wuzak
Captain
Waiting for its engine.
Build a better Sea Hurricane 1938 (1 Viewer)
- Thread starter fastmongrel
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Waiting for its engine.
Because RR and the UK AM put Griffon development on hold during the BofB and then the RAF poached it from the FAA.
wuzak
Captain
The "poaching" came before the BoB.
The Griffon design was started in 1938. It was realised that with some changes the Griffon could fit a Spitfire, and a redesign took place. This may have been before The original design was complete, and it consisted mainly of repackaging external parts. That occurred during 1939.
The first production Griffon Spitfires started being delivered in October 1943, service starting in early 1943.
The Firefly I was being delivered from March 1943, but did not go into service until July 1944.
The first flight of the Firefly Mk I was December 1941. The first flight of the Spitfire IV/XX was November 1941.
Even if the BoB delayed the Griffon by 6 months, the Firefly wasn't getting into service much before 1943.
The Griffon design was started in 1938. It was realised that with some changes the Griffon could fit a Spitfire, and a redesign took place. This may have been before The original design was complete, and it consisted mainly of repackaging external parts. That occurred during 1939.
The first production Griffon Spitfires started being delivered in October 1943, service starting in early 1943.
The Firefly I was being delivered from March 1943, but did not go into service until July 1944.
The first flight of the Firefly Mk I was December 1941. The first flight of the Spitfire IV/XX was November 1941.
Even if the BoB delayed the Griffon by 6 months, the Firefly wasn't getting into service much before 1943.
ThomasP
Senior Master Sergeant
Hello, although I have been visiting your forums for a couple of years, I am new to posting on forums so I apologize ahead of time if I make mistakes.
This post is intended to possibly clarify and answer some questions about why the SeaHurricane was not adopted before the war. It may be a bit long-winded for forum purposes - if so please advise me.
First I would like to stress that the need for a second seat in any carrier based aircraft was not outmoded as such when the US entered WW2 and for the same reasons was not outmoded at the end of the war. The reason for my stating this is as follows:
Prior to WW2 the USN generally prohibited single-seat aircraft from flying over-the-horizon unless they were heading toward large land masses (in daylight), or unless they were accompanied by one or more two-seaters with better navigation capability (in daylight). This was due to numerous serious failures in navigation that sometimes endangered entire squadrons of aircraft, and did result in the loss of a significant number of smaller flights of 1-4 aircraft. Night flying was generally avoided also (other than a minimum amount for training purposes to familiarize the pilots with the dangerous aspects of night operations in case of unplanned situations) due to the recognition of the inherent dangers in terms of landing accidents and failures in navigation. When the USN entered WW2 the official doctrine stressed avoidance of night operations for these same reasons.
The RN/FAA on the other hand had adopted a policy/goal in 1935 of becoming fully night operations capable. This was primarily in order to accomplish the FAA's missions of striking ship targets in harbor, and other shore and near-shore targets, while being relatively immune to enemy retaliation. In order to be able to accomplish the mission the crews needed to be able to navigate at least most of the flight without landmarks while in the dark. This required above average skill in navigation, as well as in night time launch and recovery operations. The RN/FAA found that the navigation skill required was not difficult to instill in the pilot, but that the pilot had a difficult time navigating and piloting at the same. This was partly due to the navigation equipment available at the time and partly due to the difficulty of multi-tasking. With the advent of more capable radios and navigation equipment in the mid-1930s, reliable relatively long range navigation at night became viable, but only if combined with a second crewman. The multi-seat Swordfish with its (for the time) advanced 3-in-1 radio set was the first operational carrier borne aircraft considered suitable for long range strike and reconnaissance by day or night.
By the beginning of WW2 the RN/FAA had the problems mostly worked out and the remaining finer points were hammered out in time for the strike on Taranto and the action vs the Bismarck. With the advent of shipborne and airborne surface search radar the mission to strike ships at sea at long range and at night had become a practical mission.
