I think they were based upon the Merlin XX and it's improved SC intake.
Build a better Sea Hurricane 1938
- Thread starter fastmongrel
- Start date
I think they were based upon the Merlin XX and it's improved SC intake.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
It is not just the supercharger intake. that allowed the engine to make more power or to make it higher up. There were a number of small changes to the cylinder blocks (the MK VIII used 3 different ones) and other parts that allowed the engine to stand up to the increased power. Different radiuses in certain areas
A different crankcase was used on both the early and late MK VIIIs and XIIs, that is the early version of both marks used one type of crankcase and later versions of both marks used a different one, D13609.
A different crankcase was used on both the early and late MK VIIIs and XIIs, that is the early version of both marks used one type of crankcase and later versions of both marks used a different one, D13609.
parsifal
Colonel
Losing two of the big fleet carriers, despite their age was regrettable, but not a critical factor in the problems facing the RN in the lead up and early stages of the war. Having a 1st line naval fighter from our perspective might look attractive as an option, and later on as the RN FAA began to change, the availability of aircraft like the sea hurricane did become vital, but in the early years of the war would have been a waste of resources and likely to lead to dangerous conclusions about the FAA needed to do to survive.
The number one problem facing the FAA in 1939 through to the end of 1940 (at least) was the supply of pilots and aircrew. The RN entered the war with at sea billets on its carriers (disregarding seaplanes), for 245 aircraft, but entered the war with just over 100 pilots. In 1939 several of the carriers, like GLORIOUS had been laid up in reserve for this reason. ARK ROYAL went to war with less than half her complement of available aircraft/pilots.
Moreover the supply of trained aircrew remained at a trickle until well into 1941. In 1939, the RN received a total of 16 trained pilots for the entire year. In 1940, 81 pilots were to receive their carrier wings (however a number of these were promptly seconded to the RAF at least for the duration of .the BoB others, despite the shortages at sea remained land based because of the dire situation in places like the western desert) In 1941, wastage overtook the supply rate. It was this cruel reality of insufficient pilots that dictated more than anything that the RN absolutely could not afford to start getting in the ring with land based air and duke it out with it in the same style as the USN or IJN. In these circumstances, the addition of a true day fighter to the inventory would have been counterproductive for a number of reasons.
The RN had no choice but to accept multi-role aircraft so that 1 pilot could do mere than one job. It wasn't shortages of deck space that forced the RN into the arena of multi role aircraft, it was pilots.
I should mention that the general conduct of the war forced the RN into situations it had sought to avoid in its pre-war planning. Prewar, it had been planned not to place its carriers within striking distance of land based air. But the invasion of Norway and the entry of Italy, as well as the surrender of the French, as well as the very late decision to hold Malta, and a bit later to lend assistance to Greece forced the RN to improvise and devise strategies and procedures that would allow them to operate in these narrow seas with some level of safety and not lose either its remaining carriers or the dwindling suppy of pilots to fly on them. Moreover, the RN in 1940 after the fall of france was in a difficult situation and had to do something to rein in the technological advantages enjoyed by ships like the RM fast battleships, and the KM heavy forces. The RN by December 1940 had received (fully worked up) just one fast battleship, and 1 carrier. They had lost 1 old BB, and two carriers, with 3 others out of theatre chasing surface raiders. They had a whole additional TO to fight against an enemy thought to have at least 3000 first line aircraft 9in reality it was more like 1700 but the british did not know that at the time.
The RN improvised. From the early part of the war, even before Norway, they had begun to train their aircrew for night operations. This took a long time, even for fully trained aircrew it would take more than a year to complete night training. Technologically they worked on night combat procedures, such as designating one aircraft as the pathfinder/ flare dropper, later on efforts were made to install an effect ASV radar (did not really come to fruition until the back half of 1941). They stretched the effectiveness of their very limited daytime fighter resources by developing GCI and radar guided interceptions for their CAP to a degree ubnknown in other navies. The RN was a much more thoroughly trained night strike force than either of the other two carrier equipped navies and this alternate strategy paid off very well, with the destruction of more than 250000 tons of shipping by the carriers alone in the med, as well as the destruction inflicted on the RM at Taranto and the KM in Denmark Strait. In those situations where daytime intervention by RN carriers was deemed necessary, such as the Malta convoys, for the first six months the RN was careful to fly air cover from out of range of the RA fighters. It got careless and overconfident in this regard resulting in the near disaster on 10 january '41.
