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Canada and Australia: what would you build?
- Thread starter tomo pauk
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You know that in the Australian constitution there is specific provision to incorporate New Zealand as a State should they wish to do so. (I wish they would so we can fix their cutomes and immigration ) I wouldn't make too many sheep shagger jokes. There are plenty of sheep opportunities here as well and the shaggers are running a lot of our companies these days.
wuzak
Captain
So now the Aussies are making fun with Zealanders, because the later have the sheep? As if the Bulgarians making fun of Greeks for being on Balkans? Good lord
Don't worry, they enjoy taking the piss out of Aussies too.
pbfoot
1st Lieutenant
Canda could have stated off with the idigenous Gregor fighter
The Gregor FDB-1 was a Canadian biplane fighter, designed in 1938 by Michael Gregor and manufactured by Canadian Car and Foundry. Despite being an advanced and innovative design, incorporating all-metal construction with flush riveting, retractable undercarriage and a sleek shape, the FDB-I was overtaken by events and, after being unable to find a buyer, was lost in a fire in 1945
Crew: 1
Length: 21 ft 8 in (6.604 m)
Wingspan: 51 ft (16 m) (15.798 8 m)
Height: 6 ft (2 m) (2.86 m (9 ft 5 in))
Empty weight: 2,880 lb (1,306 kg)
Loaded weight: 4,100 lb (1,859.7 kg)
Powerplant: 1 × Pratt and WhitneyR-1535-72 9-cylinder radial engine, 700 hp (521.9 kW)
Performance
Maximum speed: 261 mph at 13100 ft (420 km/h (261 mph) at 4,000 m)
Range: 985 mi (1,585 km)
Service ceiling: 32,000 ft (estimated) (9,906 m)
Rate of climb: 3,500 ft/min at sea level (1,066.8 m m/min at sea level)
Armament
2×0.50 mm machine guns
2X 116 lb (kg ) of bombs under wings
which was higher faster and longer then the other Biplanes of the same period unfortunatly Biplanes were passe
The Gregor FDB-1 was a Canadian biplane fighter, designed in 1938 by Michael Gregor and manufactured by Canadian Car and Foundry. Despite being an advanced and innovative design, incorporating all-metal construction with flush riveting, retractable undercarriage and a sleek shape, the FDB-I was overtaken by events and, after being unable to find a buyer, was lost in a fire in 1945
Crew: 1
Length: 21 ft 8 in (6.604 m)
Wingspan: 51 ft (16 m) (15.798 8 m)
Height: 6 ft (2 m) (2.86 m (9 ft 5 in))
Empty weight: 2,880 lb (1,306 kg)
Loaded weight: 4,100 lb (1,859.7 kg)
Powerplant: 1 × Pratt and WhitneyR-1535-72 9-cylinder radial engine, 700 hp (521.9 kW)
Performance
Maximum speed: 261 mph at 13100 ft (420 km/h (261 mph) at 4,000 m)
Range: 985 mi (1,585 km)
Service ceiling: 32,000 ft (estimated) (9,906 m)
Rate of climb: 3,500 ft/min at sea level (1,066.8 m m/min at sea level)
Armament
2×0.50 mm machine guns
2X 116 lb (kg ) of bombs under wings
which was higher faster and longer then the other Biplanes of the same period unfortunatly Biplanes were passe
michaelmaltby
Colonel
oldcrowcv63
Tech Sergeant
Seems very competitive with the contemporary Grumman F3F-3 with some resemblance as well:
General characteristics
Crew: 1 pilot
Length: 23 ft 2 in (7.06 m)
Wingspan: 32 ft 0 in (9.75 m)
Height: 9 ft 4 in (2.84 m)
Wing area: 260 ft² (24.15 m²)
Empty weight: 3,285 lb (1,490 kg)
Max. takeoff weight: 4,795 lb (2,175 kg)
Powerplant: 1 × Wright R-1820-22 "Cyclone" 9-cylinder radial engine, 950 hp (710 kW)
Performance
Maximum speed: 264 mph (229 kn, 425 km/h) at 15,250 ft (4,658 m)
Cruise speed: 150 mph (130 kn, 240 km/h)
Range: 980 mi (850 nmi, 1,600 km)
Service ceiling: 33,200 ft (10,120 m)
Rate of climb: 2,800 ft/min (14 m/s) at sea level
Guns:
1× 0.30 in (7.62 mm) M1919 machine gun, 500 rounds (left)
1× 0.50 in (12.7 mm) M2 machine gun, 200 rounds (right)
Bombs: 2× 116 lb (52.6 kg) Mk IV bombs, one under each wing
General characteristics
Crew: 1 pilot
Length: 23 ft 2 in (7.06 m)
Wingspan: 32 ft 0 in (9.75 m)
Height: 9 ft 4 in (2.84 m)
Wing area: 260 ft² (24.15 m²)
Empty weight: 3,285 lb (1,490 kg)
Max. takeoff weight: 4,795 lb (2,175 kg)
Powerplant: 1 × Wright R-1820-22 "Cyclone" 9-cylinder radial engine, 950 hp (710 kW)
Performance
Maximum speed: 264 mph (229 kn, 425 km/h) at 15,250 ft (4,658 m)
Cruise speed: 150 mph (130 kn, 240 km/h)
Range: 980 mi (850 nmi, 1,600 km)
Service ceiling: 33,200 ft (10,120 m)
Rate of climb: 2,800 ft/min (14 m/s) at sea level
Guns:
1× 0.30 in (7.62 mm) M1919 machine gun, 500 rounds (left)
1× 0.50 in (12.7 mm) M2 machine gun, 200 rounds (right)
Bombs: 2× 116 lb (52.6 kg) Mk IV bombs, one under each wing
Last edited:
Well I'll go for the Gloster F.5/34 for the Australians instead of the Wirraway - gives them a more capable aircraft which could be adapted to carry bombs, and no need to go for the Boomerrang. And instead of the Beaufort, the can also have the Bristol P.13/36 - bigger bomb load, and longer range.Moreover due to problems with the Hercules - not given enough power - the Aussie version uses 1600 hp Wright D/R Cyclone engines.
