Buffaloes save Force Z, now what?

[Thumpalumpacus]

That's completely bogus. There are signal message exchanges between AHQFE and Mingaladon asking about the status of their intelligence holdings, with specific mention of intelligence about the A6M. Mingaladon responded that they had received the information. There's also traffic from 67 Sqn noting that P/O Wigglesworth, one of the pilots, had been tasked with the secondary duty of Squadron Int Officer and that he'd set up an intel table in the squadron ops room where all pilots could access and peruse available intel.

AFAIK, the actual source of the "locked in a draw" comment has never been discovered. It sounds like hearsay and is certainly not supported by (the admittedly limited) available files in the UK National Archives.

I don't doubt you. While I don't know enough about the matter to argue his claim, I defer to your knowledge, sure.

He has a smug and smarmy mien that inspires distrust in me, but I watched to entire show anyway.

 

[Shortround6]

British thinking as to what was needed was constrained by what was available. They also may have thought they had more time.
The US was pumping more aircraft and equipment (tanks and SP guns for instance) into the Philippines and the AVG was just the first element of a 3 group force. The AVG was the 1st group (fighter) the 2nd group was to be bombers (never got there) and a 3rd group (fighters) was planned. A total of 500 aircraft were planned for the 3 groups plus use by the Chinese air force. Granted this may have taken until some time in 1942 to complete.
With 300-400 aircraft in China and another 100-200 in the Philippines even before desired totals were reached might have slowed down the Japanese enough to buy more time for Malaya. A-24s and A-20s were aboard ship or being loaded when Pearl Harbor happened. B-17s were in transit. I don't know if the Philippines had gotten all their allotted P-40s or if more were scheduled to arrive.

How much of this the British actually knew I don't know.

Also changes in the Mid east and in East Africa might have allowed more assets to be transferred in the spring/summer of 1942.

Needing to send equipment to the Soviets to help prop them up (even if just morale) was more important than sending stuff to an area were nobody was shooting at them yet.

 

[buffnut453]

The AVG was the 1st group (fighter) the 2nd group was to be bombers (never got there) and a 3rd group (fighters) was planned. A total of 500 aircraft were planned for the 3 groups plus use by the Chinese air force. Granted this may have taken until some time in 1942 to complete.

Plus a British Volunteer Group comprising one squadron each of Blenheims and Buffalos that was being recruited just as the Japanese attacked. I suspect the provision of 32 Buffalos to Mingaladon just for 67 Sqn was actually meant to equip the BVG Buffalo squadron as well.

 

[Shortround6]

Plus a British Volunteer Group comprising one squadron each of Blenheims and Buffalos that was being recruited just as the Japanese attacked. I suspect the provision of 32 Buffalos to Mingaladon just for 67 Sqn was actually meant to equip the BVG Buffalo squadron as well.

Could be.
Bogging down the Japanese in China (more than they were) may have been strategy for defending Hong Kong and Singapore with China taking more of the punishment.

 

[EwenS]

Boyd in "The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters" has a section on what was known about Japanese aircraft. One of the notes to this reads:

" 'Performance Tables, Japanese Army And Naval Air Services', circulated by Air Ministry (A.I.2.c) on 20 May 1941, AIR 40/241, TNA. This included a note at the front with recent headline intelligence on the new Zero fighter. Specifications and performance data were correct, including a possible endurance of 6-8 hours."

Data was also being circulated in India at the time of Pearl Harbor.

Fairly accurate data, including ranges, on the on the Zero, Sally, Helen, Nell and Betty were circulated to Brooke-Popham in Sept.

Further data on the Zero, Val and Kate was circulated on 13 Dec 1941 but, according to Boyd, clearly drew on information in the intelligence community for some months. Details of the main Japanese bombs were circulated on 17 Dec along with those of the Type 91 Mod 2 torpedo which only entered service in mid-1941.

So there was plenty of fairly accurate information in circulation. For one reason or another no one chose to pay any attention to it.

 

[GrauGeist]

I don't know if the Philippines had gotten all their allotted P-40s or if more were scheduled to arrive.

More were enroute.

