Thumpalumpacus
Major
Burn him! He's a witch!
'Tis blasphemy, I assert.
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Burn him! He's a witch!
The RAF says 378 Hurricane I ended up as Sea I but it looks like that is more along the lines of saw RN service, most of which were Sea versions plus Sea versions that served in the Merchant Ship Fighter Unit which was RAF. This excludes theatre transfers to the RN fighter squadrons operatind in the Western Desert. Transfers continued in bulk until late 1942.All Sea Hurricanes were produced by conversion from ex-RAF Hurricanes, some of which were already well worn when they passed to the RN. In addition to those converted numbers of ordinary Hurricanes were made available for training fighter pilots in Britain or to equip shore based fighter squadrons in the Middle East working alongside RAF and other nations units in that theatre (for example 803 & 806 from Fomidable & Illustrious during 1941 before they re-equiped with Fulmars and left for Ceylon in early 1942).
Seafire Slipper tanks:Interesting points about other aircraft. But what's any of that got to do with a smaller, single seat Fulmar?
It's a rare occurrence, such as with Fairey's Flycatcher where the Brits field a single-seat naval fighter that is not a modified RAF fighter. The Firebrand is one example of a failure of such. Let's give Fairey another shot at repeating this rare example of design and procurement. So, the AM decides it needs a single-seat naval fighter to match up against the A5M (first flown 1935) and F4F (first flown 1937) and similar types. This requires the AM, FAA and RN to join the USN and IJN in the rejection the notion of a 2nd crewman for naval fighter navigation. The AM approaches the FAA's top supplier, Fairey, where they look at the P.4/34 and say no thanks, too big. Fairey replies, we'll make a smaller version, single seat, made specifically for FAA needs.
Late war the Seafire III was using both the 90IG slipper tankAs far as I know the SeaHurricane only used the 45 Impgal under-wing DTs for combat missions, while the Seafire only used the 30 & 45 Impgal slipper DTs for combat missions.
Do you mean and/or ?Late war the Seafire III was using both the 90IG slipper tank and a ~90IG DT (borrowed from RAAF P-40s) during combat missions.
887 & 894 squadrons on Indefatigable used the 90 imp gal slipper tank in July/Aug ops off Japan.Do you mean and/or ?
I would ask our long range escort fans to check the climb rates of a Spitfire carrying a 500lb bomb vs a clean plane.
I believe there are some tests with some of these drop tanks?
Inside fuel won't affect speed like external loads will but the change in weight will be close.
Or.Do you mean and/or ?
I would ask our long range escort fans to check the climb rates of a Spitfire carrying a 500lb bomb vs a clean plane.
I believe there are some tests with some of these drop tanks?
Inside fuel won't affect speed like external loads will but the change in weight will be close.
However the second crewman and the RN homing system was seen as a positive advantage by the RN. Being before later radar systems and allowing the Fulmar to range far away and at night or poor weather and still find the carrier even if the carrier had changed course from the expected heading. Other navies relied upon either or both dead reckoning and/or planned rendezvous with the alternative of a radio beacon that could be tracked to the carrier by the enemy. There was also the idea of the aeroplane broadcasting a signal for the carrier to identify and send directions. Also a security risk. The RN system was a signal sent from the carrier to the aeroplane in a manner which prevented the carrier or the aeroplane having the signal intercepted and positions given away. The same was fitted to the strike aeroplanes. Hence the second crewman was normally a Telegraphist Air Gunner rating and not a navigator officer.There was a good reasoned basis for the decision.Interesting points about other aircraft. But what's any of that got to do with a smaller, single seat Fulmar?
It's a rare occurrence, such as with Fairey's Flycatcher where the Brits field a single-seat naval fighter that is not a modified RAF fighter. The Firebrand is one example of a failure of such. Let's give Fairey another shot at repeating this rare example of design and procurement. So, the AM decides it needs a single-seat naval fighter to match up against the A5M (first flown 1935) and F4F (first flown 1937) and similar types. This requires the AM, FAA and RN to join the USN and IJN in the rejection the notion of a 2nd crewman for naval fighter navigation. The AM approaches the FAA's top supplier, Fairey, where they look at the P.4/34 and say no thanks, too big. Fairey replies, we'll make a smaller version, single seat, made specifically for FAA needs.
Yes, this notion would need to be considered and rejected. Or the tech modified so that the pilot can do it himself.However the second crewman and the RN homing system was seen as a positive advantage by the RN.
If it's good enough for the USN and IJN, it should be fine for the RN. The RN's Corsair, Hellcat, Seafire and Sea Hurricane pilots managed to return to their carriers.Other navies relied upon either or both dead reckoning and/or planned rendezvous with the alternative of a radio beacon that could be tracked to the carrier by the enemy.
Yes, this notion would need to be considered and rejected. Or the tech modified so that the pilot can do it himself.
If it's good enough for the USN and IJN, it should be fine for the RN. The RN's Corsair, Hellcat, Seafire and Sea Hurricane pilots managed to return to their carriers.
However the second crewman and the RN homing system was seen as a positive advantage by the RN. Being before later radar systems and allowing the Fulmar to range far away and at night or poor weather and still find the carrier even if the carrier had changed course from the expected heading. Other navies relied upon either or both dead reckoning and/or planned rendezvous with the alternative of a radio beacon that could be tracked to the carrier by the enemy. There was also the idea of the aeroplane broadcasting a signal for the carrier to identify and send directions. Also a security risk. The RN system was a signal sent from the carrier to the aeroplane in a manner which prevented the carrier or the aeroplane having the signal intercepted and positions given away. The same was fitted to the strike aeroplanes. Hence the second crewman was normally a Telegraphist Air Gunner rating and not a navigator officer.There was a good reasoned basis for the decision.
887 & 894 squadrons on Indefatigable used the 90 imp gal slipper tank in July/Aug ops off Japan.
801 & 880 on Implacable used the ex-Kittyhawk tanks.
That's why other navies used their torpedo or dive bombers for the recon and pathfinder roles. For the Royal Navy, the twin seat, monoplane, retractable undercarriage aircraft for distant scout work should have been the TSR or dive bomber not the fighter.See this is the thing for me. I think the Fulmar was quite useful in this particular role. And the RN / FAA saw this as a major role for British carriers, basically scouting / surveilling large tracts of ocean,
The British also seemed to think this was a issue in the North Atlantic too,Finding ones way back to base - even for land based fighters, was a serious issue particularly in the Pacific.
The British have a few problems in the 1930s.Anyway, this is all a reason why I've been saying - keep the Fulmar, just also develop a smaller single seat fighter.
It pretty much was a TSR, the fighter roll was somewhat secondary.That's why other navies used their torpedo bombers for this role and pathfinder. The twin seat, monoplane, retractable undercarriage aircraft for distant scout work should have been the TSR, not the fighter.