Characteristics of WW2 Air Launched torpedoes from different nations

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The dropping height being taught to FAA Swordfish and Albacore crews at Crail in 1940/41 was 50ft at speeds of 90-100 knots (103-115mph). Accounts of operations rarely mention dropping heights, but more often dropping distances from the target. At Taranto for example dropping distances varied between 400 and 1,000 yards depending on where each pilot found themselves.

By 1943 Barracuda pilots were being trained at Crail to drop at 200ft and 200 knots (230mph) ideally 1,000 yards from the target.

Judging the height above the ocean was one of the more difficult skills pilots had to learn, especially at night or in bad weather. Operations in the North Atlantic and North Sea could provide very difficult torpedo dropping conditions with heavy seas in often appalling weather. During the Bismarck chase, Ark Royal’s flight deck was reportedly pitching 60ft. Hence the need for the Observer to look over the cockpit side to determine the height above the sea. No radio altimeters at that time.

Thanks, good data there. 50 feet and 115 knots is fairly average for the early war - and quite difficult. I think that is about the same for the early Mk 13.

200 feet and 200 knots is pretty good release parameters and more typical of the mid to later war.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The reason the drop speed and drop height are so important is because it impacts how vulnerable the torpedo bomber is during their attack runs.

Very early war, such as at Taranto, torpedo bombers could come in low and slow and still survive due to the relative paucity of concentrated AAA.

But by around say spring 1942 with heavy concentrated AAA,radar, fire directors and a bit later, proximity fuses, you really needed to be going much faster and it helped to be able to drop from higher altitudes.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Naval Weapons of World War Two by Donald Campbell. Ignoring the homing torpedoes.

RN
Mark XI, not used by aircraft during the war, 150 knots at up to 100 feet.
Mark XII, initially at 150 knots control in the air was unreliable, later fitted with the mark XV tail and strengthened to handle launch speeds of 250 to 270 knots. Main torpedo for the first half of the war.
Mark XV, drop speed up to 270 knots but it took time to actually make the entire torpedo strong enough
Mark XVII, under trial at end of war, 350 knots drop speed.

Naval Weapons of World War Two by Donald Campbell. Ignoring the homing torpedoes.

RN
Mark XI, not used by aircraft during the war, 150 knots at up to 100 feet.
Mark XII, initially at 150 knots control in the air was unreliable, later fitted with the mark XV tail and strengthened to handle launch speeds of 250 to 270 knots. Main torpedo for the first half of the war.
Mark XV, drop speed up to 270 knots but it took time to actually make the entire torpedo strong enough
Mark XVII, under trial at end of war, 350 knots drop speed.

USN
Mark 13, pre war 110 knots from 50 feet, by 1944 "high speed" from 1,000 feet, end war 410 knots from 2,400 feet.

IJN
Type 91, early war optimum launch 180 knots from 100 metres but up to 250/260 knots from 300 metres, in 1943 up to 300 knots, in 1944 up to 400 knots

Germany,
F5 pre war 75 knots from 15 to 25 metres, in 1942 120/130 knots from 30/40 metres but 150 knots caused no serious problems.

F5W, Italian.

Italy
W and SI, no launch limits given.

Thank you this is excellent! Exactly what I was looking for.

it seems like they were making a lot of changes to the older types, such as by adding wooden fins to the tail and sometimes wooden covers for the nose to help them drop more stable and not break up when they hit the water. I think by the mid war they really needed to be able to drop from about 200 kts minimum for crew safety.

So now we just need numbers for Russian and Italian drop parameters.


Speaking of the homing torpedoes, I know a little bit about the American one but were there any others used successfully during the war?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Speaking of the homing torpedoes, I know a little bit about the American one but were there any others used successfully during the war?

The Germans did: G7es Type V Torpedo

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Having this data, especially if we can flesh it out some more, really helps give us a much better picture of the efficacy of the naval aviation for each nation during different periods of the war, and helps us understand it with more nuance. We know in the early war the Japanese, British, and Italians were quite effective with air attacks against shipping, and this was largely due to their torpedo bombers, and their torpedoes. The Japanse B5N and British Swordfish were well suited for dropping the early generation of air launched torpedoes. As was, apparently, the Italian SM.79. The Germans and Russians were also fairly effective in torpedo bombing, though the Germans got a lot of mileage out of their dive bomber the Stuka. The Americans had to make due almost exclusively with dive bombers, (and land based fighter bombers and light bombers doing masthead and skip-bombing attacks) probably until about 1943 (?) and were very fortunate in that they had the SBD and an excellent training system for their naval aviators.

