Build a better Sea Hurricane 1938

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Maybe the conversion of British RAF types to a carrier role was to quote Winkle Brown "When needs must the devil drives". In another thread the discussion was as to the origin of the F8F "Beer Cat". Certainly the Grumman team was inspired to a new direction in checking out the FW190, but it was immediately apparent that other than trying to keep the general size and power, and especially the weight, a very different design would be necessary to optimize for a naval aircraft. Grumman produced a very fine aircraft, too late for the war. Having neglected Naval aircraft for the FAA England did not have the luxury of other than a "make do".

The HSH seems to have done quite well in carrier service, with very low accident rates (unlike the Seafire) even when operating from CVEs. I'd guess that an optimized HSH with folding wings and extra fuel (use the 12gun wing and replace the outer 4 guns with another 30 or 40 gallons of fuel) would have been potent naval fighter in the 1941-43 timeframe.
 
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fliger747 said:
Having neglected Naval aircraft for the FAA England did not have the luxury of other than a "make do".

This is what happens when you put ground pounders in charge of anything to do with the sea. How could the the world's premier naval power have allowed that to happen??
Cheers,
Wes
This is what happens when you put ground pounders in charge of anything to do with the sea. How could the the world's premier naval power have allowed that to happen??
Cheers,
Wes

The UK/FAA didn't neglect naval aircraft. The difference between the UK and USA/IJapan is that the UK went to war in Sept 1939 and then the Luftwaffe parked itself 20 miles from the UK in June 1940 and this played havoc with naval aircraft development and procurement. If you compare what the FAA had in service in 1939 and 1940 with the USA and IJ you'll see that there's not much difference. However the dislocation caused by WW2 and the BofB really threw a wrench into the works and the aircraft planned for 1941 and 1942 (and the USA and IJ introduced a whole series of new aircraft in 1941/42) were considerably delayed.

This is a quote from Norman Friedman who has written extensively about the development of USN and RN carriers:

As in the USA, the advent of engines in the 2,000hp class solved many problems, However, it was much more difficult for the British aircraft industry to switch to new types in wartime, As a result, aircraft which should have entered service about 1941, like this Fairey Firefly 1, did not appear in numbers until the end of the war.
Aircraft of the Second World War
The Development of the Warplane 1939-45

and the Firefly 1 would have been a very welcome fighter in 1941 with the performance and firepower to really make a impact.
 
My view is that the Admiralty got it right. The Fulmar, an all weather fighter, later the Firefly. The Sea Hurricane, an interim, reasonably fast day fighter, adapted from a standard production aircraft by the addition of what are a number of simple field mods. The Merlin powered Seafire, a high performance low altitude fighter interceptor. During the war, you fill the gaps in your inventory with the Wildcat, Hellcat and Corsair, although its a shame we couldn't have licence built them in Canada. Post war of course you have the Griffon Seafire, the Hawker Sea Fury and the clipped wing Firefly with the two stage Griffon competitive in performance to the Bearcat, Corsair and Hellcat, its just a shame that they arrived a bit late.
 
I must admit that to my mind the Fulmar was a missed opportunity. As has been pointed out earlier in the thread the RN had operated single seat aircraft for many years without any problems.
Had the RN gone for a single seat fighter, with the same advantages as the Fulmar, range and ammunition being the primary advantages, then we would have had a very useful fighter/recce aircraft. She would have been lighter resulting in an increased acceleration, climb and agility. I'm not trying to pretend that she would have been the equal to a Zero but would have filled the gaps more effectively.
 
I must admit that to my mind the Fulmar was a missed opportunity. As has been pointed out earlier in the thread the RN had operated single seat aircraft for many years without any problems.
Had the RN gone for a single seat fighter, with the same advantages as the Fulmar, range and ammunition being the primary advantages, then we would have had a very useful fighter/recce aircraft. She would have been lighter resulting in an increased acceleration, climb and agility. I'm not trying to pretend that she would have been the equal to a Zero but would have filled the gaps more effectively.

The other option for a single seat fighter would be the Hawker Hotspur which had the outer wing panels of the Hurricane. The radiator is under the engine so there should not be the problems the Hurricane had when ditching. Replace the turret with an extra fuel tank, put the guns back in the wings and add catapult spools and arrestor hook. Availability, pre war just as the Fulmar but a one seater not a two seater. Top speed 317 mph in original form with a turret mock up, so not that much slower than a Hurricane with twice (?) the range.
 
