Comparison of Pacific, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, and North Atlantic naval combat

[RCAFson]

Which is wrong - there were three waves of strikes. The IJN also had 202 naval combat aircraft, not including seaplane scouts etc. This included:

82 x A6M2 (22 on Shokaku, 21 on Zuikaku, 19 on Zuiho, 20 on Jun'yo)
63 x D3A (21 on Shokaku, 24 on Zuikaku, 18 on Jun'yo)
57 x B5N (24 on Shokaku, 20 on Zuikaku, 6 on Zuiho, 7 on Jun'yo)

So you undercounted there were 120 bombers. But here is the thing - There was more than one wave of strikes I posted a summary. Running total of sorties in bold on the right.

• First strike on the 26th Oct 1942 was 64 aircraft from three carriers (41 bombers - 21 D3A, 20 B5N +2 more in a command role) at about 7:40 am - 64 bombers + 23 fighters
• Then Shokaku launched a second wave of 19 x D3A escorted by 5 x A6M at 8:00 am - 83 bombers + 28 fighters
• Then Zuikako launched 16 x B5N escorted by 4 x A6M - 99 bombers + 32 fighters

During the initial contact in the morning, two SBD dauntless scouts by the way, unescorted, were able to hit Zuiho with two 500 lb bombs and taking their flight deck out of action.
Tgen, due to some confusion after a Japanese attack, the first 15 SBDs had to strike without their escort, and were attacked by 12 x A6M. Nevertheless, losing 2 with another 2 forced to jetison bombs and escape. 11 of them nevertheless attacked and hit Shokaku with at least 3 bombs.

• Second wave continued on the 26th continued as 17 x D3A and 12 x A6M from the Jun'yo at 9:14- 116 bombers + 44 fighters

By this point Hornet was all but sunk, Enterprise was damaged by two bombs, Zuiho and Shokaku were damaged. But the Japanese spotted Enterprise and knew they needed to attack.

• The third wave was launched on the 26th at 13:06 Jun'yo launched 7 x B5N and 8 x A6M - 123 bombers + 52 fighters
• Zuikaku simultaneously launched her their strike of 7 x B5N, 2 x D3A, and 5 x A6M - 132 bombers + 57 fighters
• then at 15:35 Jun'yo launched another strike of 4 x D3A and 6 x A6M - 136 bombers + 63 fighters

This battle, pitting 2 x US carriers (without any land based fighter defense) against 4 x IJN carriers, is a pretty close comparison to Ceylon, incidentally. It was a Japanese victory, but two of their carriers were put out of commission for months and had to return to Japan for repairs, and more importantly, unlike the clash between these same IJN units and the British five months earlier, the exchange in aircraft lost was even, in fact slightly favoring the Americans. And as we know, Japanese aircraft losses meant a much higher toll in dead or missing crew.

you also forgot many other smaller actions, and undercounted others.

For example on 7 August 1942, the Saratoga attacked what was then Japanese positions at Guadalcanal during the invasion by the Marines. Allied transports and amphibious vessels conducting landing operations were attacked by 27 x G4M escorted by 17 x A6M of the elite Tinian Kōkūtai . They were engaged by 8 x F4F, shooting down 5. The bombers missed the ships.

Then 9 x D3A attacked, but were intercepted by 15 x F4F, losing 5.

The Japanese forces never attacked Saratoga directly in this action (basically due to random luck), but they did attack naval ships and engaged Saratogas fighters.

the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal of 13-15 November pitted aircraft from one US carrier (Enterprise) plus land based planes, vs one Japanese (Jun'yo) - all that was available after Santa Cruz - with sizable surface fleets on both sides.

The US lost 2 x CLs, 7 x DD's with 2 x CA heavily damaged, 1 x BB damaged.
The IJN lost 2 x BB, 1 x CA, 3 x DD, and 7 x transports (4 more shot up after being beached)

More telling, the US lost 36 aircraft while the Japanese lost 64.