By contrast, the USN did not focus on improving their night operations during the early war, and were not as concerned with more advanced navigation skills (what might be called blind flying techniques today) as the RN/FAA. This is not to say that the USN was not aware of the benefits of having multi-crew aircraft, it was more a matter of the carrier doctrine adopted, and then prioritizing the type of aircraft put into service, and the crew training within the time available. For the seizing of local air superiority during a strike at the ranges originally imagined, single seat fighter aircraft were considered the best answer, the second crewman requirement imposing unacceptable performance penalties. And if a type of training did not directly go to accomplishing doctrine it was given secondary importance or set aside altogether. Overall this attitude served the USN well in the PTO, with the following exception: during the war 16% of the losses of USN carrier aircraft (that launched) were lost due to navigation error (often referred as 'fuel starvation' in the reports), regardless of whether they were assigned to CAP, strike, or reconnaissance, regardless of whether they were launched in clear skies, partly cloudy, or full cloud cover, and regardless of limited visibility (ie hazy) or perfectly clear skies. (The previous statement is based on a USN post-war analysis of USN&USMC aircraft losses in the PTO. I have not been able to find any kind of numerical breakdown of what % of the losses was during what type of mission or of what type of aircraft. The only qualifiers in the report were that while a small but possibly significant % of the losses could be due to mechanical failure, or pilot error - with a very small % possibly due to enemy action - the only available evidence pointed to the vast majority of these losses being due to navigational problems. It was also stated that the 16% value remained more-or-less constant throughout the war. The report stated the stark contrast to the RN/FAA experience, with less than 2% losses due to navigation failures under similar conditions.)
The USN was aware of and alarmed by the losses quite early in the war, but the carrier operational doctrine was working and that was considered paramount, the losses would just have to be accepted.
The Japanese IJN, as mentioned above, also adopted single-seat fighters. They managed the navigation problem through an extremely stringent screening, selection, and training program where navigation was concerned. But even the IJN, with what could be considered far above average flight crews, had problems with losing aircraft due to navigation failures. At the start of the war when the air crews were all 'elite' there were relatively few problems, but as the war progressed the problem increased as more new less well trained air crews entered service. However, even at the start of the war, the IJN squadron and flight leaders were often selected as much for their superior navigation skills as for their leadership qualities.
Just pre-war the RN/FAA carrier doctrine focused on two types of fighters, the single-seat day fighter, and the two-seat long range fighter/reconnaissance aircraft.
The only RN/FAA operational single-seat carrier fighter in 1939 was the SeaGladiator, but it was of limited value due to small fuel load, the previously mentioned navigation problem, and low maximum speed. It had a fuel load marginal for CAP duties and unacceptable for escort or reconnaissance, could not navigate reliably at longer ranges due to the lack of the second crewman, and was considered too slow to intercept the new generation of fast bomber coming into service.
The Hurricane and Spitfire were in land service in limited numbers, and while both types would have solved the speed problem, and could have probably solved the range problem through the use of drop tanks, both were single-seaters which prevented a solution to the navigation problem. Hawker offered a folding wing navalized Hurricane in late-1938 and was turned down by the decision makers for reasons I am not familiar with. Supermarine first offered a folding wing navalized Spitfire in 1941(?) but was turned down due to perceived production issues.
The Fulmar was intended and procured as a temporary solution to meet the need for the two-seat long range fighter/reconnaissance type while the Firefly was developed. It was originally hoped that a speed of just under 300 mph would be achieved, solving the speed problem mentioned above. It had enough fuel to function as CAP, escort, and reconnaissance, and it had the second crewman to help with navigation. As it turned out the actual top speed (247-265 mph) and sustained climb rate (1200-1400 ft/min) were marginal. In spite of its limited performance the Fulmar shot down more enemy aircraft than any other RN/FAA carrier fighter type.
The Firefly was the original intended two-seat ship-board fighter. If it had entered service in 1942 when originally planned it would have met the requirements of speed, range, and navigation. Delays in development of the Griffon engine, due to the rationalization program of 1940, caused a 1-2 year delay in the Firefly's operational status.
I do not remember the exact range requirement of the FAA navigators operational test, but the qualification test required a flight of over 400 nm total, composed of 3 or more legs, over open ocean, arriving at the destination within a 25 nm radius. The 25 nm radius was considered the maximum range for reliable location finding of the carrier using the Type 72 homing beacon.
