Buffaloes save Force Z, now what?

[Admiral Beez]

So… Force Z survives. Nagumo sails south with some carriers and sinks it.

Nagumo is on his way back from Pearl Harbour and on skosh fuel when Force Z escapes the IJNAS torpedo bombers.

By the time the Kido Butai is ready to sail to Singapore I'd hope that Force Z has boogied for Ceylon.

 

[Conslaw]

If the Prince of Wales could have been kept afloat long enough, it should have made a great flagship for the ABDA fleet - a modern battleship with radar could have helped a lot in the Battle of the Java Sea.

 

[Admiral Beez]

If the Prince of Wales could have been kept afloat long enough, it should have made a great flagship for the ABDA fleet - a modern battleship with radar could have helped a lot in the Battle of the Java Sea.

Good point, and accurate radar-directed 14" fire could keep those Long Lance equipped IJN cruisers at a distance. We have to consider:

1) Where is PoW and Repulse operating from? By the time the battle of Java Sea occurs Singapore has fallen.
2) Who's in command, does Doorman refer to Phillips?
3) Nothing happens in a vacuum, so if the ABDA has a battleship or two, what does the IJN send to counter this?
4) Where's HMS Indomitable? If Force Z is operating from either Darwin or Ceylon, they may be assigned Indomitable for air cover.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

2) Who's in command, does Doorman refer to Phillips?

I'm voting for the man with the biggest guns.

3) Nothing happens in a vacuum, so if the ABDA has a battleship or two, what does the IJN send to counter this?

Didn't the Japanese have a couple of Kongos in-theater. Couple that with Long Lances on your cruisers and destroyers, I bet the Japanese would be comfy with that balance.

I'm watching this loooooong vid right now about Java Sea on WW2TV where the author being interviewed spends a good thirty minutes talking about Force Z's fate as a preliminary. The interviewee's obnoxious presentation aside, the facts he lays out are pretty solid. From about six minutes in:



He addresses what he thinks is the prime reason for the absence of air cover for Phillips's squadron, to wit, poor communications regarding planning for air cover. A lot of it is farily basic knowledge, but he makes some good points.

 

[Admiral Beez]

He addresses what he thinks is the prime reason for the absence of air cover for Phillips's squadron, to wit, poor communications regarding planning for air cover. A lot of it is farily basic knowledge, but he makes some good points.

Bloody Shambles agrees with this. Phillips never told the RAF where he was nor where he was going, making fighter cover impossible. Phillips breaking radio silence might have saved his ships from air attack. Mind you, Lutjens breaking radio silence doomed his ship by air attack.

Really, Force Z should have never sailed without it's own air cover. Send HMS Ark Royal with a full load of Fulmars and Stringbags/Applecores to join Phillips as Force Z sails past Gibraltar in October. Force H and the Home Fleet will have to do without her come November anyway.

Fulmars vs. unescorted Nells and Bettys. Now that's a turkey shoot!

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Bloody Shambles agrees with this. Phillips never told the RAF where he was nor where he was going, making fighter cover impossible.

Phillips breaking radio silence might have saved his ships from air attack. Mind you, Lutjens breaking radio silence doomed his ship by air attack.

The point Cox makes is that the RAF indicated to Palliser that no air coverage was available in only one particular locale, but Palliser implied (by omission) to Phillips instead that the lack of air coverage was total, hence Phillips didn't ask for any once he knew he'd been sighted; and it fell to Repulse's captain to request it only once the Japanese air attack had started.

In either event, the lack of good communications between RAF and RN undid Force Z's mission.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The point Cox makes is that the RAF indicated to Palliser that no air coverage was available in only one particular locale, but Palliser implied (by omission) to Phillips instead that the lack of air coverage was total, hence Phillips didn't ask for any once he knew he'd been sighted; and it fell to Repulse's captain to request it only once the Japanese air attack had started.

In either event, the lack of good communications between RAF and RN undid Force Z's mission.

I've read that had Phillips sailed a day earlier he would have met the IJA landing ships before the Bettys and Nells had arrived in FIC. Such a near run thing.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I've read that had Phillips sailed a day earlier he would have met the IJA landing ships before the Bettys and Nells had arrived in FIC. Such a near run thing.

