Build a better Sea Hurricane 1938

[tomo pauk]

The Royal Navy drove the development of aircraft by laying the specifications as the customer. Just as the US, Germany, Japan, etc. drove development by writing specifications for what they desired. I stand by the customer driving development.
My bad on the Swordfish (Outside of the Pacific Ocean.) But in flew in 1934 and i specifically omitted as it predated my 1935 cut-off date. The Sea Hornet? Don't know enough about it. Seafire? No, horrendous non-combat attrition.

'Driving the development' and 'developing' are not same things. Don't know enough about Sea Hornet?
BTW, what was wrong with Skua as a dive bomber - that it was not a biplane like the 1st Helldiver, or that it didn't have fixed U/C lake the later Aichi 'Val'?
Any numbers to back up the claim that Seafire's non-combat attrition was horrendous?

Relating back to my original post, did the UK have the engineering, material, and human resources to allocate to the "Sea Hurricane" from 1938-1940?
The simple answer is there was not enough excess capacity to do the project. Let's look at folding the wings, we need to
...

Where was proven, without the shadow of the doubt, that 'the simple answer' is negative?

 

[parsifal]

Relating back to my original post, did the UK have the engineering, material, and human resources to allocate to the "Sea Hurricane" from 1938-1940?.

Yes. Discussions about the use of either the hurricane or the spitfire as a carrier borne fighter had been in progress since at least 1938. The stickin goint was the RAF. They did not want any interruption or deviation of production away from land based air. But as war broke out factories normally used for production of naval aircraft were used to supplement traditional sources of production anyway.

Actually, what I'm saying is that the UK simply did not have the excess engineering and manufacturing capabilities to develop every engineering proposal that came along.

Neither did the US in 1938

The UK was far more resource constrained than the US. Programs such as the Albermarle, Botha, Lerwick were under development and a higher priority.

Not in 1938-40. UK production in 1940 amounted to over 16000 aircraft whilst US production languished at just over 2000. Nearly all of those 2000 were failures because of the backwardness of the supporting industry and R&D in the US at that time. Not until substantial amounts of (mostly) British cash to set up US production and massivce amounts of technical support provided was the US able to shift to a war footing. Case in point has to be the P-51....powered by a british designed engine and development assisted by British knopw how.

My entire post was related to internal politics, production and engineering resources.

Your entire post was defined by glib one liners, misinformation and downright baloney, self serving and designed for a particular outcome.

I wasn't saying US aircraft were better.

You implied it, and from there made a whole bunch of spurious statements

I was saying the US had the engineering and production capacity to absorb a mistake.

They didn't have much capacity in 1938-40, but they also were not in a war situation. it didn't matter that in that period most of the aircraft they built were utter dogs ,


The British did not.

Yes they did, which they used to haul the US aircraft industry into the modern age.


My bad on the Swordfish (Outside of the Pacific Ocean.) But in flew in 1934 and i specifically omitted as it predated my 1935 cut-off date.
So, all the numerous and major development of the Swordfish up to 1943 doesn't count. Too bad about that, since it remained the best carrier borne strike aircraft in poor weather conditions throughout the war and was responsible for more sinking more than 50 submarines (including some 30 Uboats).

Seafire? No, horrendous non-combat attrition.

Seafire IIIs with proper training, aboard fleet carriers (rather than escort carriers in still air in the med that it was forced to operate from in 1943) enjoyed the lowest attrition rate of the three main types embarked (Hellcat, corsair and seafire) in 1945.

You don't know what you are talking about.

 

[jetcal1]

Relating back to my original post, did the UK have the engineering, material, and human resources to allocate to the "Sea Hurricane" from 1938-1940?.

Yes. Discussions about the use of either the hurricane or the spitfire as a carrier borne fighter had been in progress since at least 1938. The stickin goint was the RAF. They did not want any interruption or deviation of production away from land based air. But as war broke out factories normally used for production of naval aircraft were used to supplement traditional sources of production anyway.

