SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
All kidding aside, thanks for that explanation. I was actually able to follow it.
Collins Foundation B-17 crashed at Bradley
- Thread starter Capt. Vick
- Start date
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
It's not just for breakfast anymore!
A screwdriver is a mighty handy thing to have on hand. Ya just never know!
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Nice, firm words to guide the student through the situation.
But to this day, I still hear the old VMF leatherneck's words:
"What the hell - are you trying to kill my machine?"
"Do NOT kill my machine!"
jimh
Senior Airman
Mechanical issues aside...which are unacceptable, and an entirely different can of worms...here is some insight of how we did things. Every year we did an annual ground school in Florida, usually the second week of January, right before the start of the Florida Tour. The classroom portion was two full days, starting on Wednesday, and the third day was spent at New Smyrna Beach at American Aero going over the airplanes and getting current. The currency varied, pilots that were starting with us in Florida showed up early in the week when we were completing post annual test flights. Many of the pilots that started with us in Florida, had essentially just come off the tour the previous November. Each PIC, or myself would sit with each pilot in the cockpits and go through procedures and checklist items, essentially a re-familiarization program. WWII bombers had the same basic checklist so it was mostly learning the systems and emergency procedures. We had a solid core group of guys at the time I was there so it wasn't teaching people from scratch.
The two day classroom consisted of Aircraft Systems, CRM, and recurrent radial engine operations. We had a group of around 50 pilots, with around 5-10 type rated PICs. For many years we had a US Air Force CRM specialist, and long time tour volunteer giving us our CRM lecture. He unfortunately passed away in 2013, after that we would have a different guest CRM specialist each year that was generally a tour volunteer pilot, and always from the airline industry.
Each year, we, as PICs had to take an annual PPE ride (Pilot Proficiency Exam), which is essentially the same as an initial checkride. This included:
1. Use of the Checklist
a. Prestart Checklist
b. Starting checklist
c. After Start checklist
d. Run up Checklist
e. Pre Take off checklist
f. After takeoff checklist
g. Cruise checklist
h. Emergency Procedures (Fire, Engine out, control failure, feathering and unfeathering) there is more but too much for this brief description.
i. Pre landing checklist
j. after landing checklist
k. Shutdown checklist
2. Briefings
a. Preflight plan of action (exiting the ramp, entering the ramp, winds, weather, where we are going fly for the ride
b. Walk around
c. Fuel status, Oil Status
d. Passenger Briefings, either by us or the Flight Engineer
3. Flying
a. Taxi and run-up
b. take off (usually a minimum of 3 circuits total for the flight)
c. air work (steep turns, stalls to the incipient, you don't stall a WWII bomber unless you are at 10,000ft or higher. And they all exhibit a noticeable buffet as you approach a stall)
d. engine out procedures, identify, verify, confirm (crew), feather (agreement on the right feather button), Shutdown checklist
e. Engine failure on take off...as soon as the wheels leave the ground engine 1 is failed to zero thrust and of course the checklist in due time and communicate with the tower
f. crosswind turn, engine 2 is failed to zero thrust, again the checklist.
g. brief the landing and condition of the airplane, flaps, no flaps, gear down when the runway is assured, which is a judgement call by the PIC
h. no flap landings
i. instrument approaches, generally with an engine "failed" to zero thrust, which was up to the examiner.
4. Post flight debrief
This is the cliff notes version of what we did during my time. It was up to us, as PICs to pass this along to our SICs, and essentially train them to the level of a type rating. After I left there was a lot of new people brought on board and I have very little insight as to what was going on from that regard. The check airman that I had, from the Orlando FSDO, unfortunately was diagnosed with Alzheimer's, but was replaced with one of the best pilots in the industry. From that standpoint there was no compromising. Our point of contact at the Orlando FSDO, Larry Enlowe, sadly lost his life in a Curtiss Jenny. This was after I left in 2016. Larry was a great guy, and the FAA DID NOT replace him with a new Collings Point of Contact. Any maintenance, engine changes, fires, flat tires, parts issues were required to be reported to the FSDO point of contact, which is really hard to do when you don't have an assigned individual. To the other issues cited in the FAA and NTSB reports, there is a lot of missing information based on the questions asked. Both the NTSB and the FAA has very few people that are familiar WWII aircraft operations. In my opinion, if the ride programs continue to exist, the FAA will be much much more active in the oversight, and rightfully so. While the FAA isn't, or jokingly isn't referred to as your friend, they do serve as an indifferent 2nd set of eyes. The more that everyone is educated on these aircraft, the longer they can fly, and fly safely. thanks for letting me vent.
Jim
The two day classroom consisted of Aircraft Systems, CRM, and recurrent radial engine operations. We had a group of around 50 pilots, with around 5-10 type rated PICs. For many years we had a US Air Force CRM specialist, and long time tour volunteer giving us our CRM lecture. He unfortunately passed away in 2013, after that we would have a different guest CRM specialist each year that was generally a tour volunteer pilot, and always from the airline industry.