One question I had about the Swordfish - I know they were hanging radar systems on them from quite early on. Did they ever get any of these to give altitude readings? Or is that more 1960s technology?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

It should be noted that American TBDs scored some torpedo hits on the Shoho at Coral Sea.

 

[33k in the air]

Torpex- TNT/RDX/ Aluminum Powder.

Torpex 1: 45% RDX, 37% TNT, 18% powdered aluminum
Torpex 2: 42% RDX, 40% TNT, 18% powdered aluminum (or 41% RDX, 41% TNT, 18% powdered aluminum)

At least according to the explosives references I've gone through. (Details provided for those who are detail obsessed.)

According to experimental results (as opposed to calculated results), it was about 1.22 times more powerful than TNT.

 

[EwenS]

Very early war, such as at Taranto, torpedo bombers could come in low and slow and still survive due to the relative paucity of concentrated AAA.

As I’ve explained in posts on other threads, that was not how FAA crews were taught torpedo attack technique.

From the early/mid 1930s the RN technique was for an approach at medium altitude (ideally 8-10,000ft). For a ship at sea the squadron would seek to attack in flights from either bow. After positioning themselves, the aircraft would then dive as steeply as possible to torpedo drop height, pull out, aim the torpedo, drop it and then get out as fast as possible. Using that technique they minimised their exposure to AA fire from the enemy by giving the gunners a target with rapidly changing bearings and height.

At Taranto, with it being a night attack and cloudy, the first wave climbed to 4,500ft outbound, so they could see the Italian coast as they approached Taranto (they ran parallel to it for some distance). Of the 6 torpedo droppers in the first wave, 4 crossed into the harbour at 4,000ft before diving to drop height. Another was at 1,000ft having become detached from the first wave while en route. (I don’t have a height for the last one). The first flight of the second wave crossed the coast at 5,000ft before diving into the harbour. (I don’t have a height for the second flight of 3, but it would have been similar as they had travelled together).

The flare droppers and bombers started their attacks at 7,500-8,000ft.

During the Bismarck chase operations were badly affected by the weather.

825 squadron on Victorious went out above the 1,500ft cloud base in its ASV II equipped Swordfish. They used radar to manoeuvre into position before dropping through the cloud to find....a USCGC! Bismarck was 6 miles away and saw them. So the attack plan became hurried and confused and ultimately unsuccessful.

Ark Royal’s second strike (the first attacked Sheffield and I have no relevant data for it) with only a few ASV equipped Swordfish, went out above the cloud base which was at 700-1,000ft. One flight was noted as having reached 6,600ft when it encountered icing conditions and had to dive to 2,000ft. Another reached 7,000ft before doing the same. The various flights then used gaps in the cloud to.locate Bismarck and to position themselves for the attack before making diving attacks through the cloud.

In 1943, while the attack formations for the Barracuda had changed, the technique was the same. Medium level approach followed by a dive to the attack position. And that was where so many Barracuda crews were lost. A low level pull out with any side slip put the aircraft into a spin with no room to pull out.

 

[EwenS]

One question I had about the Swordfish - I know they were hanging radar systems on them from quite early on. Did they ever get any of these to give altitude readings? Or is that more 1960s technology?

ASV II began to be introduced on the Swordfish in early 1941, but initially only on the basis of a few aircraft per squadron. 825 must have been one of the first to become fully radar equipped.

There were technical problems getting ASV II to work on the Albacore, so it was nearly the end of 1941 before it began to be fitted to that aircraft. It was one reason why Indomitable received 2 Swordfish to augment her Albacores in the IO in early 1942.

Radio altimeters were not available until later in WW2. Mid 1942 seems to be the earliest but it was not a universal fit by 1945.

RAF Coastal Command Radar Altimeters

Did Coastal Command aircraft use radar altimeters in WWII?

www.rafcommands.com

 

[SaparotRob]

As I’ve explained in posts on other threads, that was not how FAA crews were taught torpedo attack technique.

