Build a better Sea Hurricane 1938

[yulzari]

The quasi OTL 1940 FAA would be folding Sea Hurricanes (their Lordships would have preferred Sea Spitfires IOTL) as fleet fighters in lieu of Sea Gladiators, Fairey Fulmars in lieu of Skuas as dive bombers/reconnaisance/loitering CAP/escort fighters and Albacores in lieu of Swordfish. A balanced set within period abilities and power. The next step being Firebrands to replace Sea Hurricanes, Firefly to replace Fulmars and Barracudas to replace Albacores. For commonality aboard ship it would be nice to all use Griffon engines. They had a plan and it was sensible but real life intervened. The priority given to the RAF and Admiralty faffing about with changing requirements made it a sensible move to fill in with US aeroplanes from existing foreign production lines. Bear in mind that they had to also plan for a FAA post war when the US types were thrown over the side in 1945.

Concentrating on the OP, the Sea Hurricane improvements would be a function of improving power to allow lifting heavier loads off the same decks. Try adding the weight of armour, folding wings, hook, extra fuel etc. onto a 2 blade fixed pitch propellor early Hurricane and get off the deck safely. Especially on one of the smaller carriers in hot weather and minimal wind. A different story with a Merlin 55 let alone a Griffon.

 

[EwenS]

So did the British, where the R in the Fairey Swordfish TSR and its predecessor, the Blackburn Shark TSR, and its successors the Fairey Albacore TSR and Barracuda TSR is for Recon (TSR = torpedo/spotter/reconnaissance).

So, yes we'll need to change the spec and doctrine for the FAA's fighter, as there's no need for two Recon types on the same carrier, and especially one that degrades fleet air defence - ideally when the Nimrod replacement is being Specified. In 1940 each RN carrier should go to sea with folding Sea Hurricanes, Swordfish TSRs, and where there's space, Skua dive bombers (this also needs a re-prioritization away from fighter pretences to dedicated DB).

Minor correction

S.24/37 that led to the Barracuda was for a "Torpedo Bomber Reconnaissance Aeroplane" combining the roles of torpedo bomber / recce with dive bomber / recce. Hence its designation became TBR not TSR. Later the Mark III version (with the radome under the aft fuselage) became the TR.III for torpedo bomber / recce. So effectively a successor for the Albacore as a TB and the Skua as a DB.

As for the Fulmar you need to sort out what it was originally intended for when ordered and what it was later sometimes used for.

FAA fighters in the 1930s had two roles:-
1. Defence over the fleet, where the expectation was that enemy attackers would not have fighter escort; and
2. Strike escort to eliminate any enemy aircraft over the target & strafing (including the use of light bombs) enemy escort ships to reduce their AA protection. It is this part that meant a second seat was required as it would be operating out of sight of the RN fleet.

During the 1930s the FAA squadrons used a mix of single seat Hawker Nimrods (for part 1 above) and two seat Hawker Ospreys (for part 2). The Skua was expected to be the replacement for the second type, but development fell behind and it was delivered later than planned. The first was meant to be filled by the Roc turret fighter.

The spec to which the Fulmar was designed, O.8/38 called for an "Interim Two Seat Fighter" i.e. a stop-gap aircraft pending a decision about what should really be done. There was no mention of reconnaissance and recce was not part of its original function. The second seat was a requirement as it was expected that it would serve in the two roles as a fighter. The Fulmar was later used to some limited extent as a recce aircraft, where fighter opposition was expected as it was seen as more survivable, or where its speed could be used to advantage. But it was limited. It was after the Japanese Operation C in April 1942 for example that Admiral Somerville's thoughts turned to using it in that role as his Albacores had proved vulnerable to the Zero.

1938 also saw an emergency purchase of Sea Gladiators due to a foreseen shortage of fighters in the FAA by the end of that year due to late delivery of the Skua / Roc and a diminishing number of available NImrod / Ospreys. It was effectively the successor to the single seat Nimrod as the fighter for protection over the fleet for use by C & G squadrons.