One more factor I feel should be mentioned is a problem with intercepting incoming aircraft. Pre-war/pre-radar exercises by both the USN and the RN/FAA revealed that even if there were 3 flights of 4 aircraft each (12 total) at different altitudes (ie above, same, and below the altitude of the incoming enemy) and the weather was clear, there was only a 25% chance of intercepting any particular group of aircraft before they released weapons. During the early war, with radar, the chance of intercept with the same CAP rose to only 40%. It was not until the end of the war in the PTO that the majority of incoming formations/individual aircraft could be reliably intercepted, but it was only possible because of greatly improved radar and radio equipment along with much higher numbers of CAP aircraft. Even during the last of the Japanese air operations against the USN fleet, it was not unusual for some formations/individual aircraft first be spotted by lookouts on the ships, not by radar, and hence there was almost no chance of aerial intercept. This problem of successful intercepts was a big part of the RN/FAA decision to not focus on single-seat single-purpose fighters for CAP duties.
[edited for clarity]
This post is intended to possibly clarify and answer some questions about why the SeaHurricane was not adopted before the war. It may be a bit long-winded for forum purposes - if so please advise me.
First I would like to stress that the need for a second seat in any carrier based aircraft was not outmoded as such when the US entered WW2 and for the same reasons was not outmoded at the end of the war. The reason for my stating this is as follows:
Prior to WW2 the USN generally prohibited single-seat aircraft from flying over-the-horizon unless they were heading toward large land masses (in daylight), or unless they were accompanied by one or more two-seaters with better navigation capability (in daylight). This was due to numerous serious failures in navigation that sometimes endangered entire squadrons of aircraft, and did result in the loss of a significant number of smaller flights of 1-4 aircraft. Night flying was generally avoided also (other than a minimum amount for training purposes to familiarize the pilots with the dangerous aspects of night operations in case of unplanned situations) due to the recognition of the inherent dangers in terms of landing accidents and failures in navigation. When the USN entered WW2 the official doctrine stressed avoidance of night operations for these same reasons.
The RN/FAA on the other hand had adopted a policy/goal in 1935 of becoming fully night operations capable. This was primarily in order to accomplish the FAA's missions of striking ship targets in harbor, and other shore and near-shore targets, while being relatively immune to enemy retaliation. In order to be able to accomplish the mission the crews needed to be able to navigate at least most of the flight without landmarks while in the dark. This required above average skill in navigation, as well as in night time launch and recovery operations. The RN/FAA found that the navigation skill required was not difficult to instill in the pilot, but that the pilot had a difficult time navigating and piloting at the same. This was partly due to the navigation equipment available at the time and partly due to the difficulty of multi-tasking. With the advent of more capable radios and navigation equipment in the mid-1930s, reliable relatively long range navigation at night became viable, but only if combined with a second crewman. The multi-seat Swordfish with its (for the time) advanced 3-in-1 radio set was the first operational carrier borne aircraft considered suitable for long range strike and reconnaissance by day or night.
By the beginning of WW2 the RN/FAA had the problems mostly worked out and the remaining finer points were hammered out in time for the strike on Taranto and the action vs the Bismarck. With the advent of shipborne and airborne surface search radar the mission to strike ships at sea at long range and at night had become a practical mission.
By contrast, the USN did not focus on improving their night operations during the early war, and were not as concerned with more advanced navigation skills (what might be called blind flying techniques today) as the RN/FAA. This is not to say that the USN was not aware of the benefits of having multi-crew aircraft, it was more a matter of the carrier doctrine adopted, and then prioritizing the type of aircraft put into service, and the crew training within the time available. For the seizing of local air superiority during a strike at the ranges originally imagined, single seat fighter aircraft were considered the best answer, the second crewman requirement imposing unacceptable performance penalties. And if a type of training did not directly go to accomplishing doctrine it was given secondary importance or set aside altogether. Overall this attitude served the USN well in the PTO, with the following exception: during the war 16% of the losses of USN carrier aircraft (that launched) were lost due to navigation error (often referred as 'fuel starvation' in the reports), regardless of whether they were assigned to CAP, strike, or reconnaissance, regardless of whether they were launched in clear skies, partly cloudy, or full cloud cover, and regardless of limited visibility (ie hazy) or perfectly clear skies. (The previous statement is based on a USN post-war analysis of USN&USMC aircraft losses in the PTO. I have not been able to find any kind of numerical breakdown of what % of the losses was during what type of mission or of what type of aircraft. The only qualifiers in the report were that while a small but possibly significant % of the losses could be due to mechanical failure, or pilot error - with a very small % possibly due to enemy action - the only available evidence pointed to the vast majority of these losses being due to navigational problems. It was also stated that the 16% value remained more-or-less constant throughout the war. The report stated the stark contrast to the RN/FAA experience, with less than 2% losses due to navigation failures under similar conditions.)