In the Eastern Solomons, (Aug 24-25) which you mentioned - the IJN had 177 aircraft available on carriers and land bases, and also launched multiple strikes. Again running totals on the side in bold.

at 14:50 27 x D3A and 15 x A6M launched from Shokaku and Zuikaku - 27 bombers- 15 fighters
then at 16:00, they launched a second wave of 27 x D3A and 9 x A6M - 54 bombers - 24 fighters

So what I see here is a lot of very careful filtering and cherry picking, trying to present both the IJN and the USN in the worst possible light, underplay Japanese activity and capability, while exaggerating (and really grasping at straws) to try to pretend that the Hurricane, Sea Hurricane, and / or Fulmar were still contenders as fighters in 1942. They were perfectly suited to seeing off Condors or chasing down a CANT 1007, but against the IJN or Japanese Army, they couldn't hold their own any more than they could against BF 109s and MC 202s.

I only counted strikes that made contact with USN carrier TFs and I excluded non strike aircraft from the totals. The IJN had a record of poor recon and subsequently launching strikes that didn't make contact with their intended targets,

 

[RCAFson]

Dare I make an observation

Comparing the Japanese capability with the Luftwaffe.
There can be no doubt that in the first half of the war the Japanese were the best naval air power around. There aircraft were at least as good as the best in the world combined with training that was in many ways better than any other power. The Luftwaffe were far from well equipped and where they were equipped they lacked the training. Their aerial torpedo's were exceptionally poor and few in number. It was so bad that the Germans asked for and received the blueprints for the Japanese type 91 torpedo in August 1942. They then only built about 70 and relied on Italian torpedo's. The Luftwaffe specialists were integrated into the normal Luftwaffe bomber units and used on normal bombing missions during the BOB losing the core of the highly trained crews in these actions.
In Mid November 1941 6/KG 26 in Greece had eighteen torpedo's barely enough for one attack, so normal bombs had to be used.

Later on the pendulum had swung. The IJN were basically using the same aircraft and the experienced crews hadn't been replaced. However the Luftwaffe had developed a number of new weapons and the technology to support them was much improved. The biggest being the introduction of the Do 217, He177 and the use of remote control bombs.
They also had (until 1943) the use of an Italian training school to teach the Luftwaffe crews on torpedo tactics.

Perhaps you can comment on PQ17 and PQ18?

 

[Schweik]

I only counted strikes that made contact with USN carrier TFs and I excluded non strike aircraft from the totals. The IJN had a record of poor recon and subsequently launching strikes that didn't make contact with their intended targets,

You still missed about 50 sorties at least, I haven't checked through all the battles.

 

[Schweik]

Perhaps you can comment on PQ17 and PQ18?

I would say, tragic, high drama (I enjoyed a couple of documentaries on PQ 17) but they were not adequately protected. Decent fighter cover should have protected easily from He 115, He 111, Fw 200 etc. USS Wasp was supposed to help support these northern convoys (and could have, I think) but wasn't deployed for PQ 17.

HMS Avenger did a better job protecting PQ 18. But Sea Hurricanes and Swordfish seemed to have trouble with BV 138s. One Sea Hurricane was lost to an He 115. But they did drive off or break up a lot of the bomber attacks and shot down a bunch of unescorted He 111s and Ju 88s. Which it should do.

The wiki notes that the limited range and endurance was a problem for the Sea Hurricanes:

"Colthurst decided that the Sea Hurricanes henceforth would fly standing patrols of 25 minutes duration per fighter, to ensure that some were always available to break up Goldene Zange formations, even if they were too slow and ill-armed to inflict many losses. The captain of Ulster Queen resolved to ignore the standing orders to keep station and steer towards incoming aircraft instead "

Still the Sea Hurricanes undoubtedly spelled the difference between the failure of PQ 17 and the success of PQ 18. They accounted for most of the 44 German aircraft lost.

I still think Martlets would have been more effective, if only for their greater loiter time.

Had those German strike aircraft been escorted by fighters like A6M or Ki 43, I think PQ 18 would have been doomed.

 

[Glider]

Perhaps you can comment on PQ17 and PQ18?

Happily

PQ17 as is well known suffered huge loses to the Luftwaffe and U-boats once the convoy was forced to scatter. Until then the convoy more than held its own against considerable air attacks. There were some losses certainly but the Luftwaffe paid a price.
It was when the convoy split did the serious losses started which was inevitable. I think 24 vessels were sunk and its notable that the Luftwaffe only sank eight of them in conditions that were ideal and five Luftwaffe aircraft were lost.

