Can we make a slightly smaller Fulmar as an improved carrier fighter?

[MikeMeech]

Were Avengers too big to fit in the early British carriers?

Hi

No. They did not fly from HMS Furious but they flew from all the armoured carriers during the war. No. 832 Sqn was the first Avenger FAA unit being equipped on 1 Jan. 1943, it operated off of HMS Victorious, although it went into action off the USS Saratoga in May 1943 supporting the USMC landings on the Mid Solomon Islands. Avengers also operated off of RN escort carriers, the first ones were from 846 Sqn. on HMS Tracker for anti-submarine work in January 1944. The Avenger was not around in time to operate off of 'early' British carriers, it was a mid-war aircraft as were the Corsair and Hellcat. Also they could not carry British torpedoes IIRC.

Mike

 

[EwenS]

Thing is, after 1942 there were very few occasions when the FAA was in a position to consider using the torpedo. So in hindsight all the effort that was put into training for concentrated torpedo attacks between 1943 and mid 1945 proved to be a waste of time and effort.

 

[nuuumannn]

But this, in my sincere opinion, is just a rationalization based on desperately cherry-picked data (having been part of several discussions about this). I know I may come across that way, but I'm really not one of those "battle of the Atlantic" WW2 aircraft nationalist types! I just refuse to accommodate the illusions of those who are. And that applies to people on both sides of the pond.

Aside from deck handling problems, which were worse than you are implying there, the real problem with the Seafire was range and endurance. The same traits that gave it that wonderful climb rate made it a poor carrier fighter. An interceptor is not what you want on a carrier. Though I'll admit they were somewhat useful against Kamikazes!

You make a good point, Bill, I'll give you that, but let's not forget the fundamental issue with the Seafire, it was only ever meant to be a stopgap until the Firebrand was ready but was continued for expediency. Regarding the Seafire's deck handling, "worse" is relative. Comparative to British operations in the Med with existing British types at the time of the Salerno landings, the Seafire's deck handling was "worse" as you say, given its accident rate, which did permanently affect its reputation. This was in the Seafire II, the first major production variant based on the Mk.V airframe that entered service in 1942. With the introduction of the Seafire III and better approach techniques, deck accidents declined. Following the Salerno Landings and the terrible attrition rate, Eric Brown did a series of deck landing trials and a few modifications were made, including a strengthened tail hook. Supermarine test pilot Jeffrey Quill carried out trials in 1944 that revealed the following (quoted directly from Quill's report):

"Pilots had to be trained to employ a curved approach to the deck as the crabbed approach was acceptable only for skilled and experienced pilots. Multiple ejector exhausts should be fitted to all Seafires and the pilots trained to land with their heads out of the cockpit and looking along the port side of the engine cowling, the Seafire had inherent poor speed controllability and it lacked the necessary robustness for carrier landings, but the fitting of a sting type hook would probably reduce the accident rate."

It turned out that the Seafire's initial poor attrition came from poor approach and landing technique, combined with a lack of mastering the type's handling at low speed. That doesn't mean that the Seafire was better than we know and that it didn't have poor deck handling characteristics as that is simply not the case. One of the fundamental issues with the earliest Seafires was the oleo throw, which was designed to absorb a given amount of pressure, but the impact of carrier landings meant the oleos were bumping against their extremes. This was eventually fixed, of course. Same problem affected the Sea Hurricane, another British bastardisation of a land-based fighter to produce a below-average carrier fighter as it was never modified to the same extent.

Regarding its performance as a fighter-interceptor, you need to stop thinking American for a second. Following Pearl Harbor, US operations were designed for the open expanse of the Pacific. The Seafire was designed for British operations in the Med and the North Sea, where on a good day, you can see the coast of France across the Channel. A high rate of climb is a necessity given decreased operational response to threats. Also, you are forgetting that Task Force 57 utilised the Seafire in the Pacific to good effect because of its high rate of climb against kamikaze aircraft. The requirement for a high rate of climb was directly applied to development of the F8F, so yes, a superior rate of climb was much needed and desired by the US Navy.