From the early/mid 1930s the RN technique was for an approach at medium altitude (ideally 8-10,000ft). For a ship at sea the squadron would seek to attack in flights from either bow. After positioning themselves, the aircraft would then dive as steeply as possible to torpedo drop height, pull out, aim the torpedo, drop it and then get out as fast as possible. Using that technique they minimised their exposure to AA fire from the enemy by giving the gunners a target with rapidly changing bearings and height.

At Taranto, with it being a night attack and cloudy, the first wave climbed to 4,500ft outbound, so they could see the Italian coast as they approached Taranto (they ran parallel to it for some distance). Of the 6 torpedo droppers in the first wave, 4 crossed into the harbour at 4,000ft before diving to drop height. Another was at 1,000ft having become detached from the first wave while en route. (I don’t have a height for the last one). The first flight of the second wave crossed the coast at 5,000ft before diving into the harbour. (I don’t have a height for the second flight of 3, but it would have been similar as they had travelled together).

The flare droppers and bombers started their attacks at 7,500-8,000ft.

During the Bismarck chase operations were badly affected by the weather.

825 squadron on Victorious went out above the 1,500ft cloud base in its ASV II equipped Swordfish. They used radar to manoeuvre into position before dropping through the cloud to find....a USCGC! Bismarck was 6 miles away and saw them. So the attack plan became hurried and confused and ultimately unsuccessful.

Ark Royal’s second strike (the first attacked Sheffield and I have no relevant data for it) with only a few ASV equipped Swordfish, went out above the cloud base which was at 700-1,000ft. One flight was noted as having reached 6,600ft when it encountered icing conditions and had to dive to 2,000ft. Another reached 7,000ft before doing the same. The various flights then used gaps in the cloud to.locate Bismarck and to position themselves for the attack before making diving attacks through the cloud.

In 1943, while the attack formations for the Barracuda had changed, the technique was the same. Medium level approach followed by a dive to the attack position. And that was where so many Barracuda crews were lost. A low level pull out with any side slip put the aircraft into a spin with no room to pull out.

Great post.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

As I’ve explained in posts on other threads, that was not how FAA crews were taught torpedo attack technique.

From the early/mid 1930s the RN technique was for an approach at medium altitude (ideally 8-10,000ft). For a ship at sea the squadron would seek to attack in flights from either bow. After positioning themselves, the aircraft would then dive as steeply as possible to torpedo drop height, pull out, aim the torpedo, drop it and then get out as fast as possible. Using that technique they minimised their exposure to AA fire from the enemy by giving the gunners a target with rapidly changing bearings and height.

Yes but they still have to drop down and slow down to drop the torpedo. This is the point of vulnerability. You couldn't attack an IJN surface fleet like that in say, mid 1942 without incurring heavy losses. I don't think the Swordfish would have been effective against an IJN fleet by that period for a variety of reasons, except maybe at night or in very bad weather. Individual German ships were apparently doable to a point.

At Taranto, with it being a night attack and cloudy, the first wave climbed to 4,500ft outbound, so they could see the Italian coast as they approached Taranto (they ran parallel to it for some distance). Of the 6 torpedo droppers in the first wave, 4 crossed into the harbour at 4,000ft before diving to drop height. Another was at 1,000ft having become detached from the first wave while en route. (I don’t have a height for the last one). The first flight of the second wave crossed the coast at 5,000ft before diving into the harbour. (I don’t have a height for the second flight of 3, but it would have been similar as they had travelled together).

The flare droppers and bombers started their attacks at 7,500-8,000ft.

During the Bismarck chase operations were badly affected by the weather.

825 squadron on Victorious went out above the 1,500ft cloud base in its ASV II equipped Swordfish. They used radar to manoeuvre into position before dropping through the cloud to find....a USCGC! Bismarck was 6 miles away and saw them. So the attack plan became hurried and confused and ultimately unsuccessful.

Ark Royal’s second strike (the first attacked Sheffield and I have no relevant data for it) with only a few ASV equipped Swordfish, went out above the cloud base which was at 700-1,000ft. One flight was noted as having reached 6,600ft when it encountered icing conditions and had to dive to 2,000ft. Another reached 7,000ft before doing the same. The various flights then used gaps in the cloud to.locate Bismarck and to position themselves for the attack before making diving attacks through the cloud.