I think the Japanese airplanes were already on scene but were rushed into the operation, but it's not an area of deep reading on my part, so that might be a misapprehension on my part. I understood that they'd been there for a bit beforehand?

 

[Shortround6]

Good point, and accurate radar-directed 14" fire could keep those Long Lance equipped IJN cruisers at a distance. We have to consider:

Did the British even know (or strongly suspect) the capabilities of the Long Lance torpedoes?
The PoW cannot engage in long range shoots with a hit percentage in low single digits. There is no spare ammo in that half of the world and none coming for weeks/months.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Good point, and I don't think the RN were aware.

There's no point in fighting at Java Sea. Malaya and most of the DEI have already fallen to the Japanese. Better for the British, Australians and Americans to withdraw and keep their ship right side up. Doorman can do what he likes.

Dec 10th, Phillips now realizing from his close call that Force Z cannot operate in the area, sails to Singapore to replenish fuel in his six ships, especially for the short legged Repulse. He then sails, along with HMS Mauritius for Ceylon and stays put until he is both reinforced and replaced by Somerville in February.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Did the British even know (or strongly suspect) the capabilities of the Long Lance torpedoes?

Nope.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Nope.

I imagine that with a little more intel and appreciation of Japanese tech and abilities (combined with a good deal less race-based disregard) the Brits and Americans could have been better prepared. The A6M Zero has been flying since early 1939, with the AVG warning about its capabilities, but still no one sought to understand and counter it. Same goes for the Long Lance torpedo, which had been in IJN service since the mid-1930s, and yet no one at the RN or USN knew of it? Both the British and American embassies maintained military attachés, but they seemingly didn't know of the Long Lance or Zero, or were ignored.

But that's war, and they're usually launched on false assumptions and misinformation, often helped along by yes-men, sycophants and confirmation bias. Did Hitler know that the USSR had 11,000 tanks, had anyone told him of the T-34? Why did Churchill think that sending four fighter squadrons (Britain had over sixty at home), eight bomber/recon squadrons, two capital ships, a light cruiser, four destroyers and an ill-equipped army of 88k would deter the Japanese?

 

[buffnut453]

I imagine that with a little more intel and appreciation of Japanese tech and abilities (combined with a good deal less race-based disregard) the Brits and Americans could have been better prepared. The A6M Zero has been flying since early 1939, with the AVG warning about its capabilities, but still no one sought to understand and counter it.

I agree about the race bias and failure to develop counters to the A6M...but the "more intel" isn't really correct.

There was accurate intelligence on the A6M and it was pushed out to squadrons in Singapore, Malaya and Burma (the latter is absolutely confirmed, the others are assumed because, if the info can reach Mingalodon, it ought to already be at Seletar, Kallang etc.).

It was less an intelligence failing and more a refusal by aircrew to believe the reporting. The whole "we didn't know about the capabilities of Japanese aircraft" is probably more down to squadron personnel not listening than it was to intelligence failing to provide the data.

 

[Shortround6]

The A6M Zero has been flying since early 1939, with the AVG warning about its capabilities,

A little revisionist history?
Chennault may well have warned the US about the Zero seeing as how he was working for the Chinese at the time but AVG didn't even come into existence until April of 1941.
That is when recruitment started, actual arrival in Burma (Rangoon) was peace meal. The AVG didn't start flying until Nov 1941 and that was training.
The AVG had no chance to send any messages/warnings before Early Dec and considering the fact that the AVG never encountered a Zero in combat (they did engage misidentified Ki-43s) it is really hard to understand what the AVG would be warning anybody about.

The battleship Yamato was laid down in Nov 1937 and launched in Aug 1940 and yet the Japanese hid the construction of her and her sister. The Americans and British may have known they were building something but what it was was a secret. As were the size of the guns, The Japanese had to build a small ship especially to carry the guns/mounts from the gun factory to the ship yards.
The Long Lance torpedo was a lot easier to keep secret than humongous battleships.