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- #69
yulzari
Tech Sergeant
Perhaps we could return to the original question. The key thing is what was actually available in 1937? Not B25, B26 Beaufort, Beaufighter or any CAC proposal. Canada had the ability to make engines, Australia did not unless resources were spent on creating from scratch and they would be far more expensive than making some more of the same in the UK and exporting them. The starting point has to be 1. the purpose and 2 what engines can be made. After that you can look at the aircraft. Best US fighter on offer is P36, once you have paid out for the rolling machines and arranging the steel strip to suit the Hurricane is easiest to build (as shown by the licence built ones). For bombers x2 of the same engines as the fighters. Again (sorry Australians) Canada has the means to do the more complex parts like powered turrets and both could settle on guns more powerful that the .303" the UK was committed to by industrial inertia. This is a more difficult decision than the fighters and I suggest that Australia should have looked to a smaller, lighter type the the Canadians. So we would be looking for a twin engined light bomber/torpedo for Australian production and a twin engined heavy bomber for the Canadians with the range to command the western North Atlantic and the Pacific coastline.
My own choice would be Merlins in both cases and Hurricanes for both fighters but the Merlin engined bombers are more difficult to choose. What would people choose for these? Remember you are choosing in 1937 and need to work in Imperial units (or American ones as they are now called) and for governments who don't want to spend money on defence as they expect UK or US to support them if attacked.
My own choice would be Merlins in both cases and Hurricanes for both fighters but the Merlin engined bombers are more difficult to choose. What would people choose for these? Remember you are choosing in 1937 and need to work in Imperial units (or American ones as they are now called) and for governments who don't want to spend money on defence as they expect UK or US to support them if attacked.
Shortround6
Major General
Australia did OK with making the Wasp under license and that lead to the Twin Wasp. Any other engine path offers may more difficulties. The sleeve valve engines are out. Merlin may require more ability than the Australians have in 1937/38 even though it has more potential.
A twin engine medium bomber may do OK for a good part of the war but a twin engine heavy is a waste of time for the Australians in 1937-41. The only British designs are the Whitley and the Wellington. With just 2400hp on tap from two engines any heavy bomber is going to be a sitting duck for ANY Japanese fighter in daylight and No twin engine bomber flying from Australian bases is going to find any worthwhile Japanese targets by night. If the RAAf can't find large German cities at night the RAAF isn't going to find small coastal bases, jungle airstrips or anchorages for small groups of ships.
A twin engine medium bomber may do OK for a good part of the war but a twin engine heavy is a waste of time for the Australians in 1937-41. The only British designs are the Whitley and the Wellington. With just 2400hp on tap from two engines any heavy bomber is going to be a sitting duck for ANY Japanese fighter in daylight and No twin engine bomber flying from Australian bases is going to find any worthwhile Japanese targets by night. If the RAAf can't find large German cities at night the RAAF isn't going to find small coastal bases, jungle airstrips or anchorages for small groups of ships.
yulzari
Tech Sergeant
If one considers Canadian and Australian Merlin production as a sort of remote shadow factory then the Merlin is quite feasible for both (ie don't be clever, just make it like the existing ones).
I agree accurate night attacks are beyond either side at the time but again I have to return to the alternatives available at the time, not what we might have preferred to be available.
For the Canadian option the Whitley would be my choice. A reasonable range to cover Canadian shores, a good bomb load and useful for Canadian use in Europe. Wellington has too weirdly specialised a construction system and only remained in production into 1945 as Vickers could make bugger all else without razing the factories to the ground and beginning again.
For the Australians a smaller faster torpedo and bomb armed airframe is necessary for daylight attacks on shipping and ground targets. Now we know how vulnerable such aircraft can be without fighter cover but this was not so obvious in the given time frame. A Merlin Beaufighter would be nice but is it available in this timescale? I am tempted by the Gloster 'Reaper'. For those unconvinced of the desireability of Merlins for Australia perhaps a Twin Wasp Gloster as a torpedo and light bomber? A Merlin Gloster would be an impressive beast if Australians can live with a limited bomb load. If the Australians went to Twin Wasp engines we are looking to some sort of Twin Wasp Hurricane (although the Swedish FVSS J22 shows what could be done with a Twin Wasp fighter but again out of our period.) If it doesn't exist in 1937 you can't have it to make in 1938/39. As a possibility at least the Hampden was designed to act as a torpedo bomber.
I agree accurate night attacks are beyond either side at the time but again I have to return to the alternatives available at the time, not what we might have preferred to be available.
For the Canadian option the Whitley would be my choice. A reasonable range to cover Canadian shores, a good bomb load and useful for Canadian use in Europe. Wellington has too weirdly specialised a construction system and only remained in production into 1945 as Vickers could make bugger all else without razing the factories to the ground and beginning again.
