Can we make a slightly smaller Fulmar as an improved carrier fighter?

[Shortround6]

It seems to me that if we can replace every Sea Gladiator, Fulmar and Sea Hurricane with a 1940 Seafire III all is better.

Why not replace all the Sea Gladiators, Fulmars and Sea Hurricanes with Sea Furies while you are at it?

Sea Gladiators were out of production and had been for quite some time in 1940.
Fulmars were in production but using single speed engines.
1940 Sea Hurricanes were converted (and somewhat worn out) EX RAF machines, not new construction.

Getting any sort of Seafire in 1940 requires a lot of shifting of production and/or a Tardis.

Edit. The Merlin 55 engines used in the Seafire III used pressure water cooling, two piece cylinder blocks, anti-G carbs and had the ability to operate at 16-18lbs of boost, in part because of better fuel and the engine improvements.
Using a 1940 or early 1941 Merlin 45 does not give you the same performance, even if you use a different supercharger that was available in 1940/41.

 

[SaparotRob]

Why not replace all the Sea Gladiators, Fulmars and Sea Hurricanes with Sea Furies while you are at it?

Sea Gladiators were out of production and had been for quite some time in 1940.
Fulmars were in production but using single speed engines.
1940 Sea Hurricanes were converted (and somewhat worn out) EX RAF machines, not new construction.

Getting any sort of Seafire in 1940 requires a lot of shifting of production and/or a Tardis.

Edit. The Merlin 55 engines used in the Seafire III used pressure water cooling, two piece cylinder blocks, anti-G carbs and had the ability to operate at 16-18lbs of boost, in part because of better fuel and the engine improvements.
Using a 1940 or early 1941 Merlin 45 does not give you the same performance, even if you use a different supercharger that was available in 1940/41.

Killjoy.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Well Merlin XX were being produced in July 1940, were available (put into a Hurricane MK II) in June. Putting them in Hurricanes (sea or land) didn't help that much, but I bet they would work out great in a Seafire. If you had Seafire III-XXs already in 1941, or even in early 1942, it would have probably saved quite a few lives. The only problem is you still have a range issue. But it's definitely better than a Sea Hurricane or a Sea Gladiator or a Seafire I or II, and would have been very helpful for many of the Mediterranean and Arctic convoys. Probably would have been nice to have at Ceylon too (whether flying from land base or carrier).

 

[ThomasP]

Navalized Spitfire Mk III with folding wings (or not - at least at first). Obviously it would only work if the AM authorized production.

 

[Shortround6]

Hurricane gets something of a bad rap here.
What might be looked at is poor priority that the Navy had for fighters in general.

Sea Hurricanes had to make do with Melrin III engines until mid to late 1942, First use of Sea Hurricanes with Merlin XX engines was at operation Torch, over 2 years after they were used in the BoB.
No Merlin XIIs
No Merlin VIIIs or 30s
No Merlin 45s or any variations.

The Sea Hurricane IIC went into action at the same time that the First Seafires did.

There was certainly time for some sort of improved Sea Hurricane to have been developed/used in 40/41 and much of 1942.

 

[EwenS]

Hurricane gets something of a bad rap here.
What might be looked at is poor priority that the Navy had for fighters in general.

All Sea Hurricanes were produced by conversion from ex-RAF Hurricanes, some of which were already well worn when they passed to the RN. In addition to those converted numbers of ordinary Hurricanes were made available for training fighter pilots in Britain or to equip shore based fighter squadrons in the Middle East working alongside RAF and other nations units in that theatre (for example 803 & 806 from Fomidable & Illustrious during 1941 before they re-equiped with Fulmars and left for Ceylon in early 1942).

A couple of extracts from Admiralty papers about the supply of Hurricanes for conversion as Sea Hurricane II and Hurricanes supplied for training from late 1942 / early 1943.

From the report by Rear Admiral Home Fleet Aircraft Carriers to Naval Commander, Expeditionary force for Operation Torch.

"Appendix II – PREPARATION OF AIRCRAFT CARRIER SQUADRONS FOR OPERATION "TORCH". PROVISION OF AIRCRAFT.

