turret. 1,000 rounds of ammunition per gun, with a reserve of 6,000 rounds."

The Avro Manchester and Handley Page HP.56 won production orders to this spec, but the HP.56 was rethunk and evolved into the HP.57 Halifax.

These are quite specific defensive armament requirements for aeroplanes in 1936, when the status quo aboard bombers in service in air forces around the world was little more than that which was fitted to the Handley Page HP O/400. By 1939, things on paper changed a little and had become more sophisticated. Dated 6 March 1939, Specification B.1/39 was for a 'Bomber Landplane' and became known as 'The Ideal Bomber'. Within was the following: "It is essential to provide a defensive armament for the bomber comparable with that of future fighters, thus involving a certain sacrifice of bomb load. The design of the aeroplane must be arranged to conform to the size and shape of the turrets required."

Under the heading Armament is the following: "In view of the known limitations of the .303 in calibre machine gun, the 20mm Hispano gun has been selected as the weapon to be mounted in the turrets. The best arrangement is to provide two large turrets amidships, one above and one below, each mounting four Hispano 20mm guns. The turrets should be operated by hydraulic or hydro-electric power, the maximum size being taken as 10 ft diameter and a depth of 6 ft. 40 magazines (30 rounds each) of ammunition for each turret shall be provided."

Between 1936 and 1939, when the first power turrets began appearing on modern (excluding the Overstrand) service aircraft, the Blenheim, Whitley and Wellington, the RAF's attitude to gunnery was changing. It had to; the officially held premise was that bombers would avoid losses to enemy fighters by their strong defensive armament by day or by operating at night, which was how BC went to war in 1939 - with precisely that approach firmly in place (see Max Hastings Bomber Command). The Air Gunner role as an RAF trade was just emerging, and a central training establishment for gunnery as favoured by the C-in-C BC, Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt was not formed in October 1939, by which time the war had begun. Ludlow-Hewitt wrote a paper in March 1939 after examining the state of BC at that time and it was scathing to say the least, particularly with regards to gunnery, in which results from target practise in operating the new turrets were dismal, principally because of inadequate training and the difficulty trainee gunners had in operating their turrets. (John Terraine, The Right of the Line) In May 1939, Ludlow-Hewitt wrote to the Air Ministry the following:

"There is little doubt that the weakest point of our bomber force at this moment lies in its gun defence... I fear that the standard of efficiency of air gunners and their ability to resist hostile attack remains extremely low."

At least he was a realist. Whilst he eventually got his wish for a central gunnery school, and the RAF under Harris began to improve accuracy with the addition of advanced navigation and bombing aids - another of Ludlow-Hewitt's bugbears about the contemporary pre-war BC, he then added the following, which was, promptly ignored:

"Experience in China and Spain seems clearly to indicate that with the aircraft in use in these theatres of war at present , Fighter Escorts are considered absolutely essential for the protection of bomber aircraft. So far as I am aware this policy runs counter to the view long held by the Air Staff."
 
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"... Fighter Escorts are considered absolutely essential for the protection of bomber aircraft. So far as I am aware this policy runs counter to the view long held by the Air Staff."

And the malign influence of a certain Trenchard who, though retired in 1930 (?), still attempted to influence policy at the Air Ministry.

Cheers

Steve
 
With 20/20 hindsight perhaps it is a blessing that the UK didn't develop a long range fighter to be in service in 1940/41. In 1940 at the fall of France the UK had only 500 single engine fighters for its own defence. As the BoB progressed the real shortage was of capable front line pilots. Any fighter would be escorting bombers with much less defensive fire than the later US bombers. By late 1941 any such escort would have run into the Fw190 so unless it was better than a Spitfire Mk V it would be hard pressed to defend itself.
 
This has been a highly interesting and educational thread so far. I never cease to be amazed at the erudition and collegiality to be displayed here.

And your summation in post #66 of the situation is on point, Wes.

It is, however worth mentioning that both the P-38 and Bf 110 were actually great aeroplanes (airplanes) that came away from the war having redeemed themselves as combat aircraft. The Bf 110 suffered from the same curse that beset the Boulton Paul Defiant, the specification versus reality were at odds with each other and the designers did the best they could with their respective products to meet a flawed requirement. That the Bf 110 became one of the Luftwaffe's most widely applied workhorses was a given - it was a good design, despite not living up to its expectation as a long range escort.

Funny, the Defiant and Bf 110's careers follow a similar path; both were found wanting in their original roles, which were flawed to begin with, but excelled as specialised night fighters, even if they were both intended as interims in that role. Both found employment outside of their purview, at which they were both suitably applied. As a negative however, during the summer of 1940, both were forced to use the Lufbery circle as a defensive measure when approached by large numbers of single seaters during daylight combat; this was not ideal at all for either long range escorts or interceptors.
 
The Bf 110 was designed as a 3 seater so it was bigger and heavier than it needed to be. Although it became a 3 seater again as a night fighter. So the Bf 110 is everything in glorious technicolour of the folly of the 1930s design. Fw 187 comment pending!

Back to bombing and the only true metric was speed. Doesn't matter about escorts or how many defence guns.

How about when Hurricanes escorted Petlyakov Pe-2 and the Hurricanes couldn't keep up! That a lesson learnt right.
 
Fw 187 comment pending!

The Fw 187 didn't fulfill the Luftwaffe's requirement, not necessarily because it was a bad design. The Bf 110 did and neither was it a bad design. It's easy to say it had too many people aboard, but it met the requirement. Again, the premise of this thread is explained by the fact that the British and the Germans got it wrong in expectations for a forthcoming conflict.

Back to bombing and the only true metric was speed. Doesn't matter about escorts or how many defence guns.

Ah, but that's a completely different thread that's been explored already! :) Again, hindsight is a wonderful thing. Remember that when de Havilland proposed his unarmed bomber specification, although gaining interest from Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt and support from Wilfred Freeman as we know, Sholto Douglas and Arthur Tedder specified that it must have a tail turret. The first prototype was built on the proviso that if it did not demonstrate good performance, the tail turret armed Mosquito prototype was to be built.
 
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In the event, the British got it right (sort of) by going mostly for a night bomber force since they (or the USAAF till later) didn't have long range escorts.

A different subject, Night fighting. Maybe a little like two blind guys with white canes and swords going at each other.
 
A different subject, Night fighting. Maybe a little like two blind guys with white canes and swords going at each other.

That is until they are both given the gift of sight in the form of radar... A very specialised discipline that both the British and Germans, out of necessity wrote the rule book.
 
That is until they are both given the gift of sight in the form of radar.
Yup, just about as much sight as a medieval knight got peering through the eye slits in his full face helmet.
"Point me towards 'em lad, and I'll lay the blackguards low!"
Cheers,
Wes
 
Radar made a huge difference though, Wes. Coupled with ground control information, the use of AI really changed the night fighter environment and the rate of intercept to kill ratios went up dramatically once it became more widespread.
 
Radar made a huge difference though, Wes. Coupled with ground control information, the use of AI really changed the night fighter environment and the rate of intercept to kill ratios went up dramatically once it became more widespread.
It certainly did, as long as the fighter got its targets handed to it, but AFAIK those early radars were pretty much fire control within a fairly narrow cone, but didn't have much wide angle search capability. Not like the ones I worked with in the 70s that had a search pattern 120° wide and 60° tall and detection range in excess of 300 miles and could lock up a fighter sized target nearly 150 miles out. It could also fry deck apes and set off pyrotechnics if someone ran BIT checks and let it slip out of standby without the dummy load on the antenna.
Cheers,
Wes
 

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