For the Australians a smaller faster torpedo and bomb armed airframe is necessary for daylight attacks on shipping and ground targets. Now we know how vulnerable such aircraft can be without fighter cover but this was not so obvious in the given time frame. A Merlin Beaufighter would be nice but is it available in this timescale? I am tempted by the Gloster 'Reaper'. For those unconvinced of the desireability of Merlins for Australia perhaps a Twin Wasp Gloster as a torpedo and light bomber? A Merlin Gloster would be an impressive beast if Australians can live with a limited bomb load. If the Australians went to Twin Wasp engines we are looking to some sort of Twin Wasp Hurricane (although the Swedish FVSS J22 shows what could be done with a Twin Wasp fighter but again out of our period.) If it doesn't exist in 1937 you can't have it to make in 1938/39. As a possibility at least the Hampden was designed to act as a torpedo bomber.
Shortround6
Major General
The Merlin was built in Australia later, the problem is building them in 1937-41. There are hundreds of little pieces that go into an aircraft engine that the main plant does not make, like bolts, nuts, fittings, studs and in some cases even valves and valve springs and such are supplied by outside companies. It is a lot easier to manufacture a 2nd or third type of aircraft engine when some of the suppliers have gotten some experience with one or two contracts already.
Aircraft engine bolts are not usually the same as car engine bolts. Different torque specifications, different allowable stretch, different quality control and so on.
Once you figure out how to make sodium cooled valves for one engine making them for the 2nd and 3rd engine gets easier.
Even bearings were often contracted out to specialty bearing manufacturers.
It is not a question of being clever and making something the home factory was not. It is a question of being able to find the needed hundreds of subcontractors that the home home factory took for granted, or taking several years to build up the needed subcontractor network.
Aircraft engine bolts are not usually the same as car engine bolts. Different torque specifications, different allowable stretch, different quality control and so on.
Once you figure out how to make sodium cooled valves for one engine making them for the 2nd and 3rd engine gets easier.
Even bearings were often contracted out to specialty bearing manufacturers.
It is not a question of being clever and making something the home factory was not. It is a question of being able to find the needed hundreds of subcontractors that the home home factory took for granted, or taking several years to build up the needed subcontractor network.
parsifal
Colonel
The problem for australia with regard to engine technology was that we were denied all access to any british enegine tech from the beginning of the war until well into 1943. the British adopted an incredibly short sighted approach, particularly after the fall of france. This included any completed engines, any technical drawings and jigs or dies. Canada was slightly better off than us, because they had some existing licences and production capability which the British govt could hardly revoke or do anything about, but for Australia it meant many of our prewar or early war projects, like the CA-4 were still borne. We had no access to any engine tecnology with anything like adequate HP until September 1941, and then only 1200HP of the twin Wasp. We did not produce Merlins until 1944, and never produced Griffins, though they were planned and allowed for (to the extent of tooling up) for 1945.
Australia did not have the technical skills to design their own engines, and was denied accews to modern technology for the critical early years of the war. It was to Wacketts credit that he was able to recover from this setback as quickly as he did. The decision to produce the twin wasp was made in June 1940, the first engines were delivered in September 1941.....thats pretty efficient by any standard
If the British had not been so one eyed about their engine techs, Australia mobilzation in the sero industry would have been 1.5-2 years ahead of what it was. We would have gone to war (in the Pacific) with about 1500 a/c instead of the 425 that we had. Malaya would have been defended by CA-12 instead of Buffaloes, and Beauforts instead of Hudsons and Blenheims. We would have had a number of CA-4 squadrons, and probably a re-worked Light Bomber version of the Wirraway (though thats just opinion)
Unit costs for Australian produced aircraft were not, as far as I can tell any more expensive than the foreign products being imported at that time. imprts under wartime conditions, when they were available, were made more expensive due to the worldwide shortages in shipping. anything domestically produced had that advantage in its favour, which was considerable. Our problem wasnt unit costs, it was that outputs were insufficient and engine outputs in particular were too limited to keep up with demand. In 1945, Australia had the 4th biggest air force in the world.....bigger by some hundreds over the RCAF and nearly a 1000 more than the LW. Domestic production only accounted for a fraction of that strength, however. We relied far too heavily on sometimes difficult to get imports, and often types that foreign air forces had tried and found unsatisfactory....
Australia did not have the technical skills to design their own engines, and was denied accews to modern technology for the critical early years of the war. It was to Wacketts credit that he was able to recover from this setback as quickly as he did. The decision to produce the twin wasp was made in June 1940, the first engines were delivered in September 1941.....thats pretty efficient by any standard
If the British had not been so one eyed about their engine techs, Australia mobilzation in the sero industry would have been 1.5-2 years ahead of what it was. We would have gone to war (in the Pacific) with about 1500 a/c instead of the 425 that we had. Malaya would have been defended by CA-12 instead of Buffaloes, and Beauforts instead of Hudsons and Blenheims. We would have had a number of CA-4 squadrons, and probably a re-worked Light Bomber version of the Wirraway (though thats just opinion)
Unit costs for Australian produced aircraft were not, as far as I can tell any more expensive than the foreign products being imported at that time. imprts under wartime conditions, when they were available, were made more expensive due to the worldwide shortages in shipping. anything domestically produced had that advantage in its favour, which was considerable. Our problem wasnt unit costs, it was that outputs were insufficient and engine outputs in particular were too limited to keep up with demand. In 1945, Australia had the 4th biggest air force in the world.....bigger by some hundreds over the RCAF and nearly a 1000 more than the LW. Domestic production only accounted for a fraction of that strength, however. We relied far too heavily on sometimes difficult to get imports, and often types that foreign air forces had tried and found unsatisfactory....
Regarding your thoughts on British twin engined bombers, Shortround; I agree. The RNZAF actually ordered 30 Wellingtons that were being readied for ferrying back to NZ when the war broke out. What use they would have been in NZ is debateable. They remained in the UK and became the basis of 75 (New Zealand) Sqn, RAF. The first 'modern' a/c that both Australia and NZ received were Lockheed Hudsons.