The addition of a Sea hurricane type fighter was utterly counterproductive to the development of those abilities and ignores the fundamental weaknesses and chanllenges facing the FAA in the lead up to war. If the RN had decided to build a real day fighter force into its carrier borne assets it probably would have lost the early battles, with potentially war changing effects.
The RN leadership made the right decision not to seek to develop or acquire dedicated single seat fighters pre-war.
The number one problem facing the FAA in 1939 through to the end of 1940 (at least) was the supply of pilots and aircrew. The RN entered the war with at sea billets on its carriers (disregarding seaplanes), for 245 aircraft, but entered the war with just over 100 pilots. In 1939 several of the carriers, like GLORIOUS had been laid up in reserve for this reason. ARK ROYAL went to war with less than half her complement of available aircraft/pilots.
Moreover the supply of trained aircrew remained at a trickle until well into 1941. In 1939, the RN received a total of 16 trained pilots for the entire year. In 1940, 81 pilots were to receive their carrier wings (however a number of these were promptly seconded to the RAF at least for the duration of .the BoB others, despite the shortages at sea remained land based because of the dire situation in places like the western desert) In 1941, wastage overtook the supply rate. It was this cruel reality of insufficient pilots that dictated more than anything that the RN absolutely could not afford to start getting in the ring with land based air and duke it out with it in the same style as the USN or IJN. In these circumstances, the addition of a true day fighter to the inventory would have been counterproductive for a number of reasons.
The RN had no choice but to accept multi-role aircraft so that 1 pilot could do mere than one job. It wasn't shortages of deck space that forced the RN into the arena of multi role aircraft, it was pilots.
I should mention that the general conduct of the war forced the RN into situations it had sought to avoid in its pre-war planning. Prewar, it had been planned not to place its carriers within striking distance of land based air. But the invasion of Norway and the entry of Italy, as well as the surrender of the French, as well as the very late decision to hold Malta, and a bit later to lend assistance to Greece forced the RN to improvise and devise strategies and procedures that would allow them to operate in these narrow seas with some level of safety and not lose either its remaining carriers or the dwindling suppy of pilots to fly on them. Moreover, the RN in 1940 after the fall of france was in a difficult situation and had to do something to rein in the technological advantages enjoyed by ships like the RM fast battleships, and the KM heavy forces. The RN by December 1940 had received (fully worked up) just one fast battleship, and 1 carrier. They had lost 1 old BB, and two carriers, with 3 others out of theatre chasing surface raiders. They had a whole additional TO to fight against an enemy thought to have at least 3000 first line aircraft 9in reality it was more like 1700 but the british did not know that at the time.
The RN improvised. From the early part of the war, even before Norway, they had begun to train their aircrew for night operations. This took a long time, even for fully trained aircrew it would take more than a year to complete night training. Technologically they worked on night combat procedures, such as designating one aircraft as the pathfinder/ flare dropper, later on efforts were made to install an effect ASV radar (did not really come to fruition until the back half of 1941). They stretched the effectiveness of their very limited daytime fighter resources by developing GCI and radar guided interceptions for their CAP to a degree ubnknown in other navies. The RN was a much more thoroughly trained night strike force than either of the other two carrier equipped navies and this alternate strategy paid off very well, with the destruction of more than 250000 tons of shipping by the carriers alone in the med, as well as the destruction inflicted on the RM at Taranto and the KM in Denmark Strait. In those situations where daytime intervention by RN carriers was deemed necessary, such as the Malta convoys, for the first six months the RN was careful to fly air cover from out of range of the RA fighters. It got careless and overconfident in this regard resulting in the near disaster on 10 january '41.
The addition of a Sea hurricane type fighter was utterly counterproductive to the development of those abilities and ignores the fundamental weaknesses and chanllenges facing the FAA in the lead up to war. If the RN had decided to build a real day fighter force into its carrier borne assets it probably would have lost the early battles, with potentially war changing effects.
The RN leadership made the right decision not to seek to develop or acquire dedicated single seat fighters pre-war.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
Well, you can say they made the best out of a bad situation. That doesn't stop the situation from being bad or bordering on tragic.
Not to mention stupid.
