Canada and Australia: what would you build?

[parsifal]

Whilst I have already broadly summarised what happened to the Australians 1939-41, it might be useful to provide a little further detail, to answer the abive question.

In September 1939, Australias initial position was to resist any significant foreign deployments of its armed forces until home production and training allowed for safe deployment of such forces. moreover, such forces as could be spared were to concentrate on the defence of Singapore, with just one division and 3 squadrons of aircraft proposed to be sent to the middle east, to guard the Suez Canal. No troops or aircraft were to be sent to the western front.

Menzies summarised the Australian position to the London High Commissioner, SM Bruce....""until japans position was established, it was imprudent to sending an expeditionary force". Similar conclusions were drawn about the Navy and air force

The British responded to this assessment on the 9 September. They again restated their 1937 committment to sending a strong battlefleet and maximum air and land resources to defend Singapore within 70 days of a Japanese DoW. Amongst their other statements, they reiterated their promise to assist the Australians in setting up their home based war industries. On the basis of that promise, the Australians were asked to increase their committment to the Far East, With regard to aircraft industry, the Australians made some faeful decisions. They deferred development of any locally designed and engined fighter as they had been promised the setting up, and or supply of British supplied aircraft. Out of this came the Buffaloes, that were promptly diverted to Malaya, and not a one to Australia. The Australians continued to make arrangements for Beafort production, in the belief that the required engine assmbly plants would be set up by the middle of 1940 at the latest. They deferred any detailed negotiations with the Americans at that point, all on the basis of the British promise of urgent and substantial reinforcement if the Japanese sirred.

That agreemenht continued until November 1940, when the Imperial Confernece on Imperial Defence took place. That was well after the fall of france, and well after the Australians had begun to get cold feet, because none of the promises about assistance by the British had as yet turned into anything tangible. It was still all one way traffic. We were training 1120 aircrew per month by that stage and retaining just 60 of those for local (including Malayan) defences). The rest were being sent to England and the Middle East.

Australia by the time of that Imperial Conference in late 1940 was thoruoughly alarmed and very disgruntled with the British

Between June and December, the British made further misrepresentations of their true intentions and made further requests on the Australian Government that placed us in even deeper trouble. We had in June indicated that we did not wish to send 4 divisions of toops to the middle East, as this would leave Malaya seriously weakened in our estimation. We wanted to leave one division in Australia, to help train the AMF cadres and deploy the 8th and 7th Divisions to Malaya. It was calculated that by June 1941 we could have a further 2 divisions fuly trained and deployed into Malaya. With regard to air strength, the Australians calculated that if the embargo by the british were lifted, they could have about 580 first line aircraft ready and deployed in Malaya and a further 900 or so in continental Ausrtralia by Septemeber '41.

It was at that conference in Novemeber that the british were asked a direct question. They answered that they would of course drop everything and come to the regions defence if the Jpanese attacked. It proved to be a promise they could not keep, I believe they never intended to honour that committment

The general conclusion of the Australian delegation was that, in the absence of a main fleet in the Far East, the forces and equipment available for the defence of Malaya were totally inadequate to meet a major attack by Japan.

 

[pbfoot]

Perhaps Australia should have stood up to the UK

 

[nuuumannn]

Parsifal, I haven't yet had time to read through your ample response and I'm looking forward to doing so. It's just that I'm a little pressed for time right now.

Perhaps Australia should have stood up to the UK?

I've actually thought the same thing myself and I hinted at it in my post; New Zealand turned to the US for military aid, which upset the Brits considerably. Once a New Zealand delegation was sent to the USA, Peter Fraser and Roosevelt actually became friends, which must have helped relations enormously. Roosevelt's wife even travelled to NZ during the war for some r 'n r and stayed with the Frasers' in Wellington. Mind you, Fraser also got on well with Churchill. If I can remember, John Curtin, the Aussie PM didn't, which explains some of the hostility.

I do realise also that we are straying a little off topic here too!

As for the suggestion of the Maryland, perhaps the A-20 Havoc would have been more suitable; the RAAF used them in any case.

 

[pbfoot]

As for a possible aircraft to build the Catalina would have been a good choice


i

 

[parsifal]

A few things I should say. From a purely self interest standpoint Australia should have been more independant than it was, moreover, from the british perspective, indeed from a general; Allied perspective it made sense not to strip out ther med front, and for Australia to concentrate on the emergency at hand rather than the emergency they most feared but not upon them. all that is conceded. This is not a blaming session, but its understanding why the Australians were not in a good position to undertake a more vigorous domestic production program in 1939 and 1940.