Actually, what I'm saying is that the UK simply did not have the excess engineering and manufacturing capabilities to develop every engineering proposal that came along.

Neither did the US in 1938

The UK was far more resource constrained than the US. Programs such as the Albermarle, Botha, Lerwick were under development and a higher priority.

Not in 1938-40. UK production in 1940 amounted to over 16000 aircraft whilst US production languished at just over 2000. Nearly all of those 2000 were failures because of the backwardness of the supporting industry and R&D in the US at that time. Not until substantial amounts of (mostly) British cash to set up US production and massivce amounts of technical support provided was the US able to shift to a war footing. Case in point has to be the P-51....powered by a british designed engine and development assisted by British knopw how.

My entire post was related to internal politics, production and engineering resources.

Your entire post was defined by glib one liners, misinformation and downright baloney, self serving and designed for a particular outcome.

I wasn't saying US aircraft were better.

You implied it, and from there made a whole bunch of spurious statements

I was saying the US had the engineering and production capacity to absorb a mistake.

They didn't have much capacity in 1938-40, but they also were not in a war situation. it didn't matter that in that period most of the aircraft they built were utter dogs ,


The British did not.

Yes they did, which they used to haul the US aircraft industry into the modern age.


My bad on the Swordfish (Outside of the Pacific Ocean.) But in flew in 1934 and i specifically omitted as it predated my 1935 cut-off date.
So, all the numerous and major development of the Swordfish up to 1943 doesn't count. Too bad about that, since it remained the best carrier borne strike aircraft in poor weather conditions throughout the war and was responsible for more sinking more than 50 submarines (including some 30 Uboats).

Seafire? No, horrendous non-combat attrition.

Seafire IIIs with proper training, aboard fleet carriers (rather than Goback escort carriers in still air in the med that it was forced to operate from in 1943) enjoyed the lowest attrition rate of the three main types embarked (Hellcat, corsair and seafire) in 1945.

You don't know what you are talking about.

Go back and read my original post. I never said US aircraft were better. I said the US had the luxury being able to produce more engineers and factories. The UK did not.

And while the US had it's problems, the wealth of resources enabled the US to have far more failed programs and still have the ability to staff modification centers and get tech reps out into the field. As I recall, UK aircraft production plateaued around 25K aircraft or so per annum starting around 1942. Thank you for proving my point about lack of growth capabilities. The UK simply did not enjoy the ability to wily nily pursue every program. And by 1942 the US enjoyed a level of engineering and production capacity to accommodate modifications and growth.

I have in past freely acknowledged the French and British roles in not only influencing US aircraft design after 1939, but also getting the US out of the Depression by purchasing the products and helping to pay for the expansion.

Seafire? Torch and Avalanche.



Please quote a specific case of where I said US aircraft were better.

 

[jetcal1]

'Driving the development' and 'developing' are not same things. Don't know enough about Sea Hornet?
BTW, what was wrong with Skua as a dive bomber - that it was not a biplane like the 1st Helldiver, or that it didn't have fixed U/C lake the later Aichi 'Val'?
Any numbers to back up the claim that Seafire's non-combat attrition was horrendous?

Seafire: Avalanche and Torch


Where was proven, without the shadow of the doubt, that 'the simple answer' is negative?

The simple answer is too be found in the numbers of aircraft produced and the report by Roy Fedden to Sir Wilford Freeman on US aircraft production.

 

[Shortround6]

Lets not go too far the other way.

Actually, what I'm saying is that the UK simply did not have the excess engineering and manufacturing capabilities to develop every engineering proposal that came along.

Neither did the US in 1938

The UK was far more resource constrained than the US. Programs such as the Albermarle, Botha, Lerwick were under development and a higher priority.

Not in 1938-40. UK production in 1940 amounted to over 16000 aircraft whilst US production languished at just over 2000. Nearly all of those 2000 were failures because of the backwardness of the supporting industry and R&D in the US at that time. Not until substantial amounts of (mostly) British cash to set up US production and massivce amounts of technical support provided was the US able to shift to a war footing. Case in point has to be the P-51....powered by a british designed engine and development assisted by British knopw how.