You don't have enough pilots to put full compliments of aircraft (of whatever type) on board the carriers you do have yet you lay down and build four more carriers that will raise the needed numbers of planes/pilots by 60% ????
and then laydown No 5 (the Implacable) on Feb 21st 1939? Space for 60 planes and ??? pilots.
Please note I am not criticizing the men who worked to perform near miracles with what they were given but there sure seems to be a disconnect somewhere in the system between what was wanted on paper and what was being supplied to the actual forces.
We will pay for multiple 23,000 ton ships with all the cost and labor that entails but we won't pay for pilots to fly planes from them????
Not to mention stupid.
You don't have enough pilots to put full compliments of aircraft (of whatever type) on board the carriers you do have yet you lay down and build four more carriers that will raise the needed numbers of planes/pilots by 60% ????
and then laydown No 5 (the Implacable) on Feb 21st 1939? Space for 60 planes and ??? pilots.
Please note I am not criticizing the men who worked to perform near miracles with what they were given but there sure seems to be a disconnect somewhere in the system between what was wanted on paper and what was being supplied to the actual forces.
We will pay for multiple 23,000 ton ships with all the cost and labor that entails but we won't pay for pilots to fly planes from them????
The FAA was starting at a low ebb and the unexpected advent of war in 1939 and the resulting attrition only made things worse. The FAA did institute aircrew training schemes that would have produced all the needed aircrew by 1941/42, in time to man the new carriers. OTOH, the FAA also had a number of landbased combat and OTU squadrons whose primary function was fleet base defence and strike/interdiction. The first Martlet kills were made by one of these squadrons.
We have to remember that the FAA went to war in Sept 1939 and had to learn all it's lessons in the school of hard knocks, whereas the USN and IJN could watch events safely from the sidelines, learn from the FAA, and build up their strength under peacetime conditions but with near wartime urgency. If we look at IJN and USN pilot training and aircraft acquisition from Sept 1939 to Dec 1941, it doesn't seem all that different from the FAA, especially for the IJN,
However, it is true that the RAF was probably the FAA's most implacable opponent.
parsifal
Colonel
I honestly believe we are more or less on the same page here. The RN did make some dangerous assumptions prewar. Its planning was out of kilter and unrealistic, but as RCAFson points out, had the war began in 1941-2, the RN would have been in a position to better and more comprehensively use its deck space, and also gone to war with something like adequate reserves
A war in 1942 would have been a much different affair for the RN, and again as RCAFson points out, would have made the RN a much more potent force
If you want to put the shoe on the other foot, imagine if the IJN or USN had been forced to go to war in 1939. For the Japanese, this would have meant going to war with just two operational carriers. The HIRYU was still working up and would not be ready for active operations until spring 1940. The KAGA had entered Sasebo December 1938 for a full reconstruction, and would not return to service until early 1941.
AKAGI had completed her major reconstruction by the end of 1938. She was promptly placed in reserve but rejoined (or rather re-constituted) CarDiv 1 about march or April 1939. She was nominally assigned 12 A5M "Claude" fighters with 4 disassembled spares (and no pilots), 19 Aichi D1A "Susie" dive bombers with 5 spares, and 35 B4Y "Jean" horizontal/torpedo bombers with 16 spares.
SORYU was fully operational, but her air group remained incomplete and poorly equipped. Her air group as at september 1939 was supposed to be 18x A5Ms, 27 x D1A, and 12 B4Ys, but in reality she was equipped with about half that number of fighters, consisting of A4N1 biplanes were issued instead. On 25 April 1940, her air group consisted of 9 A4Ns, 12 D1A2s and 9 B4Ys.
HOSHO was in reserve, but would be used periodically as a training carrier after the outbreak of histilities. I believe she was in mothballs until well into 1940 or 1941.
RYUJO was the only other carrier in existence in the IJN at that time. In February 1938 she had been in service off the Chinese coast, attached to Cardiv 1. At this time her A4Ns were replaced with A5Ms. In this configuration the light carrier supported Japanese operations in Southern China in March–April and again in October 1938. RYUJO was laid up at the outbreak of the war and entered a refit that lasted from November 1939 through January 1940 and became a training ship until November 1940. At that time she became the flagship of Rear Admiral Kakutas newly formed Cardiv 3. With captain Ushio Sugimoto taking command of the ship. As at the outbreak of war in the pacific, her air group consisted of 18 Kates and 16 Claudes In April 1941 she was again re-organised when the first air fleet was formed 10 April 1941, at this time RYUJO was designated flagship of CarDiv 4.