You cant have it both ways. if Australia had opted for a more independant stance, we would have told the british to shove off in 1939 and refused to send the AIF, parts of the navy and 6 squadrons of aircraft (2/3 of our air strength at the time) off to the ME. This would have scr*wed the Brits in the med in a big way in 1940-1, and probably have led to the loss of Suez in April or May 1941, but it also would have meant a much stronger and effective supply of aircraft, a better trained home defence army and probably would have dealt the Japanese a stiff bloody nose in Malaya in 1941-2. The outcome would, in the finish have been the same. I am not that presumptuous to claim the Australians had the ability to produce war winning effects, just that the cause of the war would have been different in that situation

But its unrealistic to expect the Australians would act any different to the way they did. We had only theoretically gained control of our foreign relations in 1931, but that was more theoretical than actual. in relaity, right up to 1942, the British continued to hold great sway over our foreign poliocy, and that included foreign investment. It was just never going to happen for Australia to follow its own consciousness in terms of foreign relations/foreign poliicy in the 1930s. we were not yet a fully independant nation at that point.

 

[Wildcat]

. I find it quite incredible that Aussies claim they were deserted by Britain and to this day continue to blame Britain for what Aussies consider its failure to protect them in the war.

Its understandable (rightly or wrongly) when you think of the forces Britain sent to help defend Australia in 1942, our darkest hour. When our backs were against the wall, RAAF airmen were still being sent to England and the Desert, RAN naval assets still fought in the Med and Indian Ocean and the 9th division still fought at El Alamein. But what in return, three squadrons of Spitfires - two of which were Australian anyway, and in so small numbers that they weren't operational until 1943. As for aircraft deliveries, apart from a handfull of Beaufighters, the vast majority of aircraft supplied in 1942 were training types. You can't wage battle against the Japanese with Ansons, Oxfords, Battles and Tiger Moths - good for training men to serve overseas in the RAF, no good in defending Darwin on Port Moresby.
This is why some have the attitude that we were "let down".

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I wanted to interject the thought that whatever the choices made by Australia and Canada, one can't ignore the influence and presence of the elephant in both their houses.

Seems to me Australia's apparent and actual vulnerablity suffered initially from a horribly disorganized USAAF (Thanks to Big Mac and his yes-man Sutherland). It is my impression (perhaps incorrect due to my profound ignorance of the subject) that the chaotic USAAF situation, aggravating Australia's vulnerability to air attack, existed until the arrival of Kenny, July 28, 1942, and was due in part because maintaining the Australian political status quo was considered at least as important as fighting the Japanese? I have to wonder if there wasn't some local political counter-pressure to Australia's reliance on the leadership of a man who had just lost his entire air force and the PI, and who ultimately abandoned his army to their ultimate fate at the hands of their Japanese conquerers? Surely there was some degree of dissent?

I don't quite understand the rift between Brett, and Curtain Mac but suspect he may have been trying to open a political flank to gain leverage on Mac/Sutherland to gain control of his own AF. Control of which may have been initially (November-December 1941) preempted by Sutherland, using Mac's authority. My admitedly tenuous understanding of these events procedes from Kenney's arrival and confrontation with Sutherland over control of his AF and thereafter becoming a staunch political supporter of Mac. Evidently, Mac burned through General's Brereton and Brett before finding his ultimate air czar in Kenney. It appears fotuitous that Marshall gave Mac only one other choice: Doolittle, a man whose fame ecipsed even that of Mac's. The choice then was obvious.

How many of the large amount of P-40's sent to Oz, intended to reinforce FEAF in the PI, ended up based in Australia, operating from Darwin, Batchelor or Port Moresby? It seems to me USAAF defense of Australia was not considered a priority until after the fall of Java. I don't know how Curtin is actually regarded in Australia but Wikipedia's favorable profile contained the following quote by Big Mac.

General Douglas MacArthur said that Curtin was "one of the greatest of the wartime statesmen".

I have to wonder if his good reputation in Oz is based upon media savvy and theatrics similar to those employed by Mac and were they birds of a feather?

I should add that US histories of the war in 1942 seem to recognize the fall of the PI, the USN's early carrier raids, the defense of Bataan and Coorregidor quickly followed by the Coral Sea and Midway Battles. I have read of a few, minor, land-based air-actions during the early (pre-July 1942) New Guinea Campaign but it appears that the Japanese spent the time after the fall of Java and Rabaul largely reconsituting its strength and consolidating its early gains.

What's the point (Pint?), you might ask? Canada wasn't in the immediate danger that Australia faced. Moreover, Canada's need for an indigenous aviation industry had been met years earlier. It had the best of all worlds: including:

1. A relatively mature aircraft industry including aircraft and engine manufacturing
2. Available natural resources
3. Distant enemies with no immediate invasion threat
4. A 500 pound gorilla living next door who would be deeply offended if anyone else decided to give its neighbor a wedgie
5. A climate so cold no one was interested in invading
6. few sheep.

In the meantime, the Australians had to settle for the intermittent defensive shield provided by the USN while awaiting the real security only an embedded large air force could provide: The national security the US had promised to provide and therefore the Australians had a right to expect. Is it possible the USA overestimated and oversold what security it could provide simply to obtain the contracts for future sales... No, that would be unallylike.