1939 saw the issue of new requirements but these did not result in any successful designs. Then right at the end of the year the RN reviewed its needs in the light of what happened since war broke out. From that in 1940 came a need for two fighter types:-

1. The two seater Firefly as successor in the two seat role; and
2. A 400mph single seater needed for base protection as the RAF couldn't do it as well as for use from a carrier. The Firebrand.

So there weren't two recon types on the carriers early war.

As for the air defence problem, you keep seeing it as giving the RN a better fighter. But it is a much deeper problem than that. The problem isn't doctrine. You are not recognising the detection problem. And you are not looking at the defensive / offensive balance of the carrier.

You have limited space on the carrier, any carrier. More fighters for self defence means less for strike escort and less strike aircraft, which is why you have the carrier in the first place. There is simply not enough room to carry enough fighters to maintain a full daytime CAP (even the USN & IJN carriers with their bigger aircraft complements only had 18 fighters to fill both the roles above). From the mid-1930s, with increasing aircraft speeds, the time between visually spotting an attacking force (and you can't guarantee that - see how the RAF Blenheims weren't spotted by the IJN in 1942 until after they dropped their bombs) had shrunk to such an extent that deck launched interceptors could not climb fast enough to intercept. There is no point in having a wonderful fighter if it can't actually intercept the attacker. Hence the adoption by the RN of the armoured carrier to protect its strike force.

1938 there is no radar. Radar changes everything. It pushes the detection point outwards. How far depends on many things, particularly height. Deck launched interceptors against low level attackers start to become viable. CAP becomes more viable as interceptions can take place further from the fleet giving DLI more time to climb to height, especially with higher performance fighters. But the problem of numbers still exists, including for strike escort.

1938 is an awkward year for the RN. Inskip has given them back control of the FAA in principle. But that doesn't become reality until May 1939. Going forward it can begin to train all its pilots to navigate to the standard of the RN pilots thay already have, so can begin to think about dispensing with the second seat in future fighters. For a whole lot of reasons the Fulmar was what it spec called for, an "interim" fighter. And in 1938 radar at sea is still in the future, far less effective fighter direction.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Concentrating on the OP, the Sea Hurricane improvements would be a function of improving power to allow lifting heavier loads off the same decks. Try adding the weight of armour, folding wings, hook, extra fuel etc. onto a 2 blade fixed pitch propellor early Hurricane and get off the deck safely. Especially on one of the smaller carriers in hot weather and minimal wind. A different story with a Merlin 55 let alone a Griffon.

We don't need the folding Sea Hurricane until HMS Ark Royal and the Illustrious class enter service, so I would start with a naval version of the Hurricane Mk1 or II, though the two blade prop may be a concern. The Outrageous class trio have catapults, so that should help get these early Sea Hurricanes airborne. HMS Eagle, Hermes and Argus will need to wait until the more powerful Sea Hurricanes are available. Hopefully by the time the Griffon is available the Sea Hurricane has been replaced entirely by the Seafire or something else (since, presumably there's no Firefly).

 

[EwenS]

We don't need the folding Sea Hurricane until HMS Ark Royal and the Illustrious class enter service, so I would start with a naval version of the Hurricane Mk1 or II, though the two blade prop may be a concern. The Outrageous class trio have catapults, so that should help get these early Sea Hurricanes airborne. HMS Eagle, Hermes and Argus will need to wait until the more powerful Sea Hurricanes are available. Hopefully by the time the Griffon is available the Sea Hurricane has been replaced entirely by the Seafire or something else (since, presumably there's no Firefly).

No catapults on Furious, Eagle or Hermes. Argus received a BH.I accelerator (catapult) during her 1936-38 refit to equip her as a Queen Bee carrier. C&G only received their BH.I in refits in 1935/36. Ark had the same model from completion.