Yep, the backwardness of the US using constant speed propellers on large numbers of those 2000 failure aircraft as opposed the British using fixed pitch and two speed propellers.
BTW the US built 1685 fighters in 1940, some of them were rubbish, some were 2nd tier, none equaled the Spitfire but then the majority of fighters built in Britain in 1940 were not Spitfires. Now how many bombers, both land and carrier, how many patrol planes, how many military trainers (not Piper Cubs ) did the US build in 1940???

I must have missed the massive amounts of technical support the US got in order to build Martin Maylanders, Lockheed Hudsons and Douglas Havocs/Boston's starting in 1939.

All that aid and technical knowhow that Bristol and Armstrong Siddeley gave to Pratt & Whitney and Wright?

The R&D that Saro, Supermarine and Shorts gave to Consolidated for the PBY (First flight 28 March 1935) the Consolidated PB2Y Coronado the Martin PBM (First flight 18 February 1939) is a little hard to find.

Come on Parsifal, you are better than this. US production may not have been large but the US engineers were not a bunch of bumpkins wandering in the wilderness waiting for enlightenment from the UK.
You might want to check were a lot the machine tools that equipped the British shadow factories came from.

 

[jetcal1]

Lets not go too far the other way.





Yep, the backwardness of the US using constant speed propellers on large numbers of those 2000 failure aircraft as opposed the British using fixed pitch and two speed propellers.
BTW the US built 1685 fighters in 1940, some of them were rubbish, some were 2nd tier, none equaled the Spitfire but then the majority of fighters built in Britain in 1940 were not Spitfires. Now how many bombers, both land and carrier, how many patrol planes, how many military trainers (not Piper Cubs ) did the US build in 1940???

I must have missed the massive amounts of technical support the US got in order to build Martin Maylanders, Lockheed Hudsons and Douglas Havocs/Boston's starting in 1939.

All that aid and technical knowhow that Bristol and Armstrong Siddeley gave to Pratt & Whitney and Wright?

The R&D that Saro, Supermarine and Shorts gave to Consolidated for the PBY (First flight 28 March 1935) the Consolidated PB2Y Coronado the Martin PBM (First flight 18 February 1939) is a little hard to find.

Come on Parsifal, you are better than this. US production may not have been large but the US engineers were not a bunch of bumpkins wandering in the wilderness waiting for enlightenment from the UK.
You might want to check were a lot the machine tools that equipped the British shadow factories came from.

I really had no idea that there was such a level of partisanship here that it would develop into this. My insight was simply as that of someone who deals with customer driven specifications and engineering constraints in aerospace. Too many programs, not enough hands, not enough floor space. But, now I am the evil arrogant American, and responsible for the F-35!

 

[tomo pauk]

The simple answer is too be found in the numbers of aircraft produced and the report by Roy Fedden to Sir Wilford Freeman on US aircraft production.

One-liner like this is not going to prove many of the points you've written here.

 

[jetcal1]

One-liner like this is not going to prove many of the points you've written here.

I'm sorry, I assumed you would be familiar with the Fedden report. My apologies.

Here, please let me recondense back down to this;
1. Excess production capacity, the Brewster Buccaneer failed,the SB2C was almost a failure. The USN had the TBF/TBM and was building a factory for the Vought TBY. That's four programs where metal was cut and three programs that reached production! What excess capacity did the British have? (Who was going to assemble the new and improved Sea Hurricane?)
Tell me, could the UK build multiple factories for 4 concurrent dive/torpedo bomber programs, and fully staff them with engineers and production workers?
Apparently not, because British production quantities would not have stagnated in the mid-20's from 1942 onward and more Barracudas, Seafires and Hurricanes would be on the deck.