The Pensacola (or Republic) convoy TG 15.5 was a joint Army/Navy reinforcement convoy intended to land men and material in the Philippines and enroute during the attack on Pearl and the Philippines. It was rerouted to Australia and received RAN protection during it's final leg to Australia.

I believe some of the crated P-40s and USAAC personnel delivered from that convoy were lost while in transit from Australia to Ceylon when the IJN sank the USS Langley.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

More were enroute.

The Pensacola (or Republic) convoy TG 15.5 was a joint Army/Navy reinforcement convoy intended to land men and material in the Philippines and enroute during the attack on Pearl and the Philippines. It was rerouted to Australia and received RAN protection during it's final leg to Australia.

I believe some of the crated P-40s and USAAC personnel delivered from that convoy were lost while in transit from Australia to Ceylon when the IJN sank the USS Langley.

Weren't some also taken on charge by RAAF? Or am I confusing something I "remember" reading?

 

[Admiral Beez]

Japan had some good kit. Too bad they were on the wrong side.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Japan had some good kit. Too bad they were on the wrong side.

They didn't just have good kit, they had good doctrine, tactics, and training. Look at Java Sea or Savo Island, they used nightfighting to advantage. Their defeat was nigh inevitable after Pearl Harbor, but that didn't mean they could not exact a cost -- and they did.

Selling them short early on cost many Allied lives. The dead weren't around in 1945 to complain.

 

[GrauGeist]

Weren't some also taken on charge by RAAF? Or am I confusing something I "remember" reading?

I'm not sure, perhaps - I'm going by memory on the convoy, so some better detail will be lacking since I don't have my books handy.

Hopefully one of the guys here can provide a better detail on the disposition of the crated P-40s diverted from the PI to Australia.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I'm not sure, perhaps - I'm going by memory on the convoy, so some better detail will be lacking since I don't have my books handy.

Hopefully one of the guys here can provide a better detail on the disposition of the crated P-40s diverted from the PI to Australia.

I'm going on mems too, no foul. Hope like you that others will flesh this out.

 

[GrauGeist]

I'm going on mems too, no foul. Hope like you that others will flesh this out.

There's a couple guys here who are really sharp on finite PTO details.

One of our member who has recently passed, Michael (Parsifal), was a major source of solid PTO/SWP/CBI info - he is sorely missed.

 

[EwenS]

The Pensacola Convoy itself brought only 18 P-40E on the SS Blomfontein. It was diverted to Brisbane where the crated aircraft were offloaded from 22 Dec 1941 and assembled. 17 of those 18 (the last was supposed to be missing a rudder) were allocated to the 17th Pursuit Squadron USAAF, whose pilots had escaped from the Philippines. Those aircraft were flown across Australia and the Arafura Sea to Java in Jan 1942.

The next deliveries totalling 122 arrived in Australia in Jan 1942. Some 32 of these were lost en route to Java when the USS Langley was sunk by the Japanese. And another 27 in crates landed from the SS Sea Witch never made it into combat.

As for the rest, see this article from ADF Serials

http://www.adf-serials.com.au/research/Part1-P40.pdf

 

[Admiral Beez]

They didn't just have good kit, they had good doctrine, tactics, and training. Look at Java Sea or Savo Island, they used nightfighting to advantage. Their defeat was nigh inevitable after Pearl Harbor, but that didn't mean they could not exact a cost -- and they did.

Agreed. Imagine their success if they'd played for the other side and joined Britain in 1939-41 in exchange for British recognition of Manchukuo. IJN vs. Italy's horn colonies and at Matapan. We'd probably see Japanese ownership of Korea and Formosa even to today.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Agreed. Imagine their success if they'd played for the other side and joined Britain in 1939-41 in exchange for British recognition of Manchukuo. IJN vs. Italy's horn colonies and at Matapan. We'd probably see Japanese ownership of Korea and Formosa even to today.

You're going to have to change the WNT/LNT restrictions on Japanese shipbuilding then. The angry resentment that stoked -- along with the League of Nations condemnation of the Manchurian invasion -- put paid to the idea of the idea of Japanese trusting the Westerners, much less fighting and dying for Western interests.