In 1943, while the attack formations for the Barracuda had changed, the technique was the same. Medium level approach followed by a dive to the attack position. And that was where so many Barracuda crews were lost. A low level pull out with any side slip put the aircraft into a spin with no room to pull out.

It's also the period where there is a lot more enemy AAA. The Barracuda had relatively poor handling (pilot had to be careful not to flip the thing over) and was also quite slow for 1943.

 

[MikeMeech]

Hi
Roy Conyers Nesbit in 'The Strike Wings', page 24, gives a brief summary of the RAF developing methods of dropping the torpedo from greater heights and higher speeds:

Mike

 

[EwenS]

Yes but they still have to drop down and slow down to drop the torpedo. This is the point of vulnerability. You couldn't attack an IJN surface fleet like that in say, mid 1942 without incurring heavy losses. I don't think the Swordfish would have been effective against an IJN fleet by that period for a variety of reasons, except maybe at night or in very bad weather. Individual German ships were apparently doable to a point.

So many negative waves.

That period of low / slow vulnerability is much reduced. Done correctly, against a fleet at sea, the technique was designed to bring the torpedo bombers over the screen at medium altitude, then carry out the steep dive to position on the capital ships at the centre. The TB are not low and slow while penetrating the screen as happened at Midway. The AA fire in that phase is only from the ships at the centre, or the screen firing inwards risks blue on blue.

It still leaves the problem of penetrating the CAP, which was not seen as so much of a problem when the technique was developed in the 1930s. But on the plus side it allows the torpedo and dive bombers to arrive as a single package at similar altitudes making the escort fighter job easier.

At Taranto it meant the Swordfish coming over the fully alerted AA defences at altitude, then diving. They lost only two of their number inside the harbour itself. 5 hits from 12 torpedoes dropped for the loss of two of the torpedo droppers seems to prove that the technique worked. Darkness helped of course. But the heavy AA fire encountered certainly didn’t.

Somerville in April 1942 certainly didn’t intend to tackle the Japanese fleet in daylight with Albacores. But he had very limited numbers of ASV equipped TB, to locate a fleet at sea. But in Operation C the Japanese fleet was well strung out and, IIRC, not using the types of circular defensive formations adopted by all navies later in the war.

Interestingly however over in the US, the USN ran trials in late 1942 into 1943 on the use of the SB2C Helldiver as a TB, including the use of diving torpedo attack profiles. So they must also have considered the technique to have some merit. At that point the SB2C was not selected as a TB due to the length of time it took to convert it from a DB to a TB (shades of the Japanese B5N Kates at Midway). But the plan raised its head again from late 1944, with more trials run in training units in 1945. This time the outcome was for the TBF/TBM Avenger to be dropped from the CAGs and for the SB2C to fill both roles. The first outcomes of this can be seen in the plans for Operation Olympic with the elimination of the Avenger from CVLG. It also shows in the air groups for Midway and FDR that completed in Sept 1945. No Avengers there either.

 

[EwenS]

It's also the period where there is a lot more enemy AAA. The Barracuda had relatively poor handling (pilot had to be careful not to flip the thing over) and was also quite slow for 1943.

The Barracuda was not nearly as bad as it is painted. It was underpowered. But then again it ended up something like 40% heavier than the original Spec called for without a correspondingly large increase in engine power. (But look at the SB2C for weight growth in the same time period). And it had been planned to enter service in 1941 not 1943. But delays. Production startup was a year later than anticipated in mid 1939.

As for the handling issues at the bottom of the dive, these were investigated in 1943 as soon as they became apparent, and by none other than Eric Brown while at the RAE. He and others identified the problem and new instructions were issued to pilots to ensure that they didn’t handle the aircraft in that particular way. And losses reduced after July 1943. One comment that does appear is that it was the pilots converting to the Barracuda in 1943 from Swordfish and Albacores that had the greatest difficulty adjusting to flying it. Habits learned while operating those types had to be unlearned. Later in 1944/45, trainees seem to have had less problems adjusting.

The Barracuda’s biggest problem was getting airborne, especially at high weights in the IO in 1944. Eric Brown however found it “quite pleasantly manoeuvrable” once airborne. He also described it in the landing phase as “very good”.