Again, regarding performance, the Seafire first appeared in 1942, the primary US carrier fighter was the F4F, of which, comparing trial data produced by the A&AEE, the Seafire II was superior in performance in all aspects, except range. Against the F6F, the Seafire III, which appeared a year later was inferior in performance in every aspect except rate of climb, but the differences are not marked, only around 1,000 feet in maximum ceiling and 20 or so mph in speeds, although the Seafire III had a faster cruise speed. Here's the thing, the Hellcat, despite being bigger and heavier had a much more powerful two-speed two-stage supercharged engine giving out a far greater power output than the Seafire's single-stage two-speed engine (I'll never understand why the Seafire III never received the 60 Series Merlin). Once the Seafire XV appears with the Griffon the balance swings in the opposite direction again, it is superior to the F6F in every respect with the exception of range and ceiling, its performance is akin to that of the F4U, with a little variation here and there.

Bearing all this in mind, the fact that the Seafire was only a stopgap and not a purpose-built naval fighter, that's not bad.

 

[EwenS]

In Sept 1943 the Future Building Committee produced a "supplementary report" identifying a need for 2 fighter types:-
1. An escort for strike groups and
2. An interceptor

The escort fighter role was to be filled by the Firefly, Corsair & Hellcat with investigation of the RAF F.12/43 (Hornet) as a successor to be followed up.

At that time the Seafire XV with the Griffon was expected to enter production in March 1944 (and was considered the 1944 interceptor). There was then to be a 1945 interceptor based on the next generation Spitfire, the Mk.XXI, with a Tempest development (aka Fury/Sea Fury) expected in 1945/46. So the RN was skipping a Spitfire generation (Merlin 61) to get an interceptor with an excellent low level performance (single stage Griffon VI) in mid-1944.

Throughout the early / mid war period the RN was concentrating on interceptors with excellent low / medium altitude performance because that was where it saw the greatest threat to its ships. The RAF single stage Griffon Spitfire, the Mk.XII, entered production in Oct 1942. The front end of that aircraft, fitted to the fuselage and wing ofvthe Seafire III combined to produce the Seafire XV along with Mk.VIII radiators (in broad terms).

Production of the Seafire XV didn't begin at low rates until Sept 1944 (IIRC only 9 were produced in 1944) and there were handling problems to be resolved and airframe mods made (new sting hook in place of the previous A frame). It didn't reach squadron service until May 1945.

With development of the Spitfire Mk.XXI delayed the whole final chapter of Seafire got pushed even further back.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

There's this interesting data on Seafire operations during Dragoon:




The Seafire LIIC/III / F6F / FM1+FM2:

Operation Dragoon (Invasion of southern France) Aug 1944.

CVE carrier sorties:

1073 Seafire Sorties / 252 F6F sorties / 347 FM1/2 sorties.

Operational and combat loss rate: 2.8% / 4.4% / 3.4%

This campaign was notable as the Seafires were also used extensively as fighter bombers (~300 sorties) , typically carrying 500lb bombs, but occasionally using 250lb bombs when winds were light or there was a shortage of 500lb bombs.

(Data from The Seafire by D. Brown)

That is one operation, the very beginning of the 'Champaign Campaign'. At Salerno they lost 44 Seafires destroyed, another 26 too badly damaged to fly, which claimed 2 enemy fighters.

Overall, the Seafire had a fairly dismal record in carrier operations. Not only were they ill-suited for landing and taking off from Carriers, the structure wasn't strong enough for it either and they routinely broke.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Regarding its performance as a fighter-interceptor, you need to stop thinking American for a second. Following Pearl Harbor, US operations were designed for the open expanse of the Pacific. The Seafire was designed for British operations in the Med and the North Sea, where on a good day, you can see the coast of France across the Channel. A high rate of climb is a necessity given decreased operational response to threats. Also, you are forgetting that Task Force 57 utilised the Seafire in the Pacific to good effect because of its high rate of climb against kamikaze aircraft. The requirement for a high rate of climb was directly applied to development of the F8F, so yes, a superior rate of climb was much needed and desired by the US Navy.

