Collins Foundation B-17 crashed at Bradley

[MIflyer]

The major pre-season maintenance on the Collings Foundation aircraft is done at American Aero at New Smyrna Beach Airport each winter. They know what they are doing!

But the mishap took place in October, at least 7 months after the pre-season work had been done. It sure looks like that regular maintenance on the aircraft after it left NSB was done minimally. I can see how doing maintenance on such an aging "exotic" aircraft at East Podunk Field while on tour can be a challenge. Of course the crew training is another matter.

 

[cvairwerks]

Something to consider, is that the FAA letter was written with limited specificity, and with deliberately inflammatory language. There are factions within the FAA that do not like and will do anything they can get away with, in an attempt to shut down any Part 91 flying. Remember these are the guys that spent years trying to get Bob Hoover's ticket pulled.

I'd wait and see for what the actually evidence the FAA has, Colling's response to it, and what the NTSB says in the final report. If it show that the foundation was faking records and actions, or was being overly complacent and sloppy, they deserve having the hammer dropped on them. On the other hand, if it comes out that it was minor record keeping problems, or internal communication problems, then, it's an entirely different thing. It's getting to be hard to find FAA people that are really airplane people and have any clue about the older aircraft these days.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Something to consider, is that the FAA letter was written with limited specificity, and with deliberately inflammatory language. There are factions within the FAA that do not like and will do anything they can get away with, in an attempt to shut down any Part 91 flying. Remember these are the guys that spent years trying to get Bob Hoover's ticket pulled.

I'd wait and see for what the actually evidence the FAA has, Colling's response to it, and what the NTSB says in the final report. If it show that the foundation was faking records and actions, or was being overly complacent and sloppy, they deserve having the hammer dropped on them. On the other hand, if it comes out that it was minor record keeping problems, or internal communication problems, then, it's an entirely different thing. It's getting to be hard to find FAA people that are really airplane people and have any clue about the older aircraft these days.

From the AV Web Article (my bold)...

"Specifically, the FAA found that Collings failed to train the aircraft crew chief, as specified in its operating guidelines. "In an interview with the FAA on March 2, 2020, the crew chief verified that he received no initial training and was unaware of basic information concerning operations under the exemption. Instead, he only received on-the-job training. This lack of training indicates Collings failed to fulfill the terms of condition and limitation Nos. 4 and 7," the FAA's document said. The two limitations require specific training and documentation. Further, the crew chief told the FAA he was unaware that a safety and risk management program existed at all for the foundation. "This absence of awareness and lack of training establishes that Collings failed to maintain and apply on a continuous basis a safety and risk management program that met or exceeded the criteria specified in the FAA Policy,"

"Although the NTSB continues to investigate the crash and has not determined a final cause, the FAA's initial findings found significant maintenance issues with two of the engines. "Inspection of the engines on the B-17G … established magneto and ignition failures existed. Regarding engine 4, to prevent the magneto P-leads from separating from the magnetos, someone had attempted to rig the magneto leads in place with safety wire. Inspection and testing of engine 4 left magneto revealed the movement of the safety-wired lead caused grounding to the case, which rendered the magneto lead inoperative. In addition, the right magneto of engine 4 was found unserviceable. The cam follower was worn beyond limits and the point gap was less than half the measurement required by service documents. When tested, the magneto produced weak or no spark to four of the nine cylinders. All spark plugs were inspected and required cleaning and all electrode gaps were out of tolerance," the FAA document said.

The initial investigation revealed that the number 3 engine also had fouled spark plugs, with gaps out of tolerance. Signs of detonation were found in both engines. "As a result of these findings and other information, the FAA questions whether the engines were inspected adequately and in accordance with the applicable maintenance requirements," the FAA said. "Moreover, the records memorializing the inspections and maintenance performed on the B-17G lack key information and, in some cases, indicate maintenance was either not performed at all or was performed in a manner contrary to the applicable requirements," the document said."