The USN was aware of and alarmed by the losses quite early in the war, but the carrier operational doctrine was working and that was considered paramount, the losses would just have to be accepted.
The Japanese IJN, as mentioned above, also adopted single-seat fighters. They managed the navigation problem through an extremely stringent screening, selection, and training program where navigation was concerned. But even the IJN, with what could be considered far above average flight crews, had problems with losing aircraft due to navigation failures. At the start of the war when the air crews were all 'elite' there were relatively few problems, but as the war progressed the problem increased as more new less well trained air crews entered service. However, even at the start of the war, the IJN squadron and flight leaders were often selected as much for their superior navigation skills as for their leadership qualities.
Just pre-war the RN/FAA carrier doctrine focused on two types of fighters, the single-seat day fighter, and the two-seat long range fighter/reconnaissance aircraft.
The only RN/FAA operational single-seat carrier fighter in 1939 was the SeaGladiator, but it was of limited value due to small fuel load, the previously mentioned navigation problem, and low maximum speed. It had a fuel load marginal for CAP duties and unacceptable for escort or reconnaissance, could not navigate reliably at longer ranges due to the lack of the second crewman, and was considered too slow to intercept the new generation of fast bomber coming into service.
The Hurricane and Spitfire were in land service in limited numbers, and while both types would have solved the speed problem, and could have probably solved the range problem through the use of drop tanks, both were single-seaters which prevented a solution to the navigation problem. Hawker offered a folding wing navalized Hurricane in late-1938 and was turned down by the decision makers for reasons I am not familiar with. Supermarine first offered a folding wing navalized Spitfire in 1941(?) but was turned down due to perceived production issues.
The Fulmar was intended and procured as a temporary solution to meet the need for the two-seat long range fighter/reconnaissance type while the Firefly was developed. It was originally hoped that a speed of just under 300 mph would be achieved, solving the speed problem mentioned above. It had enough fuel to function as CAP, escort, and reconnaissance, and it had the second crewman to help with navigation. As it turned out the actual top speed (247-265 mph) and sustained climb rate (1200-1400 ft/min) were marginal. In spite of its limited performance the Fulmar shot down more enemy aircraft than any other RN/FAA carrier fighter type.
The Firefly was the original intended two-seat ship-board fighter. If it had entered service in 1942 when originally planned it would have met the requirements of speed, range, and navigation. Delays in development of the Griffon engine, due to the rationalization program of 1940, caused a 1-2 year delay in the Firefly's operational status.
I do not remember the exact range requirement of the FAA navigators operational test, but the qualification test required a flight of over 400 nm total, composed of 3 or more legs, over open ocean, arriving at the destination within a 25 nm radius. The 25 nm radius was considered the maximum range for reliable location finding of the carrier using the Type 72 homing beacon.
One more factor I feel should be mentioned is a problem with intercepting incoming aircraft. Pre-war/pre-radar exercises by both the USN and the RN/FAA revealed that even if there were 3 flights of 4 aircraft each (12 total) at different altitudes (ie above, same, and below the altitude of the incoming enemy) and the weather was clear, there was only a 25% chance of intercepting any particular group of aircraft before they released weapons. During the early war, with radar, the chance of intercept with the same CAP rose to only 40%. It was not until the end of the war in the PTO that the majority of incoming formations/individual aircraft could be reliably intercepted, but it was only possible because of greatly improved radar and radio equipment along with much higher numbers of CAP aircraft. Even during the last of the Japanese air operations against the USN fleet, it was not unusual for some formations/individual aircraft first be spotted by lookouts on the ships, not by radar, and hence there was almost no chance of aerial intercept. This problem of successful intercepts was a big part of the RN/FAA decision to not focus on single-seat single-purpose fighters for CAP duties.
[edited for clarity]
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- Thread starter
- #245
fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
The quality of the info far outweighs the length of the post. Bravo Zulu! Welcome aboard, shipmate.