I disagree completely. First of all, the Seafire was not "designed for operations in the North Sea" - it was adapted from a land based interceptor designed to defend England from German bombers. By the time the Seafire was put into service, it was, like the Sea Hurricane inadequate to the tasks at hand exactly for this reason. Aside from all the landing accidents and other problems on the carrier, the short range of these fighters (mostly the Sea Hurricane initially) was a problem for convoy protection, both for the northern convoys and in the Med. Just because you aren't (only) in the Pacific does not mean you don't need to be able to escort bombers to strike enemy targets. And it doesn't mean that you don't need good flight endurance for combat air patrol over your own fleet either.

Again, regarding performance, the Seafire first appeared in 1942, the primary US carrier fighter was the F4F, of which, comparing trial data produced by the A&AEE, the Seafire II was superior in performance in all aspects, except range.

Range was a big one. Seafire could not escort friendly strike aircraft on air raids, unless the carrier was extremely close to the target, and they could not remain on CAP for long durations. Which are both major limitations.

Against the F6F, the Seafire III, which appeared a year later was inferior in performance in every aspect except rate of climb, but the differences are not marked, only around 1,000 feet in maximum ceiling and 20 or so mph in speeds, although the Seafire III had a faster cruise speed. Here's the thing, the Hellcat, despite being bigger and heavier had a much more powerful two-speed two-stage supercharged engine giving out a far greater power output than the Seafire's single-stage two-speed engine (I'll never understand why the Seafire III never received the 60 Series Merlin). Once the Seafire XV appears with the Griffon the balance swings in the opposite direction again, it is superior to the F6F in every respect with the exception of range and ceiling, its performance is akin to that of the F4U, with a little variation here and there.

Bearing all this in mind, the fact that the Seafire was only a stopgap and not a purpose-built naval fighter, that's not bad.

I don't buy that the Seafire XV was better than a Hellcat at the main tasks needed for a carrier fighter.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Define 'BIG'.

Fit on the carrier lift?
Fit in the hanger?
Get off the deck with the existing catapult and not nose dive into the sea?
Land without tearing out the arresting cables and crashing into the crash barrier/superstructure?

To fix the last two usually requires a dockyard refit.

When it comes to WW2 carrier aircraft, I define "BIG" as a TBF / TBM Avenger or Tarpon. It's bigger than a city bus. But I guess the way those wings folded helped a lot.

 

[nuuumannn]

I disagree completely. First of all, the Seafire was not "designed for operations in the North Sea" - it was adapted from a land based interceptor designed to defend England from German bombers.

You're being pedantic. I know it was a modification of an existing airframe. I even pointed that out, so stop wasting time with silliness. The Seafire was designed, because (since you are being pedantic) you don't just throw mud at a wall and hope it sticks, you "design" the airframe to do a task on the drawing board first using your designers, regardless of whether you build an aircraft from scratch or you adapt an existing aircraft to do something else.

Range was a big one. Seafire could not escort friendly strike aircraft on air raids, unless the carrier was extremely close to the target, and they could not remain on CAP for long durations. Which are both major limitations.

Again, stop with the presumptuousness. The British reason for developing the Seafire was very different to the American philosophy and you've completely ignored what I've said about it being a stopgap and what others have written about its intended role.

I don't buy that the Seafire XV was better than a Hellcat at the main tasks needed for a carrier fighter.

Point out where I said it was better as a carrier aircraft. READ WHAT'S BEING POSTED.

 

[nuuumannn]

So the RN was skipping a Spitfire generation (Merlin 61) to get an interceptor with an excellent low level performance (single stage Griffon VI) in mid-1944.