My view is that the Admiralty got it right. The Fulmar, an all weather fighter, later the Firefly. The Sea Hurricane, an interim, reasonably fast day fighter, adapted from a standard production aircraft by the addition of what are a number of simple field mods. .

The Fulmar was an all weather fighter (?) in that it could find the carrier to land back aboard in crappier weather than the same year single seaters. Not sure the system did a whole lot of good at night. It also did nothing for finding the enemy aircraft, that was left to the good old eyeball, MK I.
 
I still find it hilarious that Bismarck didn't manage to shoot down any "Stringbags". Maybe like a Battleship Cage Mast, lots of room for stuff to just sail by.
 
The RN didn't just need a fighter. They lacked the pilots mostly to enjoy that kind of specialisation. From about 1933, nearly all RN procurements were for multi role aircraft. Swordfish for example, was primarily a torpedo aircraft, but it also was the designated spotter and recon aircraft. This multi role capability meant that it could be used in other roles with minimal conversion...….divebombing, ASW patrol ASR.. The Skua was multi role, with divebombing its primary role, but it could and did operate as a fighter.


At the end the RAF (which controlled FAA procurement and training until the eve of the war), either made sure the FAA went to war undermanned and poorly equipped. They either did thjis deliberately 9concentrating on expansion of the RAF) or simply felt that fleet related requirements were not a priority. At the end, having screwed down the Fleet air arm to the point of extinction, the RAF was more or less relieved to return the FAA to admiralty control to the Admiralty.


In these circumstances, where resources were in such short supply and there was no time left (all this occurred after April 1939), it was absolutely the right thing to opt for the multi role Fulmar over a dedicated fighter. The material shortages wouldn't allow any other solution to be applied. If the RN had tried to develop a new single seat fighter, (the f4F was not yet ready at that time) it would have had to wait even longer for a fighter than it did 9Fulmars didn't begin squadron entry until June 1940), and worse, would not have had any all weather capability and reduced recon capability which the RN placed great significance on. S/E fighters cant really do this job .


The Fulmar arose from necessity
 
The Fulmar was an all weather fighter (?) in that it could find the carrier to land back aboard in crappier weather than the same year single seaters. Not sure the system did a whole lot of good at night. It also did nothing for finding the enemy aircraft, that was left to the good old eyeball, MK I.


Fulmars were able to operate at night/conditions of low visibility. They participated in the ill fated operation EF (operations against Kirkenes) July 1941, which saw the loss of two Fulmars when jumped by BF109s. The raid had gone in conditions of half light, with the Fulmars also tasked with flak suppression as well as target making with flares. Two german aircraft were also shot down, but the disaster was the inability of the Fulmars to adequately protect the attacking Albacores. 13 RN aircraft were lost to sink just two ships and bring down 3 LW aircraft (1 Ju87 and 2 me 109s) .


These represented capabilities not yet available to either the USN or the IJN at the time.
 
At the end the RAF (which controlled FAA procurement and training until the eve of the war), made sure the FAA went to war undermanned and poorly equipped.
Once again, refer to post 162 in this thread. Downright criminal in my book.
At least our naval airedales were truly naval, not exiles from the air force.
Cheers,
Wes
 
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I would like to go "slightly (actually way off.) the reservation" with a C&P of my Amazon review of the Mushroom Publications book on the Fairey Barracuda.
I think it covers a lot of points that are generally overlooked about British Industry while pointing fingers where they belong. Just substitute Sea Hurricane for Barracuda and you pretty much have it. From the late 30's when the shadow factories were being built and the new aircraft specifications being drawn up for the impending war, the Fleet Arm just wasn't a priority. Remember by 1938 the British and French were initiating the rebuilding of the American plants by paying for whole new factories to be built for assembly of their new planes. No one had any extra design or manufacturing capacity in 1938. (Also,some thoughts that might better tie things together are in parenthesis.)