PQ18
This was a different convoy. It had an escort carrier but also other advantages compared to PQ17. The close in defence was much stronger and Coastal Command had a working base in Russia equipped with Hampden torpedo bombers, Catalina's and PR Spitfires. On the German side there were 60 Ju88 plus 46 x He111 and 27 Ju88 torpedo bombers. They had one major handicap, Goering had issued a firm order that the primary target wasn't the convoy, it was the carrier. He was desperate to sink a carrier.

The first attack was 20 x Ju88 who did a high level bombing attack that hit nothing but also didn't lose anyone despite the Hurricanes being launched to intercept.
The second attack was deadly. 17 x Ju88 dive bombed whilst 43 torpedo bombers attacked sinking eight transports. Seven aircraft were lost or crash landed on return all by AA fire
Two more attacks took place totalling 21 He115 which achieved nothing and one was shot down by AA fire. Sea Hurricanes were launched but they were not able to intercept and one was lost when attacking a shadowing Bv138.

Then Goering got involved again. He was furious that that the Carrier hadn't been attacked and ordered Kg26 the principle Torpedo unit to concentrate all its aircraft on the carrier. To quote Cajus Bekker in the Luftwaffe War Diaries 'Thus they were sent to their doom'

The first attack on the Avenger involved the He111 having to fly the length of the convoy with predictable results three were shot down, two had to abandon the attack and jettison the torpedo's.
The second was a dive bomber attack which did nothing and one plane was damaged.
The Third was another torpedo attack two ships were torpedoed and seven aircraft shot down

The fighting continued and at the end ten merchant ships were lost but it broke the back of the naval strike arm of the Luftwaffe. Forty Nine aircraft had been lost including 42% of the entire Luftwaffe torpedo bomber crews.

Points of Interest
1) The AA fire of the convoy was very effective and was better than most people believe.
Note I am not claiming that it equalled USN standards. Indeed in PQ17 was a USN destroyer and she became a very important part of the defence, in particular for her long range shooting. Far better than any RN destroyer

2) The Sea Hurricanes main benefit was in the breaking up attacks as opposed to shooting the enemy down. They had some success but not what you would expect against unescorted bombers.

 

[RCAFson]

I would say, tragic, high drama (I enjoyed a couple of documentaries on PQ 17) but they were not adequately protected. Decent fighter cover should have protected easily from He 115, He 111, Fw 200 etc. USS Wasp was supposed to help support these northern convoys (and could have, I think) but wasn't deployed for PQ 17.

HMS Avenger did a better job protecting PQ 18. But Sea Hurricanes and Swordfish seemed to have trouble with BV 138s. One Sea Hurricane was lost to an He 115. But they did drive off or break up a lot of the bomber attacks and shot down a bunch of unescorted He 111s and Ju 88s. Which it should do.

The wiki notes that the limited range and endurance was a problem for the Sea Hurricanes:

"Colthurst decided that the Sea Hurricanes henceforth would fly standing patrols of 25 minutes duration per fighter, to ensure that some were always available to break up Goldene Zange formations, even if they were too slow and ill-armed to inflict many losses. The captain of Ulster Queen resolved to ignore the standing orders to keep station and steer towards incoming aircraft instead "

Still the Sea Hurricanes undoubtedly spelled the difference between the failure of PQ 17 and the success of PQ 18. They accounted for most of the 44 German aircraft lost.

I still think Martlets would have been more effective, if only for their greater loiter time.

Had those German strike aircraft been escorted by fighters like A6M or Ki 43, I think PQ 18 would have been doomed.

HMS Avenger carried 8 or 10 Sea Hurricanes (nominally 12 but she couldn't operate that many at one time) and some Swordfish ASW aircraft. The PQ18 Sea Hurricanes only claimed or were credited with 7 kills (5 from Avenger and two from a CAT ship), IIRC, as the heavily armoured Luftwaffe aircraft, with SS tanks, were hard to kill with .303mgs. Of course most IJNAF aircraft didn't have this kind of protection. The majority of Luftwaffe aircraft shot down were due to RN AA.

The Luftwaffe flew approximately 600 strike sorties against Arctic Convoys from April to Sept 1942.