There were some more accidental losses in 1944/45 but for different reasons. Some of the locking pins for the wings proved to be of insufficient strength, attributable in part to weight growth, so some wings came off. Some were found to have popped wing rivets in mid 1944 due to being overstressed on regular pull out from dives (no G meters to check that kind of thing). And finally in 1945 a problem with a hydraulic line in the cockpit fracturing led to pilots being instructed to fly on oxygen or keep the canopy open. There was ether in the fluid.

But more Barracudas were built and operated than any other type of FAA aircraft. I think its reputation was best summed up by Matthew Willis in his book “The Fairey Barracuda”

“There is no doubt that the Barracuda is an aircraft of contradictions. It was unquestionably flawed, often unpopular and troubled throughout its life. For all that, though, it achieved far more than its critics like to admit and was among the most powerful and adaptable weapons in the Fleet Air Arm’s arsenal in the last two years of war and beyond.”

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Consider me one of the critics of both the Swordfish and the Barracuda. And you can throw in the Albacore for good measure.

Swordfish was at least fairly reliable and adaptable, and the early use of radar was certainly a plus. But it was painfully slow, highly vulnerable to fighters (as seen during the Channel Dash for example), and worst of all for a navy aircraft, it had extremely short range.

The slow speed meant that in an ostensible carrier duel, enemy strike aircraft would reach the RN carrier first. If any fighters were present, it was basically doomed. And the short range meant that an enemy fleet equipped with say, B5N or D3A could attack RN carriers from beyond their own strike range.

For a 1933-34 design, the Swordfish was very good. Obviously in 1940, while getting a little past it's freshness date, it was still good enough to do harm to the enemy. But Taranto was kind of a fluke in many ways (as was the successful surprise attacks against the French fleet at Mers el Kebir), and the problem with the Swordfish was that it was still in action well into the mid and later war.

The Barracuda was plagued with problems which were never fully resolved. It was underpowered for it's weight and size but when they added more powerful engines it caused dangerous stability problems (work-arounds or not), it had short range (especially for it's size) and particularly poor climb and medium altitude performance (evidently exacerbated in Tropical climates). The rather dismal operational history of the Barracuda tells the story all too well.

I think there is a reason the British adapted the TBF when it became available, and then eventually the FAA were using Fireflies as strike aircraft by preference (by which time the era of the air launched torpedo was ending).

As for the tactics - attacking simultaneously from multiple directions and changing altitude prior to attack were fairly common gambits. The tactic used at Midway were supposed to be coordinated attack from dive bombers above and torpedo planes below, simultaneously, the goal being to create a problem for the AAA and CAP (which it did, even though the timing was a bit off) as well as both types attacking from different directions.

I don't mean to be throwing out too many 'negative waves' Moriarty but I think we need to be honest about it when designs failed and in the case of the FAA, entire systems failed to produce weapons needed by the fighting men who flew them. Every nation had their major problems like this. The US TBD devastator was a very poor design (worse than the Swordfish), the US Mk 13 torpedo was a catastrophic disaster for the first couple of years of the war, the SB2C was plagued with problems even though they eventually addressed a lot of them sufficiently to have a fairly good operational record. The Germans had the Me 210 and the He 177, the Japanese had all kinds of delayed projects and crippling maintenance and teething issues even with their promising designs.

To me, part of the reason to study WW2 and other conflicts is to learn from these mistakes. Clearly the whole procurement process for the FAA was a mess. Those brave FAA pilots should not have been flying 150 mph biplanes into battle in 1942 and 1943.

 

[EwenS]

I think there is a reason the British adapted the TBF when it became available, and then eventually the FAA were using Fireflies as strike aircraft by preference (by which time the era of the air launched torpedo was ending).

When the TBF/TBM became available to the FAA in from early 1943, with one exception, the squadrons were used for anti submarine work both from shore bases and escort cariers. The one exception was 832 squadron on Victorious (aka USS Robin) in the South Pacific. Even that squadron was sent to the IO in 1944 for ASW work.

It was Sept 1944 before Avenger squadrons were sent East to the IO for/with the fleet carriers Illustrious, Victorious, Indomitable & Formidable while the Barracuda squadrons on Indefatigable & Implacable converted to Avengers before going East in late 1944/early 1945.