Compared to Canada, the Australian's world appears far from optimum. It found itself with:

1. An aircraft industry in its infancy
2. Available natural resources
3. A nearby enemy who appeared to be ready and fully capable of invading in the forseeable future (regardless of its advisabilty).
4. No large, relatively powerful nearby neighbor to aid in its defense
5. a benign and inviting climate.
6. plenty of sheep?

And dare I say it, these factors were not apparent to its enlightened leadership? I know about this kind of leadership. I live in the USA.

Well 2 out of 6 isn't too bad.

 

[Wildcat]

I should add that US histories of the war in 1942 seem to recognize the fall of the PI, the USN's early carrier raids, the defense of Bataan and Coorregidor quickly followed by the Coral Sea and Midway Battles. I have read of a few, minor, land-based air-actions during the early (pre-July 1942) New Guinea Campaign but it appears that the Japanese spent the time after the fall of Java and Rabaul largely reconsituting its strength and consolidating its early gains.

Hi Oldcrow. 1942 was the crucial year of the war for Australia. The North of the country came under aerial attack many times (Darwin defended by the 49th FG USAAF), a limited submarine offensive was undertaken by the Japanese off the East Coast of Australia, including a midget sub attack on Sydney Harbour. The aerial defence of Port Moresby was initially undertaken by a single RAAF P-40 squadron (the only allied fighter squadron in New Guniea at the time). Australian soldiers were fighting a gruelling campaign over the owen stanley mountains (google Kokoda), later at Milne Bay, Australian soldiers and airmen successfully defeated a Japanese amphibious landing until finally in late '42 Australian and American ground forces went on the offensive at the very costly battles of Buna, Gona and Sanananda.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Hi Oldcrow. 1942 was the crucial year of the war for Australia. The North of the country came under aerial attack many times (Darwin defended by the 49th FG USAAF), a limited submarine offensive was undertaken by the Japanese off the East Coast of Australia, including a midget sub attack on Sydney Harbour. The aerial defence of Port Moresby was initially undertaken by a single RAAF P-40 squadron (the only allied fighter squadron in New Guniea at the time). Australian soldiers were fighting a gruelling campaign over the owen stanley mountains (google Kokoda), later at Milne Bay, Australian soldiers and airmen successfully defeated a Japanese amphibious landing until finally in late '42 Australian and American ground forces went on the offensive at the very costly battles of Buna, Gona and Sanananda.

Thanks Wildcat,

Your reference to the 49th was exactly what I was hoping to see. I actually had a biography of George Preddy I hadn't yet read and it records some of the events you've described. Much of what you listed above was post-July 1942 and that has received somewhat better historical coverage in the states; I am sure because of the proximity and involvement of US forces. However, I believe the activities of he 49th FG are perhaps not quite as well known. Perhaps I misspoke and the USAAF did provide some solid, well organized aerial defensive capability to Northern Australia. I am glad to learn of it, but was shocked to find that Darwin was bombed not once or twice but dozens of times. the following web site described some of Preddy's experience in the 49th FG:

Darwin's Few

This same web site contains the following quote:

"Darwin endured 46 raids during the war with a total of 64 in the top end."

Wikipedia has the following shocking (to me, at least) quote:

"Between February 1942 and November 1943, during the Pacific War, the Australian mainland, domestic airspace, offshore islands and coastal shipping were attacked at least 97 times by aircraft from the Imperial Japanese Navy and Imperial Japanese Army Air Force. These attacks came in various forms; from large-scale raids by medium bombers, to torpedo attacks on ships, and to strafing runs by fighters."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Darwin

I expect some of my bias toward Big Mac was derived from a quote I heard as a pup: "Mac was willing to fight the Japanese to the last Australian."

another late note: I meant bias against Big Mac

 

[nuuumannn]

Hello Parsifal and co. Well, as I expected, a reasonable and well thought out set of answers to my query.

While I understand that Britain made promises and sure, they did not honour them, I still find it hard to accept that the Australians accused them of lying under the circumstances. Two of you hint at the suggestion that Britain might have pulled its forces out of the Med and North Africa to defend Australia. Are you kidding me? I cannot believe that, even if Britain promised it, that it would actually happen - so Britain couldn't live up to its promises; there was a war on. British and Australian troops were involved and if I can recall, Australia declared war on Germany as well. Aussies who committed themselves to the British armed forces could not by contract extract themselves from the war if they wanted to, which I'm sure they wouldn't have wanted to in any rate. As for Aussie units; it's foolhardy to have expected them to do this in the middle of a war zone. To me, your argument of "But what in return" is petty minded tit-for-tat under the circumstances.

As for the threat of Japan, no one was prepared for it. Not the Americans, not the British and considering what happened, its easy to say that Britain should have done more with the considerable benefit of hindsight, but at the time, despite what actions Japan carried out in China, none of the major world powers did more at the time. Your claim that 500 or more Australian built aircraft could have made a difference. Not likely. Not at all, in fact. Firstly, there's no way that even with an embargo not in place Australia could have had such numbers of aircraft available to them from their own manufacture, secondly, if the British were to send aircraft and ships to the Far East, from where were they going to get them? In 1939, the RAF was still partially equipped with obsolete biplanes, the Spit, Hurricane, Blenheim, Battle numbers were barely adequate to cover Britain's own needs, let alone bolster the Far East, similarly with warships.