The Barracuda represented a microcosm of typically insipid Royal Navy requirements and the resulting mediocre aircraft needs to be examined from a complete perspective of the factors that influenced its development and use.
Here are some examples to contrast the British and American production scale of WWII along with some factors somewhat unique to the British;
1. Excess production capacity, the Brewster Buccaneer failed,the SB2C was almost a failure. The USN had the TBF/TBM and was building a factory for the Vought TBY. That's four programs where metal was cut and three programs that reached production! What excess capacity did the British have? (Who was going to assemble the new and improved Sea Hurricane?)
2. The Wichita B-29 program had more engineers working at that one, single plant than England had engineers working in the entire industry. (Who was going to redesign the Sea Hurricane? Everything was going to new aircraft designs or engineering the assembly sequences for the new plants)
3. The aircraft of the RN were controlled by the RAF almost until the last moments before WWII, austere budgets, a customer that was reluctant to develop new technology aircraft, obsolete specifications, etc. all conspired to leave the RN bereft of any truly competitive and state of the art aircraft literally until the introduction of the Hawker Sea Fury. Consider the 82% increase in HP over the life of the Barracuda airframe compared to only a 38% increase in empty weight, All of that HP resulted in only a 14% increase in useful load.
(The Barracuda also was competing for better engines, all of which went to higher priority programs. - Good examples in the US would include cancellation of the Boeing PBB-1 and the Beech XA-38 Grizzly to ensure availability of the R3350 for those B-29's being built in Wichita.)
The exigencies of war combined with a lack of engines and manpower conspired with insipid customer design requirements consigned this aircraft to mediocrity. (Again back to the rearmament and shadow factories, where were the engineering and assembly resources for the Sea Hurricane in 1938?) The fact the RN got the mileage out it that they did is a real tribute to the men that flew, maintained and supported it.
In fact, I will go further and say that in my opinion the Barracuda, Sea Fury, possibly the Wyvern and the Blackburn Buccaneer were the only effective aircraft developed by the Royal Navy after 1935. The RN can't even take credit for the Harrier as that was originally operated by the RAF.
End review

There were some interesting comments here about the Fulmar. IMO the combination of, when it fighting, where it was fighting, and who it was fighting contributed more to its success then anything else. For a brief period of a few months the Fulmar rose ascendant over its competition, but by late 1941 its days were numbered. Not a great plane, but the right plane in the right quantities at the right time when it was sorely needed. (That's a greatness unto itself.)

Okay, I'm back on the Sea Hurricane reservation. (Let the fireworks begin!)
 
The problem with that last post is that it overlooks some very important home truths. The RN didn't need the aircraft types being designed and produced in the US until the carrier famine was overcome. the next problem is that most US types could not be operated from RN carriers for most of the war. Until the problems of the deck park had been solved (circa 1944) the numbers of Hellcats, Corsairs and the like were strictly limited. Even then, the abilities of US types to operate in the rough weather conditions and at night, which was a necessity in RN doctrine, proved very limited.

moreovewr, at the time the RN needed high performance aircraft.....1939-1940, the US aircraft industry was backward and did not offer any real solution to the problems confronting the RN at that time. The F4F was not ready, neither was the SBD. Aircraft like the Cleveland could not be operated from the small British Carriers

By 1943, things were turning around, but as the recent experiences with aircraft like the F-35, the apparent invincibility of the US aerospace industry is transient and unrelaiable. On the basis of the logic you are suggesting, coutries like Australia would have been far better served to go tell the US president and all his rudeness to stick it, and his JSF where the sun doesn't shine and bought aircraft like the the new SU57. We would have saved ourselves a wad full of cash, had our aircraft at a fraction of the cost, and not have to deal with an "ally" of dubious reliability
 
Australia would have been far better served to go tell the US president and all his rudeness to stick it, and his JSF where the sun doesn't shine and bought aircraft like the the new SU57. We would have saved ourselves a wad full of cash, had our aircraft at a fraction of the cost, and not have to deal with an "ally" of dubious reliability.
HEAR, HEAR! Making America "GRATE" again!? This is the second Pachydermous POTUS this century we've had to apologize to the world for! Nuff said.
 
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1. Excess production capacity, the Brewster Buccaneer failed,the SB2C was almost a failure. The USN had the TBF/TBM and was building a factory for the Vought TBY. That's four programs where metal was cut and three programs that reached production! What excess capacity did the British have? (Who was going to assemble the new and improved Sea Hurricane?)

Boulton Paul, for example, since in any alternative FAA the Roc does not get built; BP was producing the Roc historically.