I'm not being critical of British Aircraft. I am however critical of British procurement policies in regards to developing naval aircraft. You must admit that the RN was extremely conservative in their specifications and this prevented the development of more advanced naval aircraft.
But more importantly, We should recognize the constraints placed upon the British industry which are borne out by the production numbers. It's not a slam on anyone's national pride.

Do you mind if I quote S L A Marshall? (US Army Historian.) It's geared towards combat, but logistically speaking also rings true.
The will does not operate in a vacuum. It cannot be imposed successfully if it runs counter to reason. Things are not done in war primarily because a man wills it; they are done because they are do-able. The limits for the commander in battle are defined by the general circumstances. What he asks of his men must be consistent with the possibilities of the situation.

That's why British production topped out in the mid-20's. It just wasn't do-able. The mythical Sea Hurricane? Given all the other programs and priorities assigned by Freeman and his predecessors, (Remember the Sea-Hurricane was in service till '44.) it just wasn't do-able with the resources available.

 

[Shortround6]

I'm sorry, I assumed you would be familiar with the Fedden report. My apologies.

Here, please let me recondense back down to this;
1. Excess production capacity, the Brewster Buccaneer failed,the SB2C was almost a failure. The USN had the TBF/TBM and was building a factory for the Vought TBY. That's four programs where metal was cut and three programs that reached production!

Nice theory but the facts don't quite back it up. Brewster made a total hash of just about anything they tried to produce. Why did the Navy order the F4F? because they already had doubts about Brewsers ability to deliver on time. Brewster's record on the F4U Corsair was also pretty dismal. Started before Goodyear as the 2nd source and Goodyear consistently beat then to first flight and in benchmarks of planes produced. Curtiss needed massive plant expansions to handle war time production The P-40s were built in Buffalo, the SB2C was built in a brand new factory in Cleveland Ohio, Until the factory is built Curtiss had no spare capacity. Grumman built quite a few TBFs but the the TBMs were built by Eastern AIrcraft, a group of plants built and managed by General Motors for the US government to free up the Grumman home factory for Hellcat production.

British production did not top out back in the 20s.

Britain was not a big country and had a much smaller population than the United States. and that is why production topped out in the middle of the war, the labor pool would only stretch so far.

That's why British production topped out in the mid-20's. It just wasn't do-able. The mythical Sea Hurricane? Given all the other programs and priorities assigned by Freeman and his predecessors, (Remember the Sea-Hurricane was in service till '44.) it just wasn't do-able with the resources available.

 

[wuzak]

The Admiralty were pushing for Searfire development as far back as 1938. The Hurricane was 2nd best option. By 1940 it was becoming clear that the Hurricane didn't have a huge performance advantage over German bombers, such as the Ju 88.

Fairey were asked to develop folding wings and produce a navalised Spitfire. Fairey counter-proposed that they would be better of building their own designs, and we then given the go-ahead for what would become the Fairey Firefly.

 

[Glider]

With hindsight of course the UK had the research and development capacity to deliver a good naval fighter. The ROC and the Defiant were basically wasted. and Bristol has a very interesting fighter programme that could have been developed without getting in the way of Hurricane and Spitfire production/development. However its very easy from here to make observations like that.
Hindsight is a wonderful thing to have

 

[jetcal1]

Nice theory but the facts don't quite back it up. Brewster made a total hash of just about anything they tried to produce. Why did the Navy order the F4F? because they already had doubts about Brewsers ability to deliver on time. Brewster's record on the F4U Corsair was also pretty dismal. Started before Goodyear as the 2nd source and Goodyear consistently beat then to first flight and in benchmarks of pance produced. Curtiss needed massive plant expansions to handle war time production The P-40s were built in Buffalo, the SB2C was built in a brand new factory in Cleveland Ohio, Until the factory is built Curtiss had no spare capacity. Grumman built quite a few TBFs but the the TBMs were built by Eastern AIrcraft, a group of plants built and managed by General Motors for the US government to free up the Grumman home factory for Hellcat production.