Comparing those FAA inspectors who went after Bob Hoover to those investigating this incident is basically apples and oranges. I worked in the business during the era when the FAA went after Bob Hoover and I could tell you it's a very different FAA today, at least in my part of the country. Although this investigation is still ongoing, it's quite evident that there were maintenance and operational issues at Collings. I would love nothing more to see a shed of light exonerate the Collings Foundation and see them continue to operate, but the preliminary evidence speaks for itself. There is no witch hunt here (unlike Bob Hoover's situation).

 

[XBe02Drvr]

There were several documents that the Collings Foundation submitted to the FAA to show operational compliance

I also question why these system breakdowns weren't captured at an earlier date by FAA inspectors

My (admittedly dated) experience has been that inspectors tend to be more comfortable with paperwork than with greasy hands. If the paperwork's OK, and the right answers are given to the standard questions, they tend to be averse to poking around in the shop. That is, unless they have direct personal experience with the hardware in question, in which case they tend to take an admiring "enthusiast" approach, until poked in the nose with an obvious red flag.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[vikingBerserker]

I know I am coming to this from an automotive viewpoint, but I would think proper spark plug gaps are pretty basic

 

[XBe02Drvr]

I can see how doing maintenance on such an aging "exotic" aircraft at East Podunk Field while on tour can be a challenge.

MEA CULPA! Back in the early 90s I changed an oil transfer pump on CF's B24 in East Podunk, Vermont. They never asked to see my A&P license, or asked anything about my experience, or put me on their maintenance certificate. The Chief Pilot/IA/Crew Chief/Team Leader just handed me his tool box, pointed to the left main wheel well, and told me to take out the old one, put in the new one, don't torque the fittings, but start the safety wire, then call him. "Instructions and specs are in the box, don't bust anything!" He was doing his patented imitation of a headless chicken, trying to get everything squared away for a scheduled show, so I took off my tie, epaulets, and wings and proceeded to get oil stains all over my uniform shirt. I still have the shirt somewhere.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[XBe02Drvr]

It's getting to be hard to find FAA people that are really airplane people and have any clue about the older aircraft these days.

AMEN! Been that way for years.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

My (admittedly dated) experience has been that inspectors tend to be more comfortable with paperwork than with greasy hands. If the paperwork's OK, and the right answers are given to the standard questions, they tend to be averse to poking around in the shop. That is, unless they have direct personal experience with the hardware in question, in which case they tend to take an admiring "enthusiast" approach, until poked in the nose with an obvious red flag.
Cheers,
Wes

Agree - but having worked as an inspector and auditor, I have found that when you start finding paperwork errors, it's easy to discover other discrepancies. I loved getting my hands dirty to find issues, especially if those issues affected safety. This also goes back to those ISO auditors who don't know the product line they are auditing to or having auditors out of a manufacturing world who never worked post delivery aircraft maintenance. Paper looks good, forms completed so everything must be ducky!

I know I am coming to this from an automotive viewpoint, but I would think proper spark plug gaps are pretty basic

100% - start with that and dig deeper.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

There are factions within the FAA that do not like and will do anything they can get away with, in an attempt to shut down any Part 91 flying.

These are the ex-airline, ex-military, bureaucracy-raised disciplinarian types who find Part 91 scary, like the wild, wild West. Classical "deep state".

 

[FLYBOYJ]

There are factions within the FAA that do not like and will do anything they can get away with, in an attempt to shut down any Part 91 flying.

These are the ex-airline, ex-military, bureaucracy-raised disciplinarian types who find Part 91 scary, like the wild, wild West. Classical "deep state".

There was a time I would agree but these days I don't find that, but I'm mainly dealing with airworthiness inspectors, it could also be the part of the country where I live. Many of the ops guys I have recently dealt with came out of GA so again, no bias towards part 91 operations.