Parsifal, I'm curious as to why it's Britain's fault that Australia did not build engines sooner because of the embargo, as you put it. I find it a bit of a cop out that Australians blame the British for their lack of technical progress, after all, the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation was formed in 1936 and the first Wirraway flew in March 1939, so how did an embargo by the British from the beginning of the war stifle Australia's growth? That had already begun by then. Starting with the NA-16 powered by the P&W R-1340 was a pretty good first step for a fledgling Australian aviation industry. I'm aware there was pressure to 'Buy British', but Wackett got around it - as is plainly evident - before the war started.
Parsifal, I'm curious as to why it's Britain's fault that Australia did not build engines sooner because of the embargo, as you put it. I find it a bit of a cop out that Australians blame the British for their lack of technical progress, after all, the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation was formed in 1936 and the first Wirraway flew in March 1939, so how did an embargo by the British from the beginning of the war stifle Australia's growth? That had already begun by then. Starting with the NA-16 powered by the P&W R-1340 was a pretty good first step for a fledgling Australian aviation industry. I'm aware there was pressure to 'Buy British', but Wackett got around it - as is plainly evident - before the war started.
parsifal
Colonel
.
Australias progress in its aeronautical industru was actually fairly impressive. We had progressed a long way in the period 1915-35. 1915 was the first year that stell was produced in commericial quantities. the first aluminium smelters were not put into place until either 1939 or 1940. Our industry was progreessing pretty rapidly, but overwhelmingly the biggest limit was investment. then, as now Australia was very heavily dependant on foreign finance for growth. There was some government money, but much of this foreign investment came from foreign companies investing in local companies to a greater or lesser extent. And whilst british money continued to dominate in the traditional areas....railways, roads, bridges and the like, money for new technology based industries, like automotive and aer industries, came more from the US. What automotive industry that was developed (mostly franchises to sell cars, but some local manufacturing content) came from US companies like Ford and GM.
When it came to setting up an aeronautical industry, both the private sector and Government, preferred the British industry to American. the best engines, the best designs, were both considered to be from England. I dont know how true that was as a fact, but the perception was there. So much effort was expended prewar trying to entice companies like Hawker, Gloster, and De Havilland to set up component manufacture in this country. I think through a mix of distance and lack of depth in the British industry, all this courting and fancy footwork was never going to work. The British did not want to let the Americans in on what they saw as their turf, but neither did they have the means, or the real motivation, to do so themselves. There was an exception (isnt there always)....Dehavilland were prepared to make the investment, grant the production licences, and provide the specialist technicians to set up the local industry in a way that none of the other British companies were prepred to do.
Despite the lack of tangible progress with the British companies investing in Australia, ther were pleanty of promises given. Thats why wackett expected that once war broke out, the Brits would be clamouring to set u0p factories in Australia similar to the way they had done in Canada. I can only imagine his bitter disappointment when, in 1939, a total embargo on such investment and export of technology was imposed by the british Government. All the promises, all the designs waiting for engines were stifled in one blow. It must have seem by some as a betrayal no less devastating than that which occurred two years later with the fall of Singapore, and the failure of the British to drop everything in the med(particulalry) and come running....the fact that such a move was harmful to the overall war effeort, and totally out of touch with reality is bedide the point, it was a promise given, one held very deeply by Australians, and not honoured. For those in the fledgling Australian aer industry, the "betrayal" by ther British in 1939-40 was 9in my opinion) no less devastating.
Australia was able to find ways to get around this otherwise mortal blow, but it was never plannied that way. Single wasps were being produced to fit into the NA-16 (the Wirraway) being built here. The NA-16 had been adopted because the Brits had been so slow, and so relauctant to set up a line to produce one of their own....
That whole periood....1938-42 was a time of radical realignment for Australia. Australia didnt just wake up Feb 16 1942 and decide it was time to throw their lot in with the Americans and ditch the Brits on that day. The split with the brits had been coming for some time and a small part of that schism was the failures by the British to lend proper assistance in a timely manner, but worse, to make promises that they would, and not really have any intention of honouring them. It was a tawdry episode in British relations I can tell you.
Parsifal, interesting information and since I'm not Australian, I can perhaps look at this delicate situation with more objectivity that yourself. I find it quite incredible that Aussies claim they were deserted by Britain and to this day continue to blame Britain for what Aussies consider its failure to protect them in the war. The blaming of the British for Australia's lack of technical development is extraordinarily self centred and narrow minded, driven by a not so cordial relationship between Britain's and Australia's Prime Ministers.
Lets look at the facts. Firstly and foremost, from September 1939 Great Britain was at war. The lack of supply of industry to Australia can easily - and should be under the circumstances, despite promises to the contrary - be forgiven, because as we know, the perception from mid 1940 in Britain and elsewhere was that Germany was going to invade and the war was going to be lost. A bit much for Australia to expect the creation of an industry from scratch by Britain under the circumstances.
To add to this, Britain was supplying Australia with aircraft and the development of an aviation industry throught 1939, 1940 and 1941 and had been in favour of such an undertaking since a few years before the war. The decision to buy the Beaufort for the RAAF took place in August 1938, after which an order for 180 Beauforts in July 1939 that were to be divided equally between the RAF and RAAF. The reason for the length of time between commitment and the first Beaufort flying in Australia (August 1941)might be construed as a lack of effort by Britain, but is better explained by the fact that Australia was undertaking production of a modern combat aircraft out of nothing. A vast undertaking.