Which again proves my point, you had a completely screwed up manufacturer in Brewster. But other plants (And supply chains!) were still being constructed for other aircraft I mentioned. I would also consider the TBY/TBU be partial failure and we still built a plant for it in PA. We could simultaneously develop new aircraft, build and staff plants for them, or concurrently build new plants to shift production over for new aircraft like the F6F. The British could not.


British production did not top out back in the 20s.
My books show max the max quantity of aircraft produced in Britain as just over 26K in 1944. Is that mid 20's?

 

[nuuumannn]

I might reiterate what I wrote in another thread; every country made mistakes and planning errors prior to the outbreak of WW2, but conversely each one of the main combatants produced some truly brilliant master strokes in design and capability in equal measure. I hope we aren't descending into this 'bias' between the USA and GB.

The aircraft of the RN were controlled by the RAF almost until the last moments before WWII, austere budgets, a customer that was reluctant to develop new technology aircraft, obsolete specifications, etc.

The Admiralty produced aircraft specifications, based on what it felt applied at the time. There was a definite favour for multi-role types that dominated British carrier decks throughout the 20s and 30s in the likes of the Avro Bison and the Torpedo Spotter Reconnaissance requirement, although single seat fighters definitely had a place in that period, see the much favoured Fairey Flycatcher and the excellent Hawker Fury development the Nimrod. So why, when it came to modern designs, was this shunned in favour of combining the requirement with a dive bomber, producing the Skua or a long range two-seater in the Fulmar? Although available, the Gloster Sea Gladiator wasn't that much far removed from the Nimrod it replaced; it's shore based original specification even predated that which produced the Swordfish.

There definitely was a tendency to stick with a conservative approach to progress, if that's what the Admiralty's approach could be described as. The Fairey Albacore is evidence of this; although very much an improvement over the Fairey Swordfish and Blackburn Shark (both contemporaries and very similar in performance and capability), but was still a throwback compared to the Grumman Tarpon (nee Avenger and to be renamed as such because Tarpon just doesn't cut it as an emotive appellation) that the Admiralty controlled FAA ordered to supplement and fulfill requirements that the British industry could not, again, largely because of the previous misfires of its own board in the production of naval aircraft specifications.

Leaving aside the barely adequate but well liked Fulmar for a moment, that the Sea Hurricane was an interim was a given. It's acquisition was also more of a knee-jerk reaction however, despite work by Hawker prior to the war's outbreak, and it certainly wasn't ideal either. Brown describes it as thus in the introduction on the chapter on the Sea Hurricane in Wings of the Navy;

"Short on range, with the ditching propensities of a submarine, harsh stalling characteristics, a very mediocre view for deck landing and an undercarriage that was as likely as not to bounce it over the arrestor wires. What less likely a candidate for deployment aboard aircraft carriers as a single-seat fighter than the Hurricane could have been imagined when, more than two score years ago, the FAA found itself at war! Yet, legacy of parsimony, expediency and short sightedness inflicted on British naval aviation of the 'thirties through its seagoing assignment two years later undoubtedly was, the Hurricane was to take to the nautical environment extraordinarily well. Its shipboard debut was to give the FAA an enormous fillip, and while no fighter designed solely with shore-based operation in mind could have expected unqualified success at sea, it was to aquit itself with distinction during its brief navial first-line career."

The last surviving Fulmar. It's a big aeroplane for a fighter.

0307 FAA Museum Fulmar

Even by 1939, the FAA's future fighter requirements did not match what was really required, but again, as has been stated in another thread, pre-war requirements were laid down without the benefit of post war experience and foresight. Both N.8/39 and N.9/39, calling for a two-seater, front gun fighter and a two-seater single engined turret fighter showed promise but again, fell short of the mark in terms of what was really needed. N.8/39 was fulfilled by the rugged and successful Fairey Firefly, but it saw action primarily as an attack aircraft (let's not even mention the FAA's turret fighter du jour the Blackburn Roc!).