 

[soulezoo]

I spent an afternoon working on the Memphis Belle (movie version) after an accident at the Fayetteville airport. I wasn't asked for a license or anything either. However, I was in my flight suit and the crew chief had watched me working on the -141 for awhile. So there's that.

 

[GrauGeist]

The initial investigation revealed that the number 3 engine also had fouled spark plugs, with gaps out of tolerance.

Is it possible that #3 was inadvertantly run lean and that damaged the center electrodes?

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Is it possible that #3 was inadvertantly run lean and that damaged the center electrodes?

Possibly but then you have to ask, "why were they running that engine lean"?

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Possibly but then you have to ask, "why were they running that engine lean"?

"Why, to burn the gunk out, man! Plugs were fouled!"

 

[MIflyer]

These are the ex-airline, ex-military, bureaucracy-raised disciplinarian types who find Part 91 scary, like the wild, wild West. Classical "deep state".

Like Pete Quesda, the man who made the FAA what it is today, an organization that has the motto:
"We're not happy until you're not happy."

 

[gumbyk]

There's nothing wrong with an analytical process to track performance and quality within an aircraft maintenance environment (and seek ways for continual improvement), but the program has to be implemented and maintained by individuals who understand the environment and track data that is not only reasonably attainable but meaningful to the operation. At the end it is desired to have an operation that operates safely and is cost effective. Regulators sometimes throw a wrench into this, but it is achievable.

In the case of this incident there seems to be breakdowns in compliance that ultimately broke links in the safety chain. There were several documents that the Collings Foundation submitted to the FAA to show operational compliance, but in the aftermath it seems many portions of these documents were not complied with, either intentionally or out of ignorance (and I don't mean that to sound insultave). I also question why these system breakdowns weren't captured at an earlier date by FAA inspectors who are usually "all over" warbird operations (at least in my experience). It's obvious that in the aftermath, all warbird operations will be heavily scrutinized.

It's pretty easy to get everything in order to satisfy a regulator, even if the reality is somewhat different. I've seen plenty of operators who view operations manuals as something to do to get the certificate, and then don't operate to what they say they will, for whatever reason. I've seen operators who both won't do it the way they say because they think they know better, and I've seen operators who simply can't operate to their manuals because they've had a consultant write a manual to get the certificate and then realised that its impossible.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

It's pretty easy to get everything in order to satisfy a regulator, even if the reality is somewhat different. I've seen plenty of operators who view operations manuals as something to do to get the certificate, and then don't operate to what they say they will, for whatever reason. I've seen operators who both won't do it the way they say because they think they know better, and I've seen operators who simply can't operate to their manuals because they've had a consultant write a manual to get the certificate and then realised that its impossible.

100%!!! The last places I worked were in that mold. The program I was on at the USAF Academy turned into that when a different company took over the contract. Right before I left they were trying to implement AS9100 and it was a giant cluster. I'm told they got their certification based on changes in procedures but still operate like a Chinese fire drill!

The only reason why we were made to go after AS9100 was so other divisions could bid larger aviation related contracts!

 

[Zippythehog]

It is a crying shame when trained and rational professionals are made to act like robots to satisfy some process. SMS and other QA processes CAN be great tools to promote safety and efficiency, but the process must be made to serve people, not the other way around.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

It is a crying shame when trained and rational professionals are made to act like robots to satisfy some process.

It is a crying shame when trained and rational professionals are made to game the system, securing some sort of cost saving or competitive advantage for their employer, and triggering another round of "rule rigidity" trying to enforce standardization.

 

[Zippythehog]

It is a crying shame when trained and rational professionals are made to game the system, securing some sort of cost saving or competitive advantage for their employer, and triggering another round of "rule rigidity" trying to enforce standardization.

Totally agree. My point is not to flaunt guidance, rather, guidance must be reasonable, appropriate to support standardization and allow for exercise of good judgment, not made as a refuge for the unthinking or those who are not end users.