 

[RCAFson]

Points of Interest
1) The AA fire of the convoy was very effective and was better than most people believe.
Note I am not claiming that it equalled USN standards. Indeed in PQ17 was a USN destroyer and she became a very important part of the defence, in particular for her long range shooting. Far better than any RN destroyer

2) The Sea Hurricanes main benefit was in the breaking up attacks as opposed to shooting the enemy down. They had some success but not what you would expect against unescorted bombers.

1) HMS Ulster Queen (6 x 4in, 1 x quad pom-pom and several 20mm) claimed 4 x AA kills during PQ18. USS Wainwright was the destroyer described above, but really her gunnery was not exceptional. Lundstrom rather carefully examined USN AA in the Pacific and it was no better than the RN's despite some claims to the contrary. The main issue being the massive AA overclaiming by the USN which has created a rather false impression of USN AA effectiveness prior to the massive use of 20mm, 40mm Bofors, and then VT ammo. Lundstrom assessed 10 AA kills, total, for Coral Sea (3), Midway (3) and Eastern Solomons (4), and 25 at Santa Cruz (the USN claimed over 200 AA kills during these 4 actions including 127 at Santa Cruz!), or about the same as the total AA kills for PQ18.

2) HMS Avenger's Sea Hurricanes flew 59 sorties during PQ18, and engaged Luftwaffe aircraft during 31 sorties, claiming 5 certain, 3 probable's and 13 damaged. (Smith)

During all the Artic Convoys, about 605K tons comprising 100 merchant ships were lost, 94 by enemy action, including 37 ships sunk by Luftwaffe aircraft.

 

[Schweik]

HMS Avenger carried 8 or 10 Sea Hurricanes (nominally 12 but she couldn't operate that many at one time) and some Swordfish ASW aircraft. The PQ18 Sea Hurricanes only claimed or were credited with 7 kills (5 from Avenger and two from a CAT ship), IIRC, as the heavily armoured Luftwaffe aircraft, with SS tanks, were hard to kill with .303mgs. Of course most IJNAF aircraft didn't have this kind of protection. The majority of Luftwaffe aircraft shot down were due to RN AA.

The Luftwaffe flew approximately 600 strike sorties against Arctic Convoys from April to Sept 1942.

You are right, I should not have assumed. I gave the Sea Hurricane far too much credit. 7 kills from 600 sorties by unescorted (and mostly obsolete) bombers is pathetic. According to a German source only 22 German aircraft were lost to all causes.

 

[RCAFson]

You are right, I should not have assumed. I gave the Sea Hurricane far too much credit. 7 kills from 600 sorties by unescorted (and mostly obsolete) bombers is pathetic.

The main Luftwaffe strike aircraft were generally better performing, carried heavier bomb loads and were far better protected than IJN aircraft.

600 Luftwaffe sorties is for all the Arctic Convoys run from April to Sept 1942 (Arctic Convoys were run from late 1941 to 1945). Only PQ18 included a CVE. The other April - Sept 1942 convoys relied on solely on AA, which shot down about 10% of all Luftwaffe strike sorties.

 

[Schweik]

The main Luftwaffe strike aircraft were generally better performing, carried heavier bomb loads and were far better protected than IJN aircraft.

If bomb loads were what mattered, the Lancaster would have been the best ship-killer of the war. But that wasn't the case was it?

Glider also made an interesting point:

"Their aerial torpedo's were exceptionally poor and few in number. It was so bad that the Germans asked for and received the blueprints for the Japanese type 91 torpedo in August 1942. "

If that is true, it's quite telling. Without any torpedoes (or with very few truly functional ones), the Germans were really limited in their effectiveness. No wonder the Ju 87 was their only real ship-killer.

600 Luftwaffe sorties is for all the Arctic Convoys run from April to Sept 1942 (Arctic Convoys were run from late 1941 to 1945). Only PQ18 included a CVE. The other April - Sept 1942 convoys relied on solely on AA, which shot down about 10% of all Luftwaffe strike sorties.

The thing is, if there were say, 200 sorties from D3A bombers, I think everyone reading this thread including you knows perfectly well that carrier and all the merchant ships would have been sunk.

If there were unescorted bombers attacking an IJN carrier, they almost certainly would have met the same fate as those torpedo bombers at Midway - total annihilation.

Against a US carrier, well we have a good documented example.

