Build a better Sea Hurricane 1938

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It never got a MK II version. 1939/40 SBDs and Vals weren't that hot either.
The British had a hole in their engine supply you could drive a Thorncroft truck through in 1938-40.
By that I mean there were too many engines of 800-1000hp size and then the big jump to the Sabre, Vulture, Centaurus. Only the Merlin and Hercules fell in between and the Hercules was running late. Griffon being something a back burner engine at that time.

There was no easy upgrade for any planes powered by the Bristol 9 cylinder engines. The AS Tiger should not have been allowed to fly over water (and in Whitleys was not). The Taurus didn't offer enough improvement and had problems of it's own early on.
The Hercules was under 1400hp to start ( and heavy) compared to the Wright R-2600 which was being delivered at 1500hp in 1938 and giving 1600hp in 1940 in full production with the promise of 1700hp being made in 1940. The Avenger (and competitors ) and the SBC2 (and competitors ) had the promise of 300-400hp more than any Hercules powered Naval aircraft in this time period.
The Merlin was fine engine but everybody and their brother ( and cousins) wanted some form of Merlin because there simply wasn't much of an option.

Getting back the Skua, Had an 1100-1200hp engine been available at a not too great an increase in weight, a MK II might have had better performance and/or a greater payload. But their wasn't one, or at least not in any sort of a useable time frame.

The 3 big British engines all stumbled and fell, for various reason and while they later got up, dusted themselves off and and went on to greater or lesser success the British still faced that gap for too long. The Griffon filled in and with the development of better fuels reached powers that were probably not anticipated in 1939-40.

I have mentioned it before but the British had two classes of carriers in the late 30s. Long and fast (although 3 of the long ones didn't have full length decks) and short and slow, out of 7 carriers 3 were of the short, slow and limited capacity type. Think escort carriers only slightly better (at least as far as speed/deck length) so some aircraft designs may have been compromised in order to operate of all carriers. Also please note the much maligned Douglas Devastator only went into squadron service in 1937 with these claimed firsts.
It was the first widely used carrier-based monoplane
the first all-metal naval aircraft,
the first with a totally enclosed cockpit,
the first with power-actuated (hydraulically) folding wings.

Many other countries naval aircraft of 1937-40 were already somewhere in the design process when the Devastator was reveled.

comparing many of the British 1938-40 aircraft to American aircraft of 1942 is comparing different generations.
 
[/QUOTE] The way you have written your statement sounds like you are speaking of the peak production year.[/QUOTE]

My bad.
 
Here,
Let me throw a little more fuel on the fire;
Here is my review on Smiths's volume on the Skua.
I'm sure some people will have something to say about that as well.
The dichotomy of so many of the previous reviews is interesting. Several complain about the how mundane the Skua was while other complain there was too much technical detail in the book.
It's important to remember the era in which the Skua was conceived and built. The Skua is the perfect representation of the Fleet Air Arm and Blackburn in the late 1930's. The FAA was seeking a transitional all metal do-it all aircraft within the restrictions imposed by budgets, politics and the RAF while Blackburn had the ability to build aircraft that exactly met customer specifications. (Not always a good thing, given the number of failed designs they produced.)
The result was the Skua.
As far as the complaints of too much detail? Don't read the sections that aren't of interest to you.
Considering the overall performance of the Skua, it's accomplishments and length of service are quite amazing. The Skua was there for the FAA to develop dive bombing tactics, provided the initial cadre of trained pilots, and was in service when it was needed.

Highly recommended as a volume on the Skua, as a prewar and early war history of the FAA.
 

The hole was not present. No military A/C in 1938-40 used engines beyond 1300 HP.
Probably 99% of military A/C in 1938-40 used engines under 1200 HP, and perhaps 90% used engines up to 1050 HP. Engines of 1000 HP were perfectly capable to power ship-borne fighters and strike aircraft even in 1942.


Comparing promised and deliverd power? C'mon.
R-2600 was many things, it was not in use aboard the carriers until well into 1942. On 100 oct fuel, Hercules III made 1425 HP, by mid 1941 Hercules VI was making 1670 HP.
The 1000 HP Pegasus was very much an option for 1938-42, just like the 1000 HP R-1820 was. Those engines that helped sunk a fair proportion of Japanese carriers in 1942.

Getting back the Skua, Had an 1100-1200hp engine been available at a not too great an increase in weight, a MK II might have had better performance and/or a greater payload. But their wasn't one, or at least not in any sort of a useable time frame..
Click to expand...

Skua Mk.2 has a better ring to it than Roc of any mark


Some fell down, some stuttered but managed to pull themselves together. Gap in engine power available was nonexistent, however - that Hercules was not used on FAA aircraft already from 1939 was not the fault of the engine, as it was not the fault of 2-stage Merlin that was not used by FAA.