Lets also add to that by stating that by the outbreak of war Britain had begun supplying the first of over 1,000 Avro Ansons to Australia; the bulk of these between 1940 and 1943 to bolster the Empire Air Training Scheme. Whilst the Anson was not a particularly modern type, 1,000 of them is a lot of metal (and fabric) that Britain could have invested in its own interests. Not only that, but the Fairey Battle was being assembled (but not produced) in Australia; the first of 350 (again, a lot of metal) completed in mid 1940. Furthermore, Short Sunderlands that never reached Australia because of the outbreak of war had been ordered and squadrons established to operate them in Aussie.
To add to this, we can also include mass production of the Tiger Moth by DHA after the outbreak of war in support of the EATS; the proposition that DHA could have built anything more sophisticated than the D.H.84 Dragon at that time is ludicrous, however. What we can add is that interest in Australia building the Mosquito was shared by both countries as early as September 1941.
The other type under consideration at the time for manufacture in Australia was the Beaufighter, interest in the type by the RAAF came about in June 1939 when 18 were ordered. Obviously production did not happen for a few years, but the Beaufighter was very much under consideration to suplement and replace the Beaufort in Australia. In fact, Britain supplied Beaufighters to Australia in October 1942 before it had sent any to the RAF in the Far East. This was, of course before the first Aussie Beau had been built.
Perhaps the British might have been keen to place an embargo on Australia out of spite for ordering Lockheed Hudsons in November 1938, which the British were opposed to and for Wackett putting an American type into production, but clearly, this was not the case.
Your claims about the Med and the Fall of Singapore are also not well considered. The Mediterranean was vital to Britain's interests and it was of utmost importance to eject the Germans and Italians from North Africa, without control of the Med would have been a whole lot harder.
As for Singapore, in hindsight there's nothing that Britain could have done to bring about a different outcome. A handful of aircraft built in Australia was not going to make a lick of difference. By mid 1941 Britain was on the backfoot on almost every front of the war. Her cities were being bombed, not least disrupting industry, merchant shipping, Britain's lifeline to the outside world was being severely mauled by the German U-boats, the British army was retreating in North Africa and was rebuilding after Dunkirk, the RAF was committed building for an enormous strategic bombing campaign and rebuilding after the Battle of Britain and the Royal Navy suffered high losses in the Med and the Atlantic. Then Japan invades Singapore to top off a pretty lousy year all round.
Exactly how Australia expected Britain to come to the rescue is a bit of a mystery, but what I don't understand is why Australia did not turn to the United States sooner. Although aircraft had been ordered, why was so much expectation put on Britain when clearly the USA was in a better position to re arm Australia? New Zealand Prime Minister Peter Fraser chose to align his country militarily to the USA prior to Japan's entry into the war, necessary because New Zealand was probably more vulnerable to invasion than Australia. Although the Japanese could have invaded Aussie in the north, let's face it, they would have died of thirst and starvation before they got anywhere near Brisbane.
Parsifal, don't take this rebuttal personally; I find your posts in general informative and interesting, even if I don't always agree with them. I have always considered this attitude by Australia as suspect and unrealistic.
Lets look at the facts. Firstly and foremost, from September 1939 Great Britain was at war. The lack of supply of industry to Australia can easily - and should be under the circumstances, despite promises to the contrary - be forgiven, because as we know, the perception from mid 1940 in Britain and elsewhere was that Germany was going to invade and the war was going to be lost. A bit much for Australia to expect the creation of an industry from scratch by Britain under the circumstances.
To add to this, Britain was supplying Australia with aircraft and the development of an aviation industry throught 1939, 1940 and 1941 and had been in favour of such an undertaking since a few years before the war. The decision to buy the Beaufort for the RAAF took place in August 1938, after which an order for 180 Beauforts in July 1939 that were to be divided equally between the RAF and RAAF. The reason for the length of time between commitment and the first Beaufort flying in Australia (August 1941)might be construed as a lack of effort by Britain, but is better explained by the fact that Australia was undertaking production of a modern combat aircraft out of nothing. A vast undertaking.
Lets also add to that by stating that by the outbreak of war Britain had begun supplying the first of over 1,000 Avro Ansons to Australia; the bulk of these between 1940 and 1943 to bolster the Empire Air Training Scheme. Whilst the Anson was not a particularly modern type, 1,000 of them is a lot of metal (and fabric) that Britain could have invested in its own interests. Not only that, but the Fairey Battle was being assembled (but not produced) in Australia; the first of 350 (again, a lot of metal) completed in mid 1940. Furthermore, Short Sunderlands that never reached Australia because of the outbreak of war had been ordered and squadrons established to operate them in Aussie.
To add to this, we can also include mass production of the Tiger Moth by DHA after the outbreak of war in support of the EATS; the proposition that DHA could have built anything more sophisticated than the D.H.84 Dragon at that time is ludicrous, however. What we can add is that interest in Australia building the Mosquito was shared by both countries as early as September 1941.
The other type under consideration at the time for manufacture in Australia was the Beaufighter, interest in the type by the RAAF came about in June 1939 when 18 were ordered. Obviously production did not happen for a few years, but the Beaufighter was very much under consideration to suplement and replace the Beaufort in Australia. In fact, Britain supplied Beaufighters to Australia in October 1942 before it had sent any to the RAF in the Far East. This was, of course before the first Aussie Beau had been built.
Perhaps the British might have been keen to place an embargo on Australia out of spite for ordering Lockheed Hudsons in November 1938, which the British were opposed to and for Wackett putting an American type into production, but clearly, this was not the case.
Your claims about the Med and the Fall of Singapore are also not well considered. The Mediterranean was vital to Britain's interests and it was of utmost importance to eject the Germans and Italians from North Africa, without control of the Med would have been a whole lot harder.
