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Wild_Bill_Kelso
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- Mar 18, 2022
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The dropping height being taught to FAA Swordfish and Albacore crews at Crail in 1940/41 was 50ft at speeds of 90-100 knots (103-115mph). Accounts of operations rarely mention dropping heights, but more often dropping distances from the target. At Taranto for example dropping distances varied between 400 and 1,000 yards depending on where each pilot found themselves.
By 1943 Barracuda pilots were being trained at Crail to drop at 200ft and 200 knots (230mph) ideally 1,000 yards from the target.
Judging the height above the ocean was one of the more difficult skills pilots had to learn, especially at night or in bad weather. Operations in the North Atlantic and North Sea could provide very difficult torpedo dropping conditions with heavy seas in often appalling weather. During the Bismarck chase, Ark Royal's flight deck was reportedly pitching 60ft. Hence the need for the Observer to look over the cockpit side to determine the height above the sea. No radio altimeters at that time.
Naval Weapons of World War Two by Donald Campbell. Ignoring the homing torpedoes.
RN
Mark XI, not used by aircraft during the war, 150 knots at up to 100 feet.
Mark XII, initially at 150 knots control in the air was unreliable, later fitted with the mark XV tail and strengthened to handle launch speeds of 250 to 270 knots. Main torpedo for the first half of the war.
Mark XV, drop speed up to 270 knots but it took time to actually make the entire torpedo strong enough
Mark XVII, under trial at end of war, 350 knots drop speed.
Naval Weapons of World War Two by Donald Campbell. Ignoring the homing torpedoes.
RN
Mark XI, not used by aircraft during the war, 150 knots at up to 100 feet.
Mark XII, initially at 150 knots control in the air was unreliable, later fitted with the mark XV tail and strengthened to handle launch speeds of 250 to 270 knots. Main torpedo for the first half of the war.
Mark XV, drop speed up to 270 knots but it took time to actually make the entire torpedo strong enough
Mark XVII, under trial at end of war, 350 knots drop speed.
USN
Mark 13, pre war 110 knots from 50 feet, by 1944 "high speed" from 1,000 feet, end war 410 knots from 2,400 feet.
IJN
Type 91, early war optimum launch 180 knots from 100 metres but up to 250/260 knots from 300 metres, in 1943 up to 300 knots, in 1944 up to 400 knots
Germany,
F5 pre war 75 knots from 15 to 25 metres, in 1942 120/130 knots from 30/40 metres but 150 knots caused no serious problems.
F5W, Italian.
Italy
W and SI, no launch limits given.
Speaking of the homing torpedoes, I know a little bit about the American one but were there any others used successfully during the war?
Torpex- TNT/RDX/ Aluminum Powder.
As I've explained in posts on other threads, that was not how FAA crews were taught torpedo attack technique.Very early war, such as at Taranto, torpedo bombers could come in low and slow and still survive due to the relative paucity of concentrated AAA.
ASV II began to be introduced on the Swordfish in early 1941, but initially only on the basis of a few aircraft per squadron. 825 must have been one of the first to become fully radar equipped.One question I had about the Swordfish - I know they were hanging radar systems on them from quite early on. Did they ever get any of these to give altitude readings? Or is that more 1960s technology?
Great post.As I've explained in posts on other threads, that was not how FAA crews were taught torpedo attack technique.
From the early/mid 1930s the RN technique was for an approach at medium altitude (ideally 8-10,000ft). For a ship at sea the squadron would seek to attack in flights from either bow. After positioning themselves, the aircraft would then dive as steeply as possible to torpedo drop height, pull out, aim the torpedo, drop it and then get out as fast as possible. Using that technique they minimised their exposure to AA fire from the enemy by giving the gunners a target with rapidly changing bearings and height.
At Taranto, with it being a night attack and cloudy, the first wave climbed to 4,500ft outbound, so they could see the Italian coast as they approached Taranto (they ran parallel to it for some distance). Of the 6 torpedo droppers in the first wave, 4 crossed into the harbour at 4,000ft before diving to drop height. Another was at 1,000ft having become detached from the first wave while en route. (I don't have a height for the last one). The first flight of the second wave crossed the coast at 5,000ft before diving into the harbour. (I don't have a height for the second flight of 3, but it would have been similar as they had travelled together).
The flare droppers and bombers started their attacks at 7,500-8,000ft.
During the Bismarck chase operations were badly affected by the weather.
825 squadron on Victorious went out above the 1,500ft cloud base in its ASV II equipped Swordfish. They used radar to manoeuvre into position before dropping through the cloud to find....a USCGC! Bismarck was 6 miles away and saw them. So the attack plan became hurried and confused and ultimately unsuccessful.
Ark Royal's second strike (the first attacked Sheffield and I have no relevant data for it) with only a few ASV equipped Swordfish, went out above the cloud base which was at 700-1,000ft. One flight was noted as having reached 6,600ft when it encountered icing conditions and had to dive to 2,000ft. Another reached 7,000ft before doing the same. The various flights then used gaps in the cloud to.locate Bismarck and to position themselves for the attack before making diving attacks through the cloud.
In 1943, while the attack formations for the Barracuda had changed, the technique was the same. Medium level approach followed by a dive to the attack position. And that was where so many Barracuda crews were lost. A low level pull out with any side slip put the aircraft into a spin with no room to pull out.
As I've explained in posts on other threads, that was not how FAA crews were taught torpedo attack technique.
From the early/mid 1930s the RN technique was for an approach at medium altitude (ideally 8-10,000ft). For a ship at sea the squadron would seek to attack in flights from either bow. After positioning themselves, the aircraft would then dive as steeply as possible to torpedo drop height, pull out, aim the torpedo, drop it and then get out as fast as possible. Using that technique they minimised their exposure to AA fire from the enemy by giving the gunners a target with rapidly changing bearings and height.