The simple fact was that nothing any of the powers could have done at that time could have stopped the Japanese invasion of the Far East. Only the United States with its superior numbers of equipment might have (and that's a heavily loaded might, too), there's no way the British could have at all with a war raging in Europe. Not without severely compromising its home forces, which would have left Britain high and dry and would have done no use to Australia at all.

It is unrealistic to expect Britain to have been able to give more assistance to Australia at the time, despite promises to the contrary. Claims of lying serve only to invoke hostility between the two parties and instead of realising the situation was hopeless, in typical Australian style, the Australian government sought to blame the British. I still find this utterly incomprehensible under the circumstances. It certainly did nothing to assist relations between the two nations.

Surely you have to realise that with Britain's declaration of war against Germany in 1939 changed everything (how can you not?!). It was far more important and necessary for Britain to have carried out things the way it did than to denude its home defences to supply a nation that was not at that time directly under threat. Any thoughts to the contrary are just ridiculous, guys. The British did not lie about the supply of aircraft and assistance to Australia; as I have pointed out, a large amount of support was given - sure, it had conditions (why wouldn't the British insist that the Beufort be built for the RAF also? It's a British aircraft!), but it was delayed by war. Australia did receive the supply of aircraft and equipment. Sure it was late as you claim, but I'll say it again; there was a war on and Australia's ability to produce aircraft was truely in its infancy.

Yes, the majority of aircraft the Aussies had were training types, but that was by agreement with the Australian government. Not only that, advanced aircrew training was something that was needed by both parties, not just Britain. (Parsifal, you also misread my stement about De Havilland Australia - you need to re-read what I wrote). When the decision to build the Beaufort in Australia was made, it had only just flown in Britain, so was considered an advanced combat type.

As for the embargo; although I can't verify it, it was probably done to prevent a loss of supply to factories in Britain, sensibly needed in 1940. There was a little thing we now call the Battle of Britain raging. Any thoughts of Britain witholding equipment to delibrately stifle Australia's growth is just ludicrous and unecessarily antagonistic. Getting production lines running in Australia was entirely to the benefit of British armed forces, but with Aussie so far away and merchant shipping being torpedoed on a regular basis meant that such a supply was unreliable, to say the least.

One thing that stands as a criticism of Britain is its 'Buy British' policy, and this alone stands as an argument against what you are claiming as official reluctance to allow Australia to stand on her own two feet. It doesn't make sense that the British would only approve of British types, then deliberately scupper any chances Australia would have of acquiring British equipment. It doesn't add up. This is why I don't believe Britain had much choice in not honouring her promises to Australia. Britain was opposed to the sale of American military aircraft to her colonies, but during wartime there was no other immediate alternative; even Britain herself had to turn to the USA for equipment.

Here is something that Britain was guilty of, not supporting and going to the defence of Czechoslovakia in 1938. The Munich Crisis was a shameful event in history and had Britain gone to the aid of the Czechs against the Nazis, perhaps world events might have been different, but their policy of peace reigned over their foreign policy, at any cost, as it was. To Chamberlian's credit however, it was he who ordered an increase in production of military types and a more 'warlike' stance at the time, so he did something right. It was he who recommended the increase in production of fighters, which led to the building of the Langley plant for Hawker and the decision of Gloster to build Hurricanes and not Wellingtons, as the C-in-C RAF Cyril Newall wanted. The Munich Crisis goes some way to explain British attitudes to defence at the time.

So, once again, I cannot understand that under the circumstances the Australians still blame the British. None of your arguments actually stand up in the light of the events at the time. All they do is serve to cause unnecessary aggravation between allies, which was really not needed. Hindsight is a wonderful thing. Sure, Britain did not live up to all its promises, but to accuse them of blatantly lying is foolhardy and as I said earlier, extremely self serving.

Old Crow, you seem to have summed the situation up quite well here!

What's the point (Pint?), you might ask? Canada wasn't in the immediate danger that Australia faced. Moreover, Canada's need for an indigenous aviation industry had been met years earlier. It had the best of all worlds: including:

1. A relatively mature aircraft industry including aircraft and engine manufacturing
2. Available natural resources
3. Distant enemies with no immediate invasion threat
4. A 500 pound gorilla living next door who would be deeply offended if anyone else decided to give its neighbor a wedgie
5. A climate so cold no one was interested in invading
6. few sheep.

In the meantime, the Australians had to settle for the intermittent defensive shield provided by the USN while awaiting the real security only an embedded large air force could provide: The national security the US had promised to provide and therefore the Australians had a right to expect. Is it possible the USA overestimated and oversold what security it could provide simply to obtain the contracts for future sales... No, that would be unallylike.