I am certain that if I undertook a brief history of the USN from 1939 through to 1941, we would discover a similar pattern of unreadiness.
The point is that the RN was unready for war in 1939, the same as the other major naval powers. Unlike the other powers, the RN was forced into action of a life threatening kind from the beginning and this affected her ability to expand and modernise. That she she still managed to do both, inflicting serious losses on the enemy along the way ought not be dismissed
A war in 1942 would have been a much different affair for the RN, and again as RCAFson points out, would have made the RN a much more potent force
If you want to put the shoe on the other foot, imagine if the IJN or USN had been forced to go to war in 1939. For the Japanese, this would have meant going to war with just two operational carriers. The HIRYU was still working up and would not be ready for active operations until spring 1940. The KAGA had entered Sasebo December 1938 for a full reconstruction, and would not return to service until early 1941.
AKAGI had completed her major reconstruction by the end of 1938. She was promptly placed in reserve but rejoined (or rather re-constituted) CarDiv 1 about march or April 1939. She was nominally assigned 12 A5M "Claude" fighters with 4 disassembled spares (and no pilots), 19 Aichi D1A "Susie" dive bombers with 5 spares, and 35 B4Y "Jean" horizontal/torpedo bombers with 16 spares.
SORYU was fully operational, but her air group remained incomplete and poorly equipped. Her air group as at september 1939 was supposed to be 18x A5Ms, 27 x D1A, and 12 B4Ys, but in reality she was equipped with about half that number of fighters, consisting of A4N1 biplanes were issued instead. On 25 April 1940, her air group consisted of 9 A4Ns, 12 D1A2s and 9 B4Ys.
HOSHO was in reserve, but would be used periodically as a training carrier after the outbreak of histilities. I believe she was in mothballs until well into 1940 or 1941.
RYUJO was the only other carrier in existence in the IJN at that time. In February 1938 she had been in service off the Chinese coast, attached to Cardiv 1. At this time her A4Ns were replaced with A5Ms. In this configuration the light carrier supported Japanese operations in Southern China in March–April and again in October 1938. RYUJO was laid up at the outbreak of the war and entered a refit that lasted from November 1939 through January 1940 and became a training ship until November 1940. At that time she became the flagship of Rear Admiral Kakutas newly formed Cardiv 3. With captain Ushio Sugimoto taking command of the ship. As at the outbreak of war in the pacific, her air group consisted of 18 Kates and 16 Claudes In April 1941 she was again re-organised when the first air fleet was formed 10 April 1941, at this time RYUJO was designated flagship of CarDiv 4.
I am certain that if I undertook a brief history of the USN from 1939 through to 1941, we would discover a similar pattern of unreadiness.
The point is that the RN was unready for war in 1939, the same as the other major naval powers. Unlike the other powers, the RN was forced into action of a life threatening kind from the beginning and this affected her ability to expand and modernise. That she she still managed to do both, inflicting serious losses on the enemy along the way ought not be dismissed
- Thread starter
- #67
fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
I wonder what efforts (if any) the RN made to try and encourage RAF pilots with carrier experience to transfer to the FAA.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
I don't know what the ins and outs of the US rebuilds/refits were but the size of the Navy (and Marines) meant more planes had been purchased at times. A big problem for all three navies was rapid advance of aeronautics during the 30s.
The US was probably the leading exponent of dive bombing.
124 of these starting in 1935, note enclosed cockpit, controllable propeller and adjustable cowl flaps.
they were replaced/augmented by
207 built but some (many?) not until after deliveries of monoplane Northrop BT-1s and SBDs started. However there were also about 170 Vought Vindicator monoplane dive bombers
Torpedo bombers we have already seen in another thread but the Devastator was the first all metal, retractable landing gear folding wing monoplane in service on any carrier.
The US also had over 140 Grumman fighters
Which were probably the equal of the Sea Gladiator. Monoplane fighters don't show up in double digits until 1940.
Everything had replacements in the works in 1939. Some just took long than others.
The US was probably the leading exponent of dive bombing.