Cheers,
Wes
ThomasP
Senior Master Sergeant
Hello again, and thank you for the encouraging welcome.
I think there is one more aspect of the navigation problem I can maybe help expand on.
When I originally read the USN report on the 16% losses mentioned in post#244 above, I was unaware of much of the development history of radio-electronics through the early 1900s, and I readily admit to being appalled by what I interpreted as a rather cavalier attitude by the USN higher-ups toward the loss of lives involved. It turns out that I was at least partially mistaken in my conclusion. I say this for the following reasons:
First reason is the fairly common statement in both anecdotal and in official records of the high regard given the YE-xx homing system used by the USN. (This by itself was not enough to dispel my feelings of anger at my perception of the attitude. I thought perhaps it was apologist propaganda.)
Second, I talked to my brother-in-law who is a radio geek of the highest order. I new that he collected radios from the end of WWI to the 1990s, including military radios, so I mentioned what I had read. He had a very different take on the losses. Basically he said that the YE-xx system was good for the time. His explanation for the problems in navigation despite the Ye-xx system included two major factors:
The first point he brought up is the tendency of radios of the period to not stay on frequency (he used the term "wander"). Apparently the tube and crystal sets would 'wander' for several reasons, including changes in ambient temperature and pressure, changes in internal temperature, unsteady voltage/amperage (ie current), vibration, and shock. This caused many radios and homing receivers (usually preset before launch) to 'wander' off the preset frequency. Apparently, it was very difficult and sometimes close to impossible to retune them in flight unless you really knew what you were doing.
The second point he brought up is the problems in manufacturing design and quality control. Although I had thought of this possibility (I am semi-retired now, but most of my working life was as a machinist-manufacturing engineer-systems engineer) I had not realized the depth of the problem in the late-1930s and early-1940s. This problem was particularly true when it came to the precise manufacture of crystals, and somewhat poorly understood concepts of heat and electrical current regulation in the sets. (It should be noted that even today some of the most common problems with durability reliable performance in modern electronics involves heat and current regulation.) Fresh off the production line, using test gauge quality peripherals, there was significant variance (ie more than 5%) in range due to production problems. Many sets, once installed and factoring in the quality control problems involved in the production of generators, antennae, or even electrical connectors, could not reliably detect the signal at the hoped for ranges.
Point two combined with point one could only increase the chance of loss of the YE signal.
The two points brought up by my brother-in-law, when combined with the range factor, goes far to explain the losses. If the frequency was lost at some time during the flight and this was not realized while still within range of the YE signal, it would be very difficult to reacquire the signal. Any navigation errors away from the YE emitter would then make the reacquisition of the signal almost impossible. The lost aircraft could only hope to return to the radius of the YE signal through old style navigation, using the sun and stars, with the aid of a pylorus or sextant. There were, from I have read, many examples of the carrier radio operators being able to hear the aircrew asking for help, the radio signal gradually getting weaker as the aircraft moved farther away, or remaining somewhat steady as the aircraft flew at right angles, but the aircrew could not not hear the carrier radio operator's replies.
I think there is one more aspect of the navigation problem I can maybe help expand on.
When I originally read the USN report on the 16% losses mentioned in post#244 above, I was unaware of much of the development history of radio-electronics through the early 1900s, and I readily admit to being appalled by what I interpreted as a rather cavalier attitude by the USN higher-ups toward the loss of lives involved. It turns out that I was at least partially mistaken in my conclusion. I say this for the following reasons:
First reason is the fairly common statement in both anecdotal and in official records of the high regard given the YE-xx homing system used by the USN. (This by itself was not enough to dispel my feelings of anger at my perception of the attitude. I thought perhaps it was apologist propaganda.)
Second, I talked to my brother-in-law who is a radio geek of the highest order. I new that he collected radios from the end of WWI to the 1990s, including military radios, so I mentioned what I had read. He had a very different take on the losses. Basically he said that the YE-xx system was good for the time. His explanation for the problems in navigation despite the Ye-xx system included two major factors:
The first point he brought up is the tendency of radios of the period to not stay on frequency (he used the term "wander"). Apparently the tube and crystal sets would 'wander' for several reasons, including changes in ambient temperature and pressure, changes in internal temperature, unsteady voltage/amperage (ie current), vibration, and shock. This caused many radios and homing receivers (usually preset before launch) to 'wander' off the preset frequency. Apparently, it was very difficult and sometimes close to impossible to retune them in flight unless you really knew what you were doing.