A year later, with the war in full swing and with a year's vital experience under its belt, the Admiralty finally released OR.88 for a single seat naval fighter. This became hardware through specification N.11/40 for a single seat front gun fighter (at last), to which the the over-engineered and much maligned Blackburn Firebrand was designed. It was the first British purpose buiIt single-seat naval fighter for the FAA, but didn't fly for the first time until 27 February 1942. Sure, that Blackburn, producers of a successful line of naval aircraft, beginning with the Swift of 1919 was to fail miserably with the Firebrand can't be blamed on the Admiralty, it did demonstrate that the British industry needed to devote more effort to modern single seat naval fighter requirements than it had because of the absense of a viable requirement. It wasn't as easy as the old throwback of converting a land based fighter for sea service, as experience with the Sea Hurricane showed.

Hawker Sea Hurricane Ib Z7015 seen here in action in the summer of 2018.

0107 Shuttleworth Military Pageant Sea Hurricane

 

[wuzak]

British production did not top out back in the 20s.
My books show max the max quantity of aircraft produced in Britain as just over 26K in 1944. Is that mid 20's?

No, 1944 is the mid '40s.

The way you have written your statement sounds like you are speaking of the peak production year.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Discussions about the use of either the hurricane or the spitfire as a carrier borne fighter had been in progress since at least 1938. The stickin goint was the RAF. They did not want any interruption or deviation of production away from land based air.

Here we go again. Ground pounders getting in the way of naval affairs. How did the "senior service" let this happen?

 

[XBe02Drvr]

That's why British production topped out in the mid-20's.

Mid 20s thousands produced per year, not mid 1920s, right? A tad confusing there.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[RCAFson]

So why, when it came to modern designs, was this shunned in favour of combining the requirement with a dive bomber, producing the Skua or a long range two-seater in the Fulmar? Although available, the Gloster Sea Gladiator wasn't that much far removed from the Nimrod it replaced; it's shore based original specification even predated that which produced the Swordfish.

There definitely was a tendency to stick with a conservative approach to progress, if that's what the Admiralty's approach could be described as. The Fairey Albacore is evidence of this; although very much an improvement over the Fairey Swordfish and Blackburn Shark (both contemporaries and very similar in performance and capability), but was still a throwback compared to the Grumman Tarpon (nee Avenger and to be renamed as such because Tarpon just doesn't cut it as an emotive appellation) that the Admiralty controlled FAA ordered to supplement and fulfill requirements that the British industry could not, again, largely because of the previous misfires of its own board in the production of naval aircraft specifications.

Leaving aside the barely adequate but well liked Fulmar for a moment, that the Sea Hurricane was an interim was a given. It's acquisition was also more of a knee-jerk reaction however, despite work by Hawker prior to the war's outbreak, and it certainly wasn't ideal either. Brown describes it as thus in the introduction on the chapter on the Sea Hurricane in Wings of the Navy;

"Short on range, with the ditching propensities of a submarine, harsh stalling characteristics, a very mediocre view for deck landing and an undercarriage that was as likely as not to bounce it over the arrestor wires. What less likely a candidate for deployment aboard aircraft carriers as a single-seat fighter than the Hurricane could have been imagined when, more than two score years ago, the FAA found itself at war! Yet, legacy of parsimony, expediency and short sightedness inflicted on British naval aviation of the 'thirties through its seagoing assignment two years later undoubtedly was, the Hurricane was to take to the nautical environment extraordinarily well. Its shipboard debut was to give the FAA an enormous fillip, and while no fighter designed solely with shore-based operation in mind could have expected unqualified success at sea, it was to aquit itself with distinction during its brief navial first-line career."

The last surviving Fulmar. It's a big aeroplane for a fighter.



Even by 1939, the FAA's future fighter requirements did not match what was really required, but again, as has been stated in another thread, pre-war requirements were laid down without the benefit of post war experience and foresight. Both N.8/39 and N.9/39, calling for a two-seater, front gun fighter and a two-seater single engined turret fighter showed promise but again, fell short of the mark in terms of what was really needed. N.8/39 was fulfilled by the rugged and successful Fairey Firefly, but it saw action primarily as an attack aircraft (let's not even mention the FAA's turret fighter du jour the Blackburn Roc!).