As for Singapore, in hindsight there's nothing that Britain could have done to bring about a different outcome. A handful of aircraft built in Australia was not going to make a lick of difference. By mid 1941 Britain was on the backfoot on almost every front of the war. Her cities were being bombed, not least disrupting industry, merchant shipping, Britain's lifeline to the outside world was being severely mauled by the German U-boats, the British army was retreating in North Africa and was rebuilding after Dunkirk, the RAF was committed building for an enormous strategic bombing campaign and rebuilding after the Battle of Britain and the Royal Navy suffered high losses in the Med and the Atlantic. Then Japan invades Singapore to top off a pretty lousy year all round.
Exactly how Australia expected Britain to come to the rescue is a bit of a mystery, but what I don't understand is why Australia did not turn to the United States sooner. Although aircraft had been ordered, why was so much expectation put on Britain when clearly the USA was in a better position to re arm Australia? New Zealand Prime Minister Peter Fraser chose to align his country militarily to the USA prior to Japan's entry into the war, necessary because New Zealand was probably more vulnerable to invasion than Australia. Although the Japanese could have invaded Aussie in the north, let's face it, they would have died of thirst and starvation before they got anywhere near Brisbane.
Parsifal, don't take this rebuttal personally; I find your posts in general informative and interesting, even if I don't always agree with them. I have always considered this attitude by Australia as suspect and unrealistic.
parsifal
Colonel
Part I of II
Its not so much that the British failed the Australians in their hour of need. More, it was that Australians made plans to prepre for their own defence in 1939, were asked in a number of ways to lend assistance to the british in their 9the British) hour of need, in excahnge for promises about Imperial defence. The australians accepted those promises at face value, and we "foregoed" our defence plans in exchamge for those promises. the promises given were wide ranging, but included this more relevant stuff bout aircraft numbers, and that was supposed to come, in part, from domestic production. Domesitic production was supposed to be facilitated by the setting up of local production (principally engine manufacture) by the British in Australia. in the finish, the british failed to honour most of the promises they gave, whilst still accepting the help we had offered (and largely gave) in that period 1942. australias displaeasure and eventual abdonment of the british in favour of the US was more than just a dislike at Prime Ministerial level. It ran very deep was part of the national mood in 1941 and led directly to the defeat of Menzies who was seen to be far too much of an Anglophile.
Half true, but half wrong as well. In the lead up to war, Australia drew up defence plans that relied very little on british support. Or at least far less than they actually did. For example, in 1939, the Australians drew plans to train and equip an air force with over 60 squadrons (ie about 1500 a/c) to defend the literal teritories of Australia. Our plans in 1939 were far different to those of 1914. We changed those plans at the requst of the british. They wanted a far greater committment of manpower and trained aircrew than we were prepred to give in our initial planning. In exchange they offered to come to ours (and the regions) defence if the Japanese got aggressive.they also agreed to certain manning levels in the far east, that in particular meant certain aircraft deployments, raised from local production. They never honoured that, worse, there is strong evidence that they deliberately misled the Australians to get what they wanted without paying for it.
This is all evidence of a maturing relationship with the British, and the Americans and the Australians, not a souring one. In 1938 Australians still hung onto the coat tails of the british. The Brits responded by giving the Australians a good kick in the guts (not becuse they wanted to, but because they had to). We eventually responded by realigning ourselves to the people who had not lied to us and who had the resources to help us defend ourselves
And you dont think our concerns about Japanese invasion were any less real. We did not lie to the british, but they lied to us. If they had been honest, Australia would have made arrangements far earlier than they did with the Americans. Deliberatly lying to your allies is not theway you should treat your friends, especially when each nation is facing dire threats to their very survival. And in the end, British duplicity did not help their own situation, it made it worse. Our continued belief in their promises, long after we should have realized what was really happening cost us about 1500 much needed aircraft, and about 4 divisions of experienced troops and about 20-40000 aircrew (a guesstimate).
These are the facts from the Australian perspective
Ah kind of true, but not at a government level. most of the initiative for the Beafort contract came from the company itself. Very little help came from the british government itself. In fact the British Government acted more like a drag chute on the whole project. The Australians were always aware that engines for these aircraft would be needed. Approaches were made to P&W from 1938 to build the double Wasp 9or similar) but the British repeatedly stepped in to thwart those negotiations. They promised from that time until 1940 to provide locally manufactured engines to power the beaforts. That greatly slowed the realization of the Beafort program. We could have had completed aircraft coming off the lines from late 39 or 1940. Instead, we had to wait until the British finalised their embargo to find alternative sources of engines, delaying first delivery by more than 18 months, and killing off a number of critical project at the same time, like the CA4. Far from assisting the Australians, the british government, despite its promises appears to have done all that it could to stifle the young industry.
There were undoubted local beneifits arising from EATS, but the majority of benefit (about 80%) went straight back to the home country in the form of "exported" air crew, or local aircrew that ended up serving in Europe anyway. Relatively litle of EATS found its way assisting the Australians in their fight for survival in the Pacific.
I disagree. Australia had designed an built a superior training a/c to all these prewar, the Wackett trainer, plus we had modified and were building the Wirraway, which had nothing to do with british aer industry.
Its not so much that the British failed the Australians in their hour of need. More, it was that Australians made plans to prepre for their own defence in 1939, were asked in a number of ways to lend assistance to the british in their 9the British) hour of need, in excahnge for promises about Imperial defence. The australians accepted those promises at face value, and we "foregoed" our defence plans in exchamge for those promises. the promises given were wide ranging, but included this more relevant stuff bout aircraft numbers, and that was supposed to come, in part, from domestic production. Domesitic production was supposed to be facilitated by the setting up of local production (principally engine manufacture) by the British in Australia. in the finish, the british failed to honour most of the promises they gave, whilst still accepting the help we had offered (and largely gave) in that period 1942. australias displaeasure and eventual abdonment of the british in favour of the US was more than just a dislike at Prime Ministerial level. It ran very deep was part of the national mood in 1941 and led directly to the defeat of Menzies who was seen to be far too much of an Anglophile.