 

[Shortround6]

I have no problem with a two pitch or even CS prop on the Folding Hurricane, Use whatever the Fulmar was going to use.
I also have no problem with using the Merlin VIII engine from the Fulmar. Just be aware that performance in the mid teens and higher would also suck.

But that does not solve the problem of the desired range/endurance, ammunition load and communications/navigation as know/understood at the time.

The longer endurance/ammo load allows for a small number of planes to maintain coverage much longer than even a larger number of shorter endurance aircraft.
Since carriers often had to turn into the wind to launch/recover aircraft, keeping aircraft in the air for even 2 hours longer reduces a lot of course changes and fuel burn of the carrier running at high speed to regain position.
I have no idea if the endurance/ammo load was based on actual needs or actual tests or if they just "sounded good".

 

[Admiral Beez]

The longer endurance/ammo load allows for a small number of planes to maintain coverage much longer than even a larger number of shorter endurance aircraft.
Since carriers often had to turn into the wind to launch/recover aircraft, keeping aircraft in the air for even 2 hours longer reduces a lot of course changes and fuel burn of the carrier running at high speed to regain position.

The USN and IJN made single seat fighters work. So can the RN/FAA, as they did with the non-folding Sea Hurricane. Add external or internal fuel as needed - we'll still be lighter than the Fulmar.

Just skip the Fulmar and get the Sea Hurricane into earlier, widespread service - that's where its opportunity for improvement is the greatest.

 

[EwenS]

The USN and IJN made single seat fighters work. So can the RN/FAA, as they did with the non-folding Sea Hurricane. Add external or internal fuel as needed - we'll still be lighter than the Fulmar.

Just skip the Fulmar and get the Sea Hurricane into earlier, widespread service - that's where its opportunity for improvement is the greatest.

Please define what you think you mean by "The USN and IJN made single seat fighters work" and with what in what timescale?

The interception problem was the same for all 3 navies. The major difference was that the USN & IJN expected to be operating their carriers in the generally better weather conditions of the Pacific. They also had complete control of their air arms throughout the inter war period and so could recruit & train their personnel to their own standards. A better shipboard Hurricane in 1938 doesn't change those factors.

 

[Glider]

Its always worth remembering the the RN also had experience of single seat fighters between the wars. So the problems and advantages were well known to the RN.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Its always worth remembering the the RN also had experience of single seat fighters between the wars. So the problems and advantages were well known to the RN.

A good point. In fact, dual-role Skuas and Rocs aside, in the entire history of British carrier aviation out of more than two dozen operational fighters there have been a total of five two-seat fighters: Fulmar, Firefly, Sea Venom, Sea Vixen and the American Phantom II. Every other FAA operated carrier fighter: Pup, Camel, Nightjar, Flycatcher, Nimrod, Sea Gladiator, Sea Hurricane, Seafire, Sea Fury, Sea Hornet, Firebrand, Attacker, Sea Hawk, Sea Vampire, Scimitar, Sea Harrier, plus the American Martlet, Hellcat, Corsair and now Lightning II have been single seaters. The FAA and Admiralty weren't stupid, but they had to deal with the cards they had.

Someone should have assigned a squadron of Fulmars to RAF Fighter Command in the summer of 1940 and demonstrated how it preforms against the Bf 109s, Bf 110s and medium bombers that it will need to defend the fleet against.

 

[RCAFson]

A good point. In fact, dual-role Skuas and Rocs aside, in the entire history of British carrier aviation out of more than two dozen operational fighters there have been a total of five two-seat fighters: Fulmar, Firefly, Sea Venom, Sea Vixen and the American Phantom II. Every other FAA operated carrier fighter: Pup, Camel, Nightjar, Flycatcher, Nimrod, Sea Gladiator, Sea Hurricane, Seafire, Sea Fury, Sea Hornet, Firebrand, Attacker, Sea Hawk, Sea Vampire, Scimitar, Sea Harrier, plus the American Martlet, Hellcat, Corsair and now Lightning II have been single seaters. The FAA and Admiralty weren't stupid, but they had to deal with the cards they had.