Compared to Canada, the Australian's world appears far from optimum. It found itself with:

1. An aircraft industry in its infancy
2. Available natural resources
3. A nearby enemy who appeared to be ready and fully capable of invading in the forseeable future (regardless of its advisabilty).
4. No large, relatively powerful nearby neighbor to aid in its defense
5. a benign and inviting climate.
6. plenty of sheep?

And dare I say it, these factors were not apparent to its enlightened leadership? I know about this kind of leadership. I live in the USA.

Well 2 out of 6 isn't too bad.

Until next time...

 

[pbfoot]

Stolen from Canadian Aviation Historical Society - Preserving Canada's Flying Heritage
The Bell P-39 Airacobra in the RCAF (Updated)
By Jerry Vernon
Quite by chance I stumbled across the article on the CAHS website recently,
about the Bell Airacobra and the RCAF.
During one of my visits to the Directorate of History in 1983, I was given a copy of
a couple of research papers by Dr. Steve Harris on the procurement of fighter
and other aircraft for the RCAF early in the Second World War. Most of this
information was later incorporated in the appropriate places in the 3-volume
official RCAF history, and can be read there in more detail.
The papers are titled "Research Note 7 - Canada, Britain and the Home War
Establishment" and "Research Note 1 - Canada and American Fighters - the P-
39 and the P-40"
Several years later, while I was poking through RCAF Record Cards and RCAF
Accident Cards at DHist, I stumbled by chance upon the accident card for a P-39
that was written off by an RCAF pilot near Rockcliffe, while the RCAF were
evaluating the type.
My Comments on Research Note 7:
In late 1940/early 1941, the Canadian view of the need for the Home War
Establishment (HWE) was the following:
151 Bolingbrokes
?? Stranraers
50+ PBYs(to be built in Canada)
144 Airacobras(to be built in Canada)
200 Martin Marauders(to be built in Canada)
Britain wanted Canada to build heavy bombers, and proposed that Canada get
the P-39s and B-26s from British contracts in the US instead. Later, the B-26s
became Lancasters and the P-39s became P-40s. There was also a proposal to
built the obsolete Short Stirling in Canada, before the plan was switched to
Lancasters. The 160 obsolete Hampdens were built as an "educational
exercise", in order to built up expertise in large all-metal aircraft in the Canadian
aircraft industry.
In order to keep the CanCar plant in operation, C. D. Howe ordered 400
additional Hurricanes and 300 Harvards, with no definite RCAF or RAF need for
the Hurricanes.... they were for foreign sale to Holland, China or whoever. This
posed another problem, to get 400 Rolls Royce or Packard Merlins for the
Hurricanes.
A deal was struck to trade 50 PBYs to the UK for 240 Merlins, and later the UK
agreed to take 200 of the Hurricanes (they are listed in Griffin's book as "Free
Issue"), which were shipped to Russia, India, etc., using older Merlins from UK
stocks. In Sep 42, the RCAF agreed to give up 200 Hurricanes, if replacements
were made available by Mar 43.
In August 1942, the RCAF was looking at a HWE of 35 squadrons, vs. an earlier
view of 49 squadrons, which included five Kittyhawk and/or Mosquito units … at
total of 575 aircraft.
In more recent years, I have found documentation that a later allotment was
made to supply the RCAF with P-51D and P-51K Mustangs in 1945 for the HWE,
but the war wound down and this never happened. Pity!! We later bought
Mustangs in 1947 and 1950.
My comments on Research Note 1:
In 1939, Canada were looking into obtaining Seversky or Curtiss fighters off US
contracts, since the supply of British aircraft did not look promising at that time.
They stopped looking in January 40. After No. 1(F) Sqn. went overseas with its
Hurricanes in mid-1940, we started looking again, this time at the Vultee Model
48 (P-66) Vanguard or at manufacturing the Lockheed P-38 in Canada.
However, the "most available" fighters were the P-39 Airacobra and P-40
Kittyhawk
In November 1940, the USAAC advised Canada that the P-40(modified) would
be superior to the P-39. … however, W/C Larry Dunlap(postwar Chief of Air
Staff) advised that the P-40 was "very poor" compared to the P-39!!! Dunlap was
the RCAF's Director of Armament from 1939 to 1942, and his opinions were
generally accepted. Based on Dunlap's recommendation, Canada decided in
Dec 40 to seek a production agreement to build P-39s in Canada, using
American engines. C. D. Howe opposed this, and preferred to obtain aircraft
transferred off British orders instead.
Also touted about and available in the 1940–41 period were the Vultee P-
48 Vanguard, Vultee A-31 Vengeance, Grumman G-36A Wildcat and G-45A (the
land-based XP-50 version of the twin-engined XF5F Skyrocket).
A total of 144 P-39s were needed. If obtained off British orders, this would be
okay … this was before the RAF decided that the P-39 was a dud. If obtained
after the British and US production orders were completed, as a separate RCAF
order, this would be too late for the RCAF's projected need.