The second point he brought up is the problems in manufacturing design and quality control. Although I had thought of this possibility (I am semi-retired now, but most of my working life was as a machinist-manufacturing engineer-systems engineer) I had not realized the depth of the problem in the late-1930s and early-1940s. This problem was particularly true when it came to the precise manufacture of crystals, and somewhat poorly understood concepts of heat and electrical current regulation in the sets. (It should be noted that even today some of the most common problems with durability reliable performance in modern electronics involves heat and current regulation.) Fresh off the production line, using test gauge quality peripherals, there was significant variance (ie more than 5%) in range due to production problems. Many sets, once installed and factoring in the quality control problems involved in the production of generators, antennae, or even electrical connectors, could not reliably detect the signal at the hoped for ranges.
Point two combined with point one could only increase the chance of loss of the YE signal.
The two points brought up by my brother-in-law, when combined with the range factor, goes far to explain the losses. If the frequency was lost at some time during the flight and this was not realized while still within range of the YE signal, it would be very difficult to reacquire the signal. Any navigation errors away from the YE emitter would then make the reacquisition of the signal almost impossible. The lost aircraft could only hope to return to the radius of the YE signal through old style navigation, using the sun and stars, with the aid of a pylorus or sextant. There were, from I have read, many examples of the carrier radio operators being able to hear the aircrew asking for help, the radio signal gradually getting weaker as the aircraft moved farther away, or remaining somewhat steady as the aircraft flew at right angles, but the aircrew could not not hear the carrier radio operator's replies.
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This had been a problem with practically any "tuned" signal all the way back to Marconi, until the advent of the phase locked loop tuned circuit. These used amplified negative feed back to keep a tuned signal on frequency, and when I went to Avionics "A" School in 1970, were still largely tube driven, and were heavy, expensive, and power-hungry. We each built one in school as a training exercise, and mine used nearly $200 worth of parts, retail value at your local Lafayette Electronics store. Today they come four each on an integrated circuit chip for less than $10.
Cheers,
Wes
yulzari
Staff Sergeant
Hence giving the task of carrier location to a trained Telegraphist Air Gunner in his own seat in the Royal Navy for their beacon system. The second seat was not normally for a navigator but for the TAG. Had he been a navigator he would have been termed an Observer. In the further ranging strike aircraft (i.e. Swordfish or Albacore) you had a 3 man crew of Pilot, Navigator and TAG. The system involved mobile planned frequencies on a rotating signal with a variable signal at set times so the carrier would only be emitting the signal on one frequency occasionally and in a narrow path at any one moment when operating. The TAG had to listen out at the et times for the fleeting signal as it rotated to plot whence it came. The was negligible chance of an enemy picking up these transmissions at all give their local brevity let alone recognise what they had heard. All in real time so the carrier could launch aeroplanes and later decide to make one or more major changes in speed and heading whilst the strike was in the air and they could still find their way home. The second crewman was well worthwhile at the time and a correct decision.
ThomasP
Senior Master Sergeant
Thank you for the info yulzari. Would the second crewmen in the Fulmar and Firefly have been a TAG or an Observer? Or maybe one or the other depending on the mission?
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- Thread starter
- #252
fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
Sometimes an Observer flew in Fulmars when they were acting as a lead aircraft. The Club Runs delivering fighters to Malta sometimes used Fulmars for navigation.
The TAG whilst not expected to navigate was often trained unofficially to do basic record keeping and plotting to aid the pilot. Much the same happened in Bomber Command the wireless operator helped the navigator.
ThomasP
Senior Master Sergeant
Although I had to ask my brother-in-law what "amplified negative feed back to keep a tuned signal on frequency" meant.
wuzak
Captain
Welcome to the forum Thomas. Great first post.
The Admiralty were pushing for a navalised Spitfire from 1938.
Smith at Supermarine proposed a Spitfire with a folding version of the standard wing in 1939. The fold mechanism would have been similar to that used by Grumman, with the wing folding to lay parallel with the fuselage.