Each year, we, as PICs had to take an annual PPE ride (Pilot Proficiency Exam), which is essentially the same as an initial checkride. This included:
1. Use of the Checklist
a. Prestart Checklist
b. Starting checklist
c. After Start checklist
d. Run up Checklist
e. Pre Take off checklist
f. After takeoff checklist
g. Cruise checklist
h. Emergency Procedures (Fire, Engine out, control failure, feathering and unfeathering) there is more but too much for this brief description.
i. Pre landing checklist
j. after landing checklist
k. Shutdown checklist
2. Briefings
a. Preflight plan of action (exiting the ramp, entering the ramp, winds, weather, where we are going fly for the ride
b. Walk around
c. Fuel status, Oil Status
d. Passenger Briefings, either by us or the Flight Engineer
3. Flying
a. Taxi and run-up
b. take off (usually a minimum of 3 circuits total for the flight)
c. air work (steep turns, stalls to the incipient, you don't stall a WWII bomber unless you are at 10,000ft or higher. And they all exhibit a noticeable buffet as you approach a stall)
d. engine out procedures, identify, verify, confirm (crew), feather (agreement on the right feather button), Shutdown checklist
e. Engine failure on take off...as soon as the wheels leave the ground engine 1 is failed to zero thrust and of course the checklist in due time and communicate with the tower
f. crosswind turn, engine 2 is failed to zero thrust, again the checklist.
g. brief the landing and condition of the airplane, flaps, no flaps, gear down when the runway is assured, which is a judgement call by the PIC
h. no flap landings
i. instrument approaches, generally with an engine "failed" to zero thrust, which was up to the examiner.
4. Post flight debrief
This is the cliff notes version of what we did during my time. It was up to us, as PICs to pass this along to our SICs, and essentially train them to the level of a type rating. After I left there was a lot of new people brought on board and I have very little insight as to what was going on from that regard. The check airman that I had, from the Orlando FSDO, unfortunately was diagnosed with Alzheimer's, but was replaced with one of the best pilots in the industry. From that standpoint there was no compromising. Our point of contact at the Orlando FSDO, Larry Enlowe, sadly lost his life in a Curtiss Jenny. This was after I left in 2016. Larry was a great guy, and the FAA DID NOT replace him with a new Collings Point of Contact. Any maintenance, engine changes, fires, flat tires, parts issues were required to be reported to the FSDO point of contact, which is really hard to do when you don't have an assigned individual. To the other issues cited in the FAA and NTSB reports, there is a lot of missing information based on the questions asked. Both the NTSB and the FAA has very few people that are familiar WWII aircraft operations. In my opinion, if the ride programs continue to exist, the FAA will be much much more active in the oversight, and rightfully so. While the FAA isn't, or jokingly isn't referred to as your friend, they do serve as an indifferent 2nd set of eyes. The more that everyone is educated on these aircraft, the longer they can fly, and fly safely. thanks for letting me vent.
Jim
Zippythehog
Staff Sergeant
- 1,112
- Jan 7, 2017
Jim,
With a course like that, I think any airman of average aircraft handling skill could be competent at wrangling a Fort. You all definitely had it going on. It looks a lot like a type course.
What kind of approaches did you shoot-fixed card NDBs (strong like bull!)?
I think the FAA really needs something like a Warbird Management Unit. It should be comprised by warbird specialists and they could oversee training and maintenance of the tour/ride aircrew, mechanics and fleet. I would expect it to be like Parts 141, 135 and 43 for warbirds.
I hate the thought of MORE oversight but something like that would provide guidance, and standardization that could keep them flying.
MIflyer
Major
I was told the other day that the FAA did have a warbird expert competent to assess the maintenance and operations of those aircraft but he retired a few years back and was never replaced.
Are you referring to the Collings Foundation point of contact at the FAA? If so, he was killed in the crash of a Curtis Jenny and not replaced.
Kathryn's Report: Curtiss JN4D Jenny, N1662, registered to and operated by the pilot: Fatal accident occurred November 17, 2016 near Peach State Airport (GA2), Williamson, Pike County, Georgia
He'd be a difficult man to replace. People with his experience and expertise don't grow on trees.
Here's a couple of gentlemen with a different take on 909's crash. Scott Perdue and Juan Browne, I suspect, have more warbird and old airplane experience between them than anyone on the NTSB, or even today's FAA.
Scott points out that the NTSB's evaluation of the pre-takeoff engine checks that the investigators referenced were taken from the B17 Tech Order, which roughly outlines procedures, instead of the B17 Crew Training Manual, which describes them in detail. This was first flight of the day, but first flight checks were not done, nor apparently, any checks at all.
Then they take a look at the photos of the cylinder dislodged from #3 engine, and point out that the failure pattern indicates an outward tension failure, as in excess BMEP, rather than a shear failure from the cylinder being knocked off the engine on impact, as NTSB alleges. Sparkplug and cylinder head evidence point to detonation and intermittent sparkplug firing, indicating #3 was the sick engine, not #4. The wrong engine was feathered, probably due to the captain's assumption of failure due to #4's starting difficulties. If the proper runup procedures had been followed #3 would have likely not passed its mag checks and the flight wouldn't have happened.