The Air Ministry was asked to provide 45 Spitfires for training and 45 Hurricanes IIB.
2. These aircraft were to be hooked as fast as possible; in the case of Spitfire VB to provide deck landing training machines and in the case of Hurricanes to provide operational aircraft. After deck landing training practice the Spitfire Squadrons were to change over to Seafires of which 48 were provided for the operation.
3. The Hurricane total was later raised to 60 aircraft and I was able to extract 30 pairs of IIC Wings from the Air Ministry who had formerly refused the Admiralty request for IIC aircraft.
4. The hooking of the Hurricanes was effectively done and in time, by Hawkers, but the change over from IIB to IIC wings produced an hiatus in the training of Squadrons which had to be accepted. Hawkers responded to the increased requirements for hooked aircraft but, having urged their workpeople to great efforts, were not prepared to take a number of aircraft back to change over the wings.
5. This wing change was done, therefore, by R.A.F.M.U. Harlow most efficiently and 24 out of the 30 aircraft were at the same time modified to take long range tanks. While this modification took some days to introduce, it was considered necessary, as it was considered that operations over Bougie might well have to be carried out by Naval Aircraft based ashore, in order to avoid the necessity of putting a Carrier in an extremely dangerous area.
6. The hooking of Spitfire VB's was not so successful and the estimated modification of 6 per week was never fulfilled. There was, therefore, a shortage of these aircraft for deck landing training which limited it. The production of Seafires, was, however, better than estimated or anticipated and Squadrons were able to put to sea with a full
complement of aircraft plus a deck cargo of 5 Seafire IB in "DASHER" and 6 Seafire IIC in each of "VICTORIOUS" and "FORMIDABLE". These deck cargoes were flown off to Gibraltar to form, with 7 Seafires already there, a reserve. While the production and allocation of these aircraft was placed on the highest priority possible, no effective steps were taken to provide for a range of stores for maintaining the training or operational aircraft on the same priority. This naturally increased the difficulty of obtaining maintenance spares etc., one hundredfold."

Sea Hurricane IIb started appearing with the squadrons in Sept 1942. 800, 804 & 891 squadron received their "new" Hurricane IIc aircraft in Oct 1942 just prior to joining the escort carriers Biter & Dasher for Operation Torch.



And this from a Letter dated 9 March 1943 from Flag Officer, Naval Air Stations to the SEcretary of Admiralty ADM 1/13522

"Condition of Hurricane I aircraft received from RAF Maintenance Units

With reference to Admiralty Letter A. 0123/ 42 of the 4th April 1942:–
1. Be pleased to represent to Their Lordships that complaints concerning the unsatisfactory condition of aircraft received from Royal Air Force Maintenance Units continue to be forwarded from Naval Air Stations.
2. Aircraft at Royal Air Force Maintenance Units under the administration of No. 41 Group are maintained on a flying hour basis, consequently when the aircraft are received at Naval Air Stations they become subject to the provision of A.F.O. 3542/ 42 and immediately become due for major inspections under paragraph 4. It has been found that the condition of the aircraft in some cases is such that the Air Engineer Officer is unable to recommend an extension on the major inspection period and disposal instructions have had to be sought.
3. … Of a total of 29 Hurricane I's received on Director of Air Materiel allotments 3659, 3660, 3662 and 3663 of 1942, dated the 28th September, 1942, on account of the incidence of petty unserviceability due to age and condition, the total flying hours of the above 29 aircraft for the period October, November, December, 1942 and January, 1943, amounts to an average of 21 hours each, and this is far below that necessary to maintain the flying programme in the Naval Air Fighter School.
The following action to date has been required in respect of 12 of them viz:
1 Write Off.
1 Complete Overhaul.
5 Major inspections.
1 Board of Survey.
4 To makers for repair.

4. In view of the present shortage of Maintenance personnel it is for consideration whether Royal Air Force Maintenance Units should be requested to carry out a minor inspection on all aircraft are in such a condition to enable the Air Engineer Officer to extend the period between major inspections as required by A.F.O. 3542/ 42, paragraph 4 in the event of such inspection falling due (on a time basis) on arrival.
5. The question of replacement of existing aircraft by newer and more reliable aircraft is being raised separately, FONAS No. 1944/ 435/ 27 dated 8th March 1943."

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Hurricane gets something of a bad rap here.
What might be looked at is poor priority that the Navy had for fighters in general.

Sea Hurricanes had to make do with Melrin III engines until mid to late 1942, First use of Sea Hurricanes with Merlin XX engines was at operation Torch, over 2 years after they were used in the BoB.
No Merlin XIIs
No Merlin VIIIs or 30s
No Merlin 45s or any variations.

The Sea Hurricane IIC went into action at the same time that the First Seafires did.

There was certainly time for some sort of improved Sea Hurricane to have been developed/used in 40/41 and much of 1942.