124 of these starting in 1935, note enclosed cockpit, controllable propeller and adjustable cowl flaps.
they were replaced/augmented by
207 built but some (many?) not until after deliveries of monoplane Northrop BT-1s and SBDs started. However there were also about 170 Vought Vindicator monoplane dive bombers
Torpedo bombers we have already seen in another thread but the Devastator was the first all metal, retractable landing gear folding wing monoplane in service on any carrier.
The US also had over 140 Grumman fighters
Which were probably the equal of the Sea Gladiator. Monoplane fighters don't show up in double digits until 1940.
Everything had replacements in the works in 1939. Some just took long than others.
parsifal
Colonel
USN reportedly had 117 F3Fs on strength in September 1939, easily making it the most powerful fighter equipped force afloat in the world at the time. Issues relating to structural strength and dive stability had remained despite strong efforts by Gruman to eradicate these problems 1933-35, though to the fair, the issues had been reduced somewhat. IMO the Grumman should be considered a 'hot" performer, with a maximum level speed of 231 mph
The basic F3F had been considered largely obsolete by 1937 by the USN, as the navy was one of the first services to reach the conclusion that biplanes were on the way out. They basically had two designs in the pipeline, the f4F and the f2a, both of which were delayed and would not enter active service until 1940ish. As a stopgap, the navy ordered the development of the F3f-2 subtype which markedly improved top speed (reportedly to 264 mph)
The highly maneuverable Grumman F3F served as the Navy and Marine Corps' premier (and last biplane) fighter of the late 1930s. Used by both the Navy and Marine Corps, the stubby fighter served from 1936 to 1941.
In July 1936, the first XF3F-2 prototype was ordered by the Navy, and tested in 1937. A major change was installation of the 950 horsepower Wright R-1820-22 engine, improving performance and changing the contours of the engine cowling. In March 1937, the Navy ordered 81 F3F-2s, assigning them to VF-6 aboard USS Enterprise (CV-6) and Marine squadrons VMF-1 and VMF-2 in 1938. Finally, the Navy purchased 27 F3F-3s, fitted with uprated Cyclone engines. They were assigned to VF-5 aboard USS Yorktown (CV-5) but remained in front line service for only a year.
The F3F-1 were probably about the equal of the Skua though less well armed and somewhat touchy in terms of dive characteristics, structural strength, and spin recovery characteristics. These same caveats need to be applied to the f3F-2, but its superior performance should not be dismissed. I would place the F3F2 in roughly the category of the A5M. by the time of their service delivery, they really should be compared to the Fulmar which in my view would fly rings around it.
The original Grumman F4F-1 design was a biplane, which proved inferior to rival designs, necessitating a complete redesign as a monoplane named the F4F-2. This design was still not competitive with the Brewster F2A Buffalo which won initial U.S. Navy orders, but when the F4F-3 development was fitted with a more powerful version of the engine, a Pratt & Whitney Twin Wasp R-1830-76, featuring a two-stage supercharger, it showed its true potential. Nevetheless the type still was not without its problems, with leaky fuel tanks and other issues that caused the RN to not grant carrier qualifications to the similar Martlet Is they received in the latter part of 1940. Similalry, the f2A buffaloes were found to be totally unsuited to carrier operations because of the weak landing gear issues that prevented them from extended operations on the US carriers. Had the USN been forced to war in 1939, they would not have had available a satisfactory fighter to call upon for carrier operations
The basic F3F had been considered largely obsolete by 1937 by the USN, as the navy was one of the first services to reach the conclusion that biplanes were on the way out. They basically had two designs in the pipeline, the f4F and the f2a, both of which were delayed and would not enter active service until 1940ish. As a stopgap, the navy ordered the development of the F3f-2 subtype which markedly improved top speed (reportedly to 264 mph)
The highly maneuverable Grumman F3F served as the Navy and Marine Corps' premier (and last biplane) fighter of the late 1930s. Used by both the Navy and Marine Corps, the stubby fighter served from 1936 to 1941.
In July 1936, the first XF3F-2 prototype was ordered by the Navy, and tested in 1937. A major change was installation of the 950 horsepower Wright R-1820-22 engine, improving performance and changing the contours of the engine cowling. In March 1937, the Navy ordered 81 F3F-2s, assigning them to VF-6 aboard USS Enterprise (CV-6) and Marine squadrons VMF-1 and VMF-2 in 1938. Finally, the Navy purchased 27 F3F-3s, fitted with uprated Cyclone engines. They were assigned to VF-5 aboard USS Yorktown (CV-5) but remained in front line service for only a year.