A Spitfire was modified to take an arrestor hook in mid-1939, and had flown by October 1939.
Supermarine also proposed a two seat fighter to specification N8/39, largely based on the Spitfire but with a redesigned folding wing. There was a version to be powered by the Merlin and another to be powered by the Griffon.
The designs were rejected based on the basis that production of Spitfires would be severely affected.
Fairey was in the discussions for the original folding wing Spitfires, but were busy building the prototype Fulmar. The timeline for the folding wing Spitfire was impractical, and would have pushed back the Fulmar prototype.
The Admiralty weren't too keen on a Sea Hurricane on the basis that the Hurricane's performance was not that much better than the German bombers, the Ju 88 in particular, and the Sea Hurricane would have lesser performance than the standard Hurricane.
Sea Hurricanes did eventuate before the Seafire, but that may be related to the needs of home defence, which delayed the deployment of Spitfires to other theatres.
The Admiralty were pushing for a navalised Spitfire from 1938.
Smith at Supermarine proposed a Spitfire with a folding version of the standard wing in 1939. The fold mechanism would have been similar to that used by Grumman, with the wing folding to lay parallel with the fuselage.
A Spitfire was modified to take an arrestor hook in mid-1939, and had flown by October 1939.
Supermarine also proposed a two seat fighter to specification N8/39, largely based on the Spitfire but with a redesigned folding wing. There was a version to be powered by the Merlin and another to be powered by the Griffon.
The designs were rejected based on the basis that production of Spitfires would be severely affected.
Fairey was in the discussions for the original folding wing Spitfires, but were busy building the prototype Fulmar. The timeline for the folding wing Spitfire was impractical, and would have pushed back the Fulmar prototype.
The Admiralty weren't too keen on a Sea Hurricane on the basis that the Hurricane's performance was not that much better than the German bombers, the Ju 88 in particular, and the Sea Hurricane would have lesser performance than the standard Hurricane.
Sea Hurricanes did eventuate before the Seafire, but that may be related to the needs of home defence, which delayed the deployment of Spitfires to other theatres.
Kevin J
Banned
With so many "What If" scenarios to choose from, I thought I'd remind everyone of actual production figures. So here we go.
British Production of Aircraft By Year During The Second World War
Lets begin with Spitfire production. 171 built in the last 4 months of 1939, 1252 in 1940 and 19898 during WW2. Total production 20334 minus 341 Mk 22's and 24's because they are post war equals 19993, so only 95 built before WW2 started, then roughly 100 per month during 1940. Castle Bromwich begins delivery during the BoB with maybe 100 delivered by its end. Roughly 50 Spitfires will be required per squadron for every 6 months in the front line, so (95 + 171 + 1252 =) 1518 gives you 30 squadrons for 6 months or 20 for 9 months front line service.
To get a Seafire in service earlier you need another source of production dedicated to what will be a bespoke naval variant. Enter Westland Aircraft Co which produced a batch of 50 Spitfire I's between July and September 1941. So the earliest a hooked Spitfire becomes available Summer 1941 as opposed to late 1941, which could mean that the Spitfire FIII/LIII enters service in 1942/43 not 1943/44. Of course priorities change during the BoB and the Blitz and the government concentrates on building aircraft to counter the immediate threat for almost a year. So we're back to the actual service entry dates for Seafires.
Next the Hurricane. Multiple production lines at Hawkers, then Glosters, CC&F and Austin so lots of spare capacity. The RN wasn't expecting its fighters to have to counter enemy single seat fighters or fast long range twins so there's no urgent need for a Sea Hurricane. Its only with the loss of Norway, France and the entry of Italy into the war that the RN suddenly needs a high performance single seat fighter that's ready for operations immediately. Take a standard Hurricane, add the navy specified equipment and you have an instant carrier capable fighter. Could it have been available earlier? Of course, yes. What would have been its opponents? The Me 110 in 1941 in the Arctic and the Med, and the A6M2 in the Far East in 1941/42. So you don't actually need the Sea Hurricane any earlier or with folding wings, also the RN had both old and new carriers with wide enough lifts to store Sea Hurricanes below deck.