A year later, with the war in full swing and with a year's vital experience under its belt, the Admiralty finally released OR.88 for a single seat naval fighter. This became hardware through specification N.11/40 for a single seat front gun fighter (at last), to which the the over-engineered and much maligned Blackburn Firebrand was designed. It was the first British purpose buiIt single-seat naval fighter for the FAA, but didn't fly for the first time until 27 February 1942. Sure, that Blackburn, producers of a successful line of naval aircraft, beginning with the Swift of 1919 was to fail miserably with the Firebrand can't be blamed on the Admiralty, it did demonstrate that the British industry needed to devote more effort to modern single seat naval fighter requirements than it had because of the absense of a viable requirement. It wasn't as easy as the old throwback of converting a land based fighter for sea service, as experience with the Sea Hurricane showed.

The Skua was an excellent divebomber that also had front guns, just like the SBD and Val - and the Skua also had folding wings, unlike the other two, and was in service before either. Why doesn't the RN get any Kudos for this triumph of naval strike aircraft design?

The Albacore predated the TBF by many years and even the Fairey Barracuda flew before the TBF and SB2C, yet unlike Grumman and Curtiss Fairey's plants were being bombed. The Firefly and Barracuda were both projected for 1941/42 and both should have been in production before the TBF and F4F-4 except that the war got in the way. The RN also ordered the Supermarine 322 which should have flown in 1941 but Supermarine was too overloaded and it didn't fly until 1943.

Brown's critique of the HSH is a bit over the top as the HSH seems to have had a lower accident rate than the Martlet and neither aircraft was fun to ditch in. The view over the HSH nose doesn't differ much at all from a Martlet. Brown has some very harsh words for various US designed naval aircraft as well, but we all tend not to dwell on failed USN designs but in the same breath wonder how the RN got it so wrong.

 

[nuuumannn]

Why doesn't the RN get any Kudos for this triumph of naval strike aircraft design?

That the Skua was successful was certainly down to its employment rather than any real merit the aeroplane possessed. Lightning in a bottle it certainly wasn't. Combining a dive bomber and fighter requirement certainly did not bestow any features on it that made it the success it was operationally. It was a successful dive bomber despite the fighter requirement, not because of it.

The Albacore predated the TBF by many years and even the Fairey Barracuda flew before the TBF and SB2C, yet unlike Grumman and Curtiss Fairey's plants were being bombed.

That doesn't well explain the built-in obsolescence of the Albacore at all. Granted, it was built to a 1936 specification, but did not enter service until four years later in March 1940. As for the Barracuda, how Marcel Lobelle arrived at the Barracuda after the neat designs of the Battle, Fulmar and Firefly is something of a mystery, nevertheless, it was overly complicated owing to a broad specification that wanted too much from a single airframe - torpedo bomber, fleet spotter and reconnaissance platform, and dive bomber. It was esssentially designed around the centre observer's station below the wing, which then dictated everything else's place on the airframe. Fitting in with a familiar pattern. And the question then has to be asked, why build both the Barracuda and the Albacore, when one is more modern than and carries out the same role as the other? The Barracuda was designed to a 1937 specification.

but we all tend not to dwell on failed USN designs but in the same breath wonder how the RN got it so wrong.

Oh, Brown's quite scathing of some US designs as well, but emphasises that the Americans, specifically Grumman just consistently got it right - which in hindsight they did. The perceived bias that most accuse him of is just not evident when his books are read. His criticism of the Admiralty comes from a unique perspective; he was there, operating at the front line and testing the results of their specifications. That has to qualify for something. As for his opening words about the Sea Hurricane, yes, he was critical of these aspects of it, but overall, he ends on a positive. It proved to be quite adaptable and tractable in the role.