Yest another action involving USN carriers in 1942 that RCAFson forgot in his summary - a small fight off of Bougainville.

This is one of the G4M in question, shortly before it crashed. It was shot down by USN Ace and Medal of Honor winner, Edward "Butch" O'Hare

During this fight on Feb 20, 1942, 17 x G4M1 bombers took off from Rabaul and flew 390 miles East to the location of the recently detected USS Lexington. They attacked in two flights. The first nine were initially intercepted by 6 x F4F-4 that were flying CAP, which shot down 5 of the G4M including the commander, which forced them to regroup. They made their attack run, but were interecepted by 6 more Wildcats, which shot down 3 more (for the loss of 2 x F4F). One G4M escaped to head home, but was intercepted by an SBD-3 and shot down.

Then a second group of 8 x G4M attacked, and with most of the CAP chasing the original wave, only 2 x F4F were available to intercept them in time. One was O'Hare. One of the F4F had a gun malfunction. O'Hare shot down 5 x G4M single-handedly. The remaining 3 x G4M were then caught by the returning CAP of F4Fs and shot down.

The result ? All 17 x G4M were shot down. That is what should have happened to unescorted bombers stalking PQ-18.

So that is another 17 sorties to add to your list by the way.

RCAFson will probably claim that this is because is because the G4M did not have self-sealing fuel tanks, but I can point out many examples of nearly identical massacres of Ju 88s and He 111s in North Africa by Tomahawks and Kittyhawks, using basically the same (or less) armament as the F4F-4. The G4M were basically the same as an He 111.

 

[Schweik]

As for the SM 79, CANT 1007, SM 84, Z 506 etc., they were vulnerable enough that Fulmars routinely shot them down.

 

[slaterat]

Some things not being considered here.

Eric Brown rated the Zero >Sea Hurricane>F4F , but believed that they were all close in relative performance. Although he is sometimes contradictory he at least flew all three of them...

Overall the KB mission into the Indian Ocean failed to achieve its main objective, the destruction of the RN Eastern Fleet. The attacks on Ceylon were broken up and did not do a lot of damage. I quote from Blooody Shambles, "Damage at Columbo and Tricomalee was fairly easily repaired, and generally the strikes had not been anywhere near as effective, as catastrophic for the recipients, or as cheap for the attackers, as had been those on Pearl harbor and Port Darwin."

The KB had a glass jaw. Their carriers exhibited poor fueling practices and woeful damage control. Quite similar to their aircraft philosophy.

The RN had already lost three fleet carriers , before the Pacific war even started.

Given parity in numbers I believe that four armoured RN carriers could meet and defeat 4 IJN carriers in 1942. The FAA superiority in night operations potentially being a decisive factor.

The RN air CAP was far more effective than the IJN. A mixed force of radar directed, radio equipped Martlets and Sea Hurricanes, would be far superior to the gang bang parade, employed by the IJN. This cost them dearly at Midway.

 

[RCAFson]

Yest another action involving USN carriers in 1942 that RCAFson forgot in his summary - a small fight off of Bougainville.

View attachment 612001
This is one of the G4M in question, shortly before it crashed. It was shot down by USN Ace and Medal of Honor winner, Edward "Butch" O'Hare

During this fight on Feb 20, 1942, 17 x G4M1 bombers took off from Rabaul and flew 390 miles East to the location of the recently detected USS Lexington. They attacked in two flights. The first nine were initially intercepted by 6 x F4F-4 that were flying CAP, which shot down 5 of the G4M including the commander, which forced them to regroup. They made their attack run, but were interecepted by 6 more Wildcats, which shot down 3 more (for the loss of 2 x F4F). One G4M escaped to head home, but was intercepted by an SBD-3 and shot down.

Then a second group of 8 x G4M attacked, and with most of the CAP chasing the original wave, only 2 x F4F were available to intercept them in time. One was O'Hare. One of the F4F had a gun malfunction. O'Hare shot down 5 x G4M single-handedly. The remaining 3 x G4M were then caught by the returning CAP of F4Fs and shot down.

The result ? All 17 x G4M were shot down. That is what should have happened to unescorted bombers stalking PQ-18.

So that is another 17 sorties to add to your list by the way.