The F3F-1 were probably about the equal of the Skua though less well armed and somewhat touchy in terms of dive characteristics, structural strength, and spin recovery characteristics. These same caveats need to be applied to the f3F-2, but its superior performance should not be dismissed. I would place the F3F2 in roughly the category of the A5M. by the time of their service delivery, they really should be compared to the Fulmar which in my view would fly rings around it.
The original Grumman F4F-1 design was a biplane, which proved inferior to rival designs, necessitating a complete redesign as a monoplane named the F4F-2. This design was still not competitive with the Brewster F2A Buffalo which won initial U.S. Navy orders, but when the F4F-3 development was fitted with a more powerful version of the engine, a Pratt & Whitney Twin Wasp R-1830-76, featuring a two-stage supercharger, it showed its true potential. Nevetheless the type still was not without its problems, with leaky fuel tanks and other issues that caused the RN to not grant carrier qualifications to the similar Martlet Is they received in the latter part of 1940. Similalry, the f2A buffaloes were found to be totally unsuited to carrier operations because of the weak landing gear issues that prevented them from extended operations on the US carriers. Had the USN been forced to war in 1939, they would not have had available a satisfactory fighter to call upon for carrier operations
You could install Fowler Flaps instead of the split trail flaps. The Fowler flap was invented around 1920 by one Harlan Davey Fowler, an engineer who was then in the employ of the U.S. Army. Probably first used in the Lockheed Model 14S Super Electra first flown in 1937. It took Mr Fowler a decade to sell his invention due to the curious disconnection between aerodynamic ressearch and the manufacturers.
Fowler Flaps add about 20% more lift than split flaps and that at a lower angle off attack. I suppose it would be about 14% across the whole wing since only the flapped portion is improved which might drop landing speed 7%.
Electra Model 14 in militarised form as Hudson showing Fowler Flaps
Below Hurricane Split Flap
Fowler Flaps add about 20% more lift than split flaps and that at a lower angle off attack. I suppose it would be about 14% across the whole wing since only the flapped portion is improved which might drop landing speed 7%.
Electra Model 14 in militarised form as Hudson showing Fowler Flaps
Below Hurricane Split Flap
Last edited:
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
For a Hurricane fighter they aren't needed. They managed to land Hurricanes on board in Norway by putting sandbags in the rear fuselage so they could use full brakes upon touching down without arresting gear (More weight in rear kept them from nosing over) . Far from Ideal but it worked for that squadron. In part due to the low landing speed of the Hurricane. Hurricane I's had a stall speed around 57-60mph (approach speed just under 70mph) so using high lift devices wasn't needed. Unlike some later fighters that needed all the help they could get.
I would note that the Lockheed 14 airliner the Hudson was based on had a landing speed of 65mph (that could be stalling speed, source is not clear) with flaps. Commercial airlines in the 1930s needed to get in and out of small airfields.
While this thread started with ideas for a work of fiction, the least changes needed are more believable.
I would note that the Lockheed 14 airliner the Hudson was based on had a landing speed of 65mph (that could be stalling speed, source is not clear) with flaps. Commercial airlines in the 1930s needed to get in and out of small airfields.
While this thread started with ideas for a work of fiction, the least changes needed are more believable.
Ditching Involved tentatively dragging the tail of the aircraft in the water and keeping the nose up as long as possible. The kind of radiator the Hurricane and P-51 mustang had made them dangerous to ditch because it acted as a water scoop. I don't think any navy ever specified that a radiator be placed in this position.
I suspect the Hurricane fabric was torn off so it sank. Best thing to do is move the radiator into the P-40 position. The so called Meridith effect was well known everywhere but so poorly implemented it was hardly worth bothering with, the chin radiator can in any case recover heat energy.
The adaptations the German developed for the long range Ju 87R for the maritime attack role and carrier use are worth emulating. Apart from jettisonable wheels they installed floatation cells in the aircraft and inflatable buoys .
Last edited:
"Simplicate and add lightness"
Originated by Gordon Hooten, an engineer working for Bill Stout (of Ford Trimotor fame) who adopted it and passed it on to Ed Heineman (of Havoc/Dauntless/Invader/Skyraider/Skyhawk/etc fame) who popularized it and inspired Colin Chapman (of Lotus fame) and a host of others to emulate the magic.