2. The Wichita B-29 program had more engineers working at that one, single plant than England had engineers working in the entire industry. (Who was going to redesign the Sea Hurricane? Everything was going to new aircraft designs or engineering the assembly sequences for the new plants)

What would be so earth-shaking with redesigning the Hurricane into Sea Hurricane? Was it a harder thing to do than installing the turret into Skua to make the Roc?
Hawker can do it, BP can do it, Blackburn can, too. Gloster does not make the two fighter prototypes from ground up, so they can do it too (belonging to the same concern as Hawker did, and were producing Hurricanes historically). Vickers: no fooling around with 1-engine fighters = spare designer's resource.

3. The aircraft of the RN were controlled by the RAF almost until the last moments before WWII, austere budgets, a customer that was reluctant to develop new technology aircraft, obsolete specifications, etc. all conspired to leave the RN bereft of any truly competitive and state of the art aircraft literally until the introduction of the Hawker Sea Fury. Consider the 82% increase in HP over the life of the Barracuda airframe compared to only a 38% increase in empty weight, All of that HP resulted in only a 14% increase in useful load.
(The Barracuda also was competing for better engines, all of which went to higher priority programs. - Good examples in the US would include cancellation of the Boeing PBB-1 and the Beech XA-38 Grizzly to ensure availability of the R3350 for those B-29's being built in Wichita.)

Useful load for carrier-based A/C is very much a factor of wing lift capacity, allowed airframe weight-lifting capacity, and the funky requirement that A/C must actually take off from a carrier with a meaningful fuel & armament. One will not see the Barracuda taking off with 2-3 torpedoes from a carrier even if we somehow graft the Centaurus on the nose, a whole new A/C is needed.

The exigencies of war combined with a lack of engines and manpower conspired with insipid customer design requirements consigned this aircraft to mediocrity.
(Again back to the rearmament and shadow factories, where were the engineering and assembly resources for the Sea Hurricane in 1938?) The fact the RN got the mileage out it that they did is a real tribute to the men that flew, maintained and supported it.
In fact, I will go further and say that in my opinion the Barracuda, Sea Fury, possibly the Wyvern and the Blackburn Buccaneer were the only effective aircraft developed by the Royal Navy after 1935. The RN can't even take credit for the Harrier as that was originally operated by the RAF.
End review

Royal Navy didn't do development of aircraft, I'm not sure where from you get that. Sea Fury was developed by Hawker, for example. Too bad you don't consider the Swordfish, Sea Hornet and Seafire to be effective aircraft.
 
Boulton Paul, for example, since in any alternative FAA the Roc does not get built; BP was producing the Roc historically.



What would be so earth-shaking with redesigning the Hurricane into Sea Hurricane? Was it a harder thing to do than installing the turret into Skua to make the Roc?
Hawker can do it, BP can do it, Blackburn can, too. Gloster does not make the two fighter prototypes from ground up, so they can do it too (belonging to the same concern as Hawker did, and were producing Hurricanes historically). Vickers: no fooling around with 1-engine fighters = spare designer's resource.



Useful load for carrier-based A/C is very much a factor of wing lift capacity, allowed airframe weight-lifting capacity, and the funky requirement that A/C must actually take off from a carrier with a meaningful fuel & armament. One will not see the Barracuda taking off with 2-3 torpedoes from a carrier even if we somehow graft the Centaurus on the nose, a whole new A/C is needed.



Royal Navy didn't do development of aircraft, I'm not sure where from you get that. Sea Fury was developed by Hawker, for example. Too bad you don't consider the Swordfish, Sea Hornet and Seafire to be effective aircraft.

If you have a look at how the Hurricane's wings are connected to the centre section then to me it looks like a pretty simple mod to make the wings to fold rearwards as per the Fulmar.
Google Image Result for https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b4/Hawker_Hurricane_P2617_-_wing_off%2C_side_view.jpg/1280px-Hawker_Hurricane_P2617_-_wing_off%2C_side_view.jpg
 
Boulton Paul, for example, since in any alternative FAA the Roc does not get built; BP was producing the Roc historically.

What would be so earth-shaking with redesigning the Hurricane into Sea Hurricane? Was it a harder thing to do than installing the turret into Skua to make the Roc?
Hawker can do it, BP can do it, Blackburn can, too. Gloster does not make the two fighter prototypes from ground up, so they can do it too (belonging to the same concern as Hawker did, and were producing Hurricanes historically). Vickers: no fooling around with 1-engine fighters = spare designer's resource.