Yeah that's an interesting point and true - my point is that putting Merlin XX into Hurricanes (or Sea Hurricanes) didn't really bring them over the line back into viability as a frontline fighter the way the Hurricane I were in 1940. Whereas I think they would have gotten a lot more bang for the buck putting Merlin XX into Spitfires, and obviously that would have been very good for Seafires as well. I think.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

All Sea Hurricanes were produced by conversion from ex-RAF Hurricanes, some of which were already well worn when they passed to the RN. In addition to those converted numbers of ordinary Hurricanes were made available for training fighter pilots in Britain or to equip shore based fighter squadrons in the Middle East working alongside RAF and other nations units in that theatre (for example 803 & 806 from Fomidable & Illustrious during 1941 before they re-equiped with Fulmars and left for Ceylon in early 1942).

A couple of extracts from Admiralty papers about the supply of Hurricanes for conversion as Sea Hurricane II and Hurricanes supplied for training from late 1942 / early 1943.

From the report by Rear Admiral Home Fleet Aircraft Carriers to Naval Commander, Expeditionary force for Operation Torch.

"Appendix II – PREPARATION OF AIRCRAFT CARRIER SQUADRONS FOR OPERATION "TORCH". PROVISION OF AIRCRAFT.

The Air Ministry was asked to provide 45 Spitfires for training and 45 Hurricanes IIB.
2. These aircraft were to be hooked as fast as possible; in the case of Spitfire VB to provide deck landing training machines and in the case of Hurricanes to provide operational aircraft. After deck landing training practice the Spitfire Squadrons were to change over to Seafires of which 48 were provided for the operation.
3. The Hurricane total was later raised to 60 aircraft and I was able to extract 30 pairs of IIC Wings from the Air Ministry who had formerly refused the Admiralty request for IIC aircraft.
4. The hooking of the Hurricanes was effectively done and in time, by Hawkers, but the change over from IIB to IIC wings produced an hiatus in the training of Squadrons which had to be accepted. Hawkers responded to the increased requirements for hooked aircraft but, having urged their workpeople to great efforts, were not prepared to take a number of aircraft back to change over the wings.
5. This wing change was done, therefore, by R.A.F.M.U. Harlow most efficiently and 24 out of the 30 aircraft were at the same time modified to take long range tanks. While this modification took some days to introduce, it was considered necessary, as it was considered that operations over Bougie might well have to be carried out by Naval Aircraft based ashore, in order to avoid the necessity of putting a Carrier in an extremely dangerous area.
6. The hooking of Spitfire VB's was not so successful and the estimated modification of 6 per week was never fulfilled. There was, therefore, a shortage of these aircraft for deck landing training which limited it. The production of Seafires, was, however, better than estimated or anticipated and Squadrons were able to put to sea with a full
complement of aircraft plus a deck cargo of 5 Seafire IB in "DASHER" and 6 Seafire IIC in each of "VICTORIOUS" and "FORMIDABLE". These deck cargoes were flown off to Gibraltar to form, with 7 Seafires already there, a reserve. While the production and allocation of these aircraft was placed on the highest priority possible, no effective steps were taken to provide for a range of stores for maintaining the training or operational aircraft on the same priority. This naturally increased the difficulty of obtaining maintenance spares etc., one hundredfold."

Sea Hurricane IIb started appearing with the squadrons in Sept 1942. 800, 804 & 891 squadron received their "new" Hurricane IIc aircraft in Oct 1942 just prior to joining the escort carriers Biter & Dasher for Operation Torch.



And this from a Letter dated 9 March 1943 from Flag Officer, Naval Air Stations to the SEcretary of Admiralty ADM 1/13522

"Condition of Hurricane I aircraft received from RAF Maintenance Units

With reference to Admiralty Letter A. 0123/ 42 of the 4th April 1942:–
1. Be pleased to represent to Their Lordships that complaints concerning the unsatisfactory condition of aircraft received from Royal Air Force Maintenance Units continue to be forwarded from Naval Air Stations.
2. Aircraft at Royal Air Force Maintenance Units under the administration of No. 41 Group are maintained on a flying hour basis, consequently when the aircraft are received at Naval Air Stations they become subject to the provision of A.F.O. 3542/ 42 and immediately become due for major inspections under paragraph 4. It has been found that the condition of the aircraft in some cases is such that the Air Engineer Officer is unable to recommend an extension on the major inspection period and disposal instructions have had to be sought.
3. … Of a total of 29 Hurricane I's received on Director of Air Materiel allotments 3659, 3660, 3662 and 3663 of 1942, dated the 28th September, 1942, on account of the incidence of petty unserviceability due to age and condition, the total flying hours of the above 29 aircraft for the period October, November, December, 1942 and January, 1943, amounts to an average of 21 hours each, and this is far below that necessary to maintain the flying programme in the Naval Air Fighter School.
The following action to date has been required in respect of 12 of them viz:
1 Write Off.
1 Complete Overhaul.
5 Major inspections.
1 Board of Survey.
4 To makers for repair.