In March 1941, Canada was advised that they could not get P-39s until 1943,
and that they should look at Canadian-built Hurricanes instead. That same
month, Canada asked for 50 Hurricanes and 144 Airacobras, later reduced to
110 Airacobras in April 1941.
In April 1941, it had become apparent that P-39 production was delayed, due to
Allison engine problems, and also it became clear that British and US needs
would use up all production capacity until 1943. However, the RAF did offer 72
of their P-39s to Canada, for delivery before 1943.
Within a few days, it became apparent that the supply of 50 Hurricanes was also
in doubt, and it was suggested that Canada take 50 early model P-40
Tomahawks instead. Canada counter-offered to take 50 more P-39s, which was
what we really wanted.
By June 1941, the total P-39 program was back up to 144, but no Hurricanes.
However, the UK advised that we could have none of these until late 1942, and
should consider taking the P-40 instead.
In August 1941, Canada advised that they would take 72 P-40s, but only if they
could be traded for 72 P-39s later, plus a further 72 P-39s to come later. This
was about the time that the RAF concluded that the P-39 wasn't such a great
performer after all.
In September 1941, the RCAF negotiated to get 12 P-40s per month, starting
immediately. The total number to come would depend on the P-39 situation, and
the Brits did agree to replace P-40s with P-39s as they came available.
In November 1941, RCAF staff advised the Chief of Air Staff that Canada should
take the additional 72 P-40s as well, and not wait for P-39 production to catch
up. If we didn't take them, the US would, and we would get nothing more. At the
time, the decision was deferred, since the RCAF lacked the aircrew and ground
crew to handle them.
By April 1942, the RCAF had taken delivery of all 72 P-40s, and by May 1942, we
had dropped the bid for 144 P-39s and asked for the full 144 to be P-40s
instead. By that time, we had taken delivery of 72 Kittyhawk Mk. I aircraft plus 12
Mk. IA(P-40E-1) aircraft.
That's the end of my summary of my notes on Steve Harris' Research Notes, so
it has been summarized twice!!
Just the digress for a moment, the Kittyhawk Mk. I(Model H87A-2) was not strictly
a P-40E …it was a bit of a hybrid between the 4-gun P-40D(Model H87A-1) and
the 6-gun P-40E (Model H-87A-3). In fact, the first 20 had been delivered with
only 4 wing guns, but the rest had 6 guns when the RAF modified their order to
take advantage of the P-40E improvements. These aircraft were part of an RAF
order for 560 Kittyhawk Mk. I aircraft… they were not Lend Lease (or Lease
Lend, depending on which end of the pipe you were at). The Kittyhawk Mk. IA
was a P-40E-1 and they were Lend Lease aircraft, with both a USAAC s/n and a
RAF s/n. The Mk. I Kittyhawks had only an RAF s/n and were later given RCAF
s/ns when they became part of the HWE. The later Kittyhawk Mk. III and Mk. IV
aircraft were also from Lend Lease orders, and had USAAC, RAF and eventually
RCAF s/ns assigned.
In a way, this looks like a bit of a beancounter's exercise … and it is amazing
how much the beancounters influenced the action on aircraft deliveries, etc. … I
have often wondered if they realized that there was a war going on!!
A total of 144 Airacobras became 72 Kittyhawks, with a promise of 72 more to
come later. Later deliveries, as you have noted, were 15 Kittyhawk Mk. III (P-
40M) and 35 Kittyhawk Mk. IV (P-40N) aircraft, for a total of 134. Thinking like a
beancounter, this is how I have rationalized it … 134 were delivered to the RCAF
+ 9 borrowed from the US in the Aleutians (some of which we destroyed) + the
one P-39 that the RCAF destroyed at Rockcliffe = 144 aircraft, so we got our full
amount!
Caption: Bell Aircraft publicity photograph of RAF AH621.
What about the one RCAF Airacobra?? It was RAF s/n AH621 and it was being
tested at Rockcliffe in 1941. The RCAF Accident Card shows that the aircraft
crashed at 1100 hrs, 26 November 1941, 2 1/2 miles from Rockcliffe. The pilot
was F/L R. B. Middleton of 12 Comm Sqn., slightly injured. The card says that
the aircraft suffered a forced landing in a field, with the undercarriage up,
following "engine failure due to gasoline stoppage". Category A (writeoff)
I have not looked for a Court of Inquiry file on AH621, but there may be one. The
Finding Aid does not indicate that there is a C of I file, but it does indicate a
couple of RCAF correspondence files on the Airacobra, one on Policy and one on
Technical Aspects.
Caption: Bell Airacobra I RAF AH621 (Stan Piet Collection)
Referring directly to statements in the article, The Bell P-39 Airacobra in the
RCAF…
The substitution of Kittyhawks for P-39s appears to have been mainly a result of
delayed P-39 production and deliveries coupled with the availability of Kittyhawks
that could be diverted to the RCAF from the RAF's order. One of the RCAF's
senior technical officers had recommended that the P-39 was superior to the
Kittyhawk, but we had to take what was available. It was not what we wanted,
but I think it worked out better in the end!!