RCAFson will probably claim that this is because is because the G4M did not have self-sealing fuel tanks, but I can point out many examples of nearly identical massacres of Ju 88s and He 111s in North Africa by Tomahawks and Kittyhawks, using basically the same (or less) armament as the F4F-4. The G4M were basically the same as an He 111.

Umm...No.

I stated in post 231:
These are all the strikes flown against USN carrier TFs in the Pacific:

"Bougainville = 18 Bettys (plus ~5 more Nell sorties against Enterprise) [the Enterprise attack was another raid]

Coral Sea = 51 = 33 Val and 18 Kate

Midway = 28 = 18 Val and 10 Kate (two strikes)

Eastern Solomons = 27 Vals

Santa Cruz = 109 = 58 Vals and 51 Kates.
------------------------------------------------------

= ~229 IJN strike aircraft sorties against USN carrier TFs in all of 1942. (My addition was incorrect and this adds up to 238 including the 5 Nell sorties)

The Axis flew about 80 strike sorties against the Illustrious TF on 10 Jan 1941 (before Illustrious entered Malta harbour).

The IJN flew about 180 attack sorties against units of the BEF on 5 and 9 April 1942.

The Axis AFs flew about 230 attack sorties against Pedestal alone during the time it was escorted by carriers or about the same as the number of strikes flown against all USN carriers during 1942."

But in fact you're correct that only 17 Bettys were involved. 15 were shot down (at least one by an SBD) or ditched near their bases and only 2 landed at IJN bases. This raid is covered in Chapter Five of First Team, Vol.1.

Regarding Santa Cruz, this is a summary by Lundstrom, in First Team Vol2:


"Even while Nagumo's Kidō Butai fought and retired northwest, another combatant entered the lists. Kakuta's Junyō, with Kondō's Advance Force, pounded northeast toward Nagumo. Anxious to attack as soon as possible, Kakuta instructed the Junyō to launch her first wave at 0905 at an estimated 280 miles. Led by the group commander, Lt. Shiga Yoshio, the attackers numbered twelve Zeros and seventeen Type 99 carrier bombers under Lt. Yamaguchi Masao.50 With the Junyō's strike, the Japanese had hurled 138 aircraft (42 fighters, 57 carrier bombers, 36 carrier attack planes, and 3 contact planes) against the American carriers, almost twice as many planes as Kinkaid sent in return...

At 1306 the Junyō dispatched her second wave: the strike leader was Lt. Irikiin Yoshiaki, with eight Zeros (five Junyō, two Zuikaku, and one Zuihō), led by Lt. Shirane Ayao (Zuikaku), and seven Type 97 carrier attack planes (six with torpedoes) led by Lieutenant Irikiin. The fifteen planes departed at 1313 on 120 degrees to search 260 miles. To the north the Zuikaku independently mounted the 1st Carrier Division's third attack wave at the same time: the strike leader was Lt. (jg) Tanaka Ichirō (Zuihō), with five Zeros (three Zuikaku, two Shōkaku) led by Lt. (jg) Kobayashi Hōhei (Shōkaku); two Type 99 carrier bombers (one Shōkaku, one Zuikaku) led by PO1c Hori Kenzō (Zuikaku); and seven Type 97 carrier attack planes (five Zuihō, two Zuikaku—six with 800-kilogram bombs) led by Lieutenant Tanaka. That two very junior officers led the Zuikaku strike epitomized the great loss in aviation leaders suffered by the Japanese.

The Junyō's third wave of six Zeros and four Type 99 carrier bombers departed at 1535."

So we have

57 Vals
36 Kates
6 Kates
2 Vals
6 Kates
4 Vals
------
= 111 strike sorties at Santa Cruz. This was a very confusing action and I missed two strike aircraft. but added an extra strike aircraft at Bougainville, so that makes a total of 239 strike sorties directed at, and engaging, USN carrier TFs in 1942.

 

[RCAFson]

If bomb loads were what mattered, the Lancaster would have been the best ship-killer of the war. But that wasn't the case was it?

Glider also made an interesting point:

"Their aerial torpedo's were exceptionally poor and few in number. It was so bad that the Germans asked for and received the blueprints for the Japanese type 91 torpedo in August 1942. "

If that is true, it's quite telling. Without any torpedoes (or with very few truly functional ones), the Germans were really limited in their effectiveness. No wonder the Ju 87 was their only real ship-killer.