4. In view of the present shortage of Maintenance personnel it is for consideration whether Royal Air Force Maintenance Units should be requested to carry out a minor inspection on all aircraft are in such a condition to enable the Air Engineer Officer to extend the period between major inspections as required by A.F.O. 3542/ 42, paragraph 4 in the event of such inspection falling due (on a time basis) on arrival.
5. The question of replacement of existing aircraft by newer and more reliable aircraft is being raised separately, FONAS No. 1944/ 435/ 27 dated 8th March 1943."

This whole thing... considering the vital role Sea Hurricanes ended up having to play.... it's maddening. Lives were definitely lost. And it's not like there was a shortage of new Hurricanes from what i understand!?

 

[Shortround6]

Yeah that's an interesting point and true - my point is that putting Merlin XX into Hurricanes (or Sea Hurricanes) didn't really bring them over the line back into viability as a frontline fighter the way the Hurricane I were in 1940. Whereas I think they would have gotten a lot more bang for the buck putting Merlin XX into Spitfires, and obviously that would have been very good for Seafires as well. I think.

In 1940 the decision was made, rightly or wrongly, to put the Merlin XX engines into the Hurricane instead of the Spitfire as it was judged that would give the British the largest amount of effective fighters per month. They knew the Hurricane I was not in the running in the summer of 1940. But Castle Bromwich had only started producing fighters. As it turns out they started producing Hurricane IIs and issuing them just a few weeks before the Southampton Spitfire factory was bombed, Which lead to a roughly 90 aircraft shortfall in production in the Fall of 1940. What the British did not know at the time that the decision was made was that the Luftwaffe would shift over to night bombing and would stay with night bombing for the winter.

With hindsight we have the ability to see that 1. the production of single engine fighters was a lot less critical over the winter and into the spring. Night fighter production became more critical. 2. The lighter/lower drag Spitfire could "make do" with the single stage engine. 3. We KNOW that the 109F and FW 190 would show up in 1941 and blow the Hurricane II into the weeds and throw the whole calculation off.

A Hurricane II vs a 109E-7 with a DB 601N engine might have been fairly equal. A 109F with the DB 601N engine was not.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

In 1940 the decision was made, rightly or wrongly, to put the Merlin XX engines into the Hurricane instead of the Spitfire as it was judged that would give the British the largest amount of effective fighters per month. They knew the Hurricane I was not in the running in the summer of 1940. But Castle Bromwich had only started producing fighters. As it turns out they started producing Hurricane IIs and issuing them just a few weeks before the Southampton Spitfire factory was bombed, Which lead to a roughly 90 aircraft shortfall in production in the Fall of 1940. What the British did not know at the time that the decision was made was that the Luftwaffe would shift over to night bombing and would stay with night bombing for the winter.

With hindsight we have the ability to see that 1. the production of single engine fighters was a lot less critical over the winter and into the spring. Night fighter production became more critical. 2. The lighter/lower drag Spitfire could "make do" with the single stage engine. 3. We KNOW that the 109F and FW 190 would show up in 1941 and blow the Hurricane II into the weeds and throw the whole calculation off.

A Hurricane II vs a 109E-7 with a DB 601N engine might have been fairly equal. A 109F with the DB 601N engine was not.

Right, I don't fault them the decision in 1940. The problem is that they were still putting Merlin XX (and equivalent) into Hurricanes and Merlin 45 (etc.) in to Mark V well into 1942 and I think even 1943. These were facing the Luftwaffe in 1942 and 1943 and having serious problems. The Spit V was supposed to be the top fighter, at least for interceptor air superiority missions close to their bases, but they really had no advantage over Bf 109F let alone Fw 190. Both aircraft suffered from the poorly designed Tropical filters they fitted to them. I think the Spit V would have greatly benefited from Merlin XX, whereas the Hurricane II probably could have done fine with a low altitude rated engine as it was no longer being used much for air defense or escort already by very early 1942... rather they were used for fighter-bombers almost exclusively. So a low-alt engine would actually probably be better.