By then the Barracuda had been found to be lacking range for the missions then being flown in the IO which were entirely bombing (the Avenger was not capable of carrying British torpedoes).

The RN continued to believe in the torpedo as an anti-shipping weapon, even though the Barracuda only used it on a handful of occasions. It was mid-1945 before such training stopped. By then another batch of Barracuda squadrons had formed in mid-1944 and yet another batch in mid-1945 which were intended for the light fleet carriers that completed from Dec 1944.

Late 1944 also saw the Barracuda TR.III with 3cm radar arrive. British Avengers did not receive a similar set for another year.

The other problem the RN had was a lack of availability of the Avenger under Lend Lease. In mid-1945 Britain was receiving reconditioned TBF/M-1 models. While deliveries of the later TBM-3 began at the end of 1944 (production began in mid-1944) numbers were very limited, and they only began to reach the squadrons in the BPF from July 1945.

That first group of 4 light fleet carriers arrived in the Pacific in Summer 1945 with Barracuda/Corsair air groups. Those Barracudas undertook some strikes at Hong Kong against suicide boat nests during the reoccupation there. But for the end of the war they would have gone into action in the East China Sea in Aug 1945.

As for the Firefly, production was slow. By the end of the war only 3 squadrons had seen operations in Indefatigable and Implacable. Formation of a fourth FR squadron was cancelled in July 1945, with the aircraft going to instead to replace Barracudas in a recently formed squadron. That was the only WW2 squadron to convert, all the others were new formations. The only other Firefly squadrons in WW2 were 3 specialist night fighter units formed in 1945. It was 1946 before the squadrons surviving the end of war cull traded Barracudas for Fireflies.

At the end of the war there were still 14 Barracuda squadrons. At the same time there were only 7 Avenger squadrons. The Avenger never came anywhere near replacing the Barracuda in FAA service.

So the Barracuda formed a major part of FAA plans from early 1943 onwards, remaining so right through to 1946. The Avenger was never going to supersede it entirely. And the Firefly changeover was post-war. And the Griffon engined Mk.V was developed in the hope that it would improve its performance, something which proved disappointing.

 

[K5083]

Swordfish was at least fairly reliable and adaptable, and the early use of radar was certainly a plus. But it was painfully slow, highly vulnerable to fighters (as seen during the Channel Dash for example), and worst of all for a navy aircraft, it had extremely short range.

Well yeah, but would you like to suggest any torpedo bomber operational in Feb 42 six of which would get through against a geschwader of the best fighter units in the world at that time? Certainly Devastator or Kate would have done no better. Nor any of the landplanes.

 

[elbmc1969]

Really, everyone had wooden boxes for the noses of their torpedoes and wooden tailfin assemblies for aerodynamic stabilization. However, all of the combatants seem to have been convinced that they had some incredible secret, so they censored all photos of such from publication, and generally prohibited photographing them for any reason.

 

[tomo pauk]

Really, everyone had wooden boxes for the noses of their torpedoes and wooden tailfin assemblies for aerodynamic stabilization. However, all of the combatants seem to have been convinced that they had some incredible secret, so the censored all photos of such from publication, and generally prohibited photographing them for any reason.

During the war, how much were aware the Americans (or British) of Japanese having the torpedoes with these appendices?

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

When the TBF/TBM became available to the FAA in from early 1943, with one exception, the squadrons were used for anti submarine work both from shore bases and escort cariers. The one exception was 832 squadron on Victorious (aka USS Robin) in the South Pacific. Even that squadron was sent to the IO in 1944 for ASW work.

Well the Royal Navy wasn't really engaged with an enemy with aircraft carriers or large surface fleets by 1943. So ASW was their main mission, aside from the occasional commerce raider. The closest thing they had to a carrier battle by that stage of the war was the debacle at Ceylon in spring of 1942, and they weren't about to try to face the IJN at that point.

As far as I know 832 Sqn was basically the only FAA unit operating in the vicinity of potential real enemy fleet in 1943 or 44. They just didn't see any action as the Japanese held back.

It was Sept 1944 before Avenger squadrons were sent East to the IO for/with the fleet carriers Illustrious, Victorious, Indomitable & Formidable while the Barracuda squadrons on Indefatigable & Implacable converted to Avengers before going East in late 1944/early 1945.