At Taranto, with it being a night attack and cloudy, the first wave climbed to 4,500ft outbound, so they could see the Italian coast as they approached Taranto (they ran parallel to it for some distance). Of the 6 torpedo droppers in the first wave, 4 crossed into the harbour at 4,000ft before diving to drop height. Another was at 1,000ft having become detached from the first wave while en route. (I don't have a height for the last one). The first flight of the second wave crossed the coast at 5,000ft before diving into the harbour. (I don't have a height for the second flight of 3, but it would have been similar as they had travelled together).
The flare droppers and bombers started their attacks at 7,500-8,000ft.
During the Bismarck chase operations were badly affected by the weather.
825 squadron on Victorious went out above the 1,500ft cloud base in its ASV II equipped Swordfish. They used radar to manoeuvre into position before dropping through the cloud to find....a USCGC! Bismarck was 6 miles away and saw them. So the attack plan became hurried and confused and ultimately unsuccessful.
Ark Royal's second strike (the first attacked Sheffield and I have no relevant data for it) with only a few ASV equipped Swordfish, went out above the cloud base which was at 700-1,000ft. One flight was noted as having reached 6,600ft when it encountered icing conditions and had to dive to 2,000ft. Another reached 7,000ft before doing the same. The various flights then used gaps in the cloud to.locate Bismarck and to position themselves for the attack before making diving attacks through the cloud.
In 1943, while the attack formations for the Barracuda had changed, the technique was the same. Medium level approach followed by a dive to the attack position. And that was where so many Barracuda crews were lost. A low level pull out with any side slip put the aircraft into a spin with no room to pull out.
So many negative waves.Yes but they still have to drop down and slow down to drop the torpedo. This is the point of vulnerability. You couldn't attack an IJN surface fleet like that in say, mid 1942 without incurring heavy losses. I don't think the Swordfish would have been effective against an IJN fleet by that period for a variety of reasons, except maybe at night or in very bad weather. Individual German ships were apparently doable to a point.
The Barracuda was not nearly as bad as it is painted. It was underpowered. But then again it ended up something like 40% heavier than the original Spec called for without a correspondingly large increase in engine power. (But look at the SB2C for weight growth in the same time period). And it had been planned to enter service in 1941 not 1943. But delays. Production startup was a year later than anticipated in mid 1939.It's also the period where there is a lot more enemy AAA. The Barracuda had relatively poor handling (pilot had to be careful not to flip the thing over) and was also quite slow for 1943.
When the TBF/TBM became available to the FAA in from early 1943, with one exception, the squadrons were used for anti submarine work both from shore bases and escort cariers. The one exception was 832 squadron on Victorious (aka USS Robin) in the South Pacific. Even that squadron was sent to the IO in 1944 for ASW work.I think there is a reason the British adapted the TBF when it became available, and then eventually the FAA were using Fireflies as strike aircraft by preference (by which time the era of the air launched torpedo was ending).
Swordfish was at least fairly reliable and adaptable, and the early use of radar was certainly a plus. But it was painfully slow, highly vulnerable to fighters (as seen during the Channel Dash for example), and worst of all for a navy aircraft, it had extremely short range.
Really, everyone had wooden boxes for the noses of their torpedoes and wooden tailfin assemblies for aerodynamic stabilization. However, all of the combatants seem to have been convinced that they had some incredible secret, so the censored all photos of such from publication, and generally prohibited photographing them for any reason.
When the TBF/TBM became available to the FAA in from early 1943, with one exception, the squadrons were used for anti submarine work both from shore bases and escort cariers. The one exception was 832 squadron on Victorious (aka USS Robin) in the South Pacific. Even that squadron was sent to the IO in 1944 for ASW work.
It was Sept 1944 before Avenger squadrons were sent East to the IO for/with the fleet carriers Illustrious, Victorious, Indomitable & Formidable while the Barracuda squadrons on Indefatigable & Implacable converted to Avengers before going East in late 1944/early 1945.
By then the Barracuda had been found to be lacking range for the missions then being flown in the IO which were entirely bombing (the Avenger was not capable of carrying British torpedoes).
The RN continued to believe in the torpedo as an anti-shipping weapon, even though the Barracuda only used it on a handful of occasions. It was mid-1945 before such training stopped. By then another batch of Barracuda squadrons had formed in mid-1944 and yet another batch in mid-1945 which were intended for the light fleet carriers that completed from Dec 1944.
That first group of 4 light fleet carriers arrived in the Pacific in Summer 1945 with Barracuda/Corsair air groups. Those Barracudas undertook some strikes at Hong Kong against suicide boat nests during the reoccupation there. But for the end of the war they would have gone into action in the East China Sea in Aug 1945.
As for the Firefly, production was slow. By the end of the war only 3 squadrons had seen operations in Indefatigable and Implacable. Formation of a fourth FR squadron was cancelled in July 1945, with the aircraft going to instead to replace Barracudas in a recently formed squadron. That was the only WW2 squadron to convert, all the others were new formations. The only other Firefly squadrons in WW2 were 3 specialist night fighter units formed in 1945. It was 1946 before the squadrons surviving the end of war cull traded Barracudas for Fireflies.
At the end of the war there were still 14 Barracuda squadrons. At the same time there were only 7 Avenger squadrons. The Avenger never came anywhere near replacing the Barracuda in FAA service.
So the Barracuda formed a major part of FAA plans from early 1943 onwards, remaining so right through to 1946. The Avenger was never going to supersede it entirely. And the Firefly changeover was post-war. And the Griffon engined Mk.V was developed in the hope that it would improve its performance, something which proved disappointing.