And the omission of better engines for the FAA / RN seems to be particularly glaring and tragic. Using the clapped out older planes seems incomprehensible.

I guess they didn't realize early on how important carriers were going to be for them.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

A Hurricane II vs a 109E-7 with a DB 601N engine might have been fairly equal. A 109F with the DB 601N engine was not.

The dividing line may be over Tropical conditions. In Egypt etc., the Hurricane IIs were being decimated by Bf 109E-7s in 1941 and 1942. That's why they switched to Tomahawks and then Kittyhawks (which also struggled but did better).... which is what led the Germans to send the 109F4s.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Which is why they (finally) sent in the Spit Vs, but they were not quite the hoped for panacea. Neither were the P-38s.

 

[Shortround6]

109F-4s used the DB 610E engines.
1350hp for take-off instead of 1200hp and 1300hp/18,045ft instead of 1270hp at 16,400ft.
"And it runs on regular gas" to quote Elwood.
The DB 601N needed 96 octane.

didn't help that they kept the XX (and 45s) rated at 9lbs of boost for much of 1941.

 

[tomo pauk]

With hindsight we have the ability to see that 1. the production of single engine fighters was a lot less critical over the winter and into the spring. Night fighter production became more critical. 2. The lighter/lower drag Spitfire could "make do" with the single stage engine. 3. We KNOW that the 109F and FW 190 would show up in 1941 and blow the Hurricane II into the weeds and throw the whole calculation off.

2. 2-speed, not 2-stage
3. British knew that they (British) were pressing hard with fighter(s) powered with two different 2000 HP engines, prototypes flying in 1939. Expecting that Germans will linger with 1200 HP engines on fighters in 1941 was wishful thinking.

109F-4s used the DB 610E engines.
1350hp for take-off instead of 1200hp and 1300hp/18,045ft instead of 1270hp at 16,400ft.
"And it runs on regular gas" to quote Elwood.
The DB 601N needed 96 octane.

2700 rpm/1.42 ata operation was banned on the 601E in service until very late in 1941, possibly until November/December?
Next best setting - 2500 rpm/1.30 ata gave 1200 PS at 4.9 km (~16080 ft).
DB 601N was enduring problems on the Bf 109s due to the material the tanks were made from, and there is one data sheet where Notleistung (most power) was limited to just 1 minute. Best power, made at 2600 rpm, was 1175 PS at 4.9 km.

Not everything was roses and unicorns in the Luftwaffe land.

 

[EwenS]

The dividing line may be over Tropical conditions. In Egypt etc., the Hurricane IIs were being decimated by Bf 109E-7s in 1941 and 1942. That's why they switched to Tomahawks and then Kittyhawks (which also struggled but did better).... which is what led the Germans to send the 109F4s.

At the end of 1941 Hurricanes still outnumbered Tomahawks about 3.5 to 1 across the Middle East. Only a handful of squadrons swapped from Hurricanes to Tomahawks / Kittyhawks. At least one went the other way IIRC at one point. Often the equipment was driven by availibility. Most of the Tomahawks, which only arrived in the theatre in June 1941, went initially to newly arrived SAAF squadrons. Kittyhawks only began to arrive at the very end of 1941 and didn't become operational until early 1942.

By El Alamein the number of Hurricane squadrons still outnumbered Tomahawk / Kittyhawk squadrons in the MIddle East.

The first 2 Spitfire squadrons arrived in Egypt in April 1942 but only enough aircraft were initially available to allow 1 (145 squadron) to become operational in May 1942. 601 squadron aircraft then transferred from Malta to Egypt in June to meet up with its groundcrews again. Finally with more Spitfire Vb becoming available 92 squadron became operational in Aug.

There is a reasonably accurate OOB for the RAF in the MIddle East in Oct 1942 here.

HyperWar: Royal Air Force 1939-1945: Volume II: The Fight Avails [Appendix XI]

www.ibiblio.org

Edit:- The first Hurricane II sent to the Middle East were for Malta in March 1941. IIRC Egypt had to wait even longer. Even in Jan 1942 there were spare Mk.I Hurricanes with MUs in Egypt because some of them got loaded on Indomitable for transfer to the Far East.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

At the end of 1941 Hurricanes still outnumbered Tomahawks about 3.5 to 1 across the Middle East. Only a handful of squadrons swapped from Hurricanes to Tomahawks / Kittyhawks. At least one went the other way IIRC at one point.