They couldn't get as many Avengers as they wanted fast enough, but I think it's pretty clear it was considered the more capable (and for it's own pilots, far less dangerous) strike aircraft by the FAA.

By then the Barracuda had been found to be lacking range for the missions then being flown in the IO which were entirely bombing (the Avenger was not capable of carrying British torpedoes).

The issue with British torpedoes a problem but by 1944 the US torpedoes were fine.

The RN continued to believe in the torpedo as an anti-shipping weapon, even though the Barracuda only used it on a handful of occasions. It was mid-1945 before such training stopped. By then another batch of Barracuda squadrons had formed in mid-1944 and yet another batch in mid-1945 which were intended for the light fleet carriers that completed from Dec 1944.

The US used torpedoes through 1945 as well, but by then they had developed skip bombing / masthead bombing as an alternative, and the guided munitions were coming online. Not to mention jets which didn't go slow enough for a torpedo run...

That first group of 4 light fleet carriers arrived in the Pacific in Summer 1945 with Barracuda/Corsair air groups. Those Barracudas undertook some strikes at Hong Kong against suicide boat nests during the reoccupation there. But for the end of the war they would have gone into action in the East China Sea in Aug 1945.

Barracudas may have been capable of contending with 'suicide boats' but they are lucky they didn't have to face any Japanese air assets at that point. The Corsair was a much better option for strikes though they would be needed for anti-Kamikaze patrols. If I as a RN admiral wanted to kill IJN ships in 1944 or 45 I'd rely on land based Beaufighters.

As for the Firefly, production was slow. By the end of the war only 3 squadrons had seen operations in Indefatigable and Implacable. Formation of a fourth FR squadron was cancelled in July 1945, with the aircraft going to instead to replace Barracudas in a recently formed squadron. That was the only WW2 squadron to convert, all the others were new formations. The only other Firefly squadrons in WW2 were 3 specialist night fighter units formed in 1945. It was 1946 before the squadrons surviving the end of war cull traded Barracudas for Fireflies.

At the end of the war there were still 14 Barracuda squadrons. At the same time there were only 7 Avenger squadrons. The Avenger never came anywhere near replacing the Barracuda in FAA service.

So the Barracuda formed a major part of FAA plans from early 1943 onwards, remaining so right through to 1946. The Avenger was never going to supersede it entirely. And the Firefly changeover was post-war. And the Griffon engined Mk.V was developed in the hope that it would improve its performance, something which proved disappointing.

Firefly was slow to arrive, but it was clearly the preferred option (just as the Avenger / Tarpon had been before it). Barracuda may have been equipped with RN fleets but that's basically because they didn't have any alternative available.

The Barracuda was a bad design, and I'm not really sure if that is more the fault of Fairey or of the agencies which came up with the specs ... they were asking a lot of the airframe no doubt by adding dive bomber capability and so on. Why the parasol wing I'm not sure, but you can look at this thing and tell it's a dud.

Aichi faced the same challenges with the B7A, I'd say they did a much better job threading the needle even though it arrived too late.