The thing is, if there were say, 200 sorties from D3A bombers, I think everyone reading this thread including you knows perfectly well that carrier and all the merchant ships would have been sunk.

If there were unescorted bombers attacking an IJN carrier, they almost certainly would have met the same fate as those torpedo bombers at Midway - total annihilation.

As Glider well knows the Luftwaffe was employing very efficient RAI torpedoes by mid 1942 and against PQ18 most Luftwaffe TBs carried two torpedoes each. The Luftwaffe sank 18 (of 37, as already stated) Arctic Convoy merchant ships with torpedoes from May-Sept 1942 and after that the survivors were redeployed to the Med to face Operation Torch.

 

[Schweik]

Umm...No.

I stated in post 231:
These are all the strikes flown against USN carrier TFs in the Pacific:

"Bougainville = 18 Bettys (plus ~5 more Nell sorties against Enterprise) [the Enterprise attack was another raid]

Ok, well you should put the dates next to the engagement so it's clearer.

Eastern Solomons = 27 Vals

Those 27 Vals struck twice, at 14:50 and at 16:00 - check again. So that is 54 sorties right there.

Santa Cruz = 109 = 58 Vals and 51 Kates.

Which is again, way off. The correct number is 136 bombers.

The IJN flew about 180 attack sorties against units of the BEF on 5 and 9 April 1942.

And the BEF also had the support of land based RAF fighters. Let's also remember in the real world, HMS Hermes was sunk by the first 32 D3A "Vals" which found it, despite the help of 6 Fulmars from 273 Sqn RAF, with another 6 from 803 and 806 squadron arriving too late (Hermes was already under the waves). So it didn't require 180 attack sorties to sink it, nor were there any other strikes on any other RN carriers that day that I am aware of, were they? If not, then in reality it was just 32 strike aircraft sorties that the British actually dealt with while they still had a carrier to attack. After that, this raid doesn't count according to your own absurd criteria that you slyly try to use to pretend that Midway only involved 28 IJN sorties!.

= 111 strike sorties at Santa Cruz. This was a very confusing action and I missed two strike aircraft. but added an extra strike aircraft at Bougainville, so that makes a total of 239 strike sorties directed at, and engaging, USN carrier TFs in 1942.

It was a confusing action I agree, but you are still making a mistake, I'll go through later and show it. In the meantime, the engagement in the Eastern Solomons was not so complex, you just missed the second wave of strike aircraft, and the attack on Hermes was over by the time 32 dive bombers had attacked.

 

[Schweik]

Some things not being considered here.

Eric Brown rated the Zero >Sea Hurricane>F4F , but believed that they were all close in relative performance. Although he is sometimes contradictory he at least flew all three of them...

He rated the Sea Hurricane as slightly better in a dogfight, but the Martlet as better as an overall carrier aircraft. And the Martlets he flew were not as capable as a Wildcat.

The reason being, to quote again from Armoured Carriers.com:

The main flaw of the Sea Hurricane was it's poor range and endurance:

The Sea Hurricane's range was recorded as about 450 miles. But it was loiter time that meant the most for carrier operations.
Sea Hurricanes carried only enough fuel to sustain themselves for 1 hour at combat power, and 4.5 hours at full-economical settings. The Fulmar and Martlet could stay aloft for 2 hours and 2 hours 45 minutes under combat power, and 6 hours economical.
The consequence of this was carriers being forced to turn into the wind far more often to take-off and land Sea Hurricanes. So they were often held as 'alert' aircraft on the deck while their longer-legged stablemates maintained the CAP.

The KB had a glass jaw. Their carriers exhibited poor fueling practices and woeful damage control. Quite similar to their aircraft philosophy.

It's easy to make that claim in retrospect, but there were few aircraft carriers which did well after bombs and torpedoes started detonating on or in them. RN carriers didn't seem to have such an outstanding survival rate compared to USN or IJN carriers. As you said...

The RN had already lost three fleet carriers , before the Pacific war even started.

And that was back when a Sea Gladiator or a Swordfish was still in the game and the Sea Hurricane looked modern!

Given parity in numbers I believe that four armoured RN carriers could meet and defeat 4 IJN carriers in 1942. The FAA superiority in night operations potentially being a decisive factor.