Yes and got relegated to fighter-bomber duties

Often the equipment was driven by availibility. Most of the Tomahawks, which only arrived in the theatre in June 1941, went initially to newly arrived SAAF squadrons. Kittyhawks only began to arrive at the very end of 1941 and didn't become operational until early 1942.

The key exception here would be 112 Squadron RAF and 3 RAAF, two of the most successful air combat units in this era. Followed shortly after with 250 RAF and 260 RAF with Kittyhawks. The SAAF got Tomahawks a bit later and kept them longer (into 1943 for one squadron). The British leadership talked quite openly about the decision to use Tomahawk and then Kittyhawk as the main air-superiority fighter (as well as for ground attack / fighter bomber missions). The pertinent memos are covered extensively in Ehlers Mediterranean Air War.

The Luftwaffe also talked about problems with the Tomahawks, notably after a couple of key incidents, and issued orders relevant to fighting them (do not engage in close combat) which worked for racking up kills but meant that they were ineffective against RAF / DAF bombers.

By El Alamein the number of Hurricane squadrons still outnumbered Tomahawk / Kittyhawk squadrons in the MIddle East.

And the Hurricanes, by that time, were flying 95% bomber / ground attack sorties

The first 2 Spitfire squadrons arrived in Egypt in April 1942 but only enough aircraft were initially available to allow 1 (145 squadron) to become operational in May 1942. 601 squadron aircraft then transferred from Malta to Egypt in June to meet up with its groundcrews again. Finally with more Spitfire Vb becoming available 92 squadron became operational in Aug.

They were playing a role by June 1942

There is a reasonably accurate OOB for the RAF in the MIddle East in Oct 1942 here.

HyperWar: Royal Air Force 1939-1945: Volume II: The Fight Avails [Appendix XI]

www.ibiblio.org

I am quite familiar with the OOB all through the Mediterranean conflict!

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

That is a good link though I hadn't seen that page before.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

There is a post on this forum somewhere which breaks down every day of air combat in Oct 1942, I'll see if I can find it. It's pretty revealing vis a vis aircraft types and what missions they were performing etc.

 

[Shortround6]

3. British knew that they (British) were pressing hard with fighter(s) powered with two different 2000 HP engines, prototypes flying in 1939. Expecting that Germans will linger with 1200 HP engines on fighters in 1941 was wishful thinking.

True but in mid/late 1940 the 2000hp engines were quite there yet and something had to be done to keep up production of fighters. Putting the best engine in the Spitfire and continuing make Hurricane Is was just providing too much target practice for the Luftwaffe. Work on the 2nd Tornado was stopped/slowed down for a number of months in 1940 to speed up production/repairs of Hurricanes. Basically because nobody knew how bad the Luftwaffe production numbers were.
Typhoon stumbled along through much of 1941. Although they had over 500 orders the first squadron only received aircraft starting in the fall if 1941. So they had to keep making Hurricanes.

 

[tomo pauk]

True but in mid/late 1940 the 2000hp engines were quite there yet and something had to be done to keep up production of fighters.

I was trying to make a point that, while Germans might not deploy fighters with 2000 HP engines in 1941, they might deploy fighters with 1400-1500 HP engines. British didn't needed crystal ball to see that Hurricane was badly behind the curve if it is powered by engine of similar power the Bf 109E. Let alone something more modern that can be expected to materialize, since 109E was already 2 years old, and it is barely more than a 1935 fighter with a modern engine and some nip & tuck.

Putting the best engine in the Spitfire and continuing make Hurricane Is was just providing too much target practice for the Luftwaffe.

Hurricane can get the Merlin XII, and later Merlin 45, and be kept with 8 .303s. Copy the darned low-drag exhausts from the Germans for extra 6-7 mph.
A 390-400 mph Spitfire in 1940 was too good for RAF to pass, yet they did exactly that; as always, neither Germans, nor French, nor Japanese have had exclusive rights to mistakes.
Even the Spitfire III airframe with Merlin XII (later with Mk.45) is a boon.

Work on the 2nd Tornado was stopped/slowed down for a number of months in 1940 to speed up production/repairs of Hurricanes. Basically because nobody knew how bad the Luftwaffe production numbers were.
Typhoon stumbled along through much of 1941. Although they had over 500 orders the first squadron only received aircraft starting in the fall if 1941. So they had to keep making Hurricanes.

I haven't suggested that Hurricanes are discontinued, there is far more glaring examples in need for the hatchet. Alas.