 

[tomo pauk]

I'm sorry, I assumed you would be familiar with the Fedden report. My apologies.

I've read the Fedden report, at least what was posted at AEHS. He does not have any figures to back-up your claim that Seafire's non-combat attrition was horendous. He also says nothing on ability of British designers to design a wing to fold

Here, please let me recondense back down to this;
1. Excess production capacity, the Brewster Buccaneer failed,the SB2C was almost a failure. The USN had the TBF/TBM and was building a factory for the Vought TBY. That's four programs where metal was cut and three programs that reached production! What excess capacity did the British have? (Who was going to assemble the new and improved Sea Hurricane?)
Tell me, could the UK build multiple factories for 4 concurrent dive/torpedo bomber programs, and fully staff them with engineers and production workers?
Apparently not, because British production quantities would not have stagnated in the mid-20's from 1942 onward and more Barracudas, Seafires and Hurricanes would be on the deck.

I've already suggested possible candidates for the earlier SH.
British production quantities didn't stagnated from 1942. The number steadily went up, and total of actual weight of produced aircraft very much increased by 1944 due to increased production of 2- and 4-engined types.

I'm not being critical of British Aircraft. I am however critical of British procurement policies in regards to developing naval aircraft. You must admit that the RN was extremely conservative in their specifications and this prevented the development of more advanced naval aircraft.
But more importantly, We should recognize the constraints placed upon the British industry which are borne out by the production numbers. It's not a slam on anyone's national pride.

Like in any other country, UK's Air Ministry/Air force/Navy made it's fair share of mistakes. However, not mentioning Sea Hornet, Swordfish and Skua, and excludes Seafire because of his opinion is a sign of poor scholarship.

Do you mind if I quote S L A Marshall? (US Army Historian.) It's geared towards combat, but logistically speaking also rings true.
The will does not operate in a vacuum. It cannot be imposed successfully if it runs counter to reason. Things are not done in war primarily because a man wills it; they are done because they are do-able. The limits for the commander in battle are defined by the general circumstances. What he asks of his men must be consistent with the possibilities of the situation.

Wow.
If things are doable, but no-one want's to do them, the things will not be done.

That's why British production topped out in the mid-20's. It just wasn't do-able. The mythical Sea Hurricane? Given all the other programs and priorities assigned by Freeman and his predecessors, (Remember the Sea-Hurricane was in service till '44.) it just wasn't do-able with the resources available.

It was doable. Just like it was doable for Castle Bromwich to make Spitfires once Fairey made his report on current state of affairs there. Just like it was doable to make 200 Henleys and 560 Bothas. Or Fairey making 5 separate folding-wing A/C designs in less than 10 years.
FAA does not need 10000s of thousands or aircraft.

 

[Kevin J]

I still think the Sea Hurricane as built was the best possible version. The Admiralty took a rugged fighter, the Hurricane, operational throughout the World, and produced a conversion kit for it, meanwhile developing a more fragile fighter, the Spitfire, not yet operational throughout the World and turning it into a first class deck launched interceptor, the Seafire FIII, LIII & FRIII available from 1943 to the end of WW2. If you want another interim fighter then why not instead of building the Henley(200), re-develop the Hotspur, by replacing the turret with an extra fuel tank, re-instating the 8 wing m/c guns, adding catapult spools, arrestor hook and rear folding wings. First delivery maybe 1940/41 so no need for the Martlet. Likewise the Defiant, instead of converting(150)/building(140) later versions as target tugs, replace the turret with an extra fuel tank, add catapult spools, arrestor hook and upward folding wings, finally putting 4 or 6 HMG's in the wings. Availability, lets say 1942/43 so no need for the Wildcat. Of course, its probably easier and cheaper to buy the Martlet I/II/II and Wildcat IV. Finally, we could have taken the Miles M20 naval version, replaced the Merlin power egg with a Hercules power egg and introduced wing folding to get a fighter faster than the Wildcat V/VI, but slower than the Hellcat I/II. My choice would have been the Grumman fighters.