Agreed all the way. We should especially avoid the thing from the latest sentence
 

Yes, we're going to duplicate the logistics chain and tooling just like that! (While competing against higher priorities!) The RN/FAA came out second best in the allocation of resources against the RAF and the politicians. If you can't get the material you need to expand, it ain't do-able. Doesn't matter if it's 1938 or 1944. Britain ain't getting there from here.

With all due respect, I believe we can say that the RN/FAA wanted folding wings if for no other reason to have more deck-space. (You know, more airplanes onboard.) I do not believe that you can say the RN DID NOT WANT FOLDING WINGS
And lest we forget, Lord Beaverbrook and others were pushing higher priority aircraft.
 


Curiously enough, UK managed to out-produce Germany and Italy combined even in dark days of 1940-42. They were designing, testing and producing aircraft even when bombed and subjected to U-boot attacks, all while re-tooling factories (Boulto Paul, Westland, Gloster, Fairey, Vickers etc) and buying in the USA before LL.


If you can explain how Lord Beaverbrook is calling shots in British AC production before May 1940, I'm all ears. Ditto for quoting me saying that folding wings are no-no for the FAA.
 
One thing that could have helped the Sea Hurricane was to fit it with a Spitfire-style bulged canopy, as I remember reading that this type of canopy had lower drag than the standard Hurricane canopy, and would allow the pilot's seat to be raised by a few inches, thus improving visibility over the nose.
 
You are probably justified to pull me into line. Can get a little excited sometimes. but the main points I made are still valid. For every aircraft that could be considered a success operationally in 1940, there was usually one that could not meet specification, and much less succeed on the battlefield. most of the aircraft supplied to Britain by the US at that time were not risked in open battle, or at best were sent to strategic back waters. Brewster Buffalo, B-17, P-39, SBC, F4f for various reasons when first received could not do the job they were first intended for. F4f, for example leaked fuel like a sieve, and suffered weak landing gear (there were some other problems as well). it would be September 1941 before the RN could operate the type on ships.
Other aircraft were useful, but were not first line aircraft. Hudson for example was relegated to secondary theatres and/or roles. They were used mostly for maritime patrol and to bolster numbers in quiet areas like the far east. Tomahawks were found to be underpowered and lacking firepower. Marylands were found to be too cramped to work effectively as a bomber, though they did find a use for fast recon
US aircraft had potential but in 1940 they ended up being a liability for the air ministry. They were seen as the great white hope, but they failed to live up to the hype. Eventually they would overtake the british in terms of both numbers and capability, but not in the part of the war that mattered.
You can discount british assistance to US aircraft manufacture if you like, but in 1940 alone, the air ministry invested over 80 million pounds as direct investment in US aircraft manufacturers. I have the figures somewhere, and it shows the critical role British financial investment had on helping to mobilise the americans. tizard wasn't just about radar and atomic research. Every service and major british war related department was ordered to share its secrets with the americans, on direct orders from Churchill. The US did not return the favour by simply giving stuff away. everything came at a price with the americans. I think it was 2010 that the final payment for lend lease was made .
 

The trouble is we are talking about several years here and many of the planes were delivered in different models. you also have to see what the American planes replaced or were used instead of.
The Maryland and Hudson were used to replace or supplement Blenheims in a number of roles. They sure weren't B-25s or B-26s but then it didn't take much to be a better plane than the Blenheim for some roles,like maritime patrol. The Hudson's did get progressively more powerful engines however most (or all but the very early ones?) had fully feathering propellers which gave the aircrew a much better chance of making it home than many British bombers with their 2 pitch propellers and a brake on the propshaft to keep the dead engine prop from windmilling.
There is no question the Maryland was cramped (as was it's successor the Baltimore) But the British kept cranking out the cramped Blenheim and the cramped Hampden was phased out of production in early 1942. The US aircraft certainly did not show up in 1940 and early 1941 and show the British how the job should be done but many of the aircraft the British were using in 1940 and 41 weren't really that much better than the American aircraft.
The Sunderland was certainly an excellent aircraft but the rest of the British flying boat fleet was old and obsolete (or prototypes of dubious value)

Unfortunately a number of the first American planes the British got were French leftovers. Most of which had been ordered in 1939 before the need for armor and self sealing fuel tanks was appreciated. The British took over the contracts on the fall of France but I guess many contracts were not updated to reflect new requirements. A number of planes were delivered with French instruments.
Martin had doubled the size of the Factory based off the initial French order/s for the type 167 and it would multiply in size several times in the years to come, The First French order was placed Jan 26th 1939.
I would note that some sources claim the French Martins had a lower loss rate than some of the French types they operated with.
The cramped Martin also was the plane that photographed Taranto before and after the Swordfishes successful raid. It was also the plane that discovered the Bismarck was no longer in Trondheim.
If the Hudson could not fly from England to Wilhelmshaven in daylight to bomb the German fleet, well, it turns out the Wellington couldn't do it either. not without a suicidal loss rate,
I would note that many American aircraft went from engines with single speed superchargers and running on 87-91 octane fuel to two speed superchargers and 100 octane fuel from the start of 1940 to the beginning or middle of 1941 so there was performance increase.