Someone should have assigned a squadron of Fulmars to RAF Fighter Command in the summer of 1940 and demonstrated how it preforms against the Bf 109s, Bf 110s and medium bombers that it will need to defend the fleet against.

There were no Fulmars to spare in the Summer of 1940:
Production:
April - 1
May - 6
June - 12
July - 20
Aug - 25
Sept - 20
Oct - 27
Nov - 29

Deliveries to the RN to end of Dec 1940 = 159 (deliveries tend to lag production). The biggest problem with the Fulmar was that there wasn't enough of them. They would have benefited from the Merlin X/XX engine but AFAIK, those were all reserved for the RAF...

 

[EwenS]

A good point. In fact, dual-role Skuas and Rocs aside, in the entire history of British carrier aviation out of more than two dozen operational fighters there have been a total of five two-seat fighters: Fulmar, Firefly, Sea Venom, Sea Vixen and the American Phantom II. Every other FAA operated carrier fighter: Pup, Camel, Nightjar, Flycatcher, Nimrod, Sea Gladiator, Sea Hurricane, Seafire, Sea Fury, Sea Hornet, Firebrand, Attacker, Sea Hawk, Sea Vampire, Scimitar, Sea Harrier, plus the American Martlet, Hellcat, Corsair and now Lightning II have been single seaters. The FAA and Admiralty weren't stupid, but they had to deal with the cards they had.

Someone should have assigned a squadron of Fulmars to RAF Fighter Command in the summer of 1940 and demonstrated how it preforms against the Bf 109s, Bf 110s and medium bombers that it will need to defend the fleet against.

For carrier borne two seaters you have missed:-

Sopwith 1 1/2 Strutter (much used in WW1 incl from Furious)
Hawker Osprey (a contemporary of the single seat Nimrod in the 1930s)
Sea Hornet NF.21 (1949-1954)

 

[Shortround6]

Someone should have assigned a squadron of Fulmars to RAF Fighter Command in the summer of 1940 and demonstrated how it preforms against the Bf 109s, Bf 110s and medium bombers that it will need to defend the fleet against.

Why?
It had entered Service in No 788 squadron (Trials unit) in May 1940. No. 806 Squadron (Illustrious) got their first ones in June 1940 and In July No 808 Squadron got their first Fulmars At Worthy Down.
By Dec of 1940 7 squadrons had received at least a few Fulmars.
FAA Squadrons had flown dockyard defense patrols during the BoB.

Giving some to the RAF wouldn't have shown anything different from what the FAA was learning in 1940.

And Aug/Sept 1940 was way too late to switch horses. What were they supposed to do in the Fall of 1940?
Park the Fulmars and go back to Gladiators while they try to sort out a non-folding wing (or primitive fold) Hurricane?

Now maybe they should have turned off the tap in 1942/43 before the last 200 or so were built but that is rather different than trying to use them over SE England in 1940 as a "trial" for how they would work as a carrier fighter.
I would note that NOBODY was suggesting using Martlets over SE England in the fall of 1940. They sent them to Scapa Flow, over 500 miles from London, and just about 300 miles from the Norwegian coast.

 

[EwenS]

808 squadron was assigned to Fighter Command in the summer of 1940, one of 2 FAA squadrons credited with flying in the BoB. The other was 804 with GSG, Bffalo & Martlet filling a similar role to 808.

Formed on 1 July 1940 with 12 Fulmars at Worthy Down in the south of England, it was sent north after work up to protect Scapa Flow because the RAF couldn't spare any Spitfire or Hurricane squadrons for the task. It was the second squadron to receive Fulmars.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Why?

To demonstrate the folly of twin seat, single-engined fighters. So, to dissuade the FAA from accepting the type. Admittedly some time travel is needed. Better for the Fulmar concept to be rejected outright and replaced by the Sea Hurricane or something else.