-------------------B7A ------------------ Barracuda ----------------TBF / Tarpon ------------------------- Swordfish
Available-------- 1944 -------------------1943 -------------------- 1942 (43 FAA) ----------------------- 1934
Crew ------------- 2 -----------------------3 ------------------------ 3 ------------------------------------- 3
Wingspan-------- 14.4m -----------------14.99m ------------------ 16.5m -------------------------------- 13.87m
Empty Weight---- 3,810 kg --------------4,241 kg ----------------- 4,853 kg ----------------------------- 1,903 kg
Engine (takeoff)-- 1,825 hp --------------1,640 hp (Merlin 32 ----- 1,700 hp (R-2600) ------------------ 690 hp
Engine (altitude)- 1,560 hp --------------1,640 hp (low alt) ------- 1.600 hp ----------------------------- 580 hp
Max speed ------- 352 mph / 566 kmh--240 mph / 386 kmh ------ 278 mph / 447 kmh ---------------- 143 mph
Cruise speed ------229 mph / 368 kmh--195 mph / 313 kmh ------ 215 mph / 346 kmh ---------------- 139 mph
Range ------------ 1,800 km -------------1,850 km ----------------- 1,800 km ---------------------------- 840 km
Initial climb ------ 1,890 ft/min------------833 ft/min -------------- 1075 ft /min ------------------------ 870 ft / min
Ceiling ----------- 11,250 m --------------4,900 m ------------------ 6,900 m ---------------------------- 5,000 m
Wing Loading --- 158.9 kg /m2 ---------159 kg/m2 ---------------- 152 kg / m2 ------------------------ 60 kg / m2
Power/mass ------ .242 kw/kg ----------- .2 kw/kg ------------------ .18 kw /kg -------------------------- .2 kw / kg
Guns (offense)---- 2 x 20mm ------------ none ---------------------- 2 x 12.7mm ------------------------ 1 x 7.7mm
Guns (defense) --- 1 x 13mm ------------ 2 x 7.7mm ---------------- 1 x 12.7mm / 1 x 7.62mm ---------- 1 x 7.7mm
Bomb load ------- 800 kg ---------------- 907 kg ------------------- 907 kg ------------------------------- 700 kg
Dive Bombing ---- Yes ------------------- Yes ------------------------ No ---------------------------------- Yes
Radar ------------- No ------------------- Yes ------------------------ Yes ---------------------------------- Yes
Handling ---------- Excellent ------------ Poor ---------------------- Good -------------------------------- Excellent

On paper the Barracuda looks better than the Swordfish in several categories, but handling and teething problems put that into question IMO. The only advantage I see for the Barracuda over the Tarpon is dive bombing capability and range, but range is questionable as they seemed to have a lot of problems in tropical climates which affected range (partly because it had problems flying at higher altitudes). The B7A is superior to all the others. The only real flaw with the B7A was that it came too late and was too big for the smaller carriers. I didn't find B7A fitted with radar, though the Japanese put radar on the B6N so I'm sure they could have done easily.

The British and Americans, neither of whom ever fielded a truly great torpedo bomber during the war, both continued to look for a viable high performance torpedo bomber design to the end of the war and for a short time after. The British designed the Blackburn Firebrand which looks good and seems comparable to a B7A, though it was not available until 1945. This was in the works since 1941 but substantial delays were apparently due to the Napier Sabre engine, which had troubles and was prioritized for the Typhoon. Eric Brown said it wasn't so good due to tricky carrier handling but on paper it looks pretty tough, the only flaw being short range. They used these postwar. Fairey came up with the Spearfish which looks cool but was kind of slow and per Eric Brown, handled like an overloaded truck. Finally there was the Westland Wyvern, which was flying since 1946 but went into service in 1953. It had a mid-engine arrangement similar to the plane which shall not be named, with counter-rotating props. This small bomber was another nice looking plane with quite good performance, decent range, and heavy armament by WW2 standards, though it was only made in small numbers (equipping three squadrons), having some teething problems and due to arriving well into the Jet Age. It was used in action during the "Suez Crisis".

The Americans came up with the Martin Mauler which wasn't available until 1948. This one also looks good (a bit like an oversized Bearcat) it was pretty fast and heavily armed, and had a good range, but had handling problems which made landing and takeoff challenging and was never popular with crews. They operated a few squadrons of these for a year or two but they were replaced by the Skyraider. The Douglas AD-1 Skyraider, designed by Ed Heinemann who was the main designer for the successful SBD, A-20 and A-26 (and later the A-4 Skyhawk). Introduced in 1946, this rather strange looking bird was originally meant to be a high performance dive / torpedo bomber, but aside from a single torpedo attack against a dam in the Korean War was basically a "bomb truck" and long loiter time close air support aircraft, though by WW2 standards it was fast, heavily armed and long ranged, it was the low and slow strike plane, alongside WW2 era fighter-bombers like Corsairs, Fireflies and P-51s, for most of it's career.

The TL : DR for me is that it was pretty difficult to make a good high performance torpedo bomber in the mid-Century era, and probably only the Japanese pulled it off, their design coming too late and too big for most of their carriers. By the time the British and Americans came up with viable designs, rockets and radar guided munitions were probably a more effective way to sink ships...

Then again, SAM capability became quite a menace for strike aircraft and even for the missiles themselves in the later 20th century so maybe an air-launched, long-range homing torpedo isn't out of the question for aircraft even today...