Half true, but half wrong as well. In the lead up to war, Australia drew up defence plans that relied very little on british support. Or at least far less than they actually did. For example, in 1939, the Australians drew plans to train and equip an air force with over 60 squadrons (ie about 1500 a/c) to defend the literal teritories of Australia. Our plans in 1939 were far different to those of 1914. We changed those plans at the requst of the british. They wanted a far greater committment of manpower and trained aircrew than we were prepred to give in our initial planning. In exchange they offered to come to ours (and the regions) defence if the Japanese got aggressive.they also agreed to certain manning levels in the far east, that in particular meant certain aircraft deployments, raised from local production. They never honoured that, worse, there is strong evidence that they deliberately misled the Australians to get what they wanted without paying for it.
This is all evidence of a maturing relationship with the British, and the Americans and the Australians, not a souring one. In 1938 Australians still hung onto the coat tails of the british. The Brits responded by giving the Australians a good kick in the guts (not becuse they wanted to, but because they had to). We eventually responded by realigning ourselves to the people who had not lied to us and who had the resources to help us defend ourselves
.
And you dont think our concerns about Japanese invasion were any less real. We did not lie to the british, but they lied to us. If they had been honest, Australia would have made arrangements far earlier than they did with the Americans. Deliberatly lying to your allies is not theway you should treat your friends, especially when each nation is facing dire threats to their very survival. And in the end, British duplicity did not help their own situation, it made it worse. Our continued belief in their promises, long after we should have realized what was really happening cost us about 1500 much needed aircraft, and about 4 divisions of experienced troops and about 20-40000 aircrew (a guesstimate).
These are the facts from the Australian perspective
Ah kind of true, but not at a government level. most of the initiative for the Beafort contract came from the company itself. Very little help came from the british government itself. In fact the British Government acted more like a drag chute on the whole project. The Australians were always aware that engines for these aircraft would be needed. Approaches were made to P&W from 1938 to build the double Wasp 9or similar) but the British repeatedly stepped in to thwart those negotiations. They promised from that time until 1940 to provide locally manufactured engines to power the beaforts. That greatly slowed the realization of the Beafort program. We could have had completed aircraft coming off the lines from late 39 or 1940. Instead, we had to wait until the British finalised their embargo to find alternative sources of engines, delaying first delivery by more than 18 months, and killing off a number of critical project at the same time, like the CA4. Far from assisting the Australians, the british government, despite its promises appears to have done all that it could to stifle the young industry.
There were undoubted local beneifits arising from EATS, but the majority of benefit (about 80%) went straight back to the home country in the form of "exported" air crew, or local aircrew that ended up serving in Europe anyway. Relatively litle of EATS found its way assisting the Australians in their fight for survival in the Pacific.
I disagree. Australia had designed an built a superior training a/c to all these prewar, the Wackett trainer, plus we had modified and were building the Wirraway, which had nothing to do with british aer industry.
parsifal
Colonel
Part II of II
All true, but missing is the reason it was delayed "for a few year". Originally it had been intended to produce the Beafighter, from locally produced Hercules engines (it might have been Taurus, I would have to look it up). When the British slapped on their embargo, this project, like all the others affected by British duplicitious promised were still borne. Beaufighters were not produced locally until 1944, and I dont think any were locally engined
I see this as an attempt to mend a bridge that was already broken. by then, Curtin had already changed allegiances and the british realized just how much damage they had caused to the relationship.
I think your reasoning is correct, but it is not clear that it was "clearly not the case". The British I believe intended to "eventually" produce aircraft in Australi, at a time that suited them, not at a time that suited us, or the situation we were facing. The Hudson, PBY and Wirraway deals were all in stark contrast to the way the british were treating us at the time. These three aircraft were all delivered ahead of shcedule, amnd represented the best the Americans could produce at the time. By comparison, the British assistance packages were either late, inadequate or never arrived at all
Im not saying the promises given were sound from a military point of view. But whilst we asked for such undertakings, it was the british perrogative to either give them, or mot. They were asked this very question AFTER the entry of Italy...."what will you do if the Japanese attack whilst you are at war with italy and Germany?" Their answer was unequivocal, and as it turned out, a complete lie "we will of course abandon the med, abandon North Africa and divert maximum resources to the far east. They did no such thing. They sent an ll considered unbalanced Task Force to be promtly sunk and diverted virtually none of their air reserves to the TO
Disagree. Instead of 180, ther might have been 5 or 600. Instead of inadequate types, like the Blenheim, there would have been types like the CA-12 and CA-4. Instead of relatively inexperienced air crews, we might have had aircrew with two or three years of experience. instead of just 2 Brigades of Australian, we might have had 5 or 6 divisions. Instead of 2 battleships, we might have had 3 battleshipe, 7 cruisers and about 12 DDs ( looking at the cancelled local projects) . That may well have made a difference
I accept all that, but it is still inexcusable for them to lie to us, to the extent of placing our country in exactly the same position as them except that our enemy was the Japanese, not the Germans. friends are not supposed to do that. Evidently the british did not consider the Australian worthy of the term "friends. There were elements of the British Government, beginning with Churchill that viewed us as "colonials" a resource to be exploited, and not worth the trouble of an honest answer.