 

[merlin]

A twin engine medium bomber may do OK for a good part of the war but a twin engine heavy is a waste of time for the Australians in 1937-41. The only British designs are the Whitley and the Wellington. With just 2400hp on tap from two engines any heavy bomber is going to be a sitting duck for ANY Japanese fighter in daylight and No twin engine bomber flying from Australian bases is going to find any worthwhile Japanese targets by night. If the RAAf can't find large German cities at night the RAAF isn't going to find small coastal bases, jungle airstrips or anchorages for small groups of ships.

Not sure where you get the 2400 hp!? True the Whitley Wellington, were twin engined aircraft - but they were produced - the one I refered to wasn't, and I mentioned that it was spec'd with Hercules engines. Incidentally the same spec produced the Manchester - granted not a success as a 'twin' but it did have a hp of circa 3500, of course later became the Lancaster. Whilst you may be thinking that Australia in this time period wouldn't want/need/ or make an aircraft this big - the Bristol design - Buckfast (?) - wasn't!! The Beaufort spanned 57' 10", max speed 268 mph range 1,450 mls, bombload 6 x 250lb; the Buckfast spanned 79', max speed 315 mph, range 2,000 to 3,000 mls, bmax bombload 16 x 250 lb. Seems to me that gives a lot flexibilty re: recon., and capacity to saturate the target - port installations, airstrips, etc., moreover rather than one, it would be able to carry two torpedos!

 

[Elvis]

Hi guys,

Was just playing with my new excavator and dug up this old thread.
Interesting question and something I was just musing on the other day.
In my case, I sometimes think about a modular air force that the USA could sell to allied country's who may be a bit more challenged, monetarily, and not afford separate viable, but somewhat obsolete aircraft that are more up-to-date than the WWI aircraft they may very well have had in stock (if any aircraft at all).
Thinking about this the other day, I hit on the idea of resurrecting the Boeing 247.
Still a viable airliner, and not all that old during the WWII years, but not the carrier the DC2/3/C-47 was.
So you double the passenger entrance doors into a barn door-type arrangement and pull all the seats and interior appointment, weld in some hold downs and you have your transport.
Good for about 5000 lbs. payload.
Make a version with no doors in the side but a couple of long trap doors in the bottom, mount some bomb racks inside....instant bomber. Capable of carrying up to 20 250 pounders.
,,,now here's the tricky part...Part of the idea here is to take one aircraft and make a whole air force out of it, so what do you about a fighter?
The 247 itself isn't suited for the aerial gymnastics that a fighter would be expected of (I imagine it would be something just a little less than an Me 110), so....what to do.
What if you took one of the engine nacelles and removed it from the plane and used that as the basis for a small single engine aircraft?
The prop might have to be shortened a bit (in fact that's an idea - longer blades for the bomber, shorter blades for the fighter, but otherwise, the same prop).
Arm it with four .30 cal machine guns (or whatever caliber the particular government has deemed their standard round) in the wings ans a hard point under the fuselage that could hold a single 250 lb. bomb or the equivalent in fuel (according to my calculations, that would be about 30-35 gallons).
...and so, the "Air-Force-in-a-box".
While I would offer this package to anyone interested, its really aimed at "lesser" countries, like those in South and Central America.
Would Canada and/or Australia go for this?
...maybe...
As someone mentioned towards the beginning of this thread, there wasn't much of an airforce in Australia in those days, so a ready made "package" might seem appealing...especially at that price!
While Canada had a little more going on in those days, the idea of grabbing some...munitions from across the border, rather than across the ocean would be very appealing to them, for obvious reasons (and history has actually shown that to be the case, several times).
I would think both countries could afford something a little more competitive, but I would still make it available to them.
Anyway, maybe not exactly the answer the OP was looking for, but those are my thoughts on the idea.


Elvis

 

[Shortround6]

A lot depends on timing. Remember that the Lockheed 14 flew in the summer of 1937 and the DC-2 had flown in 1934. The newer planes aren't that much more expensive to build on a per pound or per sq ft of wing basis. The big thing would be the engines and here you have a stumbling block. The 550-600hp Wasp is just too small to power effective combat planes in the mid to late 30s. Yes the Australians used Wasp powered Wirraways in combat but they were far from ideal.
I would imagine that this scenario is supposed to provide better aircraft than the historical options and to do that you need better engines. From the US that means P&W Hornets or Twin Wasps or Wright Cyclones.
If you put 20 250lb bombs in a Boeing 247 you are down to a one man crew and enough fuel to fly around the perimeter of the airfield.