If it was a high enough priority in 1938-1940 it would have been done. The fact of the matter is there was no excess engineering capability available in the UK and a more specialized "Sea Hurricane" was simply not a high enough priority with the deficit of engineers and factory space. There were simply more programs than resources. The Blackburn Botha and Warwick were simply higher priority in a resource constrained environment.

Useful load for carrier-based A/C is very much a factor of wing lift capacity, allowed airframe weight-lifting capacity, and the funky requirement that A/C must actually take off from a carrier with a meaningful fuel & armament. One will not see the Barracuda taking off with 2-3 torpedoes from a carrier even if we somehow graft the Centaurus on the nose, a whole new A/C is needed.

Again, there was a shortage of engine production so even to re-engine an airplane meant it was competing for resources, priorities, and allocations. If you can only produce X number of engines, and you have requirements for XX number of engines. The Barracuda lost that race, was there enough excess Merlin production at the time to engine the "Sea Hurricane" and still fulfill higher priority allocations?


Royal Navy didn't do development of aircraft, I'm not sure where from you get that. Sea Fury was developed by Hawker, for example. Too bad you don't consider the Swordfish, Sea Hornet and Seafire to be effective aircraft.

The Royal Navy drove the development of aircraft by laying the specifications as the customer. Just as the US, Germany, Japan, etc. drove development by writing specifications for what they desired. I stand by the customer driving development.
My bad on the Swordfish (Outside of the Pacific Ocean.) But in flew in 1934 and i specifically omitted as it predated my 1935 cut-off date. The Sea Hornet? Don't know enough about it. Seafire? No, horrendous non-combat attrition.
 
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The problem with that last post is that it overlooks some very important home truths. The RN didn't need the aircraft types being designed and produced in the US until the carrier famine was overcome. the next problem is that most US types could not be operated from RN carriers for most of the war. Until the problems of the deck park had been solved (circa 1944) the numbers of Hellcats, Corsairs and the like were strictly limited. Even then, the abilities of US types to operate in the rough weather conditions and at night, which was a necessity in RN doctrine, proved very limited.

moreovewr, at the time the RN needed high performance aircraft.....1939-1940, the US aircraft industry was backward and did not offer any real solution to the problems confronting the RN at that time. The F4F was not ready, neither was the SBD. Aircraft like the Cleveland could not be operated from the small British Carriers

By 1943, things were turning around, but as the recent experiences with aircraft like the F-35, the apparent invincibility of the US aerospace industry is transient and unreliable. On the basis of the logic you are suggesting, countries like Australia would have been far better served to go tell the US president and all his rudeness to stick it, and his JSF where the sun doesn't shine and bought aircraft like the the new SU57. We would have saved ourselves a wad full of cash, had our aircraft at a fraction of the cost, and not have to deal with an "ally" of dubious reliability

Actually, what I'm saying is that the UK simply did not have the excess engineering and manufacturing capabilities to develop every engineering proposal that came along. The UK was far more resource constrained than the US. Programs such as the Albermarle, Botha, Lerwick were under development and a higher priority. My entire post was related to internal politics, production and engineering resources. I wasn't saying US aircraft were better. I was saying the US had the engineering and production capacity to absorb a mistake. The British did not.

As far the F-35? For the limited numbers being procured for the RN? Does the UK have the ability to develop the aircraft today? Is it engineering or resource constrained? Or is financially constrained?
As far current politics are concerned? I don't come here for that and find don't particularly find it relevant to the "Sea Hurricane".
 
Relating back to my original post, did the UK have the engineering, material, and human resources to allocate to the "Sea Hurricane" from 1938-1940?
The simple answer is there was not enough excess capacity to do the project. Let's look at folding the wings, we need to
1. Develop concept and specifications
2. Spec the materials
3. Manufacture prototype
4. Test prototype
5. Determine the ability to manufacture (New Production Line? Hire New personnel? Use existing personnel from a current production line?)
5a. Assess and determine the impact on production assembly time and impact on current contract obligations
(Does the customer want this enough to impact on their deliveries? Which is more important? Deliveries or folding wings?)
6. Determine lead times for specialized materials and manufacturing operations and schedule production
Remember all this being done while the RAF is rearming, new plants are being built, and there is a shortage of machine tools. And how many new aircraft are being developed and competing for the same resources? Note that items 3-6 can all be concurrently assuming there are no "glitches".
 

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