The West would have had to treat the Japanese as equals, and I don't know that our socio-cultural mores of the time would have permitted that. The Japanese atrocities in the China war, and the revulsion they engendered in the UK and especially the US, were a major obstacle too.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The West would have had to treat the Japanese as equals, and I don't know that our socio-cultural mores of the time would have permitted that. The Japanese atrocities in the China war, and the revulsion they engendered in the UK and especially the US, were a major obstacle too.

I imagine had a new government in Tokyo approached Churchill's nascent government in August 1940 with an offer to join her traditional ally and declare war on both Germany and Italy in exchange for easing of British sanctions and a recognition of Manchukuo, Churchill (or his opposition) might have been tempted, no matter what atrocities Japan was guilty of in China. A couple of IJN fast fleets alongside HMS Illustrious at Taranto that November would be useful.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I imagine had a new government in Tokyo approached Churchill's nascent government in August 1940 with an offer to join her traditional ally and declare war on both Germany and Italy in exchange for easing of British sanctions and a recognition of Manchukuo, Churchill (or his opposition) might have been tempted, no matter what atrocities Japan was guilty of in China. A couple of IJN fast fleets alongside HMS Illustrious at Taranto that November would be useful.

The Japanese had already signed on with the Axis by 1940, and again, you're going to have to find some way to wipe away 17 years of bitterness after WNT in the minds of Japanese naval officers, and likely their Army as well. No one likes being treated that way. They saw the derogated limitations as a humiliation (Hara, Destroyer Captain) and were not likely to pursue your suggestion as a result, I don't think.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The Japanese had already signed on with the Axis by 1940, and again, you're going to have to find some way to wipe away 17 years of bitterness after WNT in the minds of Japanese naval officers, and likely their Army as well. No one likes being treated that way. They saw the derogated limitations as a humiliation (Hara, Destroyer Captain) and were not likely to pursue your suggestion as a result, I don't think.

The Brits were shafted by the WNT as well, it's common ground if anything. Sure, they got parity with the upstart former colonists and their USN, but while the Exchequer may be relieved, the WNT was a humiliation for the RN and Britain.

Per Wikipedia, Japan isn't so hard done by.

The agreement solidified Japan's position as a great power; it got parity in the Pacific with the two leading global navies, was allowed to maintain a larger naval force than France and Italy and was treated as a colonial power with equal diplomatic interests, a first for a non-Western nation.

 

[SaparotRob]

The Brits were shafted by the WNT as well, it's common ground if anything. Sure, they got parity with the upstart former colonists and their USN, but while the Exchequer may be relieved, the WNT was a humiliation for the RN and Britain.

Per Wikipedia, Japan isn't so hard done by.

The agreement solidified Japan's position as a great power; it got parity in the Pacific with the two leading global navies, was allowed to maintain a larger naval force than France and Italy and was treated as a colonial power with equal diplomatic interests, a first for a non-Western nation.

Although I agree with you, the Japanese militarists didn't see it that way.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The Brits were shafted by the WNT as well, it's common ground if anything. Sure, they got parity with the upstart former colonists and their USN, but while the Exchequer may be relieved, the WNT was a humiliation for the RN and Britain.

Per Wikipedia, Japan isn't so hard done by.

The agreement solidified Japan's position as a great power; it got parity in the Pacific with the two leading global navies, was allowed to maintain a larger naval force than France and Italy and was treated as a colonial power with equal diplomatic interests, a first for a non-Western nation.

At the same time Japan was restricted to 3/5 the naval power of either America or Britain, and that pissed the Japanese off. You can argue the rightness or wrongness of the proportions, or the rectitude of the Japanese attitude, but you cannot ignore the ire such treatment caused; and it caused much anger and resentment in Japan which would likely have scuppered any British demarche to alliance in 1939.

Remember, both the Japanese army and navy could bring down a sitting government simply by withdrawing their cabinet members. These are feelings you couldn't ignore. The IJN could simply pull its admiral out of the Cabinet, and the government wanting to ally with the UK is gone.

Equating this with the UK's plight, if that's what it was, isn't tenable.