Check out the video.
jimh
Senior Airman
I'm not here to defend Mac, or the actions of that day. BUT, here is what I know. The F/E and Mac talked about shutting down engine #4 before Mac feathered it. It was the balky engine. Engine 3 was making power. They did a mag check twice, once before the nitrogen and once after. Mac also did a baro check with the brakes held on the runway before releasing them for takeoff. It was SOP, and never deviated from, to stop on the runway centerline, hold the brakes, run all four engines up to 30", if the temps and pressures were stable and all 4 were running smooth, you go, and continuing up to 40"MAP. That being said, and having the wet mag issue on multiple occasions, if all the moisture wasn't displaced and still fouling the spark, further problems wouldn't show up until you get to takeoff manifold pressure of 40". It was also SOP to fly it around the pattern and land if that was the case. B-17 brakes get hot and fade really fast, flying it around the pattern was the safer option. We all know now that moisture was not the issue with the mag on #4...although it exhibited the same symptoms...that is on a very long list of "why was this allowed" questions we all have. Why didn't engines 1-2 get the around the pattern, why didn't they land on 33...things happened that didn't necessarily start that morning...it was a chain. 900 + hours in that airplane, most of it with Mac, I never felt unsafe in (any of) the aircraft. We all knew exactly where everything stood. The breakdown of the chain is incredible. While these guys make some good points, they are running with a lot of speculation, which isn't good for anyone.
Jim
Jim
jimh
Senior Airman
The people are out there, but...and that is a big but, nobody (at least that I know) wants to work for the FAA. Larry Enlowe was a fair and knowledgeable FAA representative, losing him was tragic on many levels. Once you start working for the FAA, unless you are a check airman, you essentially fly a desk.
It was portrayed more like Mac TOLD the FE, (not an actual, certified Flight Engineer) that he was shutting down the engine, then immediately did it, while the so-called FE was preoccupied with passenger concerns. More like "talked AT", then "talked WITH".
jimh
Senior Airman
I can't say a whole lot about it. Mitch and Mac are/were friends. That being said, there was a discussion about shutting down 4, when it was decided, by Mac, to do so it was to prevent damaging the engine. Again...it ultimately wasn't all moisture and damage was already present, but Mac didn't know that, whether it's moisture or an actual failed mag, it will act the same. Once that choice was made, Mitch sat people down. Ultimately his actions saved lives, particularly the two PAX in the forward area. There is no official need for a certified F/E on a B-17, or a B-24. He is, however an A&P. Hopefully more will come out in the end. Its just ugly all the way around. In my time of flying the airplane wet mags were common in the Northwest, the Northeast, and Florida. It was a non event once the moisture was displaced with nitrogen, heat would do the rest. We never went with any kind of a mag drop, at all, in any of the airplanes. The bigger question is why didn't 1-2-3 get them around the pattern, that was part of the annual recurrent training in all the multi engine airplanes. We always "failed" an engine at rotation, generally 1, since it is the most critical. There is no published VMC for a B-17, or a B-24, we always used 130mph as a minimum until the runway is assured.
There is a lot of discussion about Mac being Director of Maintenance. While Mac, over the years, did a lot of work on the 17 on a daily basis, he had started deferring most, if not all the maintenance to the tour mechanics. Mac always did the paperwork. Make no mistake, he loved that airplane, and this was not his plan or the legacy he, or any of us wanted for him.
Case in point. in 2014 we did an oil change on the Mustang and found small slivers of metal in the screens the size of a fingernail clipping. I made a phone call to the Foundation, and call to Roush. A replacement engine was dispatched that day. It was running fine, temps and pressures were solid, but we didn't want to take any chances. Two phone calls and we had a $220,000 engine being brought to us with no questions asked.
Well, I wasn't there, and I've only flown in it once, so I don't know for sure, but from what I have seen from NTSB and the commentary of people more educated on war birds than I, it appears that #3 was detonating and running on barely functional mags, so likely not contributing much useful thrust, making 909 "half an airplane". Of course we all know that's really only about "40% of an airplane" in real world performance.
The question that bugs me is, why leave the power up on #s 1&2 after they were on the ground? Certainly another takeoff wasn't in the cards, why not just stop?
jimh
Senior Airman
In the 16 years I flew with them I had 3 engine engine failures that required feathering. I had numerous other issues, cracked cylinders, mag issues, oil coolers...that did not require feathering. The important thing to understand about a radial engine is their ability to make power unless the event is a catastrophic engine failure. This would be a crankshaft, a bearing failure, or a nosecase issue. It's not hard to differentiate or diagnos an issue based on the gauges, the sounds and the performance. Rule #1 is never rush, you are in a multi-engine airplane, Fly the airplane first then, Identify, Verify, Confirm, Feather, Checklist.
I can armchair quarterback with the best of them, but I had several hundred hours in that airplane with Mac. I know his habits and I know his concerns. Again, I'm not defending anything that happened and why it happened, bottom line is, it shouldn't have happened. There are several us that flew with him that talk on a near daily basis, one for moral support, and two, just processing information. There are many questions outside of the report(s) that weren't asked or answered to our satisfaction. The optics of this are horrible on many levels...