Lets also remember that the First B-24 prototype flew in Dec of 1939. less than 2 months after the first Halifax.

Yes the French And British did fund a considerable portion of the US expansion but without knowing how much the US spent it is a little difficult to judge. The 12,8 million dollar contract for the first P-40s gets a lot ink but let's remember that Ford got over 14 million less than 18 months later JUST to build a factory. that sum did not include one engine.

The US appropriated over 7.8 billion dollars for defence in 1940. Granted a very large part of that did NOT go to the aircraft industry.
 

Which entered operational service when? Late '43 early 44?
So to continue to being the A$$hat here on this post, during wartime it took 5 years to get to the squadrons and 6 years to make it into it's first combat deployment? Do think it may have lost some engineering or production priority along the way?
 
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Okay, let's talk before Lord Beaverbrook,
"Yes. Discussions about the use of either the hurricane or the spitfire as a carrier borne fighter had been in progress since at least 1938. The stickin goint (sic) was the RAF. They did not want any interruption or deviation of production away from land based air. But as war broke out factories normally used for production of naval aircraft were used to supplement traditional sources of production anyway."

Well sir,
Which brings me back the original post that so inflamed you. The RAF/RN were resource poor and the manufacturers were also resource poor for the number of projects that were extant at the time from 1938 until the Sea Hurricane came off the deck. The RN apparently lost the battle of available resources.
Thus.........no folding wings for your Hurricane.
 
jetcal1 said:
Well sir,
Which brings me back the original post that so inflamed you.
Click to expand...

Let's see. You, as a supposed authority on the subject, are trying to sell short British A/C development & production capabilities, the claim I base on following:
- not being aware of Swordfish, Skua, Seafire, Sea Hornet
- try to make Seafire being more a trouble than asset, yet, when challenged, provided zero evidence
- avoiding mentioning that 7 aircraft types received folding wings in UK in 5 years, 10 in 10 years
- avoiding to acknowledge that Hawker themselves designed and flew two aircraft types between Hurricane and Typhoon/Tornado
- avoiding to acknowledge that companies in the UK were designing, testing and making many new A/C types (from trainers and bombers to jet A/C) even when country was subjected to bombing and U-boat threat
- trying to pitch for fact that people, that were put in charge in mid-1940 were also calling the shots in 1938 and 1939
- trying to sell for a fact that designing the wing fold as impossible to pull off in a coutry that designed & produced vast majority of A/C types, engines and subsystems, including folding wings themselves, multi-engined A/C and even jets, all before 1941

That is too many holes on a picture you're trying to paint.
 
jetcal1 said:
Well sir,
Which brings me back the original post that so inflamed you. The RAF/RN were resource poor and the manufacturers were also resource poor
Thus.........no folding wings for your Hurricane.
Click to expand...

tomo pauk said:
Let's see. You, as a supposed authority on the subject, are trying to sell short British A/C development & production capabilities
That is too many holes on a picture you're trying to paint.
Click to expand...
Hoo boy, another exciting fireworks show, and it isn't even Guy Fawkes Day or 4th of July, either! One of the unadvertised benefits of this forum.
Cheers,
Wes
 
Lets look at the best case scenario for a better Sea Hurricane. 1938/39 the Hurricane enters service. The RAF wrings the bugs out of it. 1939, tropicalisation trials undertaken in Khartoum, yes they really happened, so add some trials for a Hurricane with an arrestor hook for the FAA. Both Hurricane I Trop and Sea Hurricane Ia produced in 1939/40 time period is feasible but there is no requirement for either plane from either the RAF or the RN. Hurricane I Trop does appear in small nos after Italy enters war in June 1940. Hurricane II Trop and Sea Hurricane IIb with both arrestor hook and catapult spools should then be available in 1940/41. In reality its Sea Hurricane Ib in Med in 1941 and Ic/IIc in 1942. Hurricane IIb/c Trop in 1941 also. What's missing is the Sea Hurricane, lets say III, with folding wings that should appear around 1941/42, but why build it when you can have the folding wing Wildcat with greater internal fuel and longer range? A better Sea Hurricane is a non-starter. And why do the RN go for the Ib/Ic in 1941/42? The reason is simple, better low altitude performance with the Merlin III, 100 octane fuel and 16 lbs boost.
 