Because whereas the US was viewed as a strnaager in 1938, friendly, but not family, the British were seen as family ("mother England" etc). You dont expect your own mother to lie to you, or act in a way not in your own best interest
Wackett had wanted to do that from 1938. he had some wins, but the British kept making promises which were believed by Menzies. In hindsight we should have done exactly what you are saying, but the failure of the earlier development of the Australian aircraft industry can be traced to two things....the imatutity of our industry and the government, on the one hand, and on the other, the near malevolent behaviour of the British governmtn in thwarting that development.
Logistically it proved impossible to invade because of the victories at Coral Sea and Midway. Lets assume that Coral Sea and Midway were Japanese overwhelming victories....what stops the Japanese from landing down the eastern seaboard , which is in fact one of the options they considered. nobody in their right mind invades Australia from the North. They do it by controlling the seas and invading where they need to
No need to apologise and we are still friends (I hope. Its an engaging debate. Tell me if you want time out. it aint worth a divorce my friend
All true, but missing is the reason it was delayed "for a few year". Originally it had been intended to produce the Beafighter, from locally produced Hercules engines (it might have been Taurus, I would have to look it up). When the British slapped on their embargo, this project, like all the others affected by British duplicitious promised were still borne. Beaufighters were not produced locally until 1944, and I dont think any were locally engined
I see this as an attempt to mend a bridge that was already broken. by then, Curtin had already changed allegiances and the british realized just how much damage they had caused to the relationship.
I think your reasoning is correct, but it is not clear that it was "clearly not the case". The British I believe intended to "eventually" produce aircraft in Australi, at a time that suited them, not at a time that suited us, or the situation we were facing. The Hudson, PBY and Wirraway deals were all in stark contrast to the way the british were treating us at the time. These three aircraft were all delivered ahead of shcedule, amnd represented the best the Americans could produce at the time. By comparison, the British assistance packages were either late, inadequate or never arrived at all
.
Im not saying the promises given were sound from a military point of view. But whilst we asked for such undertakings, it was the british perrogative to either give them, or mot. They were asked this very question AFTER the entry of Italy...."what will you do if the Japanese attack whilst you are at war with italy and Germany?" Their answer was unequivocal, and as it turned out, a complete lie "we will of course abandon the med, abandon North Africa and divert maximum resources to the far east. They did no such thing. They sent an ll considered unbalanced Task Force to be promtly sunk and diverted virtually none of their air reserves to the TO
Disagree. Instead of 180, ther might have been 5 or 600. Instead of inadequate types, like the Blenheim, there would have been types like the CA-12 and CA-4. Instead of relatively inexperienced air crews, we might have had aircrew with two or three years of experience. instead of just 2 Brigades of Australian, we might have had 5 or 6 divisions. Instead of 2 battleships, we might have had 3 battleshipe, 7 cruisers and about 12 DDs ( looking at the cancelled local projects) . That may well have made a difference
.
I accept all that, but it is still inexcusable for them to lie to us, to the extent of placing our country in exactly the same position as them except that our enemy was the Japanese, not the Germans. friends are not supposed to do that. Evidently the british did not consider the Australian worthy of the term "friends. There were elements of the British Government, beginning with Churchill that viewed us as "colonials" a resource to be exploited, and not worth the trouble of an honest answer.
Because whereas the US was viewed as a strnaager in 1938, friendly, but not family, the British were seen as family ("mother England" etc). You dont expect your own mother to lie to you, or act in a way not in your own best interest
Wackett had wanted to do that from 1938. he had some wins, but the British kept making promises which were believed by Menzies. In hindsight we should have done exactly what you are saying, but the failure of the earlier development of the Australian aircraft industry can be traced to two things....the imatutity of our industry and the government, on the one hand, and on the other, the near malevolent behaviour of the British governmtn in thwarting that development.
Logistically it proved impossible to invade because of the victories at Coral Sea and Midway. Lets assume that Coral Sea and Midway were Japanese overwhelming victories....what stops the Japanese from landing down the eastern seaboard , which is in fact one of the options they considered. nobody in their right mind invades Australia from the North. They do it by controlling the seas and invading where they need to
No need to apologise and we are still friends (I hope. Its an engaging debate. Tell me if you want time out. it aint worth a divorce my friend
yulzari
Tech Sergeant
Parcival, I don't want to get too involved in a matter that strays from the original question, but I do want to point out that, at the time of the entry of Italy into the war, France was Britain's partner. Once the German advance was coped with (as they expected to) France was willing to undertake naval control of the Mediterranean and use it's North African army to cope with Italy in Libya and the Middle East to thus allow Britain to meet any Japanese attack in the Far East and that then included covering India, Burma, Malaya, French Indo-China, supporting the Dutch East Indies, as well as Australia and New Zealand.
By 1941 Britain was without French assistance (touchy subject there) and expected a German invasion. I can tell you to within 2 square metres where my grandfather would have died in the Home Guard if they had invaded in 1941 and he was an ex-RSM who had fought in South Africa and from 1914 to 1918 in France so knew he would die if an invasion came.
To return to the subject, I was wondering if the Martin Maryland might not be suitable for the Australian twin engined Twin Wasp role? Fast and proved capable of attacking it's Italian peers with sucess using the front 4x.7.7mm fixed guns.
By 1941 Britain was without French assistance (touchy subject there) and expected a German invasion. I can tell you to within 2 square metres where my grandfather would have died in the Home Guard if they had invaded in 1941 and he was an ex-RSM who had fought in South Africa and from 1914 to 1918 in France so knew he would die if an invasion came.
To return to the subject, I was wondering if the Martin Maryland might not be suitable for the Australian twin engined Twin Wasp role? Fast and proved capable of attacking it's Italian peers with sucess using the front 4x.7.7mm fixed guns.