Then of course there was the Martlet which I'm sure was a damn sight cheaper than Seafires, and better engineered from the outset for carrier duty. If you took a Spitfire I, added 20 mm cannon, arrestor hook and catapult spools to it, you get a 335 mph fighter, same as an F4F-3, but less sturdy and with shorter range. Surely its a no brainer, you want a Wildcat.
British Production of Aircraft By Year During The Second World War
Lets begin with Spitfire production. 171 built in the last 4 months of 1939, 1252 in 1940 and 19898 during WW2. Total production 20334 minus 341 Mk 22's and 24's because they are post war equals 19993, so only 95 built before WW2 started, then roughly 100 per month during 1940. Castle Bromwich begins delivery during the BoB with maybe 100 delivered by its end. Roughly 50 Spitfires will be required per squadron for every 6 months in the front line, so (95 + 171 + 1252 =) 1518 gives you 30 squadrons for 6 months or 20 for 9 months front line service.
To get a Seafire in service earlier you need another source of production dedicated to what will be a bespoke naval variant. Enter Westland Aircraft Co which produced a batch of 50 Spitfire I's between July and September 1941. So the earliest a hooked Spitfire becomes available Summer 1941 as opposed to late 1941, which could mean that the Spitfire FIII/LIII enters service in 1942/43 not 1943/44. Of course priorities change during the BoB and the Blitz and the government concentrates on building aircraft to counter the immediate threat for almost a year. So we're back to the actual service entry dates for Seafires.
Next the Hurricane. Multiple production lines at Hawkers, then Glosters, CC&F and Austin so lots of spare capacity. The RN wasn't expecting its fighters to have to counter enemy single seat fighters or fast long range twins so there's no urgent need for a Sea Hurricane. Its only with the loss of Norway, France and the entry of Italy into the war that the RN suddenly needs a high performance single seat fighter that's ready for operations immediately. Take a standard Hurricane, add the navy specified equipment and you have an instant carrier capable fighter. Could it have been available earlier? Of course, yes. What would have been its opponents? The Me 110 in 1941 in the Arctic and the Med, and the A6M2 in the Far East in 1941/42. So you don't actually need the Sea Hurricane any earlier or with folding wings, also the RN had both old and new carriers with wide enough lifts to store Sea Hurricanes below deck.
Then of course there was the Martlet which I'm sure was a damn sight cheaper than Seafires, and better engineered from the outset for carrier duty. If you took a Spitfire I, added 20 mm cannon, arrestor hook and catapult spools to it, you get a 335 mph fighter, same as an F4F-3, but less sturdy and with shorter range. Surely its a no brainer, you want a Wildcat.
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That was a scandalously over simplified explanation on my part. I presume he filled in the details. Pretty amazing device, isn't it? It's made possible huge improvements in audio, video, IT, communications, radar, sonar, fire control, robotics, process control, and the list goes on.Although I had to ask my brother-in-law what "amplified negative feed back to keep a tuned signal on frequency" meant.
Cheers,
Wes
Reluctant Poster
Tech Sergeant
- 1,624
- Dec 6, 2006
This simply cannot be true. No military organization can sustain anywhere near those losses and be an effective fighting force. Your force would be almost completely wiped out after 10 missions. If this were true being a USN airman would be by far the most dangerous assignment in World War II, dwarfing the loss rates suffered by heavy bombers over Germany. Note that 4% loss rate was considered to be the maximum sustainable rate for bomber crews
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You don't suppose the intended statistic was "16% of all aircraft assigned to carrier operations were lost, and most were lost to navigation error", making it a lifetime loss rate rather than a per-sortie loss rate?
Cheers,
Wes
Reluctant Poster
Tech Sergeant
- 1,624
- Dec 6, 2006
According to David Brown in his book The Seafire-The Spitfire that went to Sea, "Unicorn, larger and somewhat faster than the escort carriers, had her own particular characteristics. The airflow around the island and flight deck had not been so carefully controlled as in the regular Fleet units, in whose design aerodynamic considerations had played a significant part, and there was a violent wind-shear to give a 'cliff-edge' effect as the round down was crossed on landing. Aircraft were thus subjected to heavy landings and a large portion of her own three squadrons' 21 deck-landing casualties were put out of action with strained or broken undercarriages and aft fuselages, as well as two of 894 and one of 885 Squadrons' aircraft."