It still doesn't make sense from a performance standpoint; the FAA went for the lesser-performing option. 60-Series Merlin variants were optimised for low-level operations. The Seafire III was essentially the same airframe (with subsequent naval mods) as the Mk.V/Mk.IX and that demonstrated a leap in performance over the Mk.V, so comparatively the Seafire III could have demonstrated the same, although its performance was better than the Mk.II.

 

[EwenS]

It still doesn't make sense from a performance standpoint; the FAA went for the lesser-performing option. 60-Series Merlin variants were optimised for low-level operations. The Seafire III was essentially the same airframe (with subsequent naval mods) as the Mk.V/Mk.IX and that demonstrated a leap in performance over the Mk.V, so comparatively the Seafire III could have demonstrated the same, although its performance was better than the Mk.II.

The only clear statement I have come across is in David Brown's book "The Seafire. The Spitfire that went to Sea" where he notes:-

"Adaptation of the two-stage Merlin 60-series engined Spitfires Mark IX or VIII was impractical because of foreseeable structural deficiencies which could not be overcome by strengthening which would further increase the weight of the aircraft."

The Merlin 60 Mk.VIII was trialled with a hook, but this is where I find the timeline for the decision making regarding the Seafire XV confusing.

From reading my various sources, it seems the Admiralty saw the Spitfire Mk.XII and first expressed an interest in a Seafire variant in Dec 1942. On 29 Jan 1943 Supermarine produced a Spec for the Type 471 to meet it (Morgan & Shacklady). Then on 31 August 1943 a formal Air Ministry Spec, N.4/43, was issued to Supermarine for 3 prototype and 3 pre-production only for a Griffon VI powered Seafire variant.

Also under consideration in early 1943 were a hooked Typhoon (not the 1941 folding wing Sea Typhoon proposal) and Tempest. The former came to nothing and the latter had to await further developments.

The first prototype Seafire XV was ready by the end of 1943 and service trials began in early 1944 at the same time as the hooked Mk.VIII trials (see below).

Production orders were placed with Westland in July 1943 for 250 Mk.XV plus another 300 on 8 Jan 1944. But then there was a bunch of contract changes between Mk.III & XV over the next couple of months.

Then in Jan 1944 8 or 9 Mk.VIII airframes (including JG661,662 & 663) were handed over to the Admiralty and modified at Supermarine Chalgrove, being given arrester hooks (JG661 got a sting hook & the other 2 A frame hooks). Those three aircraft then went to 778 squadron at Crail where "a full range of performance and handling trials together with extensive deck landing trials." (Darling "Supermarine Seafire). He then notes that the FAA had no real interest in adapting the Mk.VIII for naval use, beyond the retractable tailwheel it featured!

Morgan & Shacklady are also confusing about Merlin 60 and the Seafire. After noting the Mk.VIII conversions, they continue:-

"The Admiralty had asked for trials of a similarly modified Mk.IX but the Air Ministry was against such a conversion for it was considered that the next generation Seafire would be used solely for the war against Japan, and as large numbers of Spitfire VIIIs were due to, or in the process of, being despatched to the Middle and Far East war zones, these fighters should be modified at the reception MUs and put immediately into service with the Navy."

But no dates for these "negotiations".

Note this was to be done AFTER these aircraft came off the production line. And no indication of just how "modified" the Air Ministry saw them. Were they to get folding wings? So they seem to me to be more akin to the original Seafire Ib conversions in 1942, rather than a fully navalised Seafire IIc/III then in production and the proposed Mk.XV. Maybe this explains Brown's comments about the strengthening.

Another factor to bear in mind that might have influenced the Admiralty was that in 1943 with the Firefly finally entering service powered by the single stage Griffon and Fairey proposing an improved Griffon engined Barracuda Mk.V in June that year, a Griffon engined Seafire might have simplified the logistics, especially on a space limited carrier.

So had the Admiralty made up its mind what it wanted before the Spitfire Mk.VIII offer was made? Or was its decision made because the Air Ministry proposal for the Mk.VIII was less than satisfactory?