Cheers,
Wes
One thing which seems to be overlooked is that the FAA did commission the conversion of the Gloster Gladiator single seat fighter into the GSG and the subsequent purchase of purpose built GSGs.
- Thread starter
- #75
fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
My idea was the Sea Hurricane replaces the Sea Gladiator for service in Norway. That now seems to be too early so maybe the Sea Hurricane takes the place one for one of the Fulmar for Meditteranean serice late 1940 onwards.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
It sort of depends, do you want a Hurricane II with all the bells and whistles (bombs, drop tanks, belt feed cannon) or do you want a Hurricane I that can operate from a carrier and fit on the elevator to get below deck?
Pilots would be nice
from a hardware standpoint, In Malta (and Finland?) they did stick Blenheim engines with two pitch props on Gladiators (the Blenheim engines already had the pump needed for the pitch change mechanism and the right propshaft) for a useful increase in performance (climb more than speed) .
Pilots would be nice
from a hardware standpoint, In Malta (and Finland?) they did stick Blenheim engines with two pitch props on Gladiators (the Blenheim engines already had the pump needed for the pitch change mechanism and the right propshaft) for a useful increase in performance (climb more than speed) .
The P.4/34 first flew in early 1937. In Jan 1938 it was ordered as the Fulmar but AFAIK no naval development occurred before 1938. In less than two years the Fulmar flew and was in production by April 1940. Fairey engineered a folding 8 gun (750rpg) wing into the Fulmar, along with a CS prop and fitted it was a 1280hp engine.It sort of depends, do you want a Hurricane II with all the bells and whistles (bombs, drop tanks, belt feed cannon) or do you want a Hurricane I that can operate from a carrier and fit on the elevator to get below deck?
Pilots would be nice
from a hardware standpoint, In Malta (and Finland?) they did stick Blenheim engines with two pitch props on Gladiators (the Blenheim engines already had the pump needed for the pitch change mechanism and the right propshaft) for a useful increase in performance (climb more than speed) .
If, for example, Fairey had been given a contract to navalize the HH instead, it seems likely that they could have done so and had them (or a conversion kit to fit to Hawker built aircraft) in production by 1 Jan 1940.
And if it delayed the typhoon a few months it only would have helped Napier by giving them a few months extra time to sort out their novel engine.
High lift devices on the Hurricane wing say full span flaperons, perhaps Fowler flaps in board plus leading edge devices over the portion without prop flow such as retractable slats could more than double the wing maximum coefficient of lift. According to aeronautics for naval aviators that could reduce approach speed by 30% ie our hurricane would be approaching at 49mph instead of 70mph.
That's a useful reduction. So roughly 45 knots approach speed into 10-15 knots headwind gives a net approach of 30-35 knots.
This is what they were trying to land on.
I realise that playing around with leading edge devices impacts on wing washout, pitching moment, gun placement which is why I suggested trailing edge devices only ie the Fowler flap.
Mitsubishi used variable gearing on the A6M zero ailerons which geared up aileron deflection in the landing mode so rigging ailerons to convert to flapperons is not unprecedented or is the use of spoilers for roll control. They have nice characteristics such as post stall roll control and certainly, Messerschmitt had been using them for 10 years. They turned up on the Black Widow as well.
Fowler flaps, wing fold outboard of the undercarriage wouldn't be too hard as you have to pretty much modify every wing drawing anyway to get the hinges in. Chin radiator of the "power egg" type used on the Lancaster and Beaufighter.
Modifying the section of wing outside of the fold with some combination of slats, flapperons and or spoilers would work but of course, adds delay to the effort and time taken.
Sandbagging the tail of an aircraft may help it to brake but it will also reduce its stability.
Last edited:
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
They used the sandbags because the planes evacuating Norway were normal land Hurricanes, NO arresting hooks.
They flew Avenger torpedo bombers from escort carriers. similar stall speed and approach speeds as the Hurricane.
BTW Those are Sea Hurricanes on the deck of the HMS Avenger, so it looks like they could operated form a deck that small and slow.
They flew Avenger torpedo bombers from escort carriers. similar stall speed and approach speeds as the Hurricane.
BTW Those are Sea Hurricanes on the deck of the HMS Avenger, so it looks like they could operated form a deck that small and slow.