 

[Shortround6]

To demonstrate the folly of twin seat, single-engined fighters. So, to dissuade the FAA from accepting the type. Admittedly some time travel is needed. Better for the Fulmar concept to be rejected outright and replaced by the Sea Hurricane or something else.

Like 1 to 2 years?
As hinted (not hard enough?) the 1940 Martlet wasn't going to work against 109s or 110s. Folding wing or no folding wing.
But by all means, let's jump on the Fulmar for not doing the job.
BTW the Hurricane I in land form was not up to dealing with the 109E or 110s during the BoB which is why they started stuffing Merlin XX engines in them in Sept of 1940.
A folding wing/hooked Hurricane I, even with CS prop was not going to be able to deal with land based 109s.

Doing a bit better but still failing doesn't actually do the job.

 

[EwenS]

Fulmars were built at Fairey's Stockport factory, which had been building Battles (can't remember just now when it stopped producing those).

It had been planned that Stockport would build Barracudas from early 1941 in succession to the Fulmars. But that aircraft was delayed so more Fulmars helped keep the workforce together & occupied. Last Fulmar rolled off the production line Feb 1943. Low level production of Barracudas began in April 1942 but only about 25 delivered from there by end of the year.

Fairey Hayes was to build the Firefly in succession to the Albacore. Again the same problem of delays meant Albacore stayed in production longer than planned.

The Admiralty were concerned that if the plants fell idle, MAP would allocate them to RAF production and the RN might never get the aircraft they needed. The FAA was well down the priority list when it came to aircraft production.

 

[Shortround6]

The Admiralty were concerned that if the plants fell idle, MAP would allocate them to RAF production and the RN might never get the aircraft they needed. The FAA was well down the priority list when it came to aircraft production.

Yes, if only the Air Ministry would tell those pesky Navy Guys that they didn't really need airplanes and with a few hundred more bombers built at the ex FAA factories the RAF could destroy the German factories producing the planes and subs the Navy Guys were worried about.

 

[Clayton Magnet]

Yes, if only the Air Ministry would tell those pesky Navy Guys that they didn't really need airplanes and with a few hundred more bombers built at the ex FAA factories the RAF could destroy the German factories producing the planes and subs the Navy Guys were worried about.

"...The bomber will always get through."

 

[Admiral Beez]

Doing a bit better but still failing doesn't actually do the job.

I sometimes find this forum exhausting. We can all find the reason why something would not, could not or should not have occurred. That's easy, anyone can throw on their contrarian hat and destroy any pov or position. But the best, most enjoyable discussions I've had in-person and online start with the how, for example how to make a better Sea Hurricane including identifying and how to overcome any barriers in doctrine, political and bureaucratic priorities, and engineering. Anyway, peace.

 

[nuuumannn]

We can all find the reason why something would not, could not or should not have occurred. That's easy, anyone can throw on their contrarian hat and destroy any pov or position.

You might be taking this all a bit personally, Admiral. A "contrarian" POV as you describe in almost all these discussions is brought about from a pragmatic view of a given situation. What is so easy to forget is that looking back in hindsight misinforms us of what might have been possible at the time. We expect things should have been done because we are informed of things after the fact that possibly could not have been known at the time, versus what was known at the time, such as prevailing attitudes, experience, or politics. The two scenarios, our hindsight informed proposals, and what was capable of happening at the time, are almost always exclusive of one another for some reason or another.

You should never stop coming up with alternative scenarios, but to expect that there should be no counter to them is naïve, bearing in mind how much of past situations are known and understood. Many of the what-if ideas proposed by people have a kernel of truth in them, and in some cases were actually considered, such as a more detailed navalised Hurricane than the traditional Sea Hurricane was, but for some reason or another that the what-if has overlooked or not considered, the proposal was not carried out. Sometimes, things didn't happen because of sheer bloody-mindedness, but if not, there is usually a pragmatic reason why they didn't.