The really annoying thing is that authors devote more time to explaining why it was a Seafire XV rather than a Seafire IV than they do to why the Griffon VI was chosen over the Merlin 60!

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Spitfire VIII would seem to be a much better basis.

The FAA seemed to have an obsession with low-altitude rated engines which I think was a mistake, generally speaking. It worked well against Kamikazes though.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

You need fighters with high (or at least, high-medium) altitude capability for CAP. They are going to end up facing enemy escort fighters and higher is always better. Low altitude is fine for torpedo bombers but dive bombers were also a big threat (both for the British in the Med and the North Sea, and for everyone in the Pacific and Indian Ocean). The two stage supercharger on the US Wildcats, as limited as they were, were probably one of the key features that allowed them to function somewhat better than they would appear to do on paper.

You also need some medium altitude 'pep' to get over mountains such as you find on many larger Pacific Islands (like New Guinea, and in the East Indies) and in China / Burma / India zone, and in Italy and some parts of North Africa. And in Norway. This was a problem for example with the Barracuda in the Pacific due to it's low alt rated engine (which was apparently giving trouble anyway in the Tropical conditions...)

 

[ThomasP]

I do not think the problem for the Barracuda was the low rated engine so much as the growth in weight of the aircraft. I may be misremembering but I think the TOGW increased by nearly 50% during development.

The low-altitude rating of the Merlin VIII/87 octane (Fulmar Mk I) and Merlin 30/100 octane (Fulmar Mk II & Barracuda Mk I) were driven by the need to deliver enough power for TO from the carrier decks.

With the Merlin 32/100 octane (Barracuda Mk II/III) the TO and low-altitude power caught up with the weight increase. Basically the Merlin 32 was the equivalent (in power & altitude) of a Merlin 24/25 in low gear.

The Merlin XX would have fit the bill for low & high altitude eventually (with the Merlin 24/25 in late-1942) but not on the original planned development timeline.

The Merlin XX was just entering service (jn numbers) in late-1940, at about the end of the Fulmar Mk I production, and was subsequently in extreme demand for the Hurricane, Halifax, and Lancaster.

 

[nuuumannn]

Spitfire VIII would seem to be a much better basis.

The FAA seemed to have an obsession with low-altitude rated engines which I think was a mistake, generally speaking. It worked well against Kamikazes though.

The Spitfire VIII's fuselage was the basis of the Griffon-engined Mk.XII and Mk.XIV so it effectively was the basis of the Seafire XV. The Seafire IIs and IIIs were based on the V and IX fuselages, the IX essentially being a V fuselage, but with a different powerplant.

Again, the low altitude fixation is for good reason, a very different operating scenario to the Pacific Theatre, where you had plenty of time to assemble large formations of fighters in the air before you can even see your enemy, but in European waters you have far less reaction time, so speed and acceleration is critical. Let's also not forget that from our performance figures the Seafire III's maximum altitude is only a thousand feet less than the F6F's, so a better performance at low altitude is matched by a high operating ceiling and greater rate of climb. The performance margins were not as much as you might think, the term "low altitude" refers to performance optimisation, not limitation.

 

[nuuumannn]

The only clear statement I have come across is in David Brown's book "The Seafire. The Spitfire that went to Sea" where he notes:-

"Adaptation of the two-stage Merlin 60-series engined Spitfires Mark IX or VIII was impractical because of foreseeable structural deficiencies which could not be overcome by strengthening which would further increase the weight of the aircraft."

The odd thing about that statement is that the first Seafire IIs and IIIs that appeared were modified Mk.Vs already on the production line. The 60-Series Merlin was capable of greater power than the earlier Merlins without that much of an increase in weight. There is a serious overestimation of total weight versus power output between the two types of Merlin as applied to a Seafire airframe in that statement. According to figures in my Supermarine Putnam book, the empty and loaded weights of the Spitfire Mk.IX (5,800 lbs, 7,500 lbs) were greater than that of the Seafire III (5,317 lbs, 7,232 lbs), which makes Brown's statement strange.