The British had used oxygen enriched torpedoes on many of their 8in cruisers, finally getting rid of them in first years of WW II. They may have dismissed reports of oxygen fueled torpedoes based on their own experience. Other countries had experimented with such torpedoes or with varying amounts of oxygen enrichment. They all had problems.
With a 100% oxygen torpedo you can't use normal lubricants in the engine and valves. Normal lubricants (and rust preservatives) will spontaneously combust in a high oxygen environment which sometimes lead to explosions on starting the torpedoes. British tried to balance improved performance with safety by using the oxygen enrichment route.
It was only used on Cruisers because they needed an oxygen plant on board the ship to top up the torpedoes periodically and the British did not want an oxygen plant/system on board submarines or destroyers. The Rodney fired an oxygen enriched torpedo at the Bismarck.
But the British torpedoes had nowhere near the range of the Japanese torpedoes.

 

[EwenS]

The battleship Yamato was laid down in Nov 1937 and launched in Aug 1940 and yet the Japanese hid the construction of her and her sister. The Americans and British may have known they were building something but what it was was a secret. As were the size of the guns, The Japanese had to build a small ship especially to carry the guns/mounts from the gun factory to the ship yards.

This article sets out what the intelligence communities of the major powers knew of the Yamato design and when.

History and Technology - "What did the USN know about Yamato and when?" - NavWeaps

www.navweaps.com

The Japanese ran a disinformation campaign in relation to the Yamato's 46cm (18.1") guns. It was officially referred to as the 45 Caliber Type 94 40cm gun i.e. a 15.7 inch weapon not an 18.1 inch weapon.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Did Hitler know that the USSR had 11,000 tanks, had anyone told him of the T-34?

According to John Erickson, Gehlen reported to Hitler in writing about the 11,000 tanks. Hitler's reply was (to the best of my recollection, I read the books 20 years ago) to ask "Who wrote this rubbish?" and entirely ignore the accurate info. Same about Gehlen's estimate for the number of Soviet divisions total, Hitler thought it was entirely too high, but both estimates were pretty accurate.

To my knowledge, the T-34 was entirely a nasty surprise to the Germans.

 

[GrauGeist]

The A6M Zero has been flying since early 1939

The A6M made it's debut in mid summer of 1940 with a small batch of pre-production A6M2s.

The KI-43-I followed about a year later.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I agree abut the race bias and failure to develop counters to the A6M...but the "more intel" isn't really correct.

There was accurate intelligence on the A6M and it was pushed out to squadrons in Singapore, Malaya and Burma (the latter is absolutely confirmed, the others are assumed because, if the info can reach Mingalodon, it ought to already be at Seletar, Kallang etc.).

It was less an intelligence failing and more a refusal by aircrew to believe the reporting. The whole "we didn't know about the capabilities of Japanese aircraft" is probably more down to squadron personnel not listening than it was to intelligence failing to provide the data.

Jeff Cox, in the video I linked above, states that the reports of the Zero and its performance were stuck in a file and never read.

 

[buffnut453]

Jeff Cox, in the video I linked above, states that the reports of the Zero and its performance were stuck in a file and never read.

That's completely bogus. There are signal message exchanges between AHQFE and Mingaladon asking about the status of their intelligence holdings, with specific mention of intelligence about the A6M. Mingaladon responded that they had received the information. There's also traffic from 67 Sqn noting that P/O Wigglesworth, one of the pilots, had been tasked with the secondary duty of Squadron Int Officer and that he'd set up an intel table in the squadron ops room where all pilots could access and peruse available intel.

AFAIK, the actual source of the "locked in a draw" comment has never been discovered. It sounds like hearsay and is certainly not supported by (the admittedly limited) available files in the UK National Archives.

 

[Shortround6]

Thach was working out his weave tactic well before Pearl Harbor and training his squadron on it.
Apparently somebody got the information and distributed it.
What was done with it at local levels (squadron, group, wing) may have been rather different.
There may not have been an Instruction or change of tactics for the Navy and Air Forces as a whole (both countries) but the 'nobody told us' excuse is a bit thin.