Not if the IJN detected them during the day, because the IJN strike aircraft far outranged the RN / FAA aircraft and the Japanese fighters would totally dominate FAA fighters, at least the British made ones. Maybe if you had Hellcats....

The RN air CAP was far more effective than the IJN.

That's a bold statement that requires some backup.

A mixed force of radar directed, radio equipped Martlets and Sea Hurricanes, would be far superior to the gang bang parade, employed by the IJN. This cost them dearly at Midway.

You would certainly need some longer range aircraft to augment the Sea Hurricanes, since they were only good for CAP (for short durations, note during PQ-18 they suggested 25 minute missions!)

 

[Schweik]

Eric Brown on the Martlet I

"The initial climb rate was one of the most sensational aspects of the performance of this little fighter. At 3300ft/min there was nothing around to touch it, and it was no slouch in level flight. Although we were to find that level speed was slower than that claimed, with top speed of 265 knots (491km/h) at 15,000ft (4570m) and about 248 knots (459km/h) at sea level, it was as good as the Hurricane Mk I and, in so far as we were aware at the time, the fastest fighter available for embarked operations. It was also a manoeuvrable aeroplane with a good rate of roll, but it needed plenty of stick handling on the part of the pilot to get the best out of it. By comparison with its British counterparts it was more stable to fly and therefore heavier to manoeuvre. "

 

[GrauGeist]

Given parity in numbers I believe that four armoured RN carriers could meet and defeat 4 IJN carriers in 1942. The FAA superiority in night operations potentially being a decisive factor.

This statement fascinates me.
Please tell me, if you would, how the Royal Navy would be able to launch effective air attacks at night, against Japanese elements, in 1942.

This is with the understanding that the IJN was well trained and well versed in night warfare.

 

[RCAFson]

Eric Brown on the Martlet I

"The initial climb rate was one of the most sensational aspects of the performance of this little fighter. At 3300ft/min there was nothing around to touch it, and it was no slouch in level flight. Although we were to find that level speed was slower than that claimed, with top speed of 265 knots (491km/h) at 15,000ft (4570m) and about 248 knots (459km/h) at sea level, it was as good as the Hurricane Mk I and, in so far as we were aware at the time, the fastest fighter available for embarked operations. It was also a manoeuvrable aeroplane with a good rate of roll, but it needed plenty of stick handling on the part of the pilot to get the best out of it. By comparison with its British counterparts it was more stable to fly and therefore heavier to manoeuvre. "

The only problem is that these aircraft were not combat and carrier ready. The actual Martlet II/IV aircraft had climb rates of half of the above figures, as did the F4F-4. 265 knots = 305mph. Sea Hurricane IB Vmax was 315mph at 7500ft. Normal climb rate was over 2000fpm (10min to 20k ft) and combat climb was about 3500fpm. Martlet II/IV was somewhat slower.

 

[RCAFson]

Ok, well you should put the dates next to the engagement so it's clearer.



Those 27 Vals struck twice, at 14:50 and at 16:00 - check again. So that is 54 sorties right there.



Which is again, way off. The correct number is 136 bombers.

No, the 2nd wave of 27 Vals failed to make contact with the USN TF.

I have carefully tallied the number of strikes at Santa Cruz and presented the numbers (111) in the prior post.

And the BEF also had the support of land based RAF fighters. Let's also remember in the real world, HMS Hermes was sunk by the first 32 D3A "Vals" which found it, despite the help of 6 Fulmars from 273 Sqn RAF, with another 6 from 803 and 806 squadron arriving too late (Hermes was already under the waves). So it didn't require 180 attack sorties to sink it, nor were there any other strikes on any other RN carriers that day that I am aware of, were they? If not, then in reality it was just 32 strike aircraft sorties that the British actually dealt with while they still had a carrier to attack. After that, this raid doesn't count according to your own absurd criteria that you slyly try to use to pretend that Midway only involved 28 IJN sorties!.

Hermes was sunk before any Fulmars arrived as were the other ships sunk by that strike. The Fulmars attacked after the Vals had finished their strikes. Of course there was no fighter cover over the two RN heavy cruisers sunk on 5 April. I didn't include the IJN strikes directed at Ceylon on 5 and 9 April.