- try to make Seafire being more a trouble than asset, yet, when challenged, provided zero evidence
Operation Avalanche and Torch. (Repeat post, you.)
- not being aware of Swordfish, Skua, Seafire, Sea Hornet
 

- not being aware of Swordfish, Skua, Seafire, Sea Hornet

1a. Swordfish, in production prior to the rearmament and with an established production line. Not influenced by the

1b. Skua, Run what ya, brung airplane, out of service by 1942. I posed my opinion on that airplane earlier. It's in this thread if you care to look.

1c. Seafire, an airplane that was adequate later in the war but did fully not come into its own until re-engined with the Griffon. Did not happen until postwar? (Wonder why?)

1d. SeaHornet, Small production run, mostly postwar development. Benefited from being designed for marinization and navalization from the beginning. Achieved a decade of service which in the early jet age is an achievement.

- try to make Seafire being more a trouble than asset, yet, when challenged, provided zero evidence
Operation Avalanche and Torch attrition rates. (Repeat post. Guess you missed that.)

- avoiding mentioning that 7 aircraft types received folding wings in UK in 5 years, 10 in 10 years
Putting folding wings on an airplane doesn't mean you have the resources to produce it as such in the case of the SeaHurricane under wartime production constraints.

- avoiding to acknowledge that Hawker themselves designed and flew two aircraft types between Hurricane and Typhoon/Tornado
Would you like to compare and contrast the number of failed US programs that flew that failed to make it to production? How about the German prototype programs.that only reinforces my resources argument. Again, cranking out a hand-built prototype is not the same as mass production. Yours is a non sequitur argument.


- avoiding to acknowledge that companies in the UK were designing, testing and making many new A/C types (from trainers and bombers to jet A/C) even when country was subjected to bombing and U-boat threat
See below

- trying to pitch for fact that people, that were put in charge in mid-1940 were also calling the shots in 1938 and 1939
Guess it doesn't really matter when the mid-1940 transition in personal continued the policy of RAF priority over the RN.

- trying to sell for a fact that designing the wing fold as impossible to pull off in a country that designed & produced vast majority of A/C types, engines and subsystems, including folding wings themselves, multi-engined A/C and even jets, all before 1941
Putting folding wings on an airplane doesn't mean you have the resources to produce it as such in the case of the SeaHurricane when it is competing for engineering, prototyping, supply and manufacturing resources. Not that they couldn't, there just wasn't' enough in Britain to do it all.

Okay, let's try this again…….

I stated that the country was resource constrained. I never said they couldn't do it. Someone, somewhere, set priorities. (Lord Beaverbrook and Sir Freeman? (And to keep you happy the RAF in 1938-39.) In other words, you just can't build or modify at will because there ain't enough "stuff" to go around.

Look at all the lovely prototypes! How many made it into production? (Same as the US, Germany, etc.)

I stated the US had the luxury of being able to almost build, staff, and supply factories at will. Great Britain did not, Germany did not. I'm sorry you took offense to the realities on the ground.

If you feel like I am denigrating the British logistics and manufacturing capabilities by acknowledging their limitations, I'm sorry that you continue to completely misinterpret what I am saying,
I happen to think that the British did very well with the resources that were available and the RN in particular by some rather limited foresight in terms of specifications.
 
Shortround6 said:
Somebody may want to do a ship by ship breakdown of this as one ship (the Unicorn) is blamed for up to 21 accidents at Salerno.
7 carriers were at Salerno and four of them were the even smaller and slower, escort carriers.
Click to expand...

I would be happy to do so once my library is out of storage. (We are recovering from flood damage) Feel free to browse
jetcal1's books | LibraryThing
 
jetcal1 said:
1c. Seafire, an airplane that was adequate later in the war but did fully not come into its own until re-engined with the Griffon. Did not happen until postwar? (Wonder why?)
Click to expand...

The Spitfire XII used a Griffon, started service in early 1943 and was out of service by early 1944. Production was limited to 100. So the Seafire XV would have been possible earlier.

However, Griffon production was not very large in number. The majority of Griffons went to the Firefly (single stage supercharger) and Spitfire XIV (2 stage supercharger), so the Seafire had to make do without.
 

The Firefly was a new design using a new engine.

Griffon development only started around 1938. Late 1939 it was redesigned, as someone at the Air Ministry, or Supermarine, realised that the Griffon could fit in the Spitfire if a few packaging changes were made.

Mid 1940 all engine development at Rolls-Royce was paused, except for the Merlin. That included the Griffon. Wonder why that would have been?

Earlier Seafire proposals from Supermarine used the Merlin, so production delays wouldn't have been a problem, though supply may have been.

in one case, Supermarine proposed a Seafire with a different wing planform, which folded in a similar fashion to the Grumman system. Supermarine were though too slow in development and had, in any case, insufficient production capacity to build Seafires without impacting production of Spitfires. Hence the approach to Fairey.

I'm sure that a Seafire built by Fairey based heavily on the Spitfire would have been available earlier than the Firefly.
 
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