Collapse of ABDA outline

[Vassili Zaitzev]

Hey guys,

I have an outline due for my research paper concerning the collapse of ABDA. I have it done, just want to see if anyone thinks I missed anything important. My paper is due on the 26th, and I've got about a quarter to a third done. I'm not concerned with lack of information; my main concern is to cover the most essential details(I'm constrained by a ten-page limit). So, if anyone sees anything I missed, or feels should not be included, feel free to point it out. Thanks!

 

[buffnut453]

Couple of observations:

1. You compare the performance of the fighters but do you also need to look at numbers available? In Malaya, the IJAAF had the luxury of assigning Ki-27s for base defence and using the Ki-43s for "offensive counter-air" operations whereas the Buffalos had to do everything - defend their bases while also trying to escort bombers, strafe ground troops, protect convoys, carry out tactical reconnaissance etc etc.

2. The fundamental problem facing the Allies is the perennial challenge of how and where to defend. The Japanese had the advantage of being able to mass force for their planned offensive actions whereas the Allies had to try and defend a much larger area and hence couldn't mass forces to meet the threat. Lack of adequate early warning in Malaya is critical in this regard for the air campaign (and follows on from #1 above).

3. The Japanese had their internal political challenges but it was still a single country looking out for its own interests. ABDA was 4 countries trying to work together when, up until the Japanese attack, not all had been willing to commit. Hardly a good environment upon which to develop cohesive defensive strategies or tactics.

4. For the Japanese, taking the Dutch East Indies was the "main event" whereas for the British and Americans it was really a sideshow...and force allocations (and competencies) reflected those realities.

 

[Vassili Zaitzev]

Couple of observations:

1. You compare the performance of the fighters but do you also need to look at numbers available? In Malaya, the IJAAF had the luxury of assigning Ki-27s for base defence and using the Ki-43s for "offensive counter-air" operations whereas the Buffalos had to do everything - defend their bases while also trying to escort bombers, strafe ground troops, protect convoys, carry out tactical reconnaissance etc etc.

2. The fundamental problem facing the Allies is the perennial challenge of how and where to defend. The Japanese had the advantage of being able to mass force for their planned offensive actions whereas the Allies had to try and defend a much larger area and hence couldn't mass forces to meet the threat. Lack of adequate early warning in Malaya is critical in this regard for the air campaign (and follows on from #1 above).

3. The Japanese had their internal political challenges but it was still a single country looking out for its own interests. ABDA was 4 countries trying to work together when, up until the Japanese attack, not all had been willing to commit. Hardly a good environment upon which to develop cohesive defensive strategies or tactics.

4. For the Japanese, taking the Dutch East Indies was the "main event" whereas for the British and Americans it was really a sideshow...and force allocations (and competencies) reflected those realities.

Thanks for the critique. I will change as much as I can, but I'm constrain by the outline only being a single page. I am having trouble finding the exact number of Japanese troops assigned to take the East Indies. I see that it was the 16th Army, but it was reinforced during the campaign as other units completed their objectives.

Thanks again.

 

[buffnut453]

The other alternative is to "zoom in" onto a more specific area of focus within the ABDA area. For example, you could look solely at the lack of cohesion among the Allies and impact that the lack of pre-war (ie prior to the Japanese offensive) political agreements and joint military structures had on the ability of the Allies to defend their territories. Even basic activities like communication (having the right codes and cyphers for secure comms) can have a major impact on combat effectiveness within a coalition. Is there a key thing (or two) which, had it been organized prior to hostilities, would have given the Allies a considerable advantage or enabled them to put up a better defence against the Japanese.

 

[Vassili Zaitzev]

Good points Buff. However, I am going to stick with the general overview of my outline. It's due to the fact that I have been writing my paper, and have gotten a good portion of it done already. I have highlighted the communication problems within ABDACOM, and will talk further with ABDAFLOAT.