 

[Elvis]

The Boeing 247 first flew in early 1933. It is accredited with being the first successful streamlined all-metal, monoplane passenger liner.
Everything else that's come down the road since then is based on that plane.
Twenty 250 lb. bombs total out to 5000 lbs (20 X 250 = 5000).
That's the payload capacity of the Boeing 247.
It should work just fine with a proper crew.
Maybe you were thinking of 500 lb. bombs?
THAT would be a problem.
My point of that exercise was not create the most competitive air force in the sky, but instead, a more competitive package, at an economical price, compared to an Air Force whose inventory would have consisted of planes from WWI or just after....if that country even had an "Air Force".
Part of the exercise was to use items that weren't in high demand at the time.
It seems we threw either Twin Wasps or 9 cylinder Cyclones in just about everything that flew, that could hold them.
That puts a lot of stress on the assembly lines to create them.
However, this leaves several slightly less competitive, but still completely viable, engines out there that could be used for this package without putting further stress on manufacturers for more high demand engines, because they would be built at a different factory.
Same goes for the aircraft itself. Not a high demand airframe, militarily.
As for actual historical fact, as it actually happened, the Aussie's did have the R-1830 at their disposal.
This is the engine that was used in the Boomerang.

 

[tomo pauk]

Not sure whether it was proposed earlier, but something like the Romanian IAR-80 might've been a good use of Twin Wasps. Aim for a decent fuel tankage, tough, even on account of firepower (ie. no cannon, but multiple MGs).

 

[Graeme]

. Mind you, Fraser also got on well with Churchill. If I can remember, John Curtin, the Aussie PM didn't, which explains some of the hostility.

There was a LOT of hostility - Curtin and Churchill hated each others guts. Since this thread started, Wurth's book has been published...

Books and Essays by Bob Wurth on the Asia/Pacific Region: The battle for Australia

 

[Shortround6]

I keep repeating this, if it seems to good to be true it probably is.
The 5000 lb payload of the 247 includes the fuel, oil and quite possibly at least one of the crew. The gross weight of 16000lbs plus may be that for àn impressed 247 in military service during the war in max overload. Normal gross weight was under 14000lbs.
Australia did build R-1340 Wasps under Iicence. This made it fairly easy to transition to building R-1830s. But they may have been running late for your time line.
The " flight of the Phoenix" movie aside, the engine nacelle of a twin engine plane is NOT a mini fuselage without a tail. It is a an aerodynamic covering for the engine, engine mount, landing gear and whatever struts/braces were needed to attach these parts to the wing structure. The fuselage of a single engine plane has to stand up to the forces of the tail serfaces. That is the twisting or bending forces imparted by the tail to change the angle of attack of the wing.
Now throw in that a fighter needs to pull somewhere between 2-3 times the number of "G"s of bomber let alone an airline and there is no savings in trying to use airliner bits and pieces on a fighter.
I would also note that next to nobody was using WW I or even early 20s aircraft in the early 1930s. They may look like the old planes but even small countries were using mid to late 20s engines and airframes. The older aircraft/engines had worn-out.

 

[Elvis]

You know, you bring up a good point....what exactly IS the timeline here?
I assumed "WWII era", which I define as 1938-1945, but are we being more specific here?
...Early WWII era?
...mid WWII era?
...Late WWII era?
What do you know?
As for the weight stats of the 247, I do have to issue an apology.
I read MTOW thinking it was NTOW.
...however, I just now ran across THIS and it lists both the loaded and maximum TO weights, which aren't that much different.
....they're also about 3000 lbs. + higher than THIS, which were the stats I misread and were basing my other post off of.
...Sheesh, Wiki can't even agree with itself!
Anyway, at the higher weight listing, the 20 bomb load would be a cinch for the airplane, but the lower one would create a situation like what you described earlier.
...I think I need to look into this a little more deeply....

 

[Shortround6]

Boeing 247, these figures are from "U.S. Civil Aircraft" by Joseph Juptner.

247, empty weight 8370lbs, Useful weight 4280lbs,Payload with 250 gallons of fuel 2155lbs. (10 pass, and 455lbs mail-baggage) gross weight 12,650lbs. Cruising speed at 5000ft 161mph, gas capacity max 265 gallons, normal, 203 gallons, range at 60 gal per hour 600 miles.
247D, empty weight 8940lbs, Useful weight 4710lbs,Payload with 273 gallons of fuel 2 pilots and stewardess 2477lbs. (10 pass, and 747lbs mail-baggage) gross weight 13,650lbs. Cruising speed at 8000ft 184mph, gas capacity max 273 gallons, range at 66 gal per hour 800 miles.

Some of the numbers may not total up correctly. The 247D had slightly different model engines. New cowls, 3 blade controllable pitch propellers instead of 2 blade propellers a rearward sloping windshield instead of forward sloping and other improvements both in passenger accommodations and exterior. Many 247s were reworked to bring them up to or close to 247D standards.
Auto pilot and de-icer boots were optional equipment but would be deducted from payload.
There are reasons the 247 was dropped from production after about 80 made, it was no longer a competitive airplane on the airliner market.