Morgan and Shacklady don't add anything of value to the discussion, simply adding that the Rolls-Royce Merlin 55 Series engine was specified for the Seafire III. "It produced the same horsepower as the Merlin 45 but had the advantage of automatic boost control with barometric governing. With this, the pilot could forget the vital functions of operating the supercharger control as it cut in as the aircraft gained altitude."

 

[nuuumannn]

Something of interest I found that Eric Brown said about the Seafire while looking up something else. Regarding the deck landing issues boiling down to training in proper techniques, following which saw a marked reduction in the number of deck landing accidents, he had this to say after Jeffrey Quill released his report stating why Seafires were having accidents, again pointing to training and poor technique in handling the aircraft.

"This report was not entirely encouraging and the sour reputation the Seafire was acquiring was in no way relieved by common knowledge of the greater sturdiness, better endurance and markedly superior deck-landing and ditching qualities offered by the new Grumman Hellcat" (There you go, Americans, your beloved F6F's honor has been restored and you can stop spitting out your cornflakes at the suggestion the Seafire XV had better performance than the Hellcat)

"Furthermore, the less tractable side of the Seafire's nature was prone to exaggeration and the result was that many pilots were unduly apprehensive of deck-landing this fighter."

 

[Admiral Beez]

Also could Avengers even carry British torpedoes?

This is also an interesting French naval fighter

Loire-Nieuport 161 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Your fighter is a big bird.

Your French fighter reminded me of this what-if model. Put in a Merlin and license produce for the FAA? Though Winkle Brown didn't like it - not that he liked any British single seat carrier fighter.

Could France make due with just two fighters?

The 150 was a one off, the 151 and 152 were the production versions and varied from the 150 considerably. Main advantage over the Ms 406, especially in this scenario, is that is not competing for the HS 12Y engines.

ww2aircraft.net

 

[Shortround6]

Put in a Merlin and license produce for the FAA

What have you got against the FAA???

No fuel.
little armament.
Wing loading worse than 109 trying to land on a carrier deck?

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The Spitfire VIII's fuselage was the basis of the Griffon-engined Mk.XII and Mk.XIV so it effectively was the basis of the Seafire XV. The Seafire IIs and IIIs were based on the V and IX fuselages, the IX essentially being a V fuselage, but with a different powerplant.

Again, the low altitude fixation is for good reason, a very different operating scenario to the Pacific Theatre, where you had plenty of time to assemble large formations of fighters in the air before you can even see your enemy, but in European waters you have far less reaction time, so speed and acceleration is critical. Let's also not forget that from our performance figures the Seafire III's maximum altitude is only a thousand feet less than the F6F's, so a better performance at low altitude is matched by a high operating ceiling and greater rate of climb. The performance margins were not as much as you might think, the term "low altitude" refers to performance optimisation, not limitation.

I'd say you are missing the point a bit here, because Seafire III wasn't necessarily ready to fight at 25,000 ft, with a top speed of 322 mph at that altitude, which would be hard pressed to outrun a late model Zero, whereas F6F was still at 391 mph at that height - almost at max speed.

I do definitely get the need for a lot of power at sea level for takeoff and low speed handling around the carrier, but you don't need a low alt rated engine to get that, at least not by the time the Seafire III or the Barracuda came out. Merlin XX was available pretty early too.

I think we are confusing rationalization or bad policy decisions with adaptation to reality. FAA had some kind of fetish for low alt rated engines. It was a mistake.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Is there anything on the folding wing Seafire III of 1943 that makes it impossible for 1940? Yes, the Merlin of 1940 will need a supercharger more apt for lower altitude and the undercarriage updated and fuselage reinforced. What else?

It seems to me that if we can replace every Sea Gladiator, Fulmar and Sea Hurricane with a